Shevuot 32a — the Talmud in English

And we raised it:

What does Shmuel come to teach us?

But

we learned

this below:

He sent

the claimant

by means of his slave

to administer an oath to the witnesses, so that they would come and testify for him,

or the defendant said to them

to the witnesses:

I administer an oath

to you that, if you know of

the claimant

testimony on his behalf, you should come and testify for him! These are exempt!

For the witnesses are not liable for the oath of testimony

until they hear from the claimant

the claim: “Come and testify for me”?

And we answer: The case of

his pursuing them was necessary

for Shmuel to teach us. For

it might enter your mind to say: Since he pursued them

and they understood the meaning of his pursuit,

it is as though he said it to them. He comes to teach us

Shmuel that an actual verbal statement is required.

And we object:

But this too we learned: How is the oath of testimony administered? —

He said to the witnesses, “Come and testify for me,”

and they answered him:

An oath.

And the Gemara infers:

“He said” —

yes; “he did not say” —

no!

And we answer: The expression

“he said”

that the Mishna used

is not precise.

And the proof is:

For if you do not say so,

but the Mishna’s intention is that “he said” is specifically required,

with regard to the oath of deposit, as it teaches: How is the oath of deposit administered? —

He said to him, “Give me my deposit that I have in your possession!”

Should

we likewise

say:

“He said”

yes; “he did not say”

no? But,

behold, with regard to the oath of deposit it is stated:

“And he denies it to his fellow,”

a denial

of any sort,

so that even if he claimed against him without an explicit statement, and the defendant swore falsely, he is liable

! Rather,

necessarily, the expression

“he said”

that appears in the Mishna of the oath of deposit

is not precise. Here too,

with regard to the oath of testimony, the expression “he said” in the Mishna

is not precise.

Therefore Shmuel needed to teach as a novelty that, with regard to the oath of testimony, “he said” is specifically required, and that without an explicit statement by the claimant that he is demanding that they testify, the witnesses are exempt from the oath of testimony.

And we ask:

What is this? Granted, if you say [as in: granted, if you say]

meaning: “Granted, if you say” ]

“he said” here

with regard to the oath of testimony

is specifically required,

then

the tan[nay] taught there,

below, with regard to the oath of deposit, the expression “he said”

is that to say here,

even though there “he said” is not precise?

But if you say that “he said” there is not specifically required, nor is “he said” here specifically required —

“he said,” “he said”

which the Mishna used twice, both with regard to testimony and with regard to a deposit,

why do I need it to teach it?

And we answer: Even without Shmuel’s statement, I would still say:

Perhaps it stated the ordinary manner of the matter,

the tan[nay] stating that they swear following his statement. But the claimant’s statement is not a condition for the oath of testimony.

He comes to teach us

Shmuel that without an explicit statement there is no liability for the oath of testimony.

A beraita was taught in accordance with Shmuel: They saw him

the witnesses, the claimant,

coming after them. They said to him: “Why are you coming after us? An oath that we do not know testimony on your behalf!”

They are

exempt

from the oath of testimony,

but if it was a deposit

in a case like this, in which the claimant came after the defendant, and the defendant said to him: “Why are you coming after me to make a claim against me? An oath that I do not owe you,”

they are liable.

And this is because only with witnesses is a statement required, but not with a deposit.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he administered an oath to them five times

and so on.

From where do we know that it is specifically for denial in court that they become liable,

but

for denial outside court they do not become liable?

Abaye said: “If he does not tell it, he shall bear his iniquity.” I told you that the witness is liable

only in a place where, if he were to testify, this one would become liable to pay money.

That is, the witness’s denial, which is learned from “if he does not tell it,” must be specifically in court, in a place where his testimony makes the person liable to pay money.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If so,

since we derive from “if he does not tell it” that a place fit for testimony is required,

say

also: The oath itself that they administer to the witnesses —

in court, yes; and outside court, no.

For ostensibly, the derivation from “if he does not tell it” includes both the denial and the oath.

Abaye said to him: It cannot enter your mind!

For we have a source for distinguishing between them and saying that they are liable for the oath even outside court.

As it was taught: “And it shall be when he is guilty

“And it shall be when he incurs guilt”

of one

of these” —

to render him liable,

when the witness swore several times that he does not know,

for each and every one!

And if it might enter your mind

that he is liable only when he swears

in court, who renders him liable for each and every one!? But we learned: If he administered an oath to them five times before the court and they denied it —

they are liable only once. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason? Since they cannot retract

after their first denial

and admit.

Rather, is it not, conclude from it

from the beraita, which expounds from the verse “of one” that he is liable for each and every one, that

an oath outside court

renders one liable. And only

the denial

is what we require

in court,

specifically.

We learned in the Mishna:

If both denied it at once, they are liable.

And the Gemara wonders: How is it possible that the two witnesses denied it together?

But it is impossible to make exact

the time so that their denials should be simultaneous!

Rav Hisda said: Whose is this? —

It is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: It is possible to make exact.

Rabbi Yohanan said: You may even say that it is the Rabbis,

who say that it is impossible to make exact; here we are dealing with a case in which

both denied within the time required for speech. And

it is established for us that

“within the time required for speech” —

is considered like speech.

Rav Aha of Difti said to Ravina: Since

it is so,

“within the time required for speech,” how much is it? —

The time required for a greeting

of a

student to a teacher [namely: “Peace be upon you, my rabbi,” which is three words]. But these witnesses,

until they say, “An oath that we do not know testimony on your behalf,” it is a great deal!

