Shevuot 33b (לג:) — the Talmud in English

Come and hear: “I administer an oath to you if you do not come and testify for me

that so-and-so brought an evil name upon my daughter,

and said in court: “I did not find your daughter to be a virgin,” but he was found to be lying in court—except that I did not manage to sue him for the fine of one hundred sela, and now I am suing you to testify for me that this is what occurred, and therefore he owes me one hundred sela!” And the witnesses denied it, these witnesses are

liable.

If the husband admitted

on his own

initiative,

before the witnesses came, he is

exempt

from payment.

The Gemara assumes that the beraita can be understood even according to the Rabbis, who say that if one admits liability for a fine, he is exempt even if witnesses subsequently come and testify. Nevertheless, the first clause states that one who administers an oath to witnesses regarding a fine is liable.

The Gemara rejects this:

This is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who said

that one who admits liability for a fine is exempt only if the entire liability is established on the basis of his own admission. But if there are witnesses,

let witnesses come and testify.

Therefore, one who administers an oath to witnesses regarding a fine is liable.

But the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Say the latter clause—

if

the husband

admitted on his own initiative,

he is

exempt.

This implies that he is exempt even if witnesses came afterward. If so, it is proven that the beraita

is according to the Rabbis,

and one can resolve that according to the Rabbis, one who administers an oath to witnesses regarding a fine is liable.

But the Gemara rejects this:

The entire beraita is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and this is what it is saying:

In the latter clause:

You find that one who admitted on his own initiative is exempt only where there are no witnesses at all and he admitted on his own initiative.

The purpose of the latter clause is to explain the first clause: The witnesses to the fine are therefore liable because his admission will not exempt him where there are witnesses. Consequently, by denying the testimony they caused him to forfeit an actual monetary claim.

Mishna:

Witnesses are liable for denying testimony only if, by their denial, they caused a monetary loss. Likewise, they are liable only if the person who needed their testimony for himself administered the oath to them, but not if one who needed their testimony on behalf of another administered the oath to them.

Accordingly, if the person who needs the witnesses’ testimony said to them:

“I administer an oath to you if you do not come and testify—

that I am a kohen,

or

that I am a Levite,

or

that I am not the son of a divorced woman,

or

that I am not the son of a ḥalutza.

They are exempt, because he did not summon them to testify regarding money.

Likewise, if he summoned them to testify

that so-and-so is a kohen, that so-and-so is a Levite, that he is not the son of a divorced woman, and that he is not the son of a ḥalutza.

Likewise, if he summoned them to testify

that so-and-so raped his daughter

of so-and-so

or seduced his daughter

of so-and-so, they are exempt, because the claim was made on behalf of another person!

And likewise, if he summoned them on his own behalf, saying to them, “Come and testify for me”

that my son wounded me [a wound involving bleeding, for which he is liable to the death penalty], or—

that my fellow wounded me on Shabbat, and that he kindled my grain stack on Shabbat [for which he incurred the death penalty for violating Shabbat]—

these witnesses are exempt!

Because their denial was not a denial of a monetary claim. After all, one who wounds his father, or one who kindles a grain stack on Shabbat, is liable to the death penalty and exempt from monetary payment under the principle of kim lei bid’rabba minei.

Gemara:

The Gemara assumes that one should infer from the wording of the Mishna that if one administers an oath to witnesses to come and testify that a certain person is a kohen, they are exempt only because they did not deny a monetary claim.

And we raised a difficulty:

The reason is that it concerns the claim that so-and-so is a kohen, or that so-and-so is a Levite,

in which case they are exempt;

but if one has one hundred dinars belonging to so-and-so in the possession of so-and-so,

and he demands that they testify to this, they are

liable,

even though he is not making the claim on his own behalf but on behalf of his fellow.

But the latter clause teaches that witnesses are not liable until they hear the oath from the claimant

on his own behalf?

Shmuel said:

With what are we dealing here?

With a claimant who came

with authorization

from the owner of the money, and therefore he is found to be making the claim on his own behalf.

And we challenge this:

But the scholars of Nehardea said: We do not write a power of attorney

for movable property,

but only for land?

And we answer:

This applies

when the defendant denied the claim

and said that the claimant had nothing in his possession. In that case it is impossible to have witnesses sign a power of attorney stating that the grantor transfers to the agent the debt or movable property that the defendant possesses, because it appears that the witnesses are signing a false document: The defendant denied the claim and said that he had nothing, so how can the witnesses sign a power of attorney stating that the claimant has money belonging to him in the possession of a certain person? But if the defendant did not deny the claim, we do write a power of attorney even for a debt or movable property, and that is the case under discussion here.

