Shevuot 37b (לז:) — the Talmud in English

Rather,

the

first

group—why is it liable?

For when the first group denied the testimony,

the second group was present,

so the denial by the first group was a denial concerning money about which there were other witnesses who could extract it through their testimony, and their denial is merely a denial of words. And since the first group is liable, it is proven that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabba!

Ravina said: Here we are dealing with a case where

the

second

group was unfit to testify

at the time the first group’s

witnesses were denied by the

first group.

The reason they were unfit was that the witnesses were married to two sisters, and they were

related

to one another

through their wives.

Therefore, the witnesses of the first group are liable, because at the time of their denial they were the only fit witnesses.

And

the novelty of the Mishna is that this is so even if the

wives

of the witnesses of the second group

were terminally ill.

Lest you say: Most terminally ill people

proceed

toward death,

and due to this majority, the terminally ill women are considered as though they were dead, and their husbands thereby become fit to testify; and if so, there are additional witnesses concerning this money, and the first group should not be liable,

it teaches us

that

since in actuality they are presently alive and have not died—

they are not considered as though they had died, and consequently there are no additional witnesses.

d.

Come and hear: If the owner of an article entrusted to a trustee,

the

trustee claimed that the deposit had been stolen,

meaning that the deposit had been stolen from him, and therefore he was exempt from returning it,

and he swore, and then admitted

that he had sworn falsely,

and witnesses came

that the deposit was in his possession—

if he admitted before the witnesses came,

he is exempt from the double payment, as is the law concerning one who admits liability for a fine.

And he pays the principal and the fifth, and

brings a

guilt-offering.

But if he admitted after the witnesses came,

he

pays the double payment and brings a guilt-offering.

This is difficult for Rabba, who exempts one who denies money concerning which there are witnesses.

And the Gemara rejects this:

Here too,

the case is one in which the witnesses were unfit at the time he denied the claim, because they were related through their wives. Thus, he denied money concerning which there were no witnesses, and afterward their wives died and they became fit to testify.

And it is in accordance with Ravina,

who established the statement of the earlier Mishna in this manner: “For example, their wives were terminally ill.” And it teaches us that in the interim they are unfit to testify.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear: The oath of deposit is more stringent than the oath of testimony,

the

oath of deposit, for whose intentional violation one is liable for lashes, and for whose unwitting violation one brings a guilt-offering worth two shekels!

And Ravina analyzes this:

From the fact that it says that he is lashed, by inference there are witnesses. And it says: For its unwitting violation, a guilt-offering worth two shekels,

which proves that one is liable even for money concerning which there are witnesses!?

Rav Mordekhai said to them: Exclude that statement.

For Rav Kahana said to them: I learned

this

beraita as follows:

Both its intentional violation and its unwitting violation

of the oath of deposit require a guilt-offering worth

two shekels!

The beraita is not speaking about lashes. Consequently, there is no proof that witnesses were present.

Come and hear:

For it was said earlier that it is stated in the Sifre: A nazirite who intentionally rendered himself impure is liable to bring an offering by means of a kal va-chomer from the oath of deposit. And this kal va-chomer was rejected as follows:

No,

do not derive this kal va-chomer.

For if you say that this is so with regard to an impure nazirite, who is lashed

for intentionally rendering himself impure, and therefore it is possible that he is not liable to bring an offering,

can you say this with regard to the oath of deposit, for which one is not lashed

when he violates it intentionally, and therefore he brings an offering?

And the Gemara analyzes this:

What are the circumstances?

If there are no witnesses, why is he lashed

in the case of the nazirite? He was not forewarned.

Rather, it is obvious that there are witnesses. And it teaches: “Can you say this with regard to the oath of deposit, for which one is not lashed”

which proves that there are witnesses contradicting his oath.

It is only that he is not lashed, but he does bring an offering! [

He is not lashed, but he brings an offering even when there are witnesses.]

This is a refutation of Rabba,

who said that one is exempt when denying money concerning which there are witnesses—

a refutation!

Rabbi Yohanan said: One who denies money concerning which there are witnesses is liable

to bring the offering for an oath of deposit. But one who denies

money

concerning which there is a

document is exempt!

Rav Pappa said: What is Rabbi Yohanan’s reason

for distinguishing between witnesses and a document?—

Witnesses are likely to die [

witnesses can die], and his denial is effective if the witnesses die. But

the document, behold, it is present,

and his denial is not effective in exempting him from the monetary obligation.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: A document too is liable to be lost [it may be lost], and thus his denial is effective if the document is lost.

it may be lost], and his denial was therefore effective if the note were to be lost.

Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is Rabbi Yohanan’s reason—

because the document is

money that contains

a lien on land.

For the document places a lien on the borrower’s land in favor of the lender, and thus one who denies money concerning which there is a document is considered as one who denies a claim to land. And it is established that one does not swear concerning land. Therefore, even when he swears while denying a claim involving land,

one does not bring an offering for denying a lien on land!

It was stated: One who administers an oath to witnesses concerning land,

asking them to come and testify that his lands belong to him, and they denied it and said that they did not know testimony to give on his behalf.

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree about this: One says he is liable

to bring the offering for an oath of testimony,

and one says he is exempt.

We do not know which one holds him liable and which one exempts him.

It can be concluded that Rabbi Yohanan

is the one

who says he is exempt.

