Shevuot 4a (ד.) — the Talmud in English

He is liable

for a sacrifice

only

for one oath

alone.

Once he swore concerning the loaf that he would not eat it, it became forbidden to him to eat, and his second oath came to fulfill the mitzva to which he had obligated himself; one who swears to fulfill a mitzva is exempt from a sacrifice.

And the Mishna adds:

This is the oath of expression

regarding the future

for whose intentional violation one is liable to lashes,

because he swore concerning the future and violated his oath through the act of eating,

and for whose unwitting violation one brings an ascending and descending offering.

And we infer from the wording of the Mishna:

“This is

the oath of expression regarding the future

for whose intentional violation one is liable to lashes”

because he violated his oath through an act.

But

if he swore,

“I will eat

this loaf,”

and he did not eat

it,

he is not lashed,

because he violated his oath without an act. And it is thus proven that the tanna of the anonymous Mishna holds that one is not lashed for a prohibition that does not involve an act.

But the difficulty still remains:

Granted,

these are

one anonymous statement and that is another anonymous statement,

and if so,

what did

Rabbi Yoḥanan

see that he acted in accordance with this anonymous statement? Let him act in accordance with that anonymous statement!?

And we answer:

According to your reasoning,

you should raise a difficulty against

Rabbi,

the editor of the Mishna,

himself—

how could he formulate an anonymous ruling here in this manner and there in that manner?

Rather,

Rabbi’s statements can be resolved as follows:

Initially Rabbi held

that

one is lashed for a prohibition that does not involve an act,

and therefore he

formulated it anonymously

in this manner in the Mishna at the beginning of the tractate.

And subsequently Rabbi held

that

one is not lashed for it, and he formulated it anonymously

[in the Mishna below, on page 27b].

And the first Mishna,

although Rabbi later retracted it,

did not move from its place.

That is: Once the Mishna had been taught to the students and had spread among them, later generations no longer had the ability to annul it. The Sages left both Mishnayot in their places, and an intelligent person will understand that the later Mishna is the primary one, and that the halakha is that Rabbi retracted his initial position. Therefore Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled in accordance with the later Mishna, since Rabbi too retracted his initial position and taught the later Mishna as the halakhic ruling.

But there is still a difficulty:

On what basis did you establish the Mishna

of “two that are four”

according to Rabbi Yishmael,

and that our Mishna is speaking not of liability for a sacrifice but of liability for

lashes,

with Rabbi Yishmael holding that one is lashed for a prohibition that does not involve an act? If so, a difficulty arises: How can we establish the law of

the appearances of afflictions

—“two that are four”—as referring to liability for lashes? After all,

what liability for lashes is there

for afflictions? [But if we establish our Mishna as referring to liability for a sacrifice, it works well, since a leper brings a sacrifice for his purification.]

And we answer:

It is referring to one who cuts off his affliction. And it is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Avin citing Rabbi Ilaa. For Rabbi Avin cited Rabbi Ilaa as saying: Wherever the Torah says “take heed,” “lest,” or “do not,” it is nothing other than a prohibition,

and with regard to afflictions it says, “Take heed concerning the affliction of leprosy,” and one is liable to lashes for cutting them off.

Therefore, the intent of the Mishna’s statement, “The appearances of afflictions are two that are four,” is to teach that for the four types of afflictions—se’et and its derivative, and baheret and its derivative—one is liable to lashes for cutting them off.

But there is still a difficulty: The matter of the appearances of afflictions works, since it can be established as referring to an intentional act and to lashes. But concerning that which we learned in the Mishna,

the acts of Shabbat

are two that are four,

what liability for lashes is there?

After all, the labor of carrying out is

a prohibition whose warning is for execution by

a court

and, for every prohibition whose warning is for execution by a court, one is not lashed? [

The reason one is not lashed for it is that a death penalty is stated for such a prohibition, and lashes are not stated for it.]

And we answer:

For this reason I establish

the Mishna

according to Rabbi Yishmael, who says: A prohibition whose warning is for execution by a court

is indeed

one for which they are lashed,

and it is well that we say that there are two that are four liabilities to lashes with regard to the acts of carrying out on Shabbat.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the wording of the answer, “For this reason I establish it according to Rabbi Yishmael,” which implies:

Were it not so,

were it not for the difficulty concerning liability to lashes for the labor of carrying out,

it would stand

our Mishna well

according to Rabbi Akiva.

