Shevuot 32b (לב:) — the Talmud in English

c.

And there is a dispute concerning the witnesses of a sota—

concerning witnesses of seclusion, who saw the woman seclude herself after her husband had warned her. The Sages and Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disputed this matter, just as they disputed the matter of a single witness concerning monetary liability:

One master, Rabbi Elazar, who holds a single witness liable for an oath-offering when he testifies concerning money,

held that

something that causes monetary loss is considered money itself. These witnesses of seclusion likewise cause monetary loss, since it is possible that as a result of their testimony—which obligates the woman to drink the bitter waters—she will be deterred by fear of drinking the waters and confess that she committed adultery, thereby exempting the husband from paying her ketuba.

And

therefore,

each of the witnesses is liable for an oath-offering.

And the other master,

the Sages,

held that

something that causes monetary loss is not considered money itself, and he is exempt. Just as a single witness in a monetary case is exempt from an offering, although it is possible that the defendant will be deterred by the oath and confess, so too, a witness who refrains from testifying about the seclusion is exempt, since he merely causes monetary loss but does not directly cause the loss of money.

d.

Everyone agrees in a case where the opposing litigant is suspect concerning an oath, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

e.

Everyone agrees with regard to the single witness in the case of Rabbi Abba, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

The Gemara now explains the law concerning one whose opposing litigant is suspect concerning an oath, and the law concerning the single witness in the case of Rabbi Abba:

Everyone agrees in a case where the opposing litigant is suspect concerning an oath.

The Gemara asks:

Who is suspect?

If we say that the borrower is suspect, and therefore the single witness is liable for refraining from testifying,

because the lender can say to him: “Had you come and testified for me, I would have taken the oath required of one who collects,”

and I would have collected the money. You would therefore be found to have caused me monetary loss by refraining from testifying!

But let the single witness say to the claimant:

“Who can say that you would take the oath required of one who collects? For without that oath you could not collect money. It follows that my refraining from testifying does not directly cause the loss, since the matter depends not only on me but also on your oath. I am therefore merely one who causes the loss, and according to the Sages, one who merely causes monetary loss is exempt from an offering. If so, how can we say that everyone agrees that, when the opposing litigant is suspect, he is liable for an offering?”

Rather, it is referring to a case where both of them,

the claimant and the defendant,

are suspect

concerning an oath,

as the master said below: In such a case, where both are suspect, the claimant does not take the oath required of one who collects; rather,

the oath returns to the one obligated to take it,

that is, to the defendant.

And since he cannot take the oath, since he is suspect, he

must pay. It follows that the claimant’s demand that the single witness come and testify for him is a direct monetary claim, since the testimony will obligate the defendant, who is suspect, to take an oath, and it is clear that he will be unable to take it and will instead be liable to pay. Therefore, everyone agrees that in this case a single witness is liable for an oath-offering.

And the final ruling stated by Abaye,

everyone agrees with regard to the single witness in the case of Rabbi Abba,

is as follows:

There was a certain man who snatched a silver ingot

a piece of silver metal

from another person. He came before Rav Ami

to bring a legal claim against the snatcher,

and Rabbi Abba was sitting before him,

before Rav Ami.

The claimant went

and

brought a single witness who testified that he had snatched it from him,

and he wished to have the snatcher take an oath concerning this, as is the law when a single witness obligates a person to take an oath.

The snatcher said to him:

“Yes,

indeed,

I snatched it,

but

I snatched what belongs to me!” It follows that he cannot take an oath, since he admitted the witness’s statement that he snatched it, but claims that he snatched his own property.

Rav Ami said: “How should the judges rule in this case?”

Let him pay—

there are not two witnesses

who testify that he snatched it!

Let us exempt him—

there is, after all, a single witness who testifies that he snatched it!

Let him take an oath—

since he said, “Yes, I snatched it, but I snatched what belongs to me,” he is like a robber,

who is not trustworthy to take an oath. The same applies to this man, who admitted that he snatched it but claims, “I snatched what belongs to me”: he cannot take an oath that he snatched his own property, because in making this claim he is not denying the witness’s testimony.

