Shevuot 49a — the Talmud in English

Rav Huna said: ![](pamud.bmp "

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In every case, one imposes an additional oath!

Through every oath, and even through rabbinic oaths, one imposes additional oaths.

Except for

the oath of a

hired worker

who takes an oath and then collects

; for one does not impose

other oaths through it.

And the reason is that the entire purpose of this oath is only to appease the mind of the employer, and it is not that the hired worker is obligated in it according to the fundamental law. Therefore, one does not impose additional oaths, neither from it nor upon it.

Rav Hisda said: In the case of all

oaths

one is neither lenient nor

refrains from imposing additional oaths upon them.

Except for

the oath of

a hired worker, in whose case one is lenient

and does not impose additional oaths upon it.

And one must ask:

what is the difference between them

between Rav Hisda and Rav Huna? Surely both of them hold that one does not impose other oaths upon the oath of a hired worker?

And the answer is:

there is a difference between them;

the practical difference between the words of Rav Huna and the words of Rav Hisda concerns the other oaths: do the court

open for him

the claimant?

That is, to show him the possibility of imposing an oath upon the defendant, and thereby the claimant will demand

to impose additional oaths,

according to Rav Huna, who holds that in every case one imposes an additional oath, the court shows him the possibility of imposing one. And if he wishes, he imposes additional oaths upon him.

But according to Rav Hisda, who holds that only with regard to the oath of a hired worker is one lenient and does not impose an additional oath, whereas with regard to the other oaths one is not lenient—and one imposes an additional oath—then the entire ruling of Rav Hisda is that one is not lenient. But it does not emerge from his words that one opens the matter initially.

And therefore, according to Rav Hisda, one does not open the matter for him, and one does not initially offer this possibility. Only if he demanded to impose additional oaths upon him does one impose them!

We learned in our Mishna:

and the Sabbatical year cancels

the oath!

And the Gemara asks:

From where are these words?

Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: For the verse says, “And this is the matter of the remission”—

and even

a debt of

speech,

that is, speech of an oath—

the Sabbatical year cancels

the oath!

We shall return to you, chapter “All Those Who Take Oaths.”

We learned above, in the fifth chapter, the law of the oath concerning a deposit: if a person denies possessing money belonging to another person, such as when he denies possessing a deposit, a loan, stolen property, or the like, and swears that he has nothing belonging to the other person, he is liable to make payment and to bring the offering called the offering for an oath concerning a deposit.

The obligation to make payment and bring an offering for this oath is derived from the verse in the section concerning the adjustable offering [Leviticus 5:21]: “When a person sins and commits a betrayal against the Lord by denying to his fellow a deposit.” The matters concerning an oath about a deposit and the ways in which one becomes liable for it are explained there below [verses 21–26]. The matters concerning this oath were explained above in the fifth chapter.

In the Mishnayot of this chapter, it will be explained when the guardians become liable to bring an offering because of a false oath.

A general principle is stated at the end of the Mishna: only when the guardian intended to exempt himself from payment through his oath is he liable to bring the offering for an oath concerning a deposit. But if he merely swore falsely, he is exempt from the offering.

For example, consider a paid guardian, who is liable for theft and loss. The owner asked him, “Where is my ox?” and the guardian replied, “The ox died!” In truth, the ox had been captured through circumstances beyond the guardian’s control. When the guardian’s lie later became known, he is exempt from the offering. Since he is a paid guardian, he is not liable to pay when the ox was captured through circumstances beyond his control, because a paid guardian is exempt from payment in such circumstances.

Mishna:

There are four types of

guardians

mentioned in the Torah:

An unpaid guardian,

who guards an object deposited with him without charge and receives no payment for guarding it.

And a borrower,

who borrows an object from another person in order to use it and does not pay for its use.

A paid guardian,

a guardian who receives payment for guarding the object.

And a renter,

who takes an object and uses it in exchange for payment.

The Mishna explains that if an event occurs to the object that makes it impossible to return it to its owner, such as its disappearance or breakage, the law of these guardians is as follows: if the event occurred while the object was with

an unpaid guardian—

and the depositor now brings a claim against him for this, while the guardian wishes to be exempt from the claim—

he takes an oath concerning everything —

he swears that one of the events that can happen to the object in fact occurred to it, such as theft, loss, or the like, or that it broke.

The guardian also swears that he was not negligent in guarding the object, and through this oath he becomes exempt from payment.

And

if the event occurred while the object was with the borrower,

then he,

the borrower—

pays for everything,

even if the event occurred through circumstances beyond his control! He is not exempt through an oath.

And if the event occurred while the object was with

the paid guardian or the renter—

and they claim that the object broke, then they

take an oath concerning the claim of

the

broken object

—that is, that the animal broke through circumstances beyond their control,

and

likewise, if they claim that the animal deposited with them was captured, they swear

concerning the claim of

the

captured animal,

that the animal was captured through circumstances beyond their control.

And

likewise

concerning death,

that the animal died through no action of theirs, and through this oath they become exempt from payment.

