Shevuot 48b — the Talmud in English

Since

the son collects

from the heirs of the borrower

whether with an oath [

the heirs’ oath]

and whether without an oath,

when there were witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that this document had not been paid,

and

if

the father does not collect —

from the orphans of the borrower,

except with an oath!

And Rav Natan bar Hoshaya analyzes:

what are the circumstances

in which the father does not collect except with an oath? — Such as

when the borrower died during the lender’s lifetime,

and the father became obligated to take an oath to the heirs, in accordance with the law concerning one who comes to collect from the property of orphans.

And it teaches

in the statement brought by Rav Natan bar Hoshaya:

that the son collects

from the orphans of the borrower

whether with an oath and whether without an oath.

And necessarily,

with an oath

means

the heirs’ oath,

and likewise when he collects

without an oath —

this is

like

the words of

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel!

For Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel said in our Mishna that if there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that this document had not been paid, they are exempt from an oath.

And it is proven from all this that a person bequeaths an oath to his sons. For in a place where the father collects with an oath, the son also collects with an oath!

And the answer:

Rav Yosef said: Whose opinion is this?

This statement brought by Rav Natan bar Hoshaya is

the opinion of Beit Shammai!

For Beit Shammai say

Beit Shammai:

a document that stands to be collected —

is considered as collected!

And therefore they hold that although the father is obligated to take an oath in order to collect with this document, he can bequeath it to his sons. Since he is not bequeathing a debt, but is bequeathing actual money to them.

And in this manner Beit Shammai hold that there is not the deficiency of a person bequeathing an oath to his sons, since he is bequeathing money that is considered as collected!

Rav Naḥman happened to come

— he happened to be there —

to Sura. They entered to him [

they entered to]

Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna. They said to him: Let the Master come

— let him come —

and let us uproot this ruling of Rav and Shmuel. [

Let us uproot their ruling, that Rav and Shmuel ruled that a person does not bequeath to his sons money over which there is an oath!

Rav Naḥman said to them: Have I troubled myself [

I exerted myself]

and come all these parasangs [

and came and traveled by way of all those many parasangs]

in order to uproot this ruling of Rav and Shmuel!?

Rather, let us not add to it!

Let us rule that we do not add to their ruling, and do not learn from their words regarding other cases —

such as what?

For Rav Pappa said: One who blemishes his document

and admits that part of the debt had already been paid and is obligated to swear that he had not paid the remainder,

and dies,

the lender

the heirs take the heirs’ oath and collect.

Now, in this case, the father was obligated to take an oath, and nevertheless the heirs take an oath and collect. And we do not say according to the ruling of Rav and Shmuel that a person does not bequeath an oath to his sons.

And as Rav Naḥman said, we have only what Rav and Shmuel enacted. However, this oath of one who blemishes his document, which was not mentioned in their enactment — the heirs take an oath!

There was a certain

borrower

who died

— he died during the lender’s lifetime —

and left

— and left behind —

a guarantor. [

Another person who had guaranteed his debt].

And the lender became obligated to take an oath to the borrower’s sons. And afterward the lender died, and the lender’s heirs came to collect their father’s debt from the guarantor. [

For they could not collect from the borrower’s heirs, since he had already become obligated to them to take an oath, and a person does not bequeath this oath to his sons].

Rav Pappa thought to say: This too,

this case, in which the borrower left a guarantor, is also included in what we said above,

“we do not add to it” [

to the words of Rav and Shmuel].

Since here the orphans do not collect from the lender’s heirs, but rather they collect from the guarantor. And Rav and Shmuel stated their ruling concerning collection from the heirs themselves, and not from the guarantor. Indeed, the orphans can collect from the guarantor with an oath.

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said to Rav Pappa: Is that so? The guarantor,

does this guarantor, after they collect from him,

not go after the orphans?

And it follows that although the lender’s heirs do not collect directly from the heirs, they cause the guarantor to go and collect from the heirs.

And if so, their collection from the guarantor is considered collection from the heirs. And once again we return to the words of Rav and Shmuel, that a person does not bequeath an oath to his sons when they collect from the heirs. And there is no difference between collection from the guarantor and collection from the heirs.

There was a certain

lender

who died [

he died] after the borrower had died during his lifetime, and the lender became obligated to take an oath to the borrower’s sons.

And he left a brother,

the lender did not leave sons behind, but only a brother who inherited him, and that brother came to collect the money concerning which there was a law of an oath.

