Shevuot 49b — the Talmud in English

The ox died

! But the truth is that

it

the ox,

was broken, or taken captive, or stolen, or lost.

And likewise, if the borrower said:

“The ox was broken,”

the ox,

and it

died, or was taken captive, or was stolen, or was lost.

And likewise, if the borrower said:

“It was taken captive, and it”

died, or was broken, or was stolen, or was lost.

And likewise, if the borrower said:

“It was stolen, and it”

died, or was broken, or was taken captive, or was lost.

And likewise, if the borrower said:

“It was lost, and it”

died, or was broken, or was taken captive, or was stolen.

And concerning all these claims, the lender said:

“I administer an oath to you!”

And the borrower answered

and said: “Amen,”

to the oath administered by the depositor—

he is exempt

the borrower from an offering.

And despite the fact that he lied in his oath, there was no denial of money in it, since through it he would not have been exempted from paying for the ox. For he is a borrower, and consequently he pays in every case.

And if the lender said to him:

“Where is my ox

that I lent you?” And

he said to him

the borrower:

“I do not know what you are talking about!” [That is, he denies the loan itself.] But the truth is that he borrowed the ox from the owners.

То есть он отрицает сам факт получения быка взаймы.] А в действительности он взял быка у владельца взаймы.

And it

the object that he borrowed,

died, or was broken, or was taken captive, or was stolen, or was lost.

And since he denied the lender’s claim, he said to him:

“I administer an oath to you”

concerning your denial of the borrowing of the ox,

and

the borrower

said: “Amen,”

he is

liable

for the offering of the oath of deposit. For there was a denial of money in his oath.

The depositor said

the one who deposited the item

to the paid

guardian

guardian, and to the renter: [Both the paid guardian and the renter are exempt from accidents and liable for theft and loss.]

“Where is my ox?”

He said to him: “It died, and

but the truth is that

it,

the ox,

—

was broken or taken captive.”

Or the guardian said:

“It was broken, and it,”

the ox,

“died or was taken captive” [through an accident].

Or the guardian said:

“It was taken captive,”

the ox,

“and it”—

“died or was broken.” [In both of these claims, he is not denying money, since he is exempt from accidents, whether the ox died or was taken captive.]

Or the guardian said:

“It was stolen,”

the ox

, and it—

“was lost.”

Or he said:

“It was lost, and it”—

“was stolen.” [And in both of these claims as well, he is not denying money, since he is liable both for theft and for loss. And although he is lying in his words, he is not denying the monetary obligation.]

And concerning all these claims, the depositor said:

“I administer an oath to you!”

And

the guardian

said: “Amen”—

he is

exempt

from an oath offering!

And the reason is: in the cases of death, breaking, and captivity, he is exempt from an oath offering because he did not deny money in his oath. For in every case he is exempt from payment, and therefore there is no denial of money in this.

But when he claimed that it was stolen, while the truth is that it was lost, and likewise when he claimed that it was lost, while the truth is that it was stolen, he is exempt from an offering, since in every case he obligates himself, and he merely lied in describing the incident. And for a mere lie that does not involve denial of a payment obligation, he does not become liable for an offering.

But if the renter claimed:

“The ox died

or was broken or was taken captive.”

And through this claim he intended to exempt himself from payment,

but the truth is that:

“It”—

“was stolen or lost.”

And in this manner he is liable for payment,

and the lessor said to him:

“I administer an oath to you,”

and the renter or paid guardian said:

“Amen. He is liable”

for an offering for the oath of deposit! Since through this claim—that the ox died or was taken captive—the guardian intended to exempt himself from payment, and he also swore to it, he is therefore liable for an offering for the denial in the oath of deposit.

And if the renter claimed:

“It was lost”

the ox

“or stolen,”

while the truth is that

“it”

“died, or was broken, or was taken captive,”

and the lessor said to him

“I administer an oath to you, and he said ‘Amen,’

he is

exempt.

For he obligates himself to pay money in a place where he is exempt, and we do not care that he lied in this.

This is the rule:

Anyone who changes

in his oath

from one obligation to another,

that is, he lies and changes his words, saying that a particular incident occurred to the ox that obligates him to pay money, whereas the truth is that another incident occurred that obligates him to pay money.

Anyone who changes

in his oath

and from exemption to exemption,

meaning that he claims that a particular incident occurred to the ox for which he is exempt from payment, whereas the truth is that another incident occurred for which he is likewise exempt from payment.

And likewise he changes from exemption to obligation,

claiming that an incident occurred for which the guardian is liable, whereas the truth is that an incident occurred for which he is exempt—

in all these false oaths,

the guardian is exempt

from an oath offering, since in his oath he is not denying a monetary obligation, but is merely swearing a completely false oath.

But if he changes in his oath

from obligation to exemption—

that is, he claims that an incident occurred for which he is exempt, but the truth is that an incident occurred for which he is liable—he is

liable

for an oath offering, since in his oath he denied a monetary obligation.