And

if the renter and the paid guardian claim that the animal was stolen from them or lost—

they pay for the loss and the theft!

They are not exempt through an oath.

The law taught above in the fifth chapter was brought in the introduction: one who denies a deposit entrusted to him, swears about it, and is shown to have lied in his oath, is liable to bring a guilt-offering. He must also pay an additional fifth because of this oath.

He becomes liable for the offering for an oath concerning a deposit only if, through that denial in his oath, he exempts himself from monetary payment.

But if he is exempt from payment in any event, even without lying, and could have exempted himself by swearing truthfully, but instead exempted himself specifically through a false oath, he is not liable to bring the offering!

Therefore, if the depositor said to an unpaid guardian:

“Where is my ox?” and he said

to him, the guardian:

“It died!”

But in truth:

it [the truth is]

the truth is

that

this ox

broke, was captured, was stolen, or was lost!

Or if the guardian said that the ox

broke, and it [the truth is]

the truth is

that

this ox

died, was captured, was stolen, or was lost!

And similarly, if he said

“It was captured,”

the ox,

but it—

died, broke, was stolen, or was lost!

And similarly, if the guardian said

“It was stolen,”

the ox.

But it died, broke, was captured, or was lost.

And similarly, if the unpaid guardian said:

“It was lost,”

the ox.

But it died, broke, was captured, or was stolen!

Concerning all these claims made by the guardian, the depositor said to him:

“I administer an oath to you

that your words are true,”

and

the guardian said:

“Amen!”—

the guardian is exempt

from the offering for an oath concerning a deposit, even though he lied, because he could have sworn a true oath and become exempt. It follows that he did not deny a monetary obligation through his oath, since he was exempt in any event.

If the depositor said to an unpaid guardian:

“Where is my ox?” He said to him,

the guardian:

“I do not know what you are talking about!”

That is, he denies the depositor’s entire claim and asserts that he did not receive his ox for safekeeping.

But in truth, he received the ox to guard it as an unpaid guardian, and the reason he is not now returning the ox to him is:

It died, broke, was captured, stolen, or lost.

The depositor said to him:

“I administer an oath to you

concerning your denial that you took the ox from me,”

and

the guardian said:

“Amen”—

then he is

exempt

from the offering, because he did not deny a monetary obligation through his oath. He could have told the truth, sworn about it, and become exempt through that oath.

The depositor said to an unpaid guardian:

“Where is my ox

that I deposited with you?”

He said to him,

the guardian:

“It was lost!”

The depositor said to him:

“I administer an oath to you

that the ox was indeed lost as you say,”

and

the guardian

said “Amen”

to his oath,

and

if

witnesses testify against him

the guardian,

that he consumed it [the ox]—then

the guardian

pays the principal

only.

But he does not bring an offering and does not pay an additional fifth, even though his oath included denial of a monetary obligation. This is because he did not admit his guilt on his own; rather, witnesses testified against him.

But if

the guardian admitted

the guardian

on his own

that he consumed the ox, denied the depositor’s claim, and swore falsely, then he

pays the principal

and an additional fifth, and

brings a

guilt-offering.

This is the law of one who swears falsely in an oath concerning a deposit!

And similarly, if the depositor said to an unpaid guardian—

“Where is my ox?” and he said to him—

“It was stolen!”

The depositor said to him:

“I administer an oath to you

that it was stolen as you say,”

and

the guardian

said, “Amen,”

and

if

witnesses testify against him that

he himself

stole it—

the guardian pays

the guardian

double payment.

Although he did not actually steal the ox from the owners—for the ox was in his possession because the owners deposited it with him—but merely claimed that the ox was stolen and swore concerning this claim, he is considered as though he stole it and pays double!

And if

the guardian who claimed that a theft occurred admitted

the guardian who claimed that a theft occurred

on his own,

he is exempt from double payment, in accordance with the law concerning one who admits to a fine.

And

he pays the principal, an additional fifth, and a guilt-offering—

in accordance with the law of one who swears falsely in an oath concerning a deposit.

If

the depositor said

the depositor

to one person,

to an ordinary person,

in the marketplace: “Where is my ox that you stole?”

He,

that person,

says: “I did not steal it,”

and witnesses testify against him that he stole it,

then he

pays double payment

even if he did not swear falsely.

And if the witnesses testify that he also

slaughtered and sold

the animal, the law is that he

pays fourfold or fivefold payment!

If

the thief, or one who claims that a theft occurred, sees that there are

witnesses approaching

to testify against him, and he preempts them and

says, “I stole it.”

And even though he continued to deny it by saying:

“But I did not slaughter it and

did not

sell it,”

and it turns out that he indeed slaughtered and sold it,

he pays only the principal!

Once he admitted it, he was exempt from the double payment. And although he admitted it because he was afraid lest witnesses testify against him and he become liable, nevertheless, since he does not pay the double payment, for he admitted the theft, he does not pay fourfold or fivefold, but only the principal!

The lender said

to the

borrower: “Where is my ox

that I lent you?”

He said to him,

the borrower: