Shevuot 32b — the Talmud in English

And a dispute concerning the witnesses of a Sota —

concerning witnesses of seclusion,

who saw the woman’s seclusion after her husband had warned her. And the Sages and Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disputed this, just as they disputed the matter of one witness concerning money:

One Master,

Rabbi Elazar, who obligates one witness concerning money to bring a guilt-offering for an oath,

held:

a matter that causes money is considered like money.

And these witnesses of seclusion do cause money, for it is possible that, on account of their testimony, which obligates the woman to drink the bitter waters, she will recoil and confess, out of fear of drinking the waters, that she committed adultery, and the husband will be exempt from paying her ketuba.

And

therefore

each is liable

for a guilt-offering for an oath.

And one Master,

the Sages,

held:

a matter that causes money is not considered like money, and he is exempt.

Just as one witness concerning money is exempt from a guilt-offering, despite the possibility that the defendant will recoil from the oath and confess, so too the witness who refrains from testifying about the seclusion is exempt, since he merely causes money and does not directly deprive him of money.

Everyone agrees when the one opposite him is suspected concerning an oath,

as it will explain and proceed.

Everyone agrees concerning the one witness of Rabbi Abba,

as it will explain and proceed.

And the Gemara now explains the law of one opposite whom is suspected concerning an oath and the law of the one witness of Rabbi Abba:

Everyone agrees when the one opposite him is suspected concerning an oath.

And the Gemara asks:

Who is suspected?

If you say that the borrower is suspected,

and therefore the one witness is liable for refraining from testifying,

because the lender could say to him: If you had come to testify for me, I would have sworn

the oath of those who collect [which the Sages instituted: wherever one suspected concerning an oath becomes obligated to take an oath and cannot swear, his claimant shall swear and collect]

and I would have collected the money.

And it follows that by refraining from testifying you deprived me of money!

But let

the one witness say to the claimant:

Who says that you will swear

the oath of those who collect—for without it you cannot collect money—and it follows that my refraining does not directly cause a loss, for the matter depends not only on me but also on your oath. It follows that I merely cause it, and according to the Sages one who merely causes it is exempt from a guilt-offering. And it is difficult: How do we say that everyone agrees when the one opposite him is suspected that he is liable for a guilt-offering?

Rather, it is such as when both,

the claimant and the defendant,

are suspected

concerning an oath,

for the Master said,

below, that in such a case, when both are suspected, the claimant does not swear the oath of those who collect; rather,

the oath returns to the one obligated by it,

namely, the defendant,

and since he cannot swear,

for he is suspected, he

pays,

and it follows that the claimant’s demand that the one witness come to testify for him is a direct monetary demand, for it will obligate the defendant, who is suspected, to swear, and it is clear to us that he will not be able to swear but will be obligated to pay. Therefore everyone agrees that the one witness is liable here for a guilt-offering for an oath.

And the last ruling that Abaye stated:

Everyone agrees concerning the one witness of Rabbi Abba,

that is:

that certain man grabbed a silver ingot

[a piece of silver metal]

from his fellow. He came before Rav Ami

to bring him to court,

and Rabbi Abba was sitting before him,

before Rav Ami.

He went

the claimant

and brought one witness who testified that he had grabbed it from him,

and he wished to make the grabber swear concerning this, as is the law of one witness who obligates an oath.

He said to him,

the grabber:

Yes,

indeed,

I grabbed it,

but

I grabbed what belongs to me!

And it follows that he cannot swear, for he admitted the words of the witness that he grabbed it, but claims that he grabbed his own.

Rav Ami said: How shall the judges judge this case?

Let him pay —

there are not two witnesses

that he grabbed it!

Let him be exempt —

but there is one witness who testifies that he grabbed it!

Let him swear —

since he said, “Yes, I grabbed it, and I grabbed what belongs to me,” he is like a robber,

who is not believed to swear. And the same is true of this one, who admitted that he grabbed it but claims, “I grabbed what belongs to me”: he cannot swear that he grabbed what belongs to him, since by this he does not deny the witness.

