Shevuot 33b — the Talmud in English

Come and hear: “I administer an oath to you: if you will not come and testify for me” ![](pamud.bmp "

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that so-and-so brought an evil name upon my daughter,

and said in court, “I did not find your daughter to have signs of virginity,” and he was found to have lied there in court, except that I did not manage to sue him for the fine of one hundred silver coins; and behold, I am suing you to testify for me that this is what occurred, and behold, he owes me one hundred silver coins!” And the witnesses denied [the matter], these are

liable.

[If] he admitted

the husband

on his own,

before the witnesses came, he is

exempt

from paying.

And the Gemara assumes that the beraita can come even according to the Rabbis, who say that if he admitted to a fine, he is exempt even if witnesses subsequently come; and nevertheless it is written in the first clause that one who administers an oath to witnesses concerning a fine is liable.

And the Gemara rejects this:

Whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says

that one who admits to a fine is exempt only if the entire liability is on the basis of his word. But if there are witnesses,

the witnesses may come and testify.

And therefore, one who administers an oath to witnesses concerning a fine is liable.

But the Gemara is astonished:

Say the latter clause—

[if] he admitted

the husband

on his own,

he is

exempt.

And it implies even when witnesses came afterward; and if so, it is proven that the beraita

comes according to the Rabbis,

and one can resolve that one who administers an oath to witnesses concerning a fine is liable according to the Rabbis.

But the Gemara rejects this:

The entire beraita is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Shimon, and this is what it says

in the latter clause:

You find an admission on his own for which he is exempt only where there are no witnesses at all, and he admitted on his own.

And the intent of the latter clause is to explain the first clause: therefore the witnesses concerning a fine are liable, because his admission will not help to exempt him in a place where there are witnesses. And if so, through their denial they caused him to lose actual money.

Mishna:

The witnesses are liable for denying testimony only if through their denial they caused a monetary loss; and likewise they are liable only if one who is suing them to testify for him administered an oath to them, but not if one who is suing them to testify for his fellow administered an oath to them.

And therefore, if one who is seeking testimony from the witnesses said to them:

“I administer an oath to you: if you will not come and testify”—

that I am a priest,

or

that I am a Levite

or

that I am not the son of a divorced woman

or

that I am not the son of a halutza.

They are exempt, because he did not summon them to testify about money.

And likewise if he summoned them to testify

that so-and-so is a priest, that so-and-so is a Levite, that he is not the son of a divorced woman, that he is not the son of a halutza.

And likewise if he summoned them to testify

that so-and-so raped his daughter

of so-and-so

or seduced his daughter

of so-and-so. They are exempt, because the claim was for another person!

And likewise if he summoned them for himself, saying to them, “Come and testify for me”

that my son injured me

[an injury involving a wound, for which he is liable to death], or—

that my fellow injured me on Shabbat, and that he kindled my stack on Shabbat

[and incurred the death penalty for desecrating Shabbat]—

these are exempt!

Because their denial was not a denial of money, for one who injures his father, or one who kindles a stack on Shabbat, is liable to the death penalty and exempt from payments by the rule of kim lei bidraba minei.

Gemara:

The Gemara assumes that one should infer from the wording of the Mishna that if one administers an oath to witnesses that they should come and testify that so-and-so is a priest, they are exempt only because they did not deny money.

And we raised [the following] against it:

The reason is that so-and-so is a priest, or that so-and-so is a Levite,

they are exempt;

but if one person has one hundred dinars belonging to another person,

and he demands that they testify about this, they are

liable,

even though he is not suing on his own behalf, but on behalf of his fellow;

yet the latter clause teaches that the witnesses are not liable until they hear it from the claimant

on his own behalf?

Shmuel said:

What are we dealing with here?

With one who

the claimant

came with authorization

from the owner of the money, and it turns out that he is suing on his own behalf.

And we raise an objection:

But the scholars of Nehardea said: We do not write a power of attorney

which is a document of authorization

for movable property,

but only for land?

And we answer:

This applies

that they do not write authorization for movable property

where the defendant denied it

and said that the claimant has nothing in his possession; for then it is impossible to have witnesses sign a document of authorization in which it is written that the authorizer transfers to the authorized party the debt or the movable property that he has in the defendant’s possession, because it appears that the witnesses signed a falsehood: for the defendant denied it and said that he has nothing in his possession, so how will the witnesses sign the claimant’s authorization in which it is written that the claimant has money in so-and-so’s possession? But if he did not deny it, we do write authorization even for a debt or for movable property, and this is what is being discussed here.