This is the rule: anyone who swears

an oath of deposit

to lessen his own obligation

and become exempt,

is liable

for an offering.

But if he swore falsely in order

to aggravate his own obligation,

in a place where in truth he is exempt from payment, he is

exempt

even from the offering.

to increase his own liability,

Gemara:

The Gemara asks:

“Who is the tanna of ‘four guardians’?” [Who is the tanna who taught the laws of the four guardians? The Gemara will explain below the intent of this question.]

Rav Nahman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha— “It is Rabbi Meir!”

Rava said to Rav Nahman: “Is there a tanna who does not hold of four guardians?”

Rabbi Meir is the tanna in our Mishna who holds the law of four guardians?

Can there be a tanna who does not hold that there are four guardians? Surely they must be four: an unpaid guardian, a paid guardian, a renter, and a borrower?

He said to him,

Rav Nahman said to Rava:

“This is what I am saying to you,”

my intention in my words is:

“Who is the tanna who says

that the law of

a renter is equivalent to that of a paid guardian?”—

Rabbah bar Avuha said—

“It is Rabbi Meir!”

And this is what Rav Nahman intended in his words in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: Rabbi Meir is the tanna of our Mishna.

And this is difficult:

“But Rabbi Meir

we have heard the opposite from him!”

For we learned:

“How does a renter pay? Rabbi Meir says: like an unpaid guardian. Rabbi Judah says: like a paid guardian.”

And the answer is: although we learned this, nevertheless—

“Rabbah bar Avuha taught the opposite,”

that Rabbi Meir holds that the law of a renter is like that of a paid guardian, and consequently he is the tanna of our Mishna.

As we learned:

“How does a renter pay? Rabbi Meir says: Like an unpaid bailee. Rabbi Yehuda says: Like a paid bailee.”

And the Gemara discusses the fundamental law of the Mishna: Is it so that

these,

the laws of the guardians mentioned in the Mishna,

are four guardians? But they are three

laws

are they?

For the renter in our Mishna is equal in law to the paid guardian.

But

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said:

indeed, in practice,

there are four guardians,

and for that reason the Mishna counted four. Nevertheless—

their laws are three! [The Gemara now mentions the guardians and the types of oaths for which they are exempt from an oath offering, in order to teach the law of Rav, as follows:] We learned in the Mishna:

“He said to an unpaid guardian: ‘Where is my ox?’

He said to him: ‘It died, while it was broken,’ and so forth”:

“He said to someone in the marketplace:

‘Where is my ox that you stole?’” and so forth:

“He said to a guardian [a paid] guardian and a renter: ‘Where is my ox?’ He said to him: ‘It died, while it was broken,’ and so forth”:

“‘Where is my ox?’ He said to him: ‘I do not know what you are talking about,’ and so forth”:

Rav said: “And all of them,”

all those concerning whom the Mishna said that they are exempt, are

exempt from the oath of guardians,

that is, they do not bring a guilt-offering for the oath of deposit on account of their oath.

But

they are liable

for

the oath of expression

through a sliding-scale offering,

since they lied in their oaths!

And Shmuel said: They are also exempt from

the offering for

the oath of expression.

And the Gemara asks: “With regard to what do Rav and Shmuel disagree?”

an oath of utterance

with a sliding-scale offering, since they lied in their oaths!

And it explains:

“Shmuel holds

that since such a form of an oath of expression

does not exist with regard to the future, that is, he cannot swear this oath concerning the future, since the guardian cannot swear that this ox will die or will not die. And since this is so, this oath is only a vain oath, since it is not in his power to determine whether the ox will die by itself while in his possession or not.

Therefore, one is not liable for this oath on account of an oath of expression, even when he swears concerning the past, since any oath that one does not swear concerning the future, one does not swear concerning the past either.

And since the oath of guardians brought in our Mishna cannot be sworn concerning the future, even if the guardian swore it concerning the past, he does not become liable for it on account of an oath of expression, and he is therefore exempt from an offering.

But

whereas

Rav holds,

since

there is

this oath

with ‘no’ and ‘yes.’

That is, since the guardian can swear this oath in the form of “no” and in the form of “yes,” for example, he can swear whether the deposit was stolen or was not stolen, this suffices to administer to him the oath of expression.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

“But they already disagreed about it

Rav and Shmuel

one time,

for Rav and Shmuel already disagreed about this above, on 25a. Why does the Gemara need to state their dispute again here as well?

And what is their dispute?

For it was stated:

A person swore

an oath that so-and-so threw

his fellow

a bundle into the sea,

or he swore

an oath that he did not throw it—

Rav said: He is liable

for this oath for a sliding-scale offering of an oath of expression,

and Shmuel said—

he is exempt.

Rav said he is liable,

because

it exists with ‘no’ and ‘yes,’

that is, he can swear this oath in the form of “yes,” namely, “he threw,” and he can swear it in the form of “no,” namely, “he did not throw.” And for an oath that he can swear in both these forms, he is liable on account of an oath of expression.

