Shevuot 33a (לג.) — the Talmud in English

Ravina said: Here we are dealing with a case where the

second group

at the time of the denial by

the

first group

was disqualified from testifying, because the witnesses of the second group were

related through their wives, while their wives were in the throes of death.

That is, the witnesses were married to two sisters. Consequently, at the time the first group denied knowing testimony, only that group was capable of testifying. But if so, this is difficult: What does this teach us? One can say that the two sisters, the wives of the witnesses of the second group, were in the throes of death at the time the first group denied knowing testimony.

Lest you say: Most of those in the throes of death do die,

and they are therefore considered dead, with the result that the second group was fit to testify because the sisters had died,

it teaches us

that one in the throes of death is considered alive. Therefore, the second group was disqualified, and the first group is liable for denying their testimony.

Mishna:

a.

I administer an oath to you that you come and testify for me that I have in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, stolen property, and a lost item,

and the witnesses said:

“An oath that we do not know of any testimony on your behalf”—

they are liable to bring only one offering.

But if they answered him:

“An oath that we do not know

that you have in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, stolen property, and a lost item,” they are liable for each and every one.

b.

I administer an oath to you that you come and testify for me that I have in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt,

and they answered him:

“An oath that we do not know of any testimony on your behalf”—

they are liable to bring only one offering.

But if they answered him:

“An oath that we do not know of any testimony on your behalf that you have in the possession of so-and-so wheat, barley, and spelt,” they are liable for each and every one.

c.

I administer an oath to you that you come and testify for me that I have in the possession of so-and-so liability for damage and half-damage

[caused by an innocuous ox that gored],

double payment by a thief, and payment of fourfold and fivefold compensation, and that so-and-so raped my daughter, seduced my daughter, and that my son struck me

[with a blow that caused no wound and for which there is no liability to receive the death penalty, but only liability for humiliation],

and that my fellow injured me, and that he kindled my stack of grain on Yom Kippur

[that is, both the injury and the kindling occurred on Yom Kippur],

in all these cases they are liable.

Gemara:

A dilemma was raised before them: If one administers an oath to witnesses to a penalty, that they come and testify for him, what is

the halakha—are they liable for denying their testimony?

According to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who said

that in every case of one who admits liability for a penalty,

witnesses should come and testify

and render him liable, since one who admits liability for a penalty is exempt only when his entire liability must arise by virtue of his admission. But if there are witnesses, his admission does not exempt him,

you have no dilemma.

Since one who summons witnesses concerning a penalty is like one who summons witnesses concerning a monetary claim, they are liable.

Your dilemma arises according to the Rabbis, who say: If one admits liability for a penalty and afterward witnesses come, he is exempt.

He has not yet admitted, and the claimant administered an oath to the witnesses that they come and testify against him. The dilemma is how to regard the claim at a time when the defendant can admit and become exempt: Is it an ordinary monetary claim as long as he has not admitted? Or is it not a fully monetary claim, since as long as the witnesses have not testified, the defendant can still exempt himself by making his admission precede their testimony?

The Gemara adds that this dilemma does not arise according to everyone:

And the Rabbis there,

who say that if one admits liability for a penalty and another subsequently brings witnesses, he is exempt,

in accordance with whose opinion do they hold

in the dispute cited above concerning the law of one who administers an oath to a single witness, whether we say that something that causes a monetary loss is considered money or not?

If you say that they hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, here,

who obligates a single witness for denying his testimony,

he said that something that causes a monetary loss is considered money,

for although it is possible that the defendant will take an oath and become exempt, nevertheless he holds him liable for denying his testimony, because it is possible that he will not take an oath but will instead admit. If so, all the more so, in the case of witnesses concerning a penalty, who do not cause a monetary loss through an oath but come to impose a monetary obligation through their testimony, they should be liable for their denial, and we should not be concerned with the defendant’s admission.

Rather, necessarily, the Rabbis there hold

in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis here, who say

that a single witness is exempt because

something that causes a monetary loss is not considered money.

According to them, the uncertainty concerning one who administers an oath to witnesses concerning a penalty is as follows:

What

if the defendant were to admit,

he would become exempt; is the witness not denying a monetary claim

?

Or perhaps, at present he has not admitted.

[And this is not something that merely causes a monetary loss, but actual money.]

Come and hear: “I administer an oath to you that you come and testify for me that I have in the possession of so-and-so liability for damage and half-damage.”

And the Gemara infers:

But half-damage is a penalty,

and it teaches that they are liable for denying it.

The Gemara rejects this: The Mishna’s case can be established

in accordance with the one who says that half-damage is a monetary obligation.

That works according to the one who says that half-damage is a monetary obligation. But according to the one who says that half-damage is a penalty, what can be said?

One should resolve from the Mishna that one who administers an oath to witnesses concerning a penalty is liable!

The Gemara again rejects this: The Mishna can be established

with regard to half-damage caused by pebbles,

where the animal walked and projected pebbles that caused damage.

For it is a halakha received by tradition that it is a monetary obligation.

Come and hear: “Double payment”

and they are liable for denying it.

The Gemara rejects this:

Because of the principal,

as it is a monetary obligation.

The Gemara brings another proof from the Mishna:

“And payment of fourfold and fivefold”

and they are liable for denying it.

It rejects this in the same manner:

Because of the principal.

And also from the law

“that so-and-so raped and seduced my daughter”

there is no proof, because his liability is

because of

denying the claim for

humiliation and diminished value,

which is a monetary claim.

The Gemara raises an objection: If so, that the entire Mishna is not referring to a claim for a penalty,

what does it teach us

the Mishna? After all,

the entire

denial concerns

money!

And why does it need so many examples? The Gemara answers:

The first clause teaches us one matter, and the latter clause teaches us one matter.

The first clause teaches us that half-damage caused by pebbles is a monetary obligation.

[And once the tanna taught this law, he taught along with it the payments of fourfold and fivefold compensation and those paid by a rapist and a seducer, which are money “that is not collected as principal.” That is, the payment is not an ordinary principal payment, similar to half-damage.]

The latter clause teaches us one matter,

the law

“and that he kindled my stack of grain on Yom Kippur,”

that he is not exempt under the principle of kam lei bidraba minei because of the liability to receive karet for Yom Kippur. [And in connection with this law, it also taught “that my son struck me,” since his striking would come close to rendering him liable for the death penalty had it caused a wound; and it teaches us that since he did not cause a wound, he is liable for payments.]

The Gemara explains:

To exclude what

does the Mishna come to teach us by stating that one is liable for an injury and for kindling on Yom Kippur? —

To exclude the opinion of Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana.

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana would treat Yom Kippur like Shabbat with regard to monetary payments:

Just as with regard to Shabbat, one who becomes liable to receive the death penalty is exempt from monetary payments, so too, with regard to Yom Kippur, one who becomes liable to receive the death penalty is exempt from monetary payments.