The Sages taught: From where [do we know] that the verse

of the oath of testimony

speaks only of a monetary claim?!

Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated here,

in the oath of testimony,

“or”

or

he saw

or

he knew.

And it is stated there,

in the oath of a deposit,

“or”

or

through a deposit entrusted

or

through robbery. And we derive by a binyan av—

just as there,

in the oath of a deposit,

it does not speak

the verse except

of a monetary claim, so here too

in the oath of testimony

it does not speak

the verse

except of a monetary claim.

Perhaps you will say: From where do we learn to derive specifically from the oath of a deposit? And why should we not say—

the “or” of the murderer

or

because of hatred he struck him

or

he cast it upon him with ambush

will prove that they are “ors,” and that they speak of something other than a monetary claim,

and let us derive from them that regarding every claim, and not specifically a monetary one, they are liable to testify!?

Your answer is:

We derive “ors” that have an oath with them

[the oath of testimony]

from “ors” that have an oath with them

[the oath of a deposit],

but let the “ors” of the murderer not prove, for they do not have an oath with them!

And perhaps you will say:

The “ors” of the sota

or

a spirit of jealousy passed over him,

or

a man upon whom it passes

will prove that they are “ors” and that they have an oath with them

[for the priest administers an oath to the woman],

and that they speak of something other than a monetary claim?

Your answer is: There is another distinction, which also answers the derivation from the murderer and the derivation from the sota:

We derive “ors” that have an oath with them and do not have a priest with them, from “ors” that have an oath with them and do not have a priest with them. But let the “ors” of the murderer not prove, for they do not have an

oath with them; and let the “ors” of the sota not prove, for although they have an oath with them, they have a priest with them,

as it is stated, “And the priest shall administer the oath.”

Rabbi Akiva says: “And it shall be, when he incurs guilt in one of these matters”—

there is one of these for which he is liable

for their denial

and there is one of these for which he is exempt. How so? He summoned him

to testify

for him about money

and he denied it,

he is liable

for the witness’s offering for the oath of testimony;

he summoned him

to testify for him

about another matter,

which is not monetary, he is

exempt. [And later it asks: Let us say the opposite.]

Rabbi Yose the Galilean says:

It says: “And he is a witness, whether he saw or knew”—

the verse speaks of testimony that is established through seeing without knowing, and through knowing without seeing,

and such testimony exists only in testimony concerning money.

How so

is there seeing without knowing? The claimant sued the defendant and said to him:

“I counted out one hundred dinars to you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,

which I lent you,” except that the witnesses saw only that I counted out the one hundred dinars to you and did not know whether it was a loan, repayment, or gift; and the defendant said—if

so-and-so and so-and-so come

the witnesses

and testify

that you counted out the one hundred dinars to me, I will repay it [although they will not testify that it was a loan]; and the claimant administered an oath to the witnesses that they should come and testify that he counted out the one hundred dinars to the defendant, and they denied it—

this is seeing without knowing! [For although they merely saw the counting out of money and do not know about the loan, the borrower is liable, because of his undertaking to repay if witnesses come concerning the counting out of the money.]

Knowing without seeing—how so?

The claimant said:

“You admitted to me one hundred dinars in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,”

that you owe them to me; and the defendant said:

“Let so-and-so and so-and-so come and testify

that I admitted to you,”

—

this is knowing without seeing,

for the witnesses know about the debt through his admission before them, although they did not see the loan.

And this law of knowing without seeing or seeing without knowing applies only to a monetary claim, for the testimony of the witnesses can obligate money in one of these two ways; but in other testimonies, the words of the witnesses have no significance without knowing and seeing. And since the verse taught that liability for the oath of testimony applies to testimony that can be established either through seeing alone or through knowing alone, we learn from here that it applies only to a monetary claim.

Rabbi Shimon says: The verse made him liable

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here

for an offering in the oath of testimony,

and the verse made him liable

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in

the oath of

a deposit

for an offering.

Just as there,

in the oath of a deposit,

it speaks only of a monetary claim, so here too it speaks only of a monetary claim!