Shevuot 36b — the Talmud in English

And we conclude:

Rather,

necessarily, we must say

reverse it.

And

even in prohibitory matters he does not hold

with Rabbi Meir that from a negative you hear the affirmative.

Ravina challenged him: And in prohibitory matters he does not hold

with Rabbi Meir that from a negative you hear the affirmative?!

If so,

koanim who served in the Temple when they were

wine-intoxicated

or

bare-headed, that

their liability

to death

is learned by means of the principle “from a negative you hear the affirmative”—is it

indeed also the case that Rabbi Meir does not hold,

that they are not liable to death? [For liability to death was not stated concerning them directly; rather, it is written: “Wine and strong drink you shall not drink—and you shall not die.” If you drink when you enter to serve in the Tent of Meeting, you will die!] But this cannot be so. For—

And we learned

in an anonymous Mishna, without a dissenting opinion:

These are those who are liable to death—

those intoxicated by wine and those with untrimmed hair!?

Rather,

this is what we must say according to Rabbi Meir:

In truth, reverse it,

for Rabbi Meir does not hold that from a negative you hear the affirmative. Rather,

when he does not hold it—

in monetary matters,

but

in prohibitory matters, he does hold it!

And therefore, also according to Rabbi Meir, koanim who served in the Temple when they were intoxicated by wine and had untrimmed hair are liable to death.

And a Sotah is different, for it is a prohibitory matter that involves money.

For the collection of the ketuba depends on the question of whether she committed adultery or not. Therefore, we do not say concerning her that from a negative you hear the affirmative; rather, it is necessary to write concerning her the language of a direct curse: “You shall be innocent”—“you shall be strangled”—“and if you have gone astray”!

And likewise in our Mishna, where he summons the witness to come and testify for him concerning money, it is a prohibitory matter that involves money; Rabbi Meir does not hold that from a negative you hear the affirmative.

We have returned to you, chapter “The Oath of Testimony.”

The concept “the oath of the deposit” is a general name for all monetary claims that a person has against his fellow, when he administers an oath to him concerning them, and not specifically for a “deposit” alone.

And it is stated in the Torah at the end of the portion of Leviticus: “

When a person sins, and commits treachery against the Lord, and denies to his fellow

a deposit, or a loan placed in his hand, or robbery; or oppresses his fellow; or finds a lost object, and denies it, and swears falsely concerning it... —

And it shall be, when he sins and is guilty, that he shall return the robbery which he robbed, or the oppression which he oppressed, or the deposit which was deposited with him,

or anything concerning which he swore falsely —

And he shall pay it according to its principal, and add its fifth to it; to the one to whom it belongs he shall give it on the day of his guilt.

And he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord — an unblemished ram from the flock.” (Leviticus 5:21–25)

That is to say, if a person deposited a deposit with his fellow, and afterward demanded that he return it to him, and administered an oath to him concerning this, and the bailee denied the claim of the depositor and his administering of the oath, or he swore to him himself, and afterward it became clear that the deposit was indeed in the possession of the bailee — the bailee is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for denying the monetary claim through an oath, and to pay the claimant the principal, and to add a fifth to it.

And this is likewise the law concerning a claim for other monetary matters and monetary obligations that Reuven has against Shimon, as will be explained below.

Mishna:

1.

The oath of the deposit,

, כי אין בידו דבר. ונמצא ששיקר הנפקד בשבועתו, וחייב על כך קרבן אשם, והוספת חומש על תשלום החוב]]which is the oath that the bailee swears to the depositor who demands that he return his deposit [or another monetary claim], that he has nothing in his possession. And it is found that the bailee lied in his oath, and is obligated for this in a guilt-offering, and in adding a fifth to the payment of the debt,

applies to men and to women, to distant and to close relations, to those fit and to those disqualified.

And this oath applies both in the presence of a court, and

both

not in the presence of a court,

if the bailee swore falsely,

from his own mouth,

for if he uttered the oath with his mouth, or answered “Amen” after the claimant administered the oath [and saying “Amen” is considered as though he swore himself], then he becomes liable for a guilt-offering for the oath of the deposit even if he denied the oath not in the presence of a court.