The Sages taught: From where is it derived that the verse

of the oath of testimony

speaks only of a monetary claim?

Rabbi Eliezer says: Here,

in the oath of testimony, “or” [literally:

“or

he saw

or

he knew”].

And there,

in the oath of deposit,

“or” [literally:

“or

a deposit

or

a robbery”]. And we derive it through a binyan av:

Just as there,

in the oath of deposit,

the verse speaks

only

of a monetary claim, so too here,

in the oath of testimony,

the verse speaks

only of a monetary claim.

Perhaps you will say: From where do we derive that it must be learned specifically from the oath of deposit? Why not say:

The “ors” concerning a murderer [literally:

“or

he struck him out of enmity

or

he cast something at him with intent”]

should prove that they are “ors” but speak of matters that are not monetary claims, and let us derive from them that one is liable to testify regarding every claim, and not specifically a monetary claim?!

Your answer is:

We derive “ors” accompanied by an oath [the oath of testimony]

from “ors” accompanied by an oath [the oath of deposit],

but the “ors” concerning a murderer do not prove anything, as they are not accompanied by an oath!

And perhaps you will say:

The “ors” concerning a sota [literally:

“or

a spirit of jealousy passed over him,

or

a man with whom she had intercourse”]

should prove that they are “ors” accompanied by an oath [as the kohen administers an oath to the woman]

and speak of matters that are not monetary claims?

Your answer is that there is another distinction, which answers both the proposed derivation from the case of a murderer and the proposed derivation from the case of a sota:

We derive “ors” accompanied by an oath and not accompanied by a kohen from “ors” accompanied by an oath and not accompanied by a kohen. But the “ors” concerning a murderer do not prove anything, as they are not accompanied by an oath; and the “ors” concerning a sota do not prove anything, because although they are accompanied by an oath, they are accompanied by a kohen,

as it is stated: “And the kohen shall administer the oath.”

Rabbi Akiva says: “And it shall be, when he incurs guilt in one of these matters”—

there is one of these matters for which he is liable

for denying the testimony,

and there is one of these matters for which he is exempt. How so? If he summoned him

to testify

for him regarding money

and he denied it, the witness is

liable

for the offering of an oath of testimony.

If he summoned him

to testify for him

regarding another matter,

which is not monetary, he is

exempt. [And later the Gemara raises the difficulty: Why not say the reverse?]

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: The verse states, “And he is a witness, whether he saw or knew”—

the verse speaks of testimony that can be established through seeing without knowledge, and through knowledge without seeing,

and such testimony exists only with regard to monetary testimony.

How so

does seeing without knowledge apply? The claimant sued the defendant and said to him:

“I counted out one hundred dinars to you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,”

meaning that he lent him that sum. But the witnesses saw only that he counted out the one hundred dinars to him, and did not know whether it was a loan, repayment, or gift. And the defendant said: “If

so-and-so and so-and-so come

the witnesses

and testify

that you counted out the one hundred dinars to me, I will repay it” [even though they will not testify that it was a loan]. The claimant administered an oath to the witnesses to come and testify that he had counted out the one hundred dinars to the defendant, and they denied it—

this is seeing without knowledge! [Although they saw only the counting out of the money and do not know about the loan, the borrower is liable because of his undertaking to repay if witnesses testify that the money was counted out.]

How does knowledge without seeing apply?

The claimant said:

“You admitted to me, in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so, that you owe me one hundred dinars,”

and the defendant said:

“Let so-and-so and so-and-so come and testify

that I admitted it to you.”

This is knowledge without seeing,

as the witnesses know of the debt through his admission before them, even though they did not see the loan.

This law of knowledge without seeing or seeing without knowledge applies only to a monetary claim: The testimony of the witnesses can establish a monetary obligation in either of these two ways. But with regard to other testimony, the words of the witnesses have no significance without both knowledge and seeing. Since the verse teaches that liability for an oath of testimony applies to testimony that can be established either through seeing alone or through knowledge alone, we learn from here that it applies only to a monetary claim.

Rabbi Shimon says: The verse made one liable

here, in the oath of testimony, for an offering,

and the verse made one liable

in the oath of deposit for an offering.

Just as there,

in the oath of deposit,

it speaks only of a monetary claim, so too here it speaks only of a monetary claim!