And Shmuel said he is exempt,

because

this oath that so-and-so threw a bundle into the sea—

does not exist with regard to the future.

That is, it is not in the power of the one swearing to undertake that so-and-so will throw a bundle into the sea or will not. Therefore this is a vain oath and is not included in the oath of expression.

If so, after this dispute of Rav and Shmuel was stated above, why does the Gemara need to state their dispute again here as well?

The Gemara answers:

“It is necessary”

to inform us of it here as well!

For

if it had informed us

that we mentioned the dispute of Rav and Shmuel only

in this case,

namely, where one swore only that so-and-so threw a bundle into the sea, then we would have said that only

in this case Rav says

that he is liable,

because he swears on his own initiative. [He swears this oath on his own, and the court does not compel him to swear about it. The Gemara will explain below the distinction between when he swears on his own initiative and when the court administered this oath to him.]

But in that case,

where the guardian swore whether the ox died or did not die, and he did not swear this oath on his own initiative, but

the court administered the oath to him, one might say that he agrees with Shmuel

that he is exempt from an oath of expression,

in accordance with Rabbi Ami!

For Rabbi Ami said: “For every oath that the judges administer, one is not liable on account of an oath of expression” [and for the reason that will be explained below].

Therefore it is necessary to state their dispute here as well, to teach us that even when the court compels him to swear this oath, Rav holds that he is liable on account of an oath of expression.

because he swears on his own initiative.

[He swears this oath on his own, and the court does not require him to swear about it. The Gemara will explain below the distinction between one who swears on his own initiative and one whom the court administered the oath.]

But in this case,

where the bailee swears whether the ox died or did not die, and he does not swear this oath on his own initiative, but rather

the court administers the oath to him, we might say that Rav concedes to Shmuel

that he is exempt from an oath of utterance,

in accordance with Rabbi Ami!

For Rabbi Ami said: With regard to every oath that the judges administer, one is not liable for it on account of an oath of utterance

[for the reason that will be explained below].

Therefore, it is necessary to state their dispute here as well, to teach us that even when the court requires him to swear this oath, Rav maintains that he is liable on account of an oath of utterance.

And if it was stated,

if their dispute had been stated only

with regard to this

that the ox died, and not with regard to the case where he swore that so-and-so threw a stone into the sea—

we would have said that

with regard to this Shmuel says

that he is exempt, and for the reason of Rabbi Ami, that with regard to every oath which the judges impose upon him, one is not liable on account of an oath of expression, and not because it is not concerning the future.

But with regard to that,

with regard to the oath that so-and-so threw a stone into the sea,

say that he agrees with Rav

that whoever has both the negative and the affirmative forms is liable, and therefore

it is necessary

to teach us there also that according to Shmuel he is exempt—for this oath does not exist in the future form.

And now the Gemara explains the words of Rabbi Ami: every oath which one is obligated to swear according to the court is exempt from it on account of an oath of expression.

In the body of the matter, Rabbi Ami said: With regard to every oath which the judges impose upon him, there is no oath of expression in it.

As it is stated

“Or a person, when he swears, expressing with his lips

to do harm or to do good, whatever a person expresses in an oath,” and so forth—if

of his own accord

he swore, he is liable. But if it was because of the court, he is exempt.

And this teaching is

in accordance with the teaching of Resh Lakish. For Resh Lakish said:

every place where it is stated in the Torah

“when”—it

is used [

serves ]

in four expressions:

a.

if,

if. b.

perhaps,

perhaps. c.

but.

d.

for indeed,

for indeed.

Accordingly, we can read the verse “a person when he swears” as: “a person if he swears.”

And the verse comes to teach us that only if he swore of his own accord—that is, that the oath depended only upon himself, whether to swear or not to swear—then there is an obligation to bring an offering for an oath of expression. But not when the court makes him swear, for then he is obligated to swear!

Rabbi Eliezer says: All of them,

all those mentioned in the Mishna who are exempt, are

exempt from the oath of the custodians.

For they do not bring a guilt-offering for an oath concerning a deposit. But

they are liable

for a sliding-scale offering

on account of an oath of expression.

And Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Rav, that with regard to every oath which applies in the form of both “no” and “yes,” one is liable on account of an oath of expression, whether he swore on his own initiative or the court made him swear.

Except for “I do not know what you are saying,” in the case of a borrower, and theft and loss, in the case of a paid bailee and a renter.

These are mentioned in our Mishna

so that he [

that is, these custodians ]

is liable, for they denied money!

And the intention of the Mishna is to make them liable for a guilt-offering on account of an oath concerning a deposit, and for a fifth, and not for an oath of expression. And regarding the other liabilities in the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer did not need to teach us that their liability is on account of an oath concerning a deposit, for it explicitly teaches with regard to them that they are liable for a guilt-offering and a fifth!

We have returned to you, chapter “The Four Custodians,” and the tractate Shevuot is concluded.