It amounts to six words, which are more than three words. How, then, did you say that they denied within the time required for speech?

Ravina said to him:

The intention is not that both denied together during the time required for speech, but

The meaning is not that both denied together within a single such period. Rather,

each and every one

had his denial

within the time required for speech of the other.

The first denied, and after the first finished his denial, the second witness denied within the time required for speech from the end of the first’s denial. And whenever the words of both were close to one another, without an interval greater than the time required for speech between them, it is as though they denied at the same time.

We learned in the Mishna: If their denial was

one after the other —

the first is liable and the second is exempt.

The Mishna is not in accordance with this tan[nay] —

As it was taught: If he administered an oath to one witness

that he should come and testify for him —

the witness

who denied is exempt from the offering for the oath of testimony.

But Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon renders him liable!

Whereas the Mishna, which exempts the second because he is a single witness after the first’s denial, disagrees with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon!

Shall we say that they disagree about this —

that one,

the tan[nay] of the Mishna,

holds: When one witness comes, he comes for an oath; he does not come for money.

And the offering for the oath of testimony applies only to testimony concerning money.

And the other,

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon,

holds: When one witness comes, he comes for money,

for the testimony of one witness is accepted with regard to money [and only for lashes and punishments are two witnesses required], and therefore he is liable for his denial, since this is a denial of testimony concerning money.

And we reject this:

And can you understand it so?

Is it possible that, according to Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon, one witness alone renders a person liable to pay money?

But Abaye said:

a.

Everyone agrees with regard to a witness concerning a sota.

b.

And everyone agrees with regard to witnesses concerning a sota.

c.

And there is a dispute with regard to witnesses concerning a sota.

d.

Everyone agrees with regard to one witness.

e.

And everyone agrees with regard to a witness against whom the other is suspected concerning the oath!

(And all this will be explained shortly.)

And since Abaye said that everyone agrees with regard to the testimony of one witness [and his intention is to say that he does not establish liability for money], it is impossible to say that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon disagrees.

Rather, everyone

holds that

when one witness comes, he comes for an oath

alone; he

comes

and not for money.

And here, they disagree about this,

the first tan[nay] and Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon:

One,

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon,

holds: An entity that causes money is considered like money.

For had the one witness come and testified, he would have made the defendant swear, and in most cases the defendant does not stand and swear against the witness, because most people do not swear falsely but prefer to pay. It follows that the witness’s denial concerned an entity that causes money, for it is considered like money.

And the other,

the first tan[nay], who exempts the one witness,

holds

that what causes money

is not considered like money,

and it follows that his denial did not concern money.

The essential matter —

Abaye said: a. Everyone agrees with regard to a witness concerning a sota. b. And everyone agrees with regard to witnesses concerning a sota. c. And there is a dispute with regard to witnesses concerning a sota. d. Everyone agrees with regard to one witness. e. And everyone agrees with regard to a witness against whom the other is suspected concerning the oath!

And the Gemara explains:

a.

Everyone agrees with regard to a witness concerning a sota that he is liable

for the offering for the oath of testimony when he denied and swore falsely —

with regard to a witness of impurity.

If her husband warned her, and afterward she secluded herself [and there are two witnesses concerning the warning and the seclusion], and there is one witness who saw that she became impure during this seclusion,

the Merciful One deemed this witness trustworthy

to exempt the husband from the obligation of the marriage settlement.

For it is written: “And there is no witness against her” [and the derivation will be explained below]. And the husband demanded that he come to testify and exempt him from the obligation of the marriage settlement, but the witness denied and swore falsely that he did not know about this impurity; he is liable for the offering for the oath of testimony. For he denied, by means of an oath, testimony concerning money, since the husband could have exempted himself from payment of the marriage settlement.

as the derivation will be explained later ], and the husband demanded that the witness come and testify to exempt him from the obligation of the marriage contract, but the witness denied it and swore falsely that he knew nothing about this defilement; he is liable for the offering for the oath of testimony. For he denied under oath a monetary matter, since the husband could have been exempted from paying the marriage contract.

And the source for the trustworthiness of one witness concerning impurity, to exempt the husband from payment of the marriage settlement, is learned from the verse

“And there is no witness against her”

— “and she was not seized.” And we expound from this verse:

Anyone concerning whom there is

any testimony whatsoever, even that of one witness, is thereby forbidden to her husband and loses her marriage settlement.

b.

And everyone agrees with regard to witnesses concerning a sota that he is exempt,

even if the two witnesses swore —

with regard to witnesses of warning,

who heard how the husband warned her not to seclude herself with a certain man. And they are exempt from the oath-offering because their refraining from testifying does not cause a direct monetary loss to the husband, but only constitutes a cause of a cause of monetary loss. For even if they testify concerning the warning, the husband still remains obligated in her marriage settlement until he brings witnesses concerning the seclusion; and even the witnesses concerning the seclusion do not exempt him from the obligation of the marriage settlement, but it is possible that the woman, out of fear of drinking the bitter waters, will recoil and confess that she committed adultery, and through this the husband will be exempt from the obligation of the marriage settlement. Therefore, with regard to such a cause of a cause of monetary loss, everyone agrees that refraining from testimony does not render one liable for the offering for the oath of testimony.