The proof is

from what Rabbi Yohanan said: One who denies money concerning which there are witnesses is liable

to bring the offering for an oath of deposit. But one who denies money concerning which there is a

document is exempt.

And

Rabbi Yohanan’s reason is

in accordance with Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua,

who said that denying money documented in a document is considered denying a lien on land. And just as one does not swear concerning land, so too an oath of deposit is not considered an oath that generates liability to bring an offering. The same applies to an oath of testimony concerning land: it is not considered an oath generating liability to bring the offering for an oath of testimony.

And the Gemara’s conclusion is:

It can be concluded

that Rabbi Yohanan is the one who says he is exempt!

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abbahu: Shall we say that Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar

disagree in the same dispute as Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis!?

As we learned in the Mishna: One who robs a field from another, and a river washes it away—

he must provide him with a field, this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

For he maintains that land can be robbed, and once he robbed it and it was damaged while in his possession, he is liable to repair it and return it to its owner as it was at the time of the robbery.

And the Rabbis say:

Land cannot be robbed, and when a river washes it away, it caused damage in the property of the owner of the land, since this damage occurred in the property of the field’s owner. Therefore,

he says to him:

Behold, yours is before you!

He is not liable to compensate him.

And we say: With regard to what do they disagree?

Rabbi Eliezer interprets through inclusions and exclusions, whereas the Rabbis interpret through generalizations and specifications!

This will be explained below.

Rabbi Eliezer interprets through inclusions and exclusions.

The Torah states:

“And he denied his fellow”—

this indicates that he

included

every denial, since it did not specify which denial or which object was involved.

“Regarding a deposit or an entrusted item”—

it excluded

anything unlike these. Only matters resembling a deposit or an entrusted item remain included.

“Or anything about which he swears”—

it again included

everything.

And it is established that when a verse

includes, excludes, and includes—

it includes everything!

What did it include?

It included every matter

as subject to liability for the offering for an oath of deposit.

And what did it exclude?

It excluded documents,

for their physical substance is not money, but they serve only as proof.

And the Rabbis interpret through generalizations and specifications [

as will be explained below]:

“And he denied his fellow”—

a generalization.

“Regarding a deposit, an entrusted item, or robbery”—

a specification. “Or anything about which he swears”—

it again generalized.

And it is established:

With a generalization, specification, and generalization, you may derive

only what is similar to the specification. [

When, in one matter, a law is stated first in general terms, then specified, and then generalized again, that law applies only to matters similar to those specified. For example, here, “And he denied his fellow” states the law concerning every denial; this is the “generalization.” “Regarding a deposit or an entrusted item” specifies these matters. “Or anything about which he swears”

again presents the matter in general terms, and this is the second generalization. One derives only what is similar to the specification. As follows]:

Just as the specification explicitly refers to an object that is movable and whose physical substance is money, so too every object that is movable and whose physical substance is money.

Land is excluded—

for it is not movable.

Slaves are excluded—

for they were equated with land.

And documents are excluded, for although they are movable, their physical substance is not money!

The Gemara explains:

The one who holds liable

one who administers an oath to witnesses concerning land and they fail to testify, making him liable for the offering for an oath of testimony, maintains

in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

Just as Rabbi Eliezer holds one liable to restore damage that occurred to robbed land, deriving this from the inclusion above, so too this inclusion teaches, with regard to everything mentioned in the passage—which also includes the law of the offering for an oath of deposit—that land has the status of movable property. Accordingly, one is liable to bring a guilt-offering and pay a fifth for denying a claim involving land, and to bring the offering for an oath of testimony for denying testimony concerning land.

And the one who exempts witnesses concerning land

from the offering for an oath of testimony maintains

in accordance with the Rabbis,

who hold that land is not like movable property, because they derive through a generalization, specification, and generalization that land was excluded from the passage.

Rabbi Avuh said to Rabbi Yirmeya: No,

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar did not disagree in accordance with the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. Rather,

the one who holds him liable

maintains

in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer. And the one who exempts him could say to you:

I too hold in this matter in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

For

in this matter,

with regard to the offering,

even Rabbi Eliezer agrees

that he is exempt, both for denying a monetary claim involving land and for denying testimony involving land.

For the Merciful One said

with regard to the offering and the fifth for an oath of deposit, “anything about which he swears falsely.” And the word “anything” is an exclusion—

“anything,” but not “everything”!

The verse comes to exclude land, which is not similar to the specification, but only with regard to liability to bring an offering, despite its having been included with regard to liability for restoration.

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: The Mishna also provides a precise indication

in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan, that there is no liability for a shevuat ha-pikadon offering for denial of a claim concerning land.

As it teaches: “You stole my ox,” and he says, “I did not steal it.” He says to him, “I administer an oath to you,” and the other says, “Amen”—he is liable!

But it does not teach: “You stole my slave.”

What is the reason? Is it not because a slave is compared to land, and one does not bring an offering for denial of a claim involving land?

Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava:

Your proof from our Mishna is not conclusive. For

consider the latter clause—

“This is the rule: Anyone who pays on the basis of his own admission is liable, but one who does not pay on the basis of his own admission is exempt!”

“This is the rule”—what does it come to include?

Is it not intended to include the case of “You stole my slave,”

in which, despite the fact that a slave is compared to land, one is liable for a shevuat ha-pikadon offering concerning it, since one is liable for an offering even for denial of a claim concerning land? If so, the Mishna provides no proof for either side of this issue.