But

however, if he did not swear on his own initiative, but was made to swear

by others,

that he was made to swear by the claimant who demanded it of him, and he did not answer “Amen” to his oath, as, for example, when the depositor demanded it of him and said to him: “I administer an oath to you that you return my deposit to me!” And the bailee answered him: “You have nothing in my possession!” then

he is not liable

for a guilt-offering for the oath of the deposit אלא

until he denies him in court,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: Whether

he swore

from his own mouth or whether

he swore

by others,

even outside court,

since he denied him

to the depositor and to his administering of the oath, and afterward admitted that this was a lie — he is

liable

for a guilt-offering for the oath of the deposit.

And he is liable

the bailee who swears falsely to bring a guilt-offering for the oath of the deposit, both

for intentionality concerning the oath,

for he was intentional, knowing that he swore falsely, and he was likewise intentional in knowing that he was liable for an offering,

and

both

for its inadvertence together with intentionality concerning the deposit,

that he did not know of the liability for an offering for his oath, but was intentional, knowing that he swore falsely concerning the deposit.

But

however,

he is not liable

for an offering for

pure inadvertence.

If he thought that his oath was indeed true, because he did not remember that the deposit had been entrusted to him, he is exempt from the offering, since he is compelled in his oath.

And what is he liable for its intentionality

for the oath of the deposit? — An offering

of guilt, for the value of two silver shekels,

whose price is two silver shekels!

2.

The oath of the deposit —

how

is its liability?

He said to him

the depositor to the bailee:

“Give me my deposit that I have in your possession!”

And the bailee answered him:

“An oath that you have nothing in my possession!” Or he said to him

the bailee to the depositor who demanded it of him:

“You have nothing in my possession.”

And the depositor said to him:

“I administer an oath to you”

concerning this claim of yours,

and

the bailee said

“Amen” —

he is liable

for an oath-offering.

If the depositor administered an oath to him

the depositor

five times, both in the presence of a court and not in the presence of a court, and he denied

the bailee on all five occasions,

he is liable

the bailee for an offering

for each and every one

of the five denials.

Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason

he is liable for an offering for each and every denial? —

Because he could return and admit

to the depositor’s claim between one denial and another, and become liable for money on the basis of his admission; and since he did not admit, but returned and denied, behold, each time his denial through an oath is a renewed denial of money, and therefore it makes him liable for an additional offering.

3.

If five people were demanding from him

their deposits that they had deposited with him,

and they said to him: “Give us the deposit that we have in your possession,”

and he answered them:

“An oath that you do not have in my possession!” —

He is liable for only one.

But if he answered them, referring to each one individually:

“An oath that you do not have in my possession, and not you, and not you” —

he is liable for each and every one!

For his saying “and not you, and not you” divides the oath into five separate oaths.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

he is not liable for five

until he says “an oath” last.

For only if he said, “You do not have in my possession, and not you, and not you” — “an oath,” is the oath considered a separate oath for each of the five; but if he mentioned the oath at the beginning of his words, and only afterward specified, his oath is considered one oath for all of them.

Rabbi Shimon says:

he is not liable on account of five oaths

until he says an oath for each and every one,

separately!

4. The claimant said to the defendant:

“Give me a deposit and a loan placed in your hand” [

a loan or any other money that was placed in your possession],

“robbery and a lost object” [

that was lost from him and you found it]

“that I have in your possession.”

And the claimant answered him:

“An oath that you have nothing in my possession! He is liable for only one.”

But if he answered him:

“An oath that you do not have in my possession: a deposit, a loan placed in your hand, robbery, and a lost object” —

he is liable for each and every one!

5. The claimant said to him:

“Give me wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession!”

And the bailee answered him:

“An oath that you have nothing in my possession! He is liable only

on account of

one

oath.

But if he said: “An oath that you do not have in my possession: wheat, barley, and spelt!” —

he is liable for each and every one.

6. Rabbi Meir says: Even if he said

the claimant

“wheat, barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each and every one.

And the Mishna teaches that we do not say that his oath concerning “wheat,” in the plural form, does not refer to the one wheat that the claimant demanded from him. Rather, we say that a claim of wheat in the singular is like a claim of wheat in the plural, as it is written, “and the wheat and the spelt were not damaged,” and it is clear that the reference is to the species of wheat and not to a single wheat.

7. The father of the maiden sued the one who raped or seduced his daughter, and said:

“You raped and seduced my daughter”

and consequently you are obligated to pay what the Torah obligated the rapist and the seducer

! And he

the rapist

says: “I did not rape and I did not seduce!”

And the father said:

“I administer an oath to you!” And

the defendant said

“Amen”; he is liable

the rapist and the seducer for an offering, since he denied a monetary obligation.

