Shevuot 49b (מט:) — the Talmud in English

“The ox

died!” But in fact,

it—

the ox—

was broken, captured, stolen, or lost.

Similarly, if the borrower said:

“The ox

was broken,

and it

died, was captured, stolen, or lost.”

Similarly, if the borrower said:

“It was captured, and it

died, was broken, stolen, or lost.”

Similarly, if the borrower said:

“It was stolen, and it

died, was broken, captured, or lost.”

Similarly, if the borrower said:

“It was lost, and it

died, was broken, captured, or stolen.”

And concerning all these claims, the lender said:

“I administer an oath to you!”

And the borrower responded

and said: “Amen”

to the oath administered by the depositor—

the borrower is exempt

from a sacrifice.

And although he lied in his oath, it did not involve a denial of a monetary obligation, since he would not be exempted by it from paying for the ox. For he is a borrower, and therefore pays in every case.

And if the lender said to him:

“Where is my ox

that I lent you?”

And

the borrower

said to him: “I do not know what you are talking about!” [That is, he denies the very fact of the loan.] And in fact, he had borrowed the ox from the owners.

And it—

the object that he borrowed—

died, was broken, captured, stolen, or lost.

And since he denied the lender’s claim, he said to him:

“I administer an oath to you”

concerning your denial of having borrowed the ox,

and

the borrower

said: “Amen,”

he is

liable

for the sacrifice for an oath concerning a deposit, since his oath involved a denial of a monetary obligation.

The depositor

said

to the paid bailee

the bailee

and the renter:

[Both of them—the paid bailee and the renter—are exempt in cases of unavoidable accident and liable in cases of theft and loss.]

“Where is my ox?”

He said to him: “It died, and

in fact

it,

the ox,

was broken or captured.”

Or the bailee said:

“It was broken, and it,”

the ox,

died or was captured [in an unavoidable accident].

Or the bailee said:

“The ox was captured,”

and

it—

died or was broken.”

[In both of these claims he is not denying a monetary obligation, since he is exempt in cases of unavoidable accident, whether the ox died or was captured.]

Or the bailee said:

“It was stolen,”

the ox,

, and it—

was lost.”

Or he said:

“It was lost, and it—

was stolen.”

[In both of these claims as well, he is not denying a monetary obligation, since he is liable in either case, whether theft or loss. And although he is lying in his statements, he is not denying his monetary liability.]

And concerning all these claims, the depositor said:

“I administer an oath to you!”

And

the bailee

said: “Amen”—

he is

exempt

from a sacrifice for the oath!

The reason is as follows: In the cases of death, breaking, and capture, he is exempt from a sacrifice for the oath because his oath did not involve a denial of a monetary obligation. For in every case he is exempt from payment, and therefore this does not constitute a denial of a monetary obligation.

But when he claimed that it was stolen, while in fact it was lost, or when he claimed that it was lost, while in fact it was stolen, he is exempt from a sacrifice, since in either case he renders himself liable, and merely lied in describing the circumstances. For mere falsehood that does not involve a denial of a payment obligation does not make him liable for a sacrifice.

However, if the renter claimed:

“The ox

died

or was broken or captured,”

and through this claim intended to exempt himself from payment,

but in fact

it—

was stolen or lost.

In this case he is liable for payment,

and the lessor said to him:

“I administer an oath to you,” and

the renter or paid bailee

said: “Amen.” He is liable

for the sacrifice for an oath concerning a deposit! Since by claiming that the ox had died or been captured, the bailee intended to exempt himself from payment, and he also swore to that effect, he is therefore liable for a sacrifice for the denial in an oath concerning a deposit.

And if the renter claimed:

“The ox was lost

or

stolen,”

while in fact

it

died, was broken, or was captured,

and the lessor

said to him: “I administer an oath to you,” and he said: “Amen,”

he is

exempt.

For he renders himself liable for money in a case in which he is exempt, and it is irrelevant to us that he lied in doing so.

This is the general rule:

Anyone who changes

in his oath

from one liability to another,

that is, he lies and changes his statement, saying that a particular event occurred to the ox that makes him liable for payment, whereas in fact a different event occurred that also makes him liable for payment.

and from exemption to exemption,

meaning that he claims that a particular event occurred to the ox for which he is exempt from payment, whereas in fact a different event occurred for which he is also exempt from payment.

And

he likewise changes

from exemption to liability,

claiming that an event occurred for which the bailee is liable, whereas in fact an event occurred for which he is exempt—

in all these false oaths,

the bailee is exempt

from a sacrifice for an oath, since in his oath he is not denying a monetary obligation, but is merely swearing a false oath.

