Shevuot 37a — the Talmud in English

Rav Kahana encountered them and said ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact folio location")

to them: “If he intentionally

swore an oath-of-deposit and they warned him”

before he swore,

“what is

his liability? — Is he liable for a korban or for lashes [since he intentionally and after a warning transgressed a negative commandment], or for both together?”

And the basis of the doubt is:

since it is a novelty

that was introduced concerning an oath-of-deposit,

that

for

in the entire Torah, we do not find

a person transgressing a prohibition

intentionally who brings a korban,

for a korban was given only for an unintentional act,

and here he brings a korban

intentionally; therefore, it is possible that all his liability is for a korban alone.

It makes no difference whether they warned him

before he transgressed and swore,

and it makes no difference whether they did not warn him.

And he swore intentionally without a warning, and the Torah introduced that his liability is for a korban and not for another punishment.

Or perhaps, these words

that he becomes liable for a korban for an oath intentionally apply only

where they did not warn him,

so that he is exempt from lashes, since the punishment of lashes applies only after a warning.

But where they warned him

and he is liable for lashes,

he receives lashes,

but

he does not bring a korban.

Since two liabilities, a korban and lashes, are not imposed upon him.

Or perhaps —

we do both

— a korban and lashes?

The Gemara below presents several ways to resolve Rav Kahana’s doubt:

a.

They said to him: “We learned it,”

we learned this doubt in a beraita.

For it was taught:

“More stringent than it”

[than an oath of testimony]

is an oath-of-deposit.

And its stringency is that

“for its intentional act one is liable for lashes, and for its unintentional act, for a guilt-korban worth shekels!”

From

the fact

that he says to him

he is liable

“for its intentional act, lashes,” it follows

that you learn from this that the case under discussion is one

where they warned him,

and because of this he receives lashes.

And he says —

“Lashes, yes. A korban, no!”

And what is the stringency

of the punishment of lashes for an intentional oath-of-deposit, more than the punishment of the korban for an oath of testimony?

For a person is pleased to bring

a korban [to bring] despite the financial expense,

and not to receive lashes!

And therefore the punishment of lashes is more stringent than the liability for a korban.

Rava bar Eiti said to them

to the Sages: Your proof from this beraita is not proof, since this beraita is only according to Rabbi Shimon and not according to the Sages. For

who is the author

of the statement in the preceding chapter,

“the intentional oath-of-deposit was not given for atonement” —

Rabbi Shimon.

And according to him, one is liable for an intentional oath-of-deposit only for lashes.

But according to the Sages, he also brings a korban

when he swears intentionally, in addition to the lashes.

Rav Kahana said to them, to the Sages: “Set that one aside!”

That is to say, do not force yourselves to establish the beraita according to Rabbi Shimon, as Rava bar Eiti established it; rather, you can establish it even according to the Sages, who hold that the intentional oath-of-deposit is given for atonement through a korban. But nevertheless, you cannot resolve from here the doubt that I asked you: what is his liability when one acts intentionally concerning an oath-of-deposit where they warned him, since

I

myself am the one

who taught it,

who taught that same beraita in the following manner,

and this is how we taught it:

“An oath-of-deposit is more stringent than an oath of testimony, because with an oath-of-deposit, both its intentional act and its unintentional act” —

a korban

“a guilt-korban worth shekels!”

And what is the stringency

of this over that one, [for with an oath of testimony too, one is liable for a korban for its intentional and its unintentional act]?

For there,

with an oath of testimony, the witness can bring

a sin-offering worth a dankah,

that is, at the cheap price of only one-sixth of a dinar.

But here,

with an oath-of-deposit, he is liable to bring

a guilt-korban worth shekels!

And if you ask me:

“And should we derive from it”

that the liability when he acted intentionally and they warned him is only a korban and not lashes?

Your answer is:

Perhaps

it is speaking

where they did not warn him.

For this beraita came only to state the stringency that an oath-of-deposit has over an oath of testimony, and it did not come to state the law of an oath-of-deposit in all circumstances. Therefore, even if he is liable for lashes where they warned him, nevertheless this law was not mentioned in the beraita, since it is speaking of a case where they did not warn him.

b.

