Shevuot 48b (מח:) — the Talmud in English

Once

the son collects

from the heirs of the debtor

with an oath [the oath of the heirs]

the heirs’ oath

and without an oath,

as in a case where there were witnesses who heard the father say at the time of his death that this document had not been paid,

and

if

the father could not collect

from the orphans of the debtor

except with an oath!

Rav Natan bar Hoshaya analyzes this statement:

What are the circumstances

in which the father could collect only with an oath? It is, for example,

that the debtor died during the lifetime of the creditor,

and the father became obligated to take an oath to the heirs, as is the law concerning one who comes to collect from the property of orphans.

And it teaches

in the statement cited by Rav Natan bar Hoshaya:

the son collects

from the orphans of the debtor

both with an oath and without an oath.

And necessarily,

“with an oath”

means

the oath of the heirs,

and likewise, when he collects

without an oath,

this is

like

the words of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel!

For Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said in our Mishna that if there are witnesses who heard the father say at the time of his death that this document had not been paid, they are exempt from taking an oath.

And it is demonstrated from all this that a person bequeaths an oath to his sons. For in a place where the father collects with an oath, the son likewise collects with an oath!

And the answer is:

Rav Yosef said: Whose opinion is this?

This statement cited by Rav Natan bar Hoshaya is

that of Beit Shammai!

For Beit Shammai say,

Beit Shammai, that

a document that stands to be collected is

considered as though it had already been collected!

Accordingly, they maintain that although the father was obligated to take an oath in order to collect with this document, he can bequeath it to his sons. Since he is not bequeathing a debt, but is actually bequeathing money to them,

and in this manner Beit Shammai maintain that the deficiency involved in a person bequeathing an oath to his sons does not apply, since he is bequeathing money that is considered as though it had already been collected!

Rav Naḥman happened to come

to Sura.

He entered to see [he entered to see]

Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna.

They said to him: Let the Master come, and let us uproot this ruling of Rav and Shmuel. ] [Let us uproot the ruling of Rav and Shmuel, who ruled that a person does not bequeath money over which there is an oath to his sons!

this ruling of

Rav and Shmuel.

They meant: Let us uproot the ruling of Rav and Shmuel, who ruled that a person cannot bequeath to his sons money over which he is required to take an oath!

Rav Naḥman said to them: Did I trouble myself [I exerted myself]

and

and come all this way [and came and traveled across all those many parasangs]

in order

in order to uproot this ruling of Rav and Shmuel!?

Rather, let us not extend it beyond its scope!

Let us rule that we do not add to their ruling, and do not derive from their words with regard to other cases—

such as what?

As Rav Pappa said: In the case of one who partially disclaims his document

and admits that part of the debt had already been paid and is obligated to take an oath that he had not paid the remainder,

and

the creditor dies,

the heirs take the oath of the heirs and collect.

In this case, the father was obligated to take an oath, and nevertheless the heirs take an oath and collect. We do not apply the ruling of Rav and Shmuel that a person does not bequeath an oath to his sons.

This is as Rav Naḥman said: We have only what Rav and Shmuel instituted. However, this oath of one who partially disclaims his document, which was not mentioned in their ordinance—the heirs do take the oath!

There was a certain

debtor

who died

during the creditor’s lifetime,

and left

behind

a guarantor. [A person who had guaranteed his debt.]

That is, another person who had guaranteed his debt.

The creditor became obligated to take an oath to the debtor’s sons. Afterward, the creditor died, and the creditor’s heirs came to collect their father’s debt from the guarantor.

[For they could not collect from the debtor’s heirs, since he had already become obligated to take an oath to them, and a person does not bequeath this oath to his sons.]

Rav Pappa thought to say: This too,

this case, in which the debtor left a guarantor, is likewise included in what we said above,

“we should not extend it beyond its scope,”

[the ruling of Rav and Shmuel].

Since here the orphans collect not from the creditor’s heirs, but from the guarantor. Rav and Shmuel stated their ruling with regard to collecting from the heirs themselves, and not from the guarantor. Indeed, the orphans can collect from the guarantor with an oath.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: Is that so? The guarantor

—after they collect from him—

does he not go after the orphans?

It follows that although the creditor’s heirs do not collect directly from the orphans, they cause the guarantor to go and collect from the orphans.

If so, their collection from the guarantor is considered collection from the orphans. We therefore return to the words of Rav and Shmuel, that a person does not bequeath an oath to his sons when they collect from orphans. There is no difference between collecting from the guarantor and collecting from the orphans.

