Shevuot 48a — the Talmud in English

And

one

of the witnesses

says:

I saw the moon

high

above the ground, at the lower edge of the firmament,

two ox-goads.

An ox-goad is a cattle-driver. It is a long stick sharpened at its end, with which they urge the animals on. And this implement had a fixed measurement, and for that reason the witnesses assessed the height of the moon by saying so-and-so many ox-goads.

And one

of the witnesses

says:

I saw it

three ox-goads high; their testimony is valid.

Since such an error, between two ox-goads and three ox-goads, is a small error in which people are liable to err, and their intention is not to lie.

But if

one says:

The moon was

three

ox-goads high,

and

one witness

says

it was high

five; their testimony is void!

For they contradicted one another. And there is no reason to err in so great a difference, and if so, certainly one of them is lying.

But

they join

each of them

with another testimony

with other witnesses.

And from now there is a difficulty:

is it not

what we said, that each of them joins with another testimony, presumably means that they join even

with testimony concerning money,

despite the fact that they contradicted one another?

And if so, there is a difficulty according to Rav Hisda, who holds that anyone who contradicted another is disqualified for all testimonies in the world?

And the answer:

Rava said:

What we said, that they join with another testimony, does not mean that they join with other testimonies in the world.

Rather,

he and

a witness

another

who was not with him in this testimony concerning the month,

join for another testimony concerning this new moon

.

That is to say, if another witness came and joined the words of one of these witnesses who contradict one another, and testified like him, in this manner he is trusted.

Since

there are two of them,

that is, two witnesses [the first who testified initially

and

the second, [the one who joined him now], and opposite them

one

—the one witness whom they previously contradicted.

And the words of one do not stand in place of two.

However, certainly these two witnesses who contradicted one another do not join together for other testimonies.

We learned in our Mishna:

[If] said

the householder

to the shopkeeper: Give me produce worth a dinar,

and he gave it to him. The shopkeeper said to the householder: Give me the dinar that you owe me in exchange for the produce.

He said to him: I gave it to you! The householder must take an oath that he gave him the dinar.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda said: When

is the householder obligated to swear that he indeed paid the dinar?

?

When the produce is gathered and lying there, and both of them

raise claims concerning it

about the payment.

The householder claims that he already paid, whereas the shopkeeper claims that he still has not received the payment.

But

if already

he had slung them

the householder

in his basket behind him,

he is already in possession of the produce and is exempt from the oath. And if the shopkeeper wants to take the dinar from him, then:

the one who seeks to extract from his fellow bears the proof!

We learned in our Mishna:

[If] he said to the money changer: Give me

coins worth a dinar, and he gave them to him. He said to him: Give me the dinar. He said to him: I gave it to you, and you put it in the purse—the householder must swear. And so on.

And this is difficult: Is this law not already explained in the words of the Mishna above, concerning a householder who bought produce from the shopkeeper? And why does the Mishna need to add this example of a money changer and a householder?

And the answer:

It is necessary!

The Mishna needs to repeat and state this law both with regard to a shopkeeper and with regard to a money changer.

Because

if it had taught us

only

the first one,

the law of the shopkeeper, we would have said that

in this one,

only in this case,

the Rabbis say

that the householder must swear,

because produce is liable to rot. [Produce is liable to rot easily and quickly.]

Produce is liable to rot easily and quickly.]

And since it is liable to rot, he does not keep it. [And since it will rot, the shopkeeper does not hold it in his possession,]

And since it would rot, the shopkeeper does not retain it in his possession,]

and therefore one must say that the shopkeeper cast it into the vessels of the buyer even before he paid him, so that the matter would be completed quickly and he would not retract from the purchase.

But coins, which do not rot, I might say,

there would be room to say that

the Rabbis agree with him

the Rabbis

with Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that it is not the way of the money changer to give the coins before he receives the dinar.

And if so, the householder would be exempt from an oath. And for this reason the law of the money changer was also written, to inform us that even in this the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and hold that the householder must swear.

However, if so, why do we need the law of the shopkeeper?

The answer:

And if it had been stated in this one,

if only the law of the money changer had been stated, and not the law of the shopkeeper, we would have said that only

in this one,

with regard to the money changer,

Rabbi Yehuda says

that he is exempt from an oath.

