Shevuot 37b — the Talmud in English

Rather

the group

the first—

why is it liable?

For at the time that the first group denied the testimony,

the second group was present,

and the denial of the first group was a denial of testimony concerning money over which there are other witnesses who can extract it through them, and their denial is a denial of words. And since he is liable, it is proven that it is not like Rabba!

Ravina said: Here we are dealing with what case? With a case where

the group

the second

was disqualified for testimony

at the time of the denial of

the witnesses of the group

the first.

And the disqualification was because the witnesses were married to two sisters, and they were

relatives

of one another

through their wives,

and therefore the witnesses of the first group are liable, because at the time of their denial they were the only valid witnesses.

And

the novelty of the Mishna is that even if

their wives

of the witnesses of the second group

were in their death throes.

Lest you say: Most of those in their death throes

go

to death,

and because of this majority the women in their death throes are considered as though they are dead, and their husbands become qualified to testify, and if so, this money has additional witnesses over it, and the first group should not be liable,

it teaches us

that since

at present, at any rate, they are alive and have not died—

this is not considered as though they had died, and consequently there are no additional witnesses either.

d.

Come and hear: The bailee,

the person entrusted with the deposit

who claimed the claim of theft concerning a deposit,

that is, the deposit was stolen from him, and therefore he is exempt from returning it,

and swore, and admitted

that he had sworn falsely,

and witnesses came

that the deposit was in his possession—

if he admitted before the witnesses came,

he is exempt from the double payment, as is the law of one who admits a penalty.

And he pays the principal and a fifth and

brings a sacrifice

of guilt.

But if he admitted after the witnesses came,

he

pays a double payment and a guilt-offering.

And this is difficult for Rabba, who exempts one who denies money over which there are witnesses.

And the Gemara rejects:

here too

it is speaking of a case where the witnesses were disqualified at the time that he denied, because they were relatives through their wives. And it turns out that he denied money over which there were no witnesses, and afterward their wives died and they became fit to testify. And

as Ravina,

who established the words of the Mishna above in this manner: “And in a case where their wives were in their death throes.” And it teaches us that in the meantime they are disqualified from testifying.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear: More stringent than it,

than the oath of testimony,

is the deposit oath, for one is liable for its deliberate violation to lashes and for its unwitting violation to a guilt-offering worth two shekels!

And Ravina infers:

From the fact that it says “he is lashed,” by inference there are witnesses. And it says: “for its unwitting violation, a guilt-offering worth two shekels,”

and it is proven that he is liable even for money over which there are witnesses!?

Rav Mordekhai said to them: Exclude that one.

For Rav Kahana said to them: I learned it

this beraita,

and this is how I learned it: Whether its deliberate violation or its unwitting violation

of the deposit oath is

a guilt-offering worth

two shekels!

And the beraita is not speaking of lashes. Consequently, there is no proof that there were witnesses there.

Come and hear: For we said above, as it appears in the Sifre: A nazirite who defiled himself deliberately is liable for a sacrifice by a kal va-chomer from the deposit oath, and we rejected this kal va-chomer as follows:

As we said earlier, it is stated in the Sifra: A nazirite who intentionally renders himself impure is liable to bring an offering by an a-fortiori inference from the oath concerning a deposit. This a-fortiori inference is rejected as follows:

No,

do not reason this kal va-chomer. For

if you say concerning a defiled nazirite, that he is lashed

for having deliberately defiled himself, and therefore it is possible that he is not liable for a sacrifice,

can you say concerning the deposit oath, that he is not lashed

deliberately, and therefore he brings a sacrifice?

And the Gemara infers:

What are the circumstances?

If there are no witnesses, why is he lashed

as a nazirite? Surely he was not forewarned.

Rather, it is obvious that there are witnesses. And it teaches: “Can you say concerning the deposit oath, that he is not lashed”!

And it is proven that there are witnesses opposing his oath.

It is lashes that he does not receive, but he does bring a sacrifice!

He does not receive lashes, but he brings a sacrifice even though there are witnesses.

A refutation of Rabba,

who said that one is exempt for money over which there are witnesses—

a refutation!

Rabbi Yohanan said: One who denies money over which there are witnesses is liable

for the sacrifice of the deposit oath. But one who denies

money

over which there is

a document is exempt!

Rav Pappa said: What is Rabbi Yohanan’s reason

for distinguishing between witnesses and a document?—

Witnesses are liable to die—

witnesses can die—and his denial was effective if the witnesses were to die. But

the document, behold, it lies there,

and his denial was not effective to exempt him from the money.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: A document too is liable to be lost—

it is liable to be lost—and it turns out that his denial was effective if the document were to be lost.

Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is Rabbi Yohanan’s reason—

because it was a document

of money in which there is

a lien on land.

For the document places a lien on the borrower’s land for the lender, and it turns out that one who denies money over which there is a document is as one who denies land; and it is established for us that one does not swear concerning land. Therefore, even when he swears concerning a denial of land,

one does not bring a sacrifice for the denial of a lien on land!

It was stated: One who adjures witnesses concerning land,

that they should come and testify to him that his lands are his, and they denied and said that they did not know testimony to testify for him.

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar disagreed about it: One said he is liable

the witness for the sacrifice of the oath of testimony,

and one said he is exempt.

And we do not know who is the one who makes liable and who is the one who exempts.