There was a certain

creditor

who died [who died] after the debtor had died during his lifetime, and the creditor had become obligated to take an oath to the debtor’s sons.

after the borrower had died during his lifetime, and the lender had become obligated to take an oath to the borrower’s sons.

And he left a brother,

meaning that the creditor left no sons behind, but only a brother who inherited him; and that brother came to collect the money that was subject to the law requiring an oath.

Rami bar Ḥama thought to say: This too,

this case is included in what Rav Naḥman said,

“we should not extend it beyond its scope.”

As stated above.

For Rav and Shmuel stated their ruling with regard to inheritance by a son, who does not inherit money concerning which an oath is owed. But inheritance by a brother was not included in this ruling. If so, the brother should take the oath of the heirs, such as, “My brother did not instruct me,” and collect!

Rava said to him: What difference is there to me

whether it is the oath

“My father did not instruct me,” or what difference is there to me

whether it is the oath

“My brother did not instruct me”?

Rather, they are both equivalent with regard to this oath. Just as a person does not bequeath an oath to his sons, so too a person does not bequeath an oath to his brothers. [This too is included in the ruling of Rav and Shmuel.]

Rav Ḥama said: Now that the halakha has not been stated neither in accordance with Rav and Shmuel nor in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

who disagrees with them,

this judge [a judge]

who

who acted

by carrying out an act and ruling in accordance with Rav and Shmuel—

has acted,

and his ruling stands!

And a judge

who acted in accordance with Rabbi Elazar—

has acted!

Rav Pappa said: With regard to this document of the orphans,

a promissory note presented against orphans, whose father, the debtor, died before the creditor—and Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Elazar disagreed whether one may collect by means of it—

if this document comes into the hands of a judge,

we do not tear it, nor do we collect by means of it.

We do not collect the debt recorded in this document.

The Gemara explains:

We do not collect by means of it—

perhaps we hold in accordance with Rav and Shmuel.

The debt recorded in this document can be paid only with an oath, and they do not take this oath!

And we do not tear it—

for this judge who acted in accordance with Rabbi Elazar—

has acted!

Perhaps the document will come before a judge who holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, and they will collect by means of it.

There was a certain judge who acted in accordance with Rabbi Elazar

and instructed the orphans to collect their father’s debt with an oath.

There was a Torah scholar in his town,

in the judge’s town.

He said to him,

that Torah scholar said to the judge:

I have received a letter from the West [a letter had arrived from Eretz Yisrael]

—from the Land of Israel—

that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Elazar!

If so, how can you rule in accordance with him?

He said to him,

the judge said:

When you bring it.

When you bring me this letter, I will heed your words!

He came before Rav Ḥama

to obtain the letter.

He said

to him,

Rav Ḥama said:

This judge who acted in accordance with Rabbi Elazar—

has acted.

And since this is so, you may not reverse the judge’s ruling, even though the halakha was ruled in accordance with Rav and Shmuel.

We learned in our Mishna:

And these take oaths

without a claim.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

Are we dealing with fools?

Is our Mishna dealing with fools, who take oaths without being asked to do so?

And the explanation is:

This is what it is saying: And these take oaths not in response to a definite claim, but

they are obligated to take an oath even

in response to a doubtful claim.

And they are

partners and tenant farmers.

For example, the partner or the owner claims against them, “Perhaps you retained something of mine for yourself.” That is, he suspects that they took from the money that was held jointly by them in a partnership or tenancy.

Our Mishna further enumerated the “household manager.” He too is made to take an oath in response to a doubtful claim, that he took nothing from the household’s money.

The Gemara explains the meaning of “household manager,” concerning whom the Mishna said that he takes an oath even in response to a doubtful claim.

It was taught: The household manager that they mentioned

in the Mishna as being obligated to take an oath

does not

refer to a household manager

who enters and leaves on his own feet,

and conducts himself in the house like any other member of the household,

but

it refers to a household manager

who brings in for him

into the house,

and takes workers out for him, brings produce in for him, and takes produce out for him.

And he manages the affairs of the household.

For this reason, he must take an oath to the other heirs, the members of the household, that he did not take anything for himself, but brought in and took out everything as he had told them.

And the Gemara asks:

And what is different about these

whom the Sages specifically obligated to take this oath even in response to a doubtful claim?

And the answer is:

Because

these tenant farmers, partners, and household managers

presume it permitted

They presume for themselves that it is permitted to take from these assets because they work with them.

Rav Yosef bar Minyומי said that Rav Naḥman said: And this,

this obligation to take an oath in response to a doubtful claim, applies only when

there is a claim between them

for at least

two silver ma’ot.

That is, the claimant said: “Perhaps you retained two silver ma’ot of mine,” and this defendant admits part of the claim.