Another formulation [

in the straightforward formulation of Rav Kahana’s doubt]:

Ta shma:

We learned in our Mishna:

One is not liable for its inadvertent violation

—for the mere oath of the deposit, a matter.

And for what are they liable for its deliberate violation—

a guilt-offering worth two shekels!

And the Gemara analyzes:

Is it not that

the way he becomes liable for its deliberate violation is

when they warned him,

which proves that when he acted deliberately and was warned—they obligate him only in a sacrifice.

And the Gemara rejects this: No,

here too, it is when they did not warn him!

Rather, he acted deliberately without a warning. If so, nothing can be proven from our Mishna.

c. [According to the version of Rav Hai Gaon]

Ta shma:

We learned in the Sifrei de-Bei Rav, From where is it derived that a nazirite is forbidden in a state of impurity, and that if he rendered himself impure deliberately he is liable for a sacrifice? You have said: kal va-chomer: Just as concerning the oath of the deposit, for which the inadvertent person is not liable for a guilt-offering, the deliberate person is liable for a sacrifice, concerning a nazirite, for whom one who became impure inadvertently is liable for a guilt-offering, is it not logically necessary that he be liable for a sacrifice when deliberate?

And in the Sifrei they challenged this kal va-chomer—

No; if you have said this concerning the oath of the deposit,

because

he is not flogged

when deliberate, therefore he brings a guilt-offering,

can you say this concerning a nazirite who became impure

deliberately,

who is flogged? And since he is flogged, he should not bring a sacrifice. The verse therefore says: “And he shall effect atonement for him for that which he sinned concerning the dead”!

And the Gemara analyzes:

From the fact that it says

“a nazirite who became impure”

is flogged,” it follows

that this means

when they warned him,

since if there had been no warning, there would be no flogging.

And it says: Can you say this concerning the oath of the deposit,

for even when they warned him

he is not flogged! Yet he does bring a sacrifice!

And it proves that when he acted deliberately and was warned, he brings a sacrifice and is not flogged.

And the Gemara rejects this:

What does “he is not flogged” mean

concerning the oath of the deposit? It means

that he is not released

from his liability for punishment

by flogging

alone; rather, he is liable for a sacrifice together with the flogging, and through this he achieves atonement.

However, this rejection is difficult. For if so,

it follows that an impure nazirite is released through the flogging

that he receives, and does not bring a sacrifice—and this cannot be. For

here,

in the case of an impure nazirite,

a sacrifice is explicitly written concerning him

[and, seemingly, it follows from this that he is released only through a sacrifice].

And the answer is:

There,

this

bringing of a sacrifice

is

so that naziriteship in purity may take effect upon him [so that the naziriteship that he now begins to count should begin in purity], and this is not a sacrifice for atonement, but only in order to purify him; and it is properly said that the nazirite’s atonement is through flogging alone. Whereas the sacrifice is not intended to atone for him.

[that is, so that the naziriteship that he now begins to count will begin in a state of purity]. This is not a sacrifice for atonement, but only in order to purify him; and it is therefore properly stated that the nazirite’s atonement is achieved through lashes alone. The sacrifice, by contrast, is not intended to atone for him.

They said

those

Sages

who were asked by Rav Kahana his question

before Rabba.

He said to them

Rabba: From the fact that Rav Kahana was uncertain concerning the case mentioned above, in which witnesses warned the defendant not to deny under oath, but to admit and return the deposit, it follows that there are witnesses who know the truth—that the deposit is in his possession. Because of this, they warn him not to swear falsely. If so,

it follows

from Rav Kahana’s words that

when they did not warn him, but there are witnesses

who know that his denial is false, nevertheless he

is liable

for a sacrifice. And this is difficult: Why is he liable? His denial did not help him to be exempt, but

it is merely a denial of words!