But with regard to that one,

the law of the shopkeeper,

I might say that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with them,

Rabbi Yehuda

with the Rabbis,

that the householder is obligated to swear, since presumably he gave the produce to the householder before the householder paid him, and for that reason—

it is necessary!

Both these cases and laws are needed.

We learned in our Mishna:

Just as they said that one who diminishes his marriage settlement

may not collect it without an oath, and so on,

so too, heirs may not collect except by an oath.

And the Gemara asks:

From whom

may the heirs not collect except by an oath?

And the Gemara discusses:

If you say

that it means that the heirs of the creditor may not collect

the loan

except by an oath, this cannot be!

Because

their father collected without an oath, and they [would collect] with an oath?

Rather,

this is what it says: And so too, the heirs

of the creditor, when they come to collect

from the heirs

of the debtor,

may not collect except by an oath.

And what is their oath? That our father did not instruct us that this document had been paid. And therefore they collect by means of the document, since an ordinary document is not considered collected.

Rav and Shmuel both say: They taught

this law, that heirs collect from heirs by an oath,

only

when

the creditor died during the debtor’s lifetime.

And only afterward did the debtor die.

But

when

the debtor died

during

the creditor’s lifetime,

and

the creditor had already become obligated to the debtor’s sons to take an oath

that he had not collected from their father [and this is the law of everyone who comes to collect from the property of orphans, that he collects only by an oath], and afterward the creditor died—

the creditor’s sons do not collect by an oath.

And a person does not bequeath an oath to his sons!

Because they cannot take the oath to which their father became obligated. That is, that he had not collected from the debtor.

They sent it

this question

before Rabbi Elazar: This oath—what is its nature?

That is, why should the creditor’s orphans lose, and why should we not make them take the heirs’ oath, “that our father did not instruct us that this document was paid,” and let them take [the debt] by this oath?

He sent to them

Rabbi Elazar: Indeed,

heirs

of the creditor

take the heirs’ oath and collect

from the debtor’s orphans! And Rabbi Elazar disagrees with Rav and Shmuel and holds that the orphans indeed inherit their father’s debt, even though they must swear concerning it!

They again

sent it

this question

in the days of Rabbi Ami; he said

Rabbi Ami:

All this

trouble they have taken,

sending and going

with this question!

For

if we find a reason in it, would we not send it to them?

Rather, Rabbi Ami said: Since it has come into our hands

since the question concerning this law of the heirs’ oath has come into our hands,

let us say a matter concerning it:

If after the debtor died,

the creditor stood

the creditor

in court

and sued the debtor’s orphans, and the court obligated him to take an oath, according to the law of one who comes to collect from heirs,

and the creditor died

the creditor.

For

the creditor had already become obligated to the debtor’s sons in an oath

in court,

and a person does not bequeath

money concerning which there is an obligation of

an oath to his sons.

But if

the creditor did not stand

the creditor, and did not sue the debtor’s orphans

in court, and died,

then

the heirs

of the creditor

take the heirs’ oath

that our father did not instruct us—and

they collect!

Since an oath obligation had not yet taken effect upon their father. And if so, they are not inheriting from him money concerning which there is an oath obligation.

Rav Nahman challenges this: Is it the court that obligates him to take an oath? [Does the court obligate the creditor to swear to the debtor’s orphans in order to collect?]

Does the court obligate the lender to swear to the borrower’s orphans in order to collect?]

Is it not

from the moment

[from the time]

that he died

[that he died] the

debtor, the creditor became obligated to the debtor’s sons in an oath.

And there is no need for a court ruling in order to obligate him in an oath. And from the moment the debtor died, he cannot collect from the heirs except by an oath?

Rather, Rav Nahman said: If the statement of Rav and Shmuel exists—

it exists!

And the heirs do not collect by an oath, whether their father stood in court or whether he did not.

And if the law of Rav and Shmuel does not exist—

it does not exist!

it does not exist!

Now, it is not implied from Rav Nahman’s words whether the halakha is according to Rav and Shmuel or not.

And the Gemara proves from this:

Apparently, it is uncertain to him,

it is uncertain to Rav Nahman according to whom the halakha is.

And if so, there is a difficulty:

But Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said: Rav Nahman carried out a ruling

when both parties, the claimant and the defendant, were suspected concerning an oath, and both were unable to swear, Rav Nahman ruled—

they divide!