However, if he changes his oath

from liability to exemption—

that is, he claims that an event occurred for which he is exempt, whereas in fact an event occurred for which he is liable—he is

liable

for a sacrifice for an oath, since in his oath he denied a monetary obligation.

This is the general rule: Anyone who swears

an oath concerning a deposit

to ease his own position

and obtain exemption

is liable

for a sacrifice.

But if he swore falsely in order

to increase his own liability,

in a case in which in truth he is exempt from payment, he is

exempt

even from a sacrifice.

Gemara:

The Gemara asks:

“Who is the tanna of ‘four bailees’?”

[Who is the tanna who taught the laws of the four bailees? The Gemara will explain the intent of this question below.]

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha—

it is Rabbi Meir!

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: “Is there a tanna who does not hold of four bailees?”

Rabbi Meir is the tanna in our Mishna who maintains the law of four bailees?

Is there a tanna who does not maintain that there are four bailees? They are necessarily four: an unpaid bailee, a paid bailee, a renter, and a borrower?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

“This is what I am saying to you,”

meaning, this is the intent of my statement:

“Who is the tanna who says

that the law of

a renter is equivalent to that of a paid bailee?”—

Rabba bar Avuha said—

it is Rabbi Meir!

This is what Rav Naḥman intended by his statement in the name of Rabba bar Avuha: Rabbi Meir is the tanna of our Mishna.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

But regarding Rabbi Meir,

we have heard the opposite!

As we learned:

“How does a renter pay? Rabbi Meir says: Like an unpaid bailee. Rabbi Yehuda says: Like a paid bailee.”

The answer is: Although we learned this, nevertheless,

Rabba bar Avuha taught the opposite.

He taught that Rabbi Meir is the one who maintains that the law of a renter is equivalent to that of a paid bailee, and consequently he is the tanna of our Mishna.

The Gemara examines the basic law of the Mishna: Are

these,

the laws of the bailees mentioned in the Mishna,

four bailees?

But

three

laws

there are?

For the renter mentioned in our Mishna has the same law as the paid bailee.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

Indeed, in practice,

there are four bailees,

and that is why the Mishna enumerated four. Nevertheless,

their laws are three!

[Below, the Gemara mentions the bailees and the types of oaths for which they are exempt from a sacrifice for an oath, in order to teach the ruling of Rav, as follows:]

We learned in the Mishna:

“If one said to an unpaid bailee, ‘Where is my ox?’

he said to him, ‘It died,’ whereas in fact it was broken, and so forth”:

“If one said to someone in the marketplace,

‘Where is my ox that you stole?’ and so forth”:

“If one said to a bailee

[a paid bailee] and a renter, ‘Where is my ox?’ He said to him: ‘It died,’ whereas in fact it was broken, and so forth”:

“Where is my ox?” He said to him: “I do not know what you are talking about,” and so forth:

Rav said: “And all of them,”

all those whom the Mishna says are exempt, are

exempt from the oath of bailees,

meaning that they do not bring a guilt offering for an oath concerning a deposit on account of their oath.

But

they are liable

for

an oath of utterance

with a sliding-scale offering, since they lied in their oaths!

And Shmuel said: They are also exempt

from a sacrifice for

an oath of utterance.

The Gemara asks:

With regard to what do

Rav and Shmuel disagree?

It explains:

Shmuel maintains that since this form of an oath of utterance

does not apply with regard to the future,

that is,

he cannot swear this oath concerning the future, since a bailee cannot swear that this ox will or will not die.

And since this is so, this oath is merely a vain oath, for it is not in his power to determine whether the ox will die on its own while in his possession or not.

Therefore, one is not liable for this oath on account of an oath of utterance, even when he swears concerning the past, since any oath that cannot be sworn concerning the future cannot be sworn concerning the past either.

And since the oath of bailees mentioned in our Mishna cannot be sworn concerning the future, even if the bailee swore it concerning the past, he does not become liable for it on account of an oath of utterance, and is therefore exempt from a sacrifice.

But

if

Rav maintains that since

this oath

does apply

to this oath

with regard to both “no” and “yes,”

that is, since the bailee can swear this oath in the form of “no” and in the form of “yes”—for example, he can swear whether the deposit was stolen or was not stolen—that is sufficient to make him liable for an oath of utterance.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But Rav and Shmuel already disagreed about it

earlier,

once,

as Rav and Shmuel already disagreed on this matter above, on page 25a. Why does the Gemara need to state their dispute again here?

And what is their dispute?

As it was stated:

A person swore

that so-and-so threw

his fellow

a bundle into the sea,

or he swore

that he did not throw it—

Rav said: He is liable

for a sliding-scale offering for an oath of utterance,

and Shmuel said—

he is exempt.

