Shevuot 33a — the Talmud in English

Ravina said: Here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which the

second group

at the time of the denial of

the

first

group was disqualified from bearing testimony, in such a manner that the witnesses of the second group were

related through their wives, and their wives were in the throes of death.

That is, they were married to two sisters. And it emerges that at the time when the first group denied, only it was able to testify. But if so, one must wonder: what does this teach us? One may say that the two sisters, the wives of the witnesses of the second group, were in the throes of death at the time of the denial of the first group.

Lest you say: The majority of those in the throes of death die

and they are therefore like the dead, and it emerges that the second group is fit to testify because the sisters had died,

it teaches us

that one in the throes of death is like one alive. Therefore the second group was disqualified, and the first group was liable for its denial.

Mishna:

A.

I administer an oath to you: If you do not come and testify for me that I have in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, stolen property, or a lost object,

and the witnesses said:

An oath that we do not know testimony on your behalf—

they are liable for only one.

But if they answered him:

An oath that we do not know

that you have in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, stolen property, or a lost object, they are liable for each and every one.

B.

I administer an oath to you: If you do not come and testify for me that I have in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt,

and they answered him:

An oath that we do not know testimony on your behalf—

they are liable for only one.

But if they answered him:

An oath that we do not know testimony on your behalf that you have in the possession of so-and-so wheat, barley, and spelt, they are liable for each and every one.

C.

I administer an oath to you: If you do not come and testify for me that I have in the possession of so-and-so damages and half-damages

[of an innocuous ox that gored],

double payment of a thief and payments of four and five, and that so-and-so raped my daughter and seduced my daughter, and that my son struck me

[a blow without a wound, for which there is no liability to the death penalty, but only humiliation],

and that my fellow wounded me, and that he set fire to my stack on Yom Kippur

[that is, both the wounding and the setting of the fire were on Yom Kippur],

they are liable.

Gemara:

It was asked of them: If one administers an oath to witnesses of a fine that they should come and testify for him, what is the law

that they should be liable for their denial?

According to Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon, who says

with regard to every one who admits to a fine,

the witnesses should come and testify

and make him liable—for one who admits to a fine is exempt only when his entire liability must come by virtue of his admission. But if there are witnesses, his admission is not effective to exempt him—

you need not ask it.

For one who claims the testimony of witnesses concerning a fine is like one who claims the testimony of witnesses concerning money, and they are liable.

When you ask it, it is according to the Rabbis, who say: One who admits to a fine and afterward witnesses come is exempt.

And he has still not admitted, and the claimant administered an oath that they should come and testify for him. The question is how to regard the claim at the time when the defendant can admit and become exempt: Is it, so long as he has not admitted, an ordinary monetary claim? Or perhaps it is not a complete monetary claim, for so long as they have not testified, the defendant can still exempt himself by preceding their testimony with his admission?

And the Gemara adds that this question is not according to everyone:

And the Rabbis there,

who say that one who admits to a fine and afterward another comes with witnesses is exempt,

in accordance with whom do they hold

in the dispute above concerning the law of one who administers an oath to one witness, whether we say that something that causes money is considered money or not?

If you say that they hold like Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon here,

who makes one witness liable for the denial of his testimony,

he said that something that causes money is considered money,

for even though it is possible that the defendant will take an oath and become exempt, nevertheless he makes him liable for the denial of his testimony, because it is possible that he will not take an oath but will admit. If so, all the more so with regard to witnesses concerning a fine, who do not cause money through an oath but come to impose a monetary payment through their testimony, that they should be liable for their denial, and we should not be concerned with the defendant’s admission.

Rather, necessarily, the Rabbis there hold

like the Rabbis here, who say

that with regard to one witness he is exempt because

something that causes money is not considered money.

And according to them, one must be uncertain concerning one who administers an oath to witnesses concerning a fine, the sides of the uncertainty being:

What is the law? Since, if he admits,

the defendant,

he becomes exempt, did the witness deny a monetary claim

?

Or perhaps, now, at any rate, he has not admitted.

[And this is not something that causes money, but actual money.]

Come and hear: I administer an oath to you: If you do not come and testify for me that I have in the possession of so-and-so damages and half-damages.

And the Gemara infers:

But half-damages is a fine,

and it teaches that they are liable for it.

And the Gemara rejects: The question is

in accordance with the one who says that half-damages is money.

This works well according to the one who says that half-damages is money. But according to the one who says that half-damages is a fine, what can be said?

Let us resolve from the Mishna that one who administers an oath to witnesses concerning a fine is liable!

And the Gemara again rejects: It is possible to establish the Mishna

with half-damages caused by pebbles,

where the animal walked, flung pebbles, and they caused damage.

For it is a halakha learned by tradition that it is money.

Come and hear: double payment

they are liable for their denial.

And the Gemara rejects:

Because of the principal,

for it is money.

And the Gemara brings an additional proof from the Mishna:

And payments of four and five

they are liable for their denial.

And it rejects in the same manner:

Because of the principal.

And also from the law of

that so-and-so raped and seduced my daughter

there is no proof, because his liability is

because of

the denial of a claim for

humiliation and impairment,

which is a monetary claim.

And the Gemara asks: If so, that the entire Mishna is not referring to a claim for a fine,

what does it teach us

the Mishna? But

the whole of it

is a denial of

money!

And what need is there for so many examples? And the Gemara answers:

The first part teaches us one thing, and the latter part teaches us one thing.

The first part teaches us one thing: that half-damages caused by pebbles is money.

And once the tanna taught this law, he taught along with it the laws of fourfold and fivefold payments and of rape and seduction, which are monetary obligations “that are not collected as principal.” That is, one does not pay an ordinary principal payment, as in the case of half-damages.]

The latter part teaches us one thing,

the law

“and that he set fire to my stack on Yom Kippur,”

that he is not exempt by kam lei bid’rabba minei on account of the karet of Yom Kippur [and in connection with this law he also taught “that my son struck me,” for his striking is close to making him liable to the death penalty if it had involved a wound, and it teaches us that since he did not make a wound, he is liable for payments].

And the Gemara explains:

To exclude what

does the Mishna come to teach us, that he is liable for wounding and burning on Yom Kippur?—

To exclude the view of Rabbi Neḥunya ben Ha-Kanah.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Neḥunya ben Ha-Kanah would treat Yom Kippur like Shabbat with regard to payments:

just as with Shabbat, one becomes liable for his life and is exempt from payments, so too, with Yom Kippur, one becomes liable for his life and is exempt from payments.