Rami bar Ḥama thought to say: This too,

even this case is included in what Rav Naḥman said,

“we do not add to it.”

As stated above.

For Rav and Shmuel stated their ruling regarding inheritance by a son, who does not inherit money concerning which there is an obligation to take an oath. But the inheritance of a brother was not included in this. And if so, the brother should take the heirs’ oath, such as “my brother did not instruct me,” and collect!

Rava said to him: What difference is there to me

an oath

“my father did not instruct me,” and what difference is there to me

an oath

“my brother did not instruct me”?

Rather, both are equal with regard to this oath. And just as a person does not bequeath an oath to his sons, so a person does not bequeath an oath to his brothers. [And this too is included in the ruling of Rav and Shmuel].

Rav Ḥama said: Now that the halakha has not been stated neither in accordance with Rav and Shmuel nor in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

who disputes them,

this judge [

judge]

who acted,

who performed an act and ruled in accordance with Rav and Shmuel —

has acted,

and his ruling stands!

And a judge

who acted in accordance with Rabbi Elazar —

has acted!

Rav Pappa said: This document of orphans

a debt document presented against orphans, whose father, the borrower, died before the lender died [and Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Elazar disputed whether one collects with it or not],

if this document comes into the hands of the judge —

we do not tear it, and we also do not collect with it.

They do not collect the debt recorded in this document.

And the Gemara explains:

we do not collect with it —

perhaps we hold in accordance with Rav and Shmuel.

For it is impossible to repay the debt recorded in this document except with an oath, and they do not take this oath!

And we do not tear it —

for this judge who acted in accordance with Rabbi Elazar —

has acted!

And it is possible that the document will come before a judge who holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, and they will collect with it.

There was a certain judge who acted in accordance with Rabbi Elazar

and instructed the orphans to collect their father’s debt with an oath.

There was a Torah scholar in his town,

in the judge’s city,

who said to him

that Torah scholar said to the judge:

A letter has arrived from the West [

a written letter arrived from the Land of Israel]

that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Elazar!

And if so, how are you ruling like him?

He said to him

the judge said:

When you bring it.

When you bring me this letter, I will heed your words!

He came before Rav Ḥama

to obtain the letter,

and he said

to him

Rav Ḥama said to him:

This judge who acted in accordance with Rabbi Elazar —

has acted.

And since this is so, you may not reverse the judge from the ruling he issued, although the halakha was ruled in accordance with Rav and Shmuel.

We learned in our Mishna:

And these take an oath

without a claim.

And the Gemara wonders:

Are we dealing with fools?

Does our Mishna deal with foolish people, who take an oath without anyone demanding that they take an oath?

And the explanation:

This is what it says: And these take an oath not on the basis of a certain claim, but

they are obligated to take an oath even

on the basis of an uncertain claim.

And they are:

partners and sharecroppers.

For example, the partner or the master claims against them, “Perhaps you retained for yourself what belongs to me.” That is, he suspects him of taking from the money that was between them in partnership or sharecropping.

Our Mishna further enumerated “the member of the household.” He too is made to take an oath on the basis of an uncertain claim, that he did not take anything from the household’s money.

And the Gemara explains what is meant by “the member of the household,” concerning whom the Mishna said that he takes an oath even on the basis of an uncertain claim.

A tanna taught: The member of the household of whom they said

in the Mishna that he is obligated to take an oath,

not

did they say this concerning a member of the household

who enters and leaves on his feet,

and conducts himself in the house like any other member of the household,

but

they said this concerning a member of the household

who brings in for him,

into the house,

laborers and takes laborers out for him, brings produce in for him and takes produce out for him.

And he manages the affairs of the household.

And for this reason he must take an oath to the other heirs, the members of the household, that he did not take anything for himself, but brought in and took out everything as he told them.

And the Gemara asks:

And what is different about these

that specifically they were obligated to take this oath even on the basis of an uncertain claim?

And the answer:

Because

these sharecroppers, partners, and members of the household

deem it permitted regarding it

they deem it permitted for themselves to take from these assets because they labor with them.

Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said in the name of Rav Naḥman: And this,

this obligation to take an oath on the basis of an uncertain claim, applies only when

there is a claim between them

of at least

two silver coins.

That is: the claimant said to him, “Perhaps you retained two silver coins of mine in your possession.” And this defendant admits part of the claim.

If his claim had been a definite claim, he would have been liable for an oath by Torah law. And the Sages instituted that he swear even concerning a claim of uncertainty, in a case where he admits to him part of his claim.