And if so, also with orphans who come to collect from orphans, when both are unable to swear, according to Rav Nahman’s words the ruling should be “they divide,” and not according to Rav and Shmuel. And why is Rav Nahman uncertain whether the halakha is like them or not?

And the answer: Rav Nahman

was speaking according to Rabbi Meir’s words

who said in our Mishna that the oath returned to its place,

he said,

that if the statement of Rav and Shmuel exists, it exists, and if it does not exist, it does not exist.

And indeed, according to Rabbi Meir’s view, one must be uncertain as Rav Nahman was uncertain: whether the halakha is according to Rav and Shmuel, that the oath returned to its place and he does not collect at all, or whether the law is not according to Rav and Shmuel, but rather the oath returned to the one obligated in it. And since he cannot swear, he pays.

However:

But according to him,

Rav Nahman himself

does not hold

like Rabbi Meir. Rather, he holds according to the words of Rabbi Yosei in our Mishna, and the law is that if they cannot swear, they divide!

And for this reason Rav Nahman carried out a ruling that they divide!

Rav Oshaya raises an objection:

A widow who did not collect her marriage settlement after her husband’s death, and returned to her father’s house without demanding maintenance from the orphans, and in the end

died

without collecting her marriage settlement, the law is that

her heirs

of that widow

mention

and claim and collect her marriage settlement from the husband’s heirs

until twenty-five years

from the husband’s death.

And if so, it is proven that the orphans collect the marriage settlement from the husband’s heirs. But this widow, had she been alive, would have collected only by an oath, according to the law of everyone who comes to collect from orphans.

And if so, her heirs too would collect by an oath. And it is proved that a person bequeaths an oath to his sons, and not in accordance with Rav and Shmuel?

And the answer:

With what are we dealing here? That

already

swore

the widow to the orphans—

and died

after she had sworn. And when her heirs come to collect, they do not need to swear. Since they collect by virtue of their mother’s oath.

And the Gemara brings proof from several places not in accordance with Rav and Shmuel:

Come and hear: He married

a

first wife and she died.

He married

a

second wife and he died.

And now his second wife wants to collect her ketuba, and the heirs of his first wife want to take the inheritance.

The law is that the wife

second and [

or ]

her heirs precede the heirs of the first wife.

Since the heirs of the second wife come to collect the ketuba. And payment of the ketuba debt must precede the division of the inheritance.

And it is difficult: Why do the heirs of the second wife collect the ketuba? After all, their mother became liable for an oath to the heirs of the first wife, and a person does not bequeath an oath to his sons?

And the answer:

So too here,

the case is also one in which

the woman had already sworn,

the wife,

and died

after she had sworn. And now the orphans collect by virtue of their mother’s oath.

Come and hear:

One who wrote to his wife: “A vow and an oath I have not imposed upon you or upon your heirs” — he cannot make her swear, neither her nor her heirs. And they take what they claim, even without an oath.

But

if he dies, then

his heirs make her and her heirs and those who come by her authority swear. [

That is, those who purchased her ketuba from her and collect it for themselves]. And all these swear to the heirs, since he alone exempted them from an oath, but not his heirs.

And from what is written, that his heirs make her heirs swear so that her heirs can take her ketuba, it is proved that a person bequeaths an oath to his sons. And not in accordance with Rav and Shmuel?

And the answer:

Rav Shemaya said—

It is taught with respect to different cases:

That is, the law that his heirs make them swear is not stated concerning all the words of the beraita. Rather, it is as follows:

His heirs make

her

herself—

in the case of a widow,

when she comes to collect the ketuba from the orphans, and this oath was stated only concerning her. However, if she herself died, her heirs cannot swear to his heirs and take their mother’s ketuba!

And

the

heirs—

in the case of a divorcee.

That is, the oath that is mentioned in the beraita with regard to her heirs was stated only when he made her ketuba payable by divorcing her during his lifetime.

And if so, she could have taken the ketuba even without an oath. And the case is one in which she died before him, and her sons inherited the money of the ketuba without there being an obligation of an oath upon it. And her heirs swear to his heirs, by the law that anyone who comes to collect from the property of orphans may collect only by an oath. But this is not an obligation of an oath that they inherited from their mother!

Rav Natan bar Hoshaya raised an objection:

It is stated in a beraita:

The son’s power is greater than the father’s power.