Shevuot 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

And we asked: How is it possible to say that two of them are

exempt!?

It teaches them in a manner analogous to the appearances of lesions: Just as there, all of them entail liability,

as for each of the four appearances one must bring an offering for his purification,

so too here,

with regard to oaths and awarenesses of impurity,

do all of them entail liability!?

Rather, this is what must be said:

Actually, it is Rabbi Yishmael.

And our Mishna is not dealing with liability to bring an offering for a ביטוי oath, but with liability to receive lashes.

And when Rabbi Yishmael does not impose liability

for an oath

concerning the past, it is an offering

for which he does not impose liability.

But he does impose liability for lashes.

And although a false oath is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and one is not flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action, here it is different—

And this is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava said: The Torah explicitly included a false oath

as subject to lashes, despite the fact that it does not involve an action,

analogously to a vain oath.

The liability to receive lashes for a false oath is derived from the verse stated with regard to a vain oath [which is an oath that alters what is known, for example, one who swears that a stone is gold]: “For the Lord will not absolve him who bears His Name in vain” — it is the Lord who will not absolve one who swears in vain, but the court absolves him by flogging him. And we expound the word “in vain” from the word “in vain” stated twice in the verse: If it is not needed with regard to a vain oath, apply it to a false oath [which is an oath concerning something not known to all, for example, concerning whether he ate yesterday].

And Rava said concerning this derivation of a false oath from a vain oath that it applies only to a false oath concerning the past, which is analogous to a vain oath—

Just as a

vain

oath

is not an oath concerning the future, but

only concerning the past,

as once the vain oath has left his mouth, its falsehood is established and it is no longer dependent on the future,

so too

a

false

oath likewise entails liability to receive lashes only for an oath concerning the

past

alone.

However, the answer is still incomplete:

Granted, he is flogged for an oath

“I ate” or

“I did not eat,” in accordance with Rava’s statement.

And granted, if he swore

an oath, “I will not eat,” and he ate,

he is likewise flogged, because

it is a prohibition that involves an action,

as he violated it through the action of eating.

But one who swears concerning the future, for example, saying,

if one swore concerning the future, for example, he said,

“I will eat”

tomorrow,

and did not eat, why

is he flogged? But

it is a prohibition that does not involve an action,

and liability to receive lashes was included only for a false oath concerning the past [which is analogous to a vain oath]. It follows that according to Rabbi Yishmael there are only three liabilities to receive lashes: two for oaths concerning the past and one for an oath concerning the future, not four!?

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yishmael holds that one is flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action.

Therefore, there is liability to receive lashes even for a ביטוי oath concerning the future when it involves no action.

And we refute this:

If so,

if our Mishna here is dealing with liability to receive lashes, and the tanna stated anonymously that there is liability even for a prohibition that does not involve an action,

there is a difficulty between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yoḥanan!

As Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha follows an anonymous Mishna

[in which the tannaim did not disagree on the matter], and accordingly the ruling should follow our Mishna, that one is flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action. Yet, on the other hand—

And it was stated:

With regard to one who says,

“An oath that I will eat this loaf today,” and the day passed and he did not eat it —

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both said: He is not flogged.

However, they disagreed concerning the reason that he is not flogged:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is not flogged because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for any prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged. And Reish Lakish said: He is not flogged

because

it is an uncertain warning, and an uncertain warning is not considered a warning.

[For when they warn him that he must eat it today, he still has time in which to eat it. If he does not eat it immediately after they warn him, he has not violated the oath]. And if so, there is a difficulty with Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that the halakha follows an anonymous Mishna: Our Mishna states anonymously, in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael, that one is flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action, whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan rules that one is not flogged for it!?

And we answer: The statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan that the halakha follows an anonymous Mishna applies only when there is no other anonymous Mishna that disagrees with it. But here,

Rabbi Yoḥanan found another anonymous Mishna,

he found another “anonymous Mishna” according to which one is not flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action, and Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled in accordance with it.

We inquire concerning this:

Which anonymous Mishna

did Rabbi Yoḥanan find?

If we say it is this anonymous Mishna, as we learned: “But one who leaves over

from the meat of the Paschal offering

of

an offering

that is pure

and fit, and likewise

one who breaks

a bone

of

a Paschal offering that was

impure is not flogged with forty lashes!”

And we analyze:

Granted, one who breaks

a

bone of

an offering

that is impure

is exempt from lashes

as it is written: “And you shall not break a bone of it,”

and we say:

“Of a fit offering, but not of an invalid one.” But one who leaves over of

an offering

that is pure, what is the reason

that he is not flogged with forty lashes?

Is it not because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged!

And Rabbi Yoḥanan relied on this anonymous Mishna.

This may be refuted: Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed concerning the interpretation of the reason for the Mishna, whether the exemption from lashes is indeed because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, or because it is a prohibition whose remedy is a positive mitzva. And if so, it is difficult:

And from where,

how does Rabbi Yoḥanan know that this anonymous Mishna

is Rabbi Yaakov’s, who says that one is not flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action!?

Perhaps it is Rabbi Yehuda’s,

and the exemption from lashes is

for another reason: Because the verse came to assign a positive mitzva after a prohibition,

and thereby transformed the prohibition into one whose remedy is a positive mitzva. And according to Rabbi Yehuda, one can infer the opposite:

Had it not been so,

if the verse had not transformed it into a positive mitzva,

he would be flogged

for the prohibition despite the fact that it does not involve an action!

The Gemara cites the beraita in which Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yaakov disagreed concerning the explanation of the Mishna:

As it was taught: “You shall not leave any of it until morning. And whatever is left of it until morning

you shall burn in fire!” The verse came to assign a positive mitzva after a prohibition, to say that one is not flogged for it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yaakov says: This is not the reason!

This is not the reason for the exemption from lashes,

but rather because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged.

Rather,

Rabbi Yoḥanan

found this anonymous Mishna—

As we learned below, on page 27b:

“An oath that I will not eat this loaf,”

and he repeated his oath once more and said:

“An oath that I will not eat it,” and he ate it

afterward,