It can be concluded that Rabbi Yohanan

is the one

who says he is exempt.

And the proof is

from what Rabbi Yohanan said: One who denies money over which there are witnesses is liable

for the sacrifice of the deposit oath. But one who denies money over which there is

a document is exempt.

And

Rabbi Yohanan’s reason is

as Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua,

that denial of money by means of a document is considered denial of a lien on land. And just as one does not swear concerning land, so too the deposit oath is not considered an oath obligating a sacrifice for the oath. And the same law applies: the oath of testimony concerning land is not considered an oath obligating the sacrifice of the oath of testimony.

And the Gemara’s conclusion is:

It can be concluded

that Rabbi Yohanan is the one who says he is exempt!

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abahu: Shall we say that Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar—

they disagree in the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis!?

For we learned: One who robs a field from his fellow, and a river washed it away—

he is liable to provide him with a field, the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

For he holds that land can be robbed, and once he robbed it and it was damaged in his possession, he is liable to repair it and return it to its owner as it was at the time of the robbery.

And the Sages say:

Land cannot be robbed, and when a river washed it away, he damaged it in the possession of the owner of the land, for this damage occurred in the possession of the owner of the field. Therefore

he says to him—

Behold, yours is before you!

And he is not liable to compensate him.

And we say: Over what do they disagree?—

Rabbi Eliezer expounds inclusions and exclusions, and the Rabbis expound generalization and specification!

And it will be explained below.

Rabbi Eliezer expounds inclusions and exclusions,

it is stated in the Torah

“and he denied his fellow”—

behold, it

included

every denial, since it did not specify which denial or which object is being discussed.

“Concerning a deposit or a placing of the hand”—

it excluded

everything that is not similar to these. And only things similar to a deposit and a placing of the hand remained.

“Or concerning all that concerning which he swears”—

it again included

everything.

And it is established for us: When the verse

included, excluded, and included—

it included everything!

What did it include?—

It included every matter

for liability for the sacrifice of the deposit oath.

And what did it exclude?—

It excluded documents

for their substance is not money, but they serve only as proof.

And the Rabbis expound generalization and specification

as will be explained below:

“And he denied his fellow”—

a generalization.

“Concerning a deposit or a placing of the hand or robbery”—

a specification. “Or concerning all that concerning which he swears”—

it again generalized.

And it is established for us:

A generalization, a specification, and a generalization—you reason

only according to the nature of the specification.

When, in one matter, a law is stated first in a general manner, and afterward specified, and then returns to a general formulation, that law is established only with regard to the specified things. For example, here, “and he denied his fellow”—this law was stated with regard to every denial, and this is a generalization. “Concerning a deposit or a placing of the hand”—it specified these things. “Or concerning all that concerning which he swears”—

it returned and reasoned in a general manner, and this is a generalization. And one reasons only according to what is like the specification. And as follows:

Just as the specification explicitly refers to something movable and whose substance is money, so too everything movable and whose substance is money.

Excluded are lands—

for they are not movable.

Excluded are slaves—

for they were equated with lands.

And excluded are documents, for although they are movable, their substance is not money!

And the Gemara explains:

The one who makes liable

one who adjures witnesses concerning land for the sacrifice of the oath of testimony holds

like Rabbi Eliezer.

Just as Rabbi Eliezer makes one liable to restore the damage that occurred to the robbed land, and learned this from the inclusion above, so too this inclusion teaches concerning everything stated in the passage, in which the law of the sacrifice of the deposit oath is also stated, that land has the status of movable property. Accordingly, one is liable for a guilt-offering and a fifth for denial concerning land, and likewise for the sacrifice of the oath of testimony for denial of testimony concerning land.

And the one who exempts witnesses concerning land

from the sacrifice of the oath of testimony holds

like the Rabbis,

for they hold that land is not like movable property, since they learn from a generalization, specification, and generalization that land was excluded from the passage.

Rabbi Avahu said to Rabbi Yirmeya: No,

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar did not disagree in the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages. Rather,

the one who makes liable

holds

like Rabbi Eliezer. And the one who exempts can say to you:

I too hold here like Rabbi Eliezer.

For

in this matter,

concerning the sacrifice,

even Rabbi Eliezer admits

that he is exempt, both for denial of money involving land and for denial of testimony involving land.

For the Merciful One said

concerning the sacrifice and the fifth in the deposit oath, “concerning all that concerning which he swears falsely.” And the word “all” is an exclusion—

“all,” but not “everything”!

And the verse came to exclude land, which is not similar to the specification, only with regard to liability for a sacrifice, despite the fact that it was included with regard to liability for restoration.

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: The Mishna too is precise

in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan, that there is no obligation for an oath-offering for denial of land.

For it teaches: “You stole my ox,” and he says, “I did not steal it.” “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen”—he is liable!

But it does not teach, “You stole my slave.”

What is the reason? Is it not because a slave was compared to land, and one does not bring an offering for denial of a claim involving land!

Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava:

Your proof from our Mishna is not conclusive. For

say the latter clause—

“This is the general rule: Whoever pays on his own admission is liable, and whoever does not pay on his own admission is exempt!”

“This is the general rule”—what does it come to include?

Is it not to include, “You stole my slave,”

for although he was compared to land, one is liable for it with an oath-offering for a deposit, because even for denial of land one is liable for an offering! And if so, one cannot prove from the Mishna either side in this matter.