But above

there is a difficulty

for us concerning the law of

knowledge

of ritual impurity according to Rabbi Akiva, who holds one liable only for unawareness of the impurity and not for unawareness of the Temple or its sacred objects; according to him, there should be only two, not four?!

And the Gemara answers: Now, after we established above that the law of the Mishna concerning knowledge of ritual impurity refers to an intentional act and to lashes, it would have been possible to establish the Mishna in the same manner according to Rabbi Akiva:

Is it not so

that

you said

that our Mishna, which states that knowledge of ritual impurity is two that are four, is

according to Rabbi Yishmael, and refers to lashes?

If so,

Rabbi Akiva as well

can be established as the one whose view our Mishna follows,

and as referring to lashes. [

On the contrary, it is preferable to establish it according to Rabbi Akiva, because an anonymous Mishna is the view of Rabbi Meir, and he received it from Rabbi Akiva. Therefore, it is properly stated that it was only because of the difficulty concerning lashes for carrying out on Shabbat that we established our Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael; were it not for that, it would properly be established according to Rabbi Akiva, and as referring to lashes.]

But there is still a difficulty: How can the law of knowledge of ritual impurity be established as referring to an intentional act and to lashes? For it should be difficult:

If so,

does

“knowledge

of ritual impurity” truly refer to what makes one liable for two that are four? After all,

“warnings

concerning ritual impurity”

is what

the tanna ought to have stated.

The Gemara attempts to resolve this by proposing a new version of the Mishna:

This is not difficult. Read: Knowledge of warnings.

But the Gemara returns and rejects this, saying that the new version will not help us either:

If so,

if our Mishna is speaking of an intentional act, how is it possible at all

that there are two that are four?

After all, there are only

two

liabilities to lashes

that there would be—for a warning not to eat sacrificial meat, and for a warning not to enter the Temple while impure—and there is no more than that!

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty: How can the Mishna be established as referring to an intentional act? The Mishna explicitly says

“one in whom there was knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end, with unawareness in between.”

But if it is speaking of an intentional act,

what function could “unawareness” have with regard to lashes?!

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty: It is explained in the Mishna:

“This is

for a sacrifice

of ascending and descending.”

But for an intentional act there is no liability for a sacrifice, only for lashes?!

Rather, Rabbi Yosef said,

our Mishna does not follow either Rabbi Akiva or Rabbi Yishmael in its entirety; rather, it is the method of

Rabbi.

And it is speaking of a sacrifice, not of lashes.

And Rabbi adopted it in accordance with the views of different tannaim,

for he formulated the Mishna according to divergent positions:

With regard to knowledge

of ritual impurity,

he adopted the view of Rabbi Yishmael,

and holds one liable for a sacrifice both for unawareness of the Temple and its sacred objects and for unawareness of the impurity. Whereas

with regard to oaths, he adopted the view of Rabbi Akiva,

who holds one liable for a sacrifice both for the future and for the past.

According to Rabbi Yosef’s statement, the Mishna should be read as follows:

Oaths, according to Rabbi Akiva, are two that are four.

Knowledge of ritual impurity, according to Rabbi Yishmael, is two that are four!

Rav Ashi said: I stated this teaching

of Rav Yosef

before Rav Kahana,

according to the version that Rabbi Akiva is the source of liability with regard to oaths, and Rabbi Yishmael the source of liability with regard to knowledge of ritual impurity.

And

Rav Kahana

said to me: Do not say: Rabbi adopted it in accordance with the views of different tannaim, but did not himself hold accordingly.

Do not err and say that Rav Yosef instructed us to read the names of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael into the Mishna because this implies that Rabbi merely cited their statements but did not rule in accordance with them.

Rather, Rabbi explained his own reasoning,

as he himself held, for his own reason, like Rabbi Akiva with regard to oaths and like Rabbi Yishmael with regard to knowledge of ritual impurity.

As it was taught in a beraita: From where

do we know that one is not liable for a sacrifice for ritual impurity of the Temple and its sacred objects

except

for impurity

about which there was knowledge at the beginning,

that he became impure,

and knowledge at the end,

that he learned that while impure he had eaten sacrificial meat or entered the Temple,

with unawareness

of the impurity

in between,

at the time he entered or ate?

The verse states: “And it was hidden,” “and it was hidden,” twice; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. [

For two verses are written: “And it was hidden from him, and he was impure,” and “And it was hidden from him, and he knew.” Rabbi Akiva derives from here that before his unawareness there must have been knowledge, and also after the period of unawareness; for if he did not know that he had sinned, how could he bring a sacrifice?]