Rabbi Abba said to

Rav Ami:

The snatcher is

the snatcher

obligated to take an oath

since a single witness testifies that he snatched it, and the only oath through which he could contradict the witness would be if he claimed that he had not snatched it at all,

but he cannot take the oath

because he admitted to the snatching,

and anyone who is obligated to take an oath but cannot take it—

must pay!

Rav Pappa said: “Everyone agrees with regard to a witness to death,

who knows that the woman’s husband died, and she makes him swear that he will come and testify for her so that she can collect her ketuba,

that he is liable

for his denial,

and everyone agrees with regard to a witness to death that he is exempt.”

The Gemara explains:

Everyone agrees with regard to a witness to death that he is exempt,

for example,

he told her personally,

outside the court,

but did not tell the court, and she demands that he testify for her in court and makes him swear concerning this. He is exempt because she has no need for his testimony after he testified to her that her husband died: she herself can go to court and testify that a single witness testified to her concerning her husband’s death, and collect her ketuba through this testimony [because the Sages were lenient and permitted relying upon hearsay testimony from a single witness in the case of a husband’s death],

as we learned in the Mishna: “A woman who says, ‘My husband died’—

may marry!”

Or, if she said in a case of yibbum:

“My husband died”—

she may enter into yibbum!

Everyone agrees with regard to a witness to death that he is liable

for his denial, in a case such as

one where he neither told her personally nor told the court.

And we challenge this:

Can we infer from this that one who makes witnesses concerning land take an oath is liable?

for the ketuba is collected only from land, and yet below the tannaim and amoraim dispute this question.

And we answer:

Perhaps

the case of Rav Pappa, in which he holds him liable, is speaking

of a case where she had seized movable property

during her husband’s lifetime for the purpose of her ketuba, so that collection of the ketuba would be from movable property and not from land.

We learned in the Mishna:

“One denied and one admitted,”

and so on.

And we ask:

Now,

with regard to their denying

one after the other, where both deny, you said—

“The first is liable and the second is exempt”; if one denied and one admitted, is it necessary to state this?

For the first one, who denied, is certainly liable, since the second stands ready to join him in his testimony.

And we answer:

It is necessary only in a case where both denied, and one of them then retracted

and admitted within the time required for an utterance

to his denial; he is exempt for his denial, since he retracted it.

And this teaches us that within the time required for an utterance, it is considered as an utterance itself.

And we ask:

Granted, according to Rav Hisda, who establishes that case

as one where both denied precisely simultaneously,

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

who holds that it is possible to establish precise simultaneity, it is understandable that in the

first clause

the Mishna teaches us

that it is possible to establish precise simultaneity, while the latter clause is necessary to teach us that within the time required for an utterance, it is considered as an utterance itself. But according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who establishes the first clause as referring to a case within the time required for an utterance,

the first clause concerns within the time required for an utterance, and the latter clause concerns within the time required for an utterance? Why do I need two such teachings?

And we answer: This is what the Mishna comes to teach us:

Lest you say that this applies only

when they join together within the time required for an utterance,

in a case of denial and denial,

where, if the second denied within the time required for an utterance of the first one’s denial, their denials are considered as one.

But in a case of denial and admission,

within the time required for an utterance,

say that it is not so

that his retraction from the denial within the time required for an utterance should cause his admission to be considered testimony.

It therefore teaches us

that within the time required for an utterance, one may even retract from a denial and become a witness.

We learned in the Mishna:

“There were two sets of witnesses. The first denied

and afterward the second denied”;

both are liable.

And we ask:

Granted,

the

second set should be liable,

because

the first set denied

the

first set, and it follows that the testimony now depends only upon them, and they are the ones currently causing him monetary loss through their denial.

But

the

first set—why

is it liable for its denial?

The

set

second is still present and can yet testify, and he is not suffering a loss because of their denial.