Rav said: He is liable,

because

it applies with regard to both “no” and “yes,”

that is, he can swear this oath in the form of “yes,” namely, “he threw it,” and he can swear it in the form of “no,” namely, “he did not throw it.” An oath that can be sworn in both of these forms entails liability on account of an oath of utterance.

And Shmuel said: He is exempt,

because

this oath that so-and-so threw a bundle into the sea

does not apply with regard to the future.

That is, it is not within the power of the person taking the oath to undertake that so-and-so will throw a bundle into the sea or will not throw it. Therefore, this is a vain oath and is not included in the category of an oath of utterance.

If so, since this dispute between Rav and Shmuel was already cited above, why does the Gemara need to state their dispute again here?

The Gemara answers:

It is necessary

to teach it here as well!

Because

if it had taught us

the dispute of Rav and Shmuel only

in that case,

that is, where one swears only that so-and-so threw a bundle into the sea, we might have said that only

in that case Rav says

that he is liable,

because he swears on his own initiative.

[He swears this oath on his own, and the court does not require him to swear about it. The Gemara will explain below the distinction between one who swears on his own initiative and one whom the court administered the oath.]

But in this case,

where the bailee swears whether the ox died or did not die, and he does not swear this oath on his own initiative, but rather

the court administers the oath to him, we might say that Rav concedes to Shmuel

that he is exempt from an oath of utterance,

in accordance with Rabbi Ami!

For Rabbi Ami said: With regard to every oath that the judges administer, one is not liable for it on account of an oath of utterance

[for the reason that will be explained below].

Therefore, it is necessary to state their dispute here as well, to teach us that even when the court requires him to swear this oath, Rav maintains that he is liable on account of an oath of utterance.

And if it was stated

that their dispute concerned only

this case

of the ox’s death, and not the case where he swore that so-and-so threw a pebble into the sea—

we would say that

in this case Shmuel said

that he is exempt, and for the reason given by Rabbi Ami: Every oath that the judges administer does not entail liability for an oath of utterance, and not because it does not apply to a future act.

But with regard to this case,

the oath that so-and-so threw a pebble into the sea,

say that he agrees with Rav

that anyone whose oath can be formulated in terms of both “no” and “yes” is liable; therefore,

it is necessary

to teach us there as well that according to Shmuel he is exempt—because this oath does not apply to a future act. [

And now the Gemara explains Rabbi Ami’s statement that every oath that one is obligated to take by order of the court does not entail liability for an oath of utterance.]

The essential statement: Rabbi Ami said: Every oath that the judges administer does not entail liability for an oath of utterance.

As it is stated

“Or a person, when he takes an oath to express with his lips

to do harm or good, whatever a person expresses in an oath,” and so forth—if he takes the oath

on his own initiative,

he is liable; but if he takes it because of the court, he is exempt.

And this exposition is

in accordance with Resh Lakish’s exposition, for Resh Lakish said:

Every place where the Torah says

“ki”—it

is used [

]

in four senses:

1.

“I,”

if. 2.

“Dilma,”

perhaps. 3.

“Ela.”

Rather. 4.

“Deha,”

for indeed.

Accordingly, we may read the verse, “A person, ki he takes an oath,” as: “A person, if he takes an oath.”

And the verse comes to teach us that only if he takes the oath on his own initiative—that is, the oath depended solely upon him, whether to take it or not—is there liability to bring the offering for an oath of utterance. But not when the court administers the oath to him, in which case he is obligated to take it!

Rabbi Eliezer says: All of them,

all those mentioned in the Mishna who are exempt, are

exempt from the oath of bailees.

For they do not bring a guilt offering for an oath of the deposit. But

they are liable

to bring an adjustable offering

for an oath of utterance.

And Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Rav that anyone who takes an oath that can be formulated in terms of “no” and “yes” is liable for an oath of utterance, whether he takes the oath on his own initiative or the court administers it to him.

Except for “I do not know what you are talking about,” in the case of a borrower, and theft or loss in the case of a paid bailee and a renter.

These cases are mentioned in our Mishna,

for he [

that is, these bailees

is liable, since they denied a monetary claim!

The Mishna’s intention is to make them liable for a guilt offering because of an oath of the deposit, and for the added fifth, not for an oath of utterance. And with regard to the other liabilities in the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer did not need to teach us that their liability is because of an oath of the deposit, since the Mishna explicitly states concerning them that they are liable for a guilt offering and an added fifth!

We have completed the eighth chapter, “The Four Bailees,” and the tractate Shevuot has been concluded.