Shevuot 36b (לו:) — the Talmud in English

And we conclude:

Rather,

we must necessarily say:

reverse it.

And

even in matters of prohibition, he does not accept

the principle that from a negative statement you can infer the affirmative, according to Rabbi Meir.

Ravina challenged this: Does Rabbi Meir not accept the principle that from a negative statement you can infer the affirmative even in matters of prohibition?

?!

If so,

koenim—members of the priestly class who serve in the Temple—who served in the Temple while

intoxicated from wine

or

with unkempt hair [unclear: the source ends with an isolated letter]

—their

liability is death

—would their liability be derived through the principle that from a negative statement you can infer the affirmative?

Is that also the case according to Rabbi Meir,

who would say that they are not liable to death? After all, their liability to death is not stated directly. Rather, it is written: “Do not drink wine or strong drink—and you will not die.” The implication is: If you drink when you come to serve in the Tent of Meeting, you will die! And this cannot be so, because—

But we learned

in an unattributed Mishna, with no dissenting opinion:

These are liable to death:

those intoxicated from wine and those with unkempt hair!?

Rather,

this is what must be said according to Rabbi Meir:

In fact, reverse it:

Rabbi Meir does not accept the principle that from a negative statement you can infer the affirmative. Rather,

when he does not accept it,

it is in monetary matters,

but

in matters of prohibition, he does accept it!

Therefore, even according to Rabbi Meir, koenim who served in the Temple while intoxicated from wine or with unkempt hair are liable to death.

But the case of a Sotah is different, because it is a prohibition that also involves monetary matters.

For the collection of the marriage settlement depends on whether she committed adultery or not. Therefore, in her case we do not apply the principle that from a negative statement you can infer the affirmative. Instead, it is necessary to write a direct wording of a curse: “If you are innocent, remain innocent; but you, if you have gone astray”!

Likewise, in our Mishna, where the claimant summons the witness to come and testify for him regarding money, this is a prohibition that also involves monetary matters; Rabbi Meir does not accept in this case the principle that from a negative statement you can infer the affirmative.

We have completed the chapter “The Oath of Testimony.”

The term “oath of the deposit” is a general designation for all monetary claims that one person has against another when he administers an oath to him concerning them, and not specifically for a “deposit” alone.

It is stated in the Torah at the end of the portion of Leviticus: “

If a person sins, committing a betrayal against the Lord and denying his fellow,

regarding a deposit, or a loan placed in his hand, or robbery; or he oppresses his fellow; or he finds a lost item and denies it, and swears falsely”...—

“And it shall be, when he sins and incurs guilt, that he shall return the robbery that he robbed, or the oppression that he oppressed, or the deposit that was deposited with him,

or anything concerning which he swore falsely—

he shall pay it in its principal amount and add its fifth to it; he shall give it to the one to whom it belongs on the day of his guilt.

And he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord—a flawless ram from the flock.” (Leviticus 5:21–25)

That is to say: If a person deposited an item with another, and afterward demanded that he return it to him and administered an oath to him concerning it, and the bailee denied the depositor’s claim and his oath, or himself swore to him, and afterward it became clear that the deposit had indeed been in the bailee’s possession, the bailee is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for denying the monetary claim under oath, to pay the claimant the principal, and to add a fifth to it.

The same law applies to a claim involving other property and monetary obligations that Reuven has against Shimon, as will be explained below.

Mishna:

1.

The oath of the deposit,

, כי אין בידו דבר. ונמצא ששיקר הנפקד בשבועתו, וחייב על כך קרבן אשם, והוספת חומש על תשלום החוב]]which is the oath that a bailee swears to a depositor who demands that he return his deposit [or in response to another monetary claim], that he has nothing belonging to him. It turns out that the bailee lied in his oath, and is therefore obligated to bring a guilt-offering and to add a fifth to the payment of the debt,

applies to men and women, to distant and close relatives, and to those fit and unfit to testify.

And this oath applies whether administered before a court, and

whether

or outside a court,

if the bailee swore falsely,

on his own initiative,

that is, if he uttered the oath himself, or answered Amen after the claimant administered the oath to him [and answering Amen is considered as though he swore himself], he becomes liable to bring a sacrifice for the oath of the deposit even if he denied the claim under oath outside a court.