Rabbi Abba said to him,

to Rav Ami:

the grabber is

the snatcher

obligated to swear

[for one witness testifies that he grabbed it, and the only oath by which he can contradict the witness is in the event that he had claimed that he did not grab it at all]

but cannot swear

because he admitted to the grabbing,

and anyone obligated to swear but unable to swear —

pays!

Rav Pappa said: Everyone agrees concerning a witness to death,

who knows that the woman’s husband died, and she makes him swear that he will come and testify for her so that she can collect her ketuba,

that he is liable

for his denial,

and everyone agrees concerning a witness to death that he is exempt.

And the Gemara explains:

Everyone agrees concerning a witness to death that he is exempt,

such as when

he said to her herself,

outside the court,

but did not say to them, to the court,

and she demands that he testify for her in court and makes him swear concerning this. And the exemption is because she has no need for his testimony after he testified before her that her husband died, since she herself can go to court and testify that one witness testified before her concerning the death of her husband, and she can collect her ketuba through this testimony [for the Sages were lenient and believed one witness based on the testimony of another witness concerning the death of a husband],

as we learned: “The woman who said, ‘My husband died’ —

may marry!”

or if she said this in a place of levirate marriage:

“My husband died” —

she may enter levirate marriage!

Everyone agrees concerning a witness to death that he is liable

for his denial, in a case such as

when he did not say it to her herself, and did not say it to them, to the court.

And we challenge: Does

this indicate that one who makes witnesses concerning land swear is liable?

[For the ketuba is collected only from land.] Yet below the tannaim and the amoraim dispute this question.

And we answer:

Perhaps

this ruling of Rav Pappa, which obligates him, speaks

when she had seized movable property

during her husband’s lifetime for the sake of her ketuba, and it follows that collection of the ketuba will be from movable property and not from land.

We learned in the Mishna:

“One denied and one admitted,”

and so on.

And we challenge:

Now,

when they denied

one after the other, when both denied, you said —

the first is liable and the second is exempt; when one denied and one admitted, is it necessary

to say that the first, who denied, is liable, for the second stands ready to join him with his testimony?

And we answer:

No, it is necessary when both denied, and one of them then returned

and admitted within the time required for an utterance

to his denial; he is exempt for his denial, since he retracted it.

And this teaches us that within the time required for an utterance is considered like an utterance.

And we challenge:

Granted, according to Rav Hisda, who establishes that case

as one in which both denied simultaneously, precisely,

in accordance with Rabbi Yose the Galilean,

who holds that it is possible to be precise, this is satisfactory, for in the

first clause

it teaches us

that it is possible to be precise. And the latter clause was necessary to teach us that within the time required for an utterance is considered like an utterance. But according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who establishes the first clause as within the time required for an utterance,

the first clause is within the time required for an utterance, and the latter clause is within the time required for an utterance? Why do I need two?

And we answer: This is what the Mishna comes to teach us:

You might say, this applies

when they join within the time required for an utterance,

denial and denial,

for if the second denied within the time required for an utterance of the first one’s denial, their denials are considered as one.

But denial and admission,

within the time required for an utterance,

one might say, not

is his retraction from the denial within the time required for an utterance considered to make his admission valid testimony.

It teaches us

that within the time required for an utterance it is even possible to retract from denial to testimony.

We learned in the Mishna:

“There were two groups of witnesses. The first denied

and afterward the second denied,”

both are liable.

And we challenge:

Granted,

the

second group should become liable,

because

the first group denied

the testimony, and it follows that the testimony depends only upon them, and they are the ones now depriving him of money through their denial.

first set, and it follows that the testimony now depends only upon them, and they are the ones currently causing him monetary loss through their denial.

получается, что показание зависит только от второй группы, и именно они теперь лишают его денег своим отрицанием.

But

the

first group—why

is it liable for its denial?

For there stands

the group, the

second

which can still testify, and he is not deprived through their denial.