And this law—that the oath must be at least concerning a claim of two silver—,

According to whom?

According to Shmuel!

Earlier, on 39b, Rav and Shmuel disagreed concerning the manner in which the law of the oath of one who admits to part [of the claim] applies. Does the claim need to be for two silver, and from that amount the defendant admits to him a peruta—and this is Shmuel’s opinion—

or must the claim be for two silver and a peruta, while the denial [that which he denies in addition to what he admits] must be for two silver—and this is Rav’s opinion?

And if so, the words of the Gemara here—that there be between the claimant and the defendant two perutot—are seemingly according to Shmuel’s opinion.

But this is difficult:

And Rabbi Hiyya taught

Earlier, in the chapter “The Oaths of the Judges,” [40a] it was demonstrated from Rabbi Hiyya’s words

to support Rav.

For only the denial needs to be for two silver, whereas the claim must be for two silver and a peruta,

and the answer is:

Say,

what we said earlier—that there must be between them a claim of two silver—means that there be between them

a denial of a claim

of two silver.

However, the claim itself will be for two silver and a peruta, and

according to Rav!

We learned in our Mishna: If

the partners and the sharecroppers

mentioned above divided, and completed between them the transaction and the division of the money or the produce, neither of them can again administer an oath to the other after the division, on the basis of a claim of uncertainty!

A question was raised to them: What is it—

is it possible

to roll over

upon a partner or a sharecropper the oath of the partners, after they divided and were released from this oath, by means of another oath

of rabbinic origin.

For example: to roll it over from an oath of inducement or from the oath of those who swear and collect. [

And the question in the Gemara is a general question: do they roll over an oath by means of an oath of rabbinic origin? ]

Come and hear: He borrowed from him on the eve of the Sabbatical year,

and the Sabbatical year arrived and released his debt.

And at the conclusion of the Sabbatical year he became to him,

the borrower

a partner or a sharecropper.

And he became liable to him for the oath of the partners.

The law is that

they do not roll over

upon him now an oath of inducement of rabbinic origin concerning the loan [if he denied the loan to him at that time], since the Sabbatical year had already released the loan.

And the Gemara infers from this:

The reason

that they do not roll it over is because

the

borrower

borrowed from him

on

the eve of the Sabbatical year.

For

in the meantime,

the Sabbatical year came

and

released it.

It released the loan.

And only for this reason do they not roll it over, since the loan no longer exists.

But the other years of the Sabbatical cycle,

in other years that are not the Sabbatical year, then in a case resembling this—

they roll over

upon him an oath of inducement, and when this was taught in the days of the tannaim, they had not yet instituted an oath of inducement, for it was instituted in the days of Rav Naḥman (Rashi), by means of the oath of the partners for which he became liable. Even though the oath of the partners is only of rabbinic origin. And it is demonstrated that they roll over an oath of rabbinic origin!

And the Gemara rejects this:

Do not say

that we should infer

but the other years of the Sabbatical cycle, they roll it over.

Rather, say,

we should infer as follows:

He became to him a partner or a sharecropper on the eve of the Sabbatical year

and they divided the partnership and were thereby released from the oath,

and at the conclusion of the Sabbatical year he borrowed from him

and admitted to him part of the claim and became liable for an oath by Torah law.

The law is that

they roll over

upon him, by means of the oath of one who admits to part [of the claim]—which is by Torah law—the oath of the partners as well.

And this statement comes to teach us that the Sabbatical year releases the oath of the partners only, but not the oath concerning the loan. And if so, there is no proof at all that they roll over an oath by means of an oath of rabbinic origin!

And the Gemara refutes this inference:

This

law—that the Sabbatical year releases only an oath concerning a loan—

it explicitly teaches

in this statement:

He became to him a partner or a sharecropper on the eve of the Sabbatical year,

and they divided between them and were released from the oath.

And at the conclusion of the Sabbatical year he borrowed from him—

they roll it over!

And necessarily, the first clause, which says that if he borrowed from him on the eve of the Sabbatical year and at the conclusion of the Sabbatical year became his partner, the law is that they do not roll it over, comes to teach us that only if he borrowed from him on the eve of the Sabbatical year do they not roll it over. But in the other years of the Sabbatical cycle, they roll it over even when it is of rabbinic origin. And

infer from it that they roll it over when it is of rabbinic origin!

The conclusion of the Gemara is:

Infer from it!