But

if he did not swear on his own initiative, but was made to swear

by others,

that is, the claimant administered the oath to him and he did not answer Amen to his oath—for example, the depositor claimed from him and said: “I administer an oath to you that you return my deposit to me!” and the bailee answered him: “You have nothing in my possession”—then

he is not liable

for a sacrifice for the oath of the deposit

until he denies the claim before a court,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: Whether

he swears

on his own initiative or

he swears

by others,

even outside a court,

once he has denied him,

that is, denied the depositor and his oath, and afterward admitted that it had been false — he is

liable

for a sacrifice for the oath of the deposit.

And he is liable

for the bailee who swore falsely to bring a sacrifice for the oath of the deposit, whether

for intentionality regarding the oath,

that is, he intentionally knew that he was swearing falsely and also intentionally knew that he was liable to bring a sacrifice,

or

whether

for its unintentionality together with intentionality regarding the deposit,

that is, he did not know that a sacrifice was required for his oath, but intentionally knew that he was swearing falsely regarding the deposit.

But

he

is not liable

for a sacrifice for

unintentionality alone.

If he believed that his oath was indeed true because he did not remember that the deposit had been entrusted to him, he is exempt from the sacrifice, since he was coerced by circumstances in taking the oath.

And what must he bring for its intentional violation,

for the oath of the deposit? A sacrifice of

a guilt-offering worth two silver shekels,

whose price is two silver shekels!

2.

The oath of the deposit—

how

does its liability apply?

If he said to him,

the depositor to the bailee:

“Give me my deposit that I have in your possession!”

And the bailee answered him:

“I swear that you have nothing in my possession!” Or he said to him,

the bailee to the depositor who was claiming from him:

“You have nothing in my possession.”

And the depositor said to him:

“I administer an oath to you”

regarding this claim,

and he said,

the bailee,

“Amen,”

he is liable

for a sacrifice for the oath.

If the depositor administered an oath to him

five times,

whether before a court or outside a court, and he denied

the claim on all five occasions,

he is liable

for a sacrifice

for each and every one

of the five denials.

Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason

that he is liable for a sacrifice for each and every denial?—

Because he could have returned and admitted

the depositor’s claim between one denial and the next, thereby becoming liable for the money on the basis of his admission; and since he did not admit, but returned and denied, each time his denial under oath is a new denial of a monetary claim, and therefore it makes him liable for an additional sacrifice.

3. If

five people claimed from him

the deposits that they had entrusted to him,

and they said to him: “Give us the deposit that we have in your possession,”

and he answered them:

“I swear that you have nothing in my possession!”—

he is liable for only one sacrifice.

But if he answered them, referring to each one individually:

“I swear that you have nothing in my possession, nor you, nor you,”—

he is liable for each and every one!

For his statement, “nor you, nor you,” divides the oath into five separate oaths.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

He is not liable for five

until he says “I swear” at the end.

Only if he said, “You have nothing in my possession, nor you, nor you—in an oath,” is the oath regarded as a separate oath for each of the five. But if he mentioned the oath at the beginning of his words and only afterward specified them, his oath is considered one oath for all of them.

Rabbi Shimon says:

He is not liable on account of five oaths

until he says “I swear” for each and every one,

separately!

4. The claimant said to the defendant:

“Give me the deposit and the loan a loan or any other money placed in your possession],

the stolen item and the lost item that was lost from me and you found],

that I have in your possession.”

And the claimant answered him:

“I swear that you have nothing in my possession! He is liable for only one.”

But if he answered him:

“I swear that you have no deposit, loan, stolen item, or lost item in my possession,”—

he is liable for each and every one!

5. The claimant said to him:

“Give me the wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession!”

And the bailee answered him:

“I swear that you have nothing in my possession! He is liable only

on account of one oath,

one.”

But if he said: “I swear that you have no wheat, barley, or spelt in my possession!”—

he is liable for each and every one.

6.

Rabbi Meir says: Even if

the claimant

said “wheat, barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each and every one.

The Mishna teaches that we do not say that his oath concerning wheat, expressed in the plural, does not refer to the single wheat that the claimant demanded. Rather, we say that a claim for wheat in the singular is equivalent to a claim for wheat in the plural, as it is written, “and the wheat and the spelt were not damaged,” where it is clear that the reference is to the type of wheat and not to a single grain.

7. The father of a young woman claimed from the man who raped or seduced his daughter, and said:

“You raped and seduced my daughter,”

and consequently you are obligated to pay what the Torah requires of one who rapes or seduces,

and he,

the rapist,

says: “I did not rape or seduce!”