Rabbi Shimon exempts

the rapist or the seducer from a guilt-offering for the oath of the deposit [although he is liable for a sliding-scale offering for an oath of utterance], because

he does not pay a fine

of fifty silver pieces that he is obligated to pay to the father of the maiden,

on his own admission , and since if he admitted that he raped or seduced, he would be exempt from paying, according to the law concerning anyone who admits to a fine, so too when he denied and swore, he did not deny a monetary obligation. And he is exempt from a guilt-offering for one who denies money, but is liable on account of an oath of utterance!

The Sages said to him

to Rabbi Shimon:

Even though he does not pay

a fine

of fifty silver pieces

on his own admission,

he nevertheless

pays humiliation and injury

that the Torah imposed upon him, and this payment is a monetary obligation, and he pays it even if he admitted

on his own admission.

And since the father’s claim also includes the monetary claim for humiliation and injury, and it follows that in his oath he denied a monetary obligation, if so, why does Rabbi Shimon exempt him?!

And in the Gemara it is explained that Rabbi Shimon holds that the father’s claim when he says, “You violated and seduced [her],” refers to the fine and not to humiliation and injury, because a person does not abandon something with a fixed amount, namely, the fifty shekels written in the Torah, and claim something without a fixed amount, namely, humiliation and injury. That is to say, since he closed his words and did not specify the claim, we say that the principal of his claim is the fixed fine.

8. The claimant said:

“You stole my ox”

(and included in this claim are payment of the principal, which is money, and double payment, which is a fine),

“and he says: ‘I did not steal! I adjure you!’ And he said”

the defendant

“Amen!” —

he is liable

for a korban because he denied the claim of the principal, even though he also claimed a fine, for which one does not bring a korban.

But if the defendant confessed and said

“I stole,”

but he added and said:

“But I did not slaughter and I did not sell.”

And then the one robbed claimed against him and said:

“I adjure you”

that you did not slaughter or sell.

“And he said”

the thief

“Amen”

to his adjuration —

the thief is exempt

from a guilt-korban, for he did not swear concerning a denial of money, but only concerning a denial of a fine. For the payment of four or five for slaughtering and selling is a fine, and therefore he is exempt. But he is liable for an “ascending and descending” sin-offering for an oath of expression.

9.

“Your ox,”

the forewarned one,

“killed my ox!” And he,

the owner of the goring ox,

“says: ‘It did not kill! I adjure you,’ and he said, ‘Amen’” —

he is liable

for denying money.

10. And if he claimed against him and said,

“Your ox killed my slave,”

and behold, you are liable for thirty [shekels] for a slave [this amount is a fine imposed by the Torah where a slave was killed],

“and he says: ‘It did not kill!’”

The owner of the slave said to the owner of the ox

“I adjure you! And the”

owner of the ox

“said: ‘Amen!’ — he is exempt

from a korban. For one who denies the thirty [shekels] for a slave is a denier of a fine, since even if the slave was worth only one dinar, he is liable to pay thirty shekels. If so, the value of the slave is not in the category of money, but is a fine.

“Said”

the claimant:

“You injured me and made a wound in me! And he says, ‘I did not injure and I did not make in you’

‘a wound! I adjure you!’ And he said, ‘Amen!’ — he is liable

for denying money, for the Torah obligated one who injures his fellow.

“His slave said to him: ‘You knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye!’”

And he is thereby claiming from him to go free, as is the law when a master injures one of the twenty-four limbs of his slave, which causes him to send him out to freedom,

“and he says: ‘I did not knock out and I did not blind! I adjure you!’ And he said, ‘Amen!’ — he is exempt”

from his denial concerning an oath-of-deposit korban, because his going free is only a fine that the Torah imposed, for the slave is like his animal, and nevertheless the Torah obligated him to free him if he knocks out his tooth or blinds his eye.

“This is the general rule: Anyone who pays on the basis of his own admission” —

is liable

for his denial of money, for an oath-of-deposit korban,

“but one who does not pay on the basis of his own admission” —

is exempt!”

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: “And he is liable for intentionality concerning the deposit.”

And the Gemara below discusses the matter of one who swears intentionally:

Rav Aha, Rav Shmuel son of Rabba bar bar Hana, and Rav Yitzhak son of Rav Yehuda taught

the tractate

Shevuot,

in the study hall of

Rabba.