For there are witnesses who will testify that his denial is untrue, and consequently he is liable for the deposit, and his denial accomplishes nothing! And the Gemara analyzes Rabba’s challenge to Rav Kahana’s doubt:

Apparently, Rabba holds—

one who denies money concerning which there are witnesses is exempt

from a sacrifice for an oath of the deposit!

Rav Hanina said to Rabba: A beraita was taught that supports you—

it is stated concerning liability for an oath of the deposit:

“And he denies it”—

concerning a deposit, and he is liable;

except for

a person holding money belonging to brothers, who

admits to one of the brothers

that he has a share in this money, which he was sued to return, but denies it to the second brother.

Or

he admits

to one of the partners,

and denies it to the other partners.

And in both these cases he makes himself liable through his admission for the money, but admits only to one of the claimants and not to all of them. In practice, through his denial he gains nothing.

“And he swears falsely”—

except for one who borrows by a document, and one who borrows before witnesses.

For he cannot release himself from his debt through his oath, since there are witnesses and a document concerning the matter!

And it proves that for a mere denial of words, which does not release him from money—for in any event he is liable for it [whether through his admission to one of the brothers or one of the partners, or through the testimony or the document]—there is no liability for a sacrifice for an oath of the deposit.

He said to him

Rabba to Rav Hanina:

If this is the reason, it does not support you.

From this beraita, through which you wished to prove your words, -

there is no proof. For it is possible to establish the words of this beraita in a manner in which he is not denying the money, but admits to it,

saying, “I borrowed,”

but

“I did not borrow before witnesses.”

Or,

“I borrowed,”

but

“I did not borrow by means of a document.”

And since he is not denying the monetary obligation itself, but only the witnesses or the document, he is exempt from a sacrifice.

And Rabba adds proof that this is the explanation of the beraita:

From where

is it that this is so, that the issue concerns one who admits the money?—

From the fact that it teaches

in the beraita, as a derivation from the verse,

“And he denied it”—

except for one who admits to one of the brothers, or to one of the partners!

This case

in which he admitted

to one of the brothers—what are the circumstances?

If you say that he admitted to him

to that brother

with regard to his half—

only his share, why do we exempt him from the sacrifice?

There is the denial of the other,

concerning the second brother’s share, and for this denial he becomes liable for a sacrifice.

Rather, is it not that they said to him

the brothers who were suing him:

“You borrowed from both of us” [

you borrowed from both of us together].

And he said to them: “No, I borrowed from one of you”

the entire sum,

so that it is merely a denial of words,

for he admits his debt but disputes with them to whom he is liable.

And since the first clause [

where he admits to one of the brothers]

is a denial of words, the latter clause [

concerning one who borrows by a document or before witnesses]

is likewise merely a denial of words,

and not of the debt itself.

And the Gemara establishes several possibilities to prove that this is not in accordance with Rabba.

(Mnemonic: obligation, groups belonging to the householder, the stringency of the nazirite)

a.

Ta shma

from our Mishna:

He is not liable for its inadvertent violation

—of the oath of the deposit.

And for what is he liable for its deliberate violation—

a guilt-offering worth two shekels!

And the Gemara analyzes:

Is it not that the deliberate violation

is through

witnesses,

who warn him, knowing about the debt, and this is difficult for Rabba, who exempts one who denies money concerning which there are witnesses [and one could even resolve from here Rav Kahana’s question, that the liability is only for a sacrifice].

The Gemara rejects this:

No!

The intention of the Mishna is

deliberateness itself,

that he himself knows that he is lying, without there being witnesses warning him.

b.

Ta shma

from the latter clause of our Mishna, in which we learned:

There were two groups of witnesses

who were summoned by a certain person to testify against his fellow that he owed him money. If

the first group denied

the testimony,

and afterward the second group denied—

both are liable

for a sacrifice for an oath of testimony,

because the testimony could be established through both of them,

and since both denied the testimony, they caused him to lose money!

And the Gemara analyzes:

Granted, the second group should become liable, for the first group already denied,

and it can no longer testify. Thus, when the second group denied, the claimant’s monetary fate depended solely on their testimony.