And the father said:

“I administer an oath to you!” And he said,

the defendant,

“Amen,” he is liable

the rapist or seducer is liable for a sacrifice, since he denied a monetary obligation.

Rabbi Shimon exempts

the rapist or seducer from a sacrifice for the oath of the deposit [although he is liable for a sliding-scale offering for an oath of utterance], because

he does not pay the fine

of fifty silver pieces that he owes the father of the young woman

on the basis of his own admission ,

and since, had he admitted that he had raped or seduced her, he would have been exempt from payment, as is the law concerning anyone who admits to a fine, when he denied and swore as well, he did not deny a monetary obligation. He is exempt from the guilt-offering for one who denies money, but is liable on account of an oath of utterance!

The Sages said to him,

the Sages said to Rabbi Shimon:

“Although he does not pay

the fine of fifty silver pieces

on the basis of his own admission,

he

does pay for embarrassment and degradation

that the Torah imposed upon him, and this payment is a monetary obligation, which he pays even if he admits

on the basis of his own admission.”

And since the father's claim also includes the monetary claims for humiliation and injury, it follows that with his oath he denied a monetary obligation; if so, why does Rabbi Shimon exempt him?!

And the Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon holds that when the father says, “You raped and seduced her,” his claim refers to the fine and not to humiliation and injury, because a person does not abandon something with a fixed amount—which is the fifty shekels written in the Torah—and claim something without a fixed amount, namely, humiliation and injury. That is, since he stated his words without specifying the claim, we say that the primary object of his claim is the fixed fine.

8. The claimant said:

“You stole my ox”

(and this claim includes payment of the principal, which is monetary, and double payment, which is a fine),

“and he says: I did not steal! I administer an oath to you!” And he said

the defendant

“Amen!”—

he is liable

for a korban because he denied the claim concerning the principal, despite the fact that he also claimed a fine, for denial of which one does not bring a korban.

However, if the defendant confessed and said

“I stole,”

but added:

“But I did not slaughter it or sell it.”

Then the person from whom it was stolen claimed against him and said:

“I administer an oath to you”

that you did not slaughter it or sell it.

And

the thief

said “Amen”

to the oath administered to him—

the thief is exempt

from a korban asham, since he did not swear while denying a monetary claim, but only while denying a fine. For the payment of four or five times the value for slaughtering or selling the animal is a fine, and therefore he is exempt. But he is liable for the sliding-scale sin-offering for an oath of utterance.

9.

“Your ox gored

the designated

ox of mine!” And he,

the owner of the goring ox,

“says: It did not gore! I administer an oath to you,” and he said “Amen”—

he is liable

for denying a monetary claim.

10. And if he claimed against him and said,

“Your ox gored my slave,”

and you are therefore liable for thirty [the sum is a fine imposed by the Torah when an ox kills a slave],

“and he says: It did not gore!”

The owner of the slave said to the owner of the ox:

“I administer an oath to you!” And the

owner of the ox

said: ‘Amen!’ He is exempt

from a korban, because one who denies liability for the thirty [shekels] of a slave is denying a fine. For even if the slave was worth only one dinar, he is obligated to pay thirty shekels. Thus, the value of the slave is not considered “money”; it is a fine.

The claimant said

:

“You injured me and caused me a wound! And he says: I did not injure you or cause you a

wound! I administer an oath to you! And he said ‘Amen!’ He is liable

for denying a monetary claim, since the Torah obligates one who injures another to pay.

His slave said to him: “You knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye!”

And he is claiming this from him in order to go free, as is the law when a master injures one of the twenty-four limbs of his slave—for this emancipates him—

“and he says: I did not knock it out or blind it! I administer an oath to you! And he said ‘Amen!’ He is exempt

for his denial from an oath concerning a deposit, because his emancipation is merely a fine imposed by the Torah. For the slave is like his animal, and nevertheless the Torah obligates him to free the slave if he knocks out his tooth or blinds his eye.

This is the general principle: Whoever pays on the basis of his own admission—

is liable

for denying money, and must bring an oath-offering for a deposit;

but whoever does not pay on the basis of his own admission—

is exempt!

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: “And he is liable for intentional denial of the deposit.”

The Gemara below discusses the case of one who swears intentionally:

Rav Aḥa, Rav Shmuel, son of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, and Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, taught

the tractate

Shevuot in the study hall

of

Rabba.