Had his claim been a definite claim, he would have been obligated by a Torah-mandated oath. The Sages instituted that he must take an oath even when the claim is uncertain, in a case where he admits to part of the claim against him].

And this law—that the oath must at the very least concern a claim of two kesef—

Like whom?

Like Shmuel!

Earlier, on 39b, Rav and Shmuel disagreed concerning the manner in which the law of the oath of one who admits to part of a claim takes effect. Must the claim be for two kesef, of which the defendant admits to the claimant that he owes him one peruta? This is Shmuel’s view.

Or must the claim be for two kesef and one peruta, while the denial—that which he denies in addition to what he admits—must be for two kesef? This is Rav’s view.

If so, the Gemara’s statement here, that there must be two perutot between the claimant and the defendant, apparently follows Shmuel’s opinion.

But this is difficult:

didn’t Rabbi Hiyya teach

Earlier, in the chapter “The Oaths of the Judges” [40a], it was demonstrated from the words of Rabbi Hiyya

in support of Rav,

that only the denial must be for two kesef, whereas the claim must be for two kesef and one peruta,

And the answer is:

Say,

what we said earlier—that there must be a claim of two kesef between them—means that there must be between them

a denial of a claim

of two kesef.

However, the claim itself must be for two kesef and one peruta, and

this follows Rav’s opinion! We learned in our Mishna: If

We learned in our Mishna: If

the partners and the sharecroppers divided

the partnership mentioned above, and concluded the transaction and divided the money or the wages between them, neither of them may subsequently make the other take an oath, on the basis of an uncertain claim!

A dilemma was raised before them: What is the law,

is it possible

to extend

upon a partner or a sharecropper the oath of partners, after they divided and were released from this oath, by means of another oath

that is rabbinic?

For example, to extend it from a heset oath or from the oath taken by those who take an oath and collect. [

The question in the Gemara is a general one: Is an oath extended by means of another oath that is rabbinic? ]

Come and hear: If one borrowed from him on the eve of the Sabbatical year,

and the Sabbatical year arrived and canceled his debt.

And at the conclusion of the Sabbatical year he became his

borrower’s

partner or sharecropper of the lender.

And he became obligated to him in the oath of partners.

The law is that

one does not extend

upon him at this point a rabbinic heset oath concerning the loan [if he had denied owing him the loan at that time], since the Sabbatical year had already canceled the loan.

And the Gemara infers from this:

The reason

that one does not extend the oath is

that

the borrower

borrowed from him

on the

eve of the Sabbatical year.

Because

in the interim,

the Sabbatical year came

and

canceled it.

It canceled the loan.

And it is only for that reason that the oath is not extended, since the loan no longer exists.

But in the other years of the seven-year cycle,

in the other years, which are not Sabbatical years, in a case of this kind—

one does extend

upon him a heset oath, and when this was taught in the days of the tannaim, the heset oath had not yet been instituted, since it was instituted in the time of Rav Naḥman (Rashi); the oath is extended by means of the oath of partners to which he became obligated, even though the oath of partners is only rabbinic. It follows that an oath is extended by means of a rabbinic oath!

The Gemara rejects this:

Do not say

that we should infer that

in the other years of the seven-year cycle, one does extend the oath.

Rather, say

that we should infer the following:

He became his partner or sharecropper on the eve of the Sabbatical year,

and they divided the partnership, thereby becoming exempt from the oath,

and at the conclusion of the Sabbatical year he borrowed from him

and admitted to part of the claim against him, thereby becoming obligated in a Torah-mandated oath.

The law is that

one does extend

to him, by means of the Torah-mandated oath of one who admits to part of a claim, the oath of partners as well.

And this statement comes to teach us that the Sabbatical year does not cancel the oath of partners, but only the oath concerning the loan. If so, there is no proof whatsoever that an oath is extended by means of a rabbinic oath!

The Gemara challenges this inference:

This

law—that the Sabbatical year cancels only the oath concerning a loan—

is explicitly taught

in this statement:

He became his partner or sharecropper on the eve of the Sabbatical year,

and they divided between them and became exempt from the oath.

And at the conclusion of the Sabbatical year he borrowed from him—

one does extend the oath!

It necessarily follows that the first clause, which says that if he borrowed from him on the eve of the Sabbatical year and at the conclusion of the Sabbatical year became his partner, the law is that one does not extend the oath, comes to teach us that only when he borrowed from him on the eve of the Sabbatical year does one not extend the oath. But in the other years of the seven-year cycle, one does extend a rabbinic oath. And

conclude from it that one does extend a rabbinic oath!

And the Gemara’s conclusion is:

Conclude from it!