Shevuot 32a (לב.) — the Talmud in English

And we raised this objection:

What does Shmuel teach us

by this statement? But

we already learned

the following later:

If the claimant sent

the plaintiff

by means of his slave

to administer an oath to the witnesses, that they should come and testify on his behalf,

or if the defendant said to them

to the witnesses:

I administer an oath

to you that if you know of

the plaintiff

having testimony on his behalf, come and testify on his behalf; these witnesses are exempt!

For witnesses are not liable for an oath of testimony

until they hear from the claimant

the claim: “Come and testify for me”!")

And we answer: The case where he

ran after them; this was necessary

for Shmuel to teach us. For

it might enter your mind to say that once he ran after them

and they understood the reason for his running,

it is equivalent to his having said it to them. Shmuel teaches us

that an actual verbal statement is required.

And we challenge this:

But we also already learned: What is the form of an oath of testimony

? He said to the witnesses, “Come and testify for me,”

and they answered him:

“An oath.”

And the Gemara infers:

“He said”—

yes; if he did not say—

no!

And we answer: The wording

“he said”

used by the Mishna

is not precise

in this regard. And the proof is as follows:

For if you do not say so,

but understand the Mishna to mean specifically that he said it,

with regard to an oath of deposit, where it teaches: What is the form of an oath of deposit

? He said to him: “Give me my deposit that I have in your possession!”

would

even so

we

say

“He said”—yes; if he did not say

—no? But

in an oath of deposit it is stated:

“And he denies it to his fellow,”

a denial

of any kind,

so that even if the claimant made his demand without an explicit statement, and the defendant swore falsely, he is liable

! Rather,

necessarily, the wording

“he said”

appearing in the Mishna of an oath of deposit

is not precise. Here too,

in the case of an oath of testimony, the Mishna’s wording “he said”

is not precise

and therefore Shmuel had to teach the novel point that, with regard to an oath of testimony, “he said” is precise: without an explicit statement by the claimant that he is demanding that they testify, the witnesses are exempt from an oath of testimony.

And we ask:

What is this? Granted, if you say [as in: granted, if you say]

that

“he said” here

in the case of an oath of testimony

is precise,

then

the tanna taught there,

later, with regard to an oath of deposit, that the wording “he said”

—is it so here,

despite the fact that there “he said” is not precise?

But if you say that neither “he said” there is precise nor “he said” here is precise—

“he said,” “he said,”

the wording used by the Mishna twice, both with regard to testimony and with regard to a deposit,

why do I need it to teach it?

And we answer: Even without Shmuel’s statement, I would still have said

perhaps he merely followed his usual manner of expression

and the tanna referred to an oath being administered following his statement. But the claimant’s statement is not a condition for an oath of testimony.

Shmuel teaches us

that without an explicit statement there is no liability for an oath of testimony.

A beraita was taught in accordance with Shmuel’s opinion: They saw him

the witnesses,

the claimant, coming after them. They said to him: “Why are you coming after us? We swear that we do not know testimony concerning you!”

They are

exempt

from an oath of testimony.

But in the case of a deposit,

if such a situation occurred, in which the claimant came after the defendant, and the defendant said to him: “Why are you coming after me to bring a claim against me? I swear that I do not owe you anything,”

they are liable.

This is because only in the case of witnesses is a statement required, but not in the case of a deposit.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he administered an oath to them five times

and so on.

From where do we know that it is only for denial in court that they become liable,

but

for denial outside court they do not become liable?

Abaye said: “If he does not tell, he shall bear his iniquity.” I told you that the witness is liable

only in a place where, had he testified, this person would have become liable to pay money.

That is to say, the witness’s denial, derived from the phrase “if he does not tell,” must be specifically in court, in a place where his testimony would make the person liable to pay money.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If so,

since we derive from “if he does not tell” that a place fit for testimony is required,

say

also that the oath itself administered to the witnesses

must be in court; yes, but outside court, no.

For, seemingly, the derivation from “if he does not tell” includes both the denial and the oath.

Abaye said to him: It cannot enter your mind!

For we have a source that distinguishes between them and teaches that they are liable for the oath even outside court.

As it was taught: “And it shall be when he incurs guilt

“And it shall be when he incurs guilt”

for one

of these”—

to render him liable,

when the witness swears several times that he does not know,

for each and every one!

And if it enters your mind

that he is liable only when he swears

in court, who renders him liable for each and every one!? But we learned: If he administered an oath to them five times before the court and they denied it—

they are liable only once. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason? Since they cannot retract

after their first denial

and acknowledge

their obligation.

Rather, is it not that we may learn from this

the beraita, which expounds the word “for one” to render him liable for each and every one, that

an oath outside court

renders one liable? It is only denial

that we require

to be in court,

specifically.

We learned in the Mishna:

If both denied it simultaneously, they are liable.

And the Gemara is astonished: How is it possible for the two witnesses to deny it simultaneously?

But it is impossible to determine with absolute precision

the time, so that their denials occur at exactly the same moment!

Rav Ḥisda said: Whose opinion is this?

It is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that it is possible to determine with absolute precision.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say that it is the opinion of the Rabbis,

who say that it is impossible to determine with absolute precision. Here we are dealing with a case in which

both denied it within the time required for speech.

And we hold that

“within the time required for speech”

is considered like speech.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Since

it is so,

“within the time required for speech”—how long is that?

The time required for a greeting

of a

student to his teacher [namely: “Peace be upon you, my teacher,” which consists of three words]. But these witnesses,

until they say, “We swear that we do not know testimony concerning you,” that is a great deal!

It consists of six words, which is more than three words. How, then, can you say that both denied it within the time required for speech?

Ravina said to him:

The intention is not that both denied it together within the time required for speech; rather,

The meaning is not that both denied together within a single such period. Rather,

each and every one

made his denial

within the time required for his fellow’s speech.

The first denied it, and after the first had completed his denial, the second witness denied it within the time required for speech from the end of the first witness’s denial. Whenever the statements of the two were adjacent, with no interval of the time required for speech between them, it is as though they denied it simultaneously.

We learned in the Mishna: If their denials were

one after the other—

the first is liable and the second is exempt.

The Mishna is not in accordance with this tanna—

As it was taught: If one administers an oath to a single witness

to come and testify on his behalf,

the witness who denied it is exempt

from the offering for an oath of testimony.

But Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon renders him liable!

Yet the Mishna, which exempts the second witness because, following the first witness’s denial, he is a single witness, disagrees with Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon!

Shall we say that this is the subject of their dispute—

one master,

the tanna of the Mishna,

holds that when a single witness comes, he comes only for an oath; he does not come for monetary liability.

The offering for an oath of testimony applies only to testimony concerning money.

And the other master,

Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon,

holds that when a single witness comes, he comes for monetary liability,

since the testimony of a single witness is accepted with regard to money [whereas two witnesses are required only for lashes and punishments]; therefore, he is liable for denying it, as this is a denial of testimony concerning money.

And we reject this:

Can you understand it so?

Is it possible that, according to Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon, a single witness alone renders one liable to pay money?

But Abaye said:

a.

Everyone agrees with regard to a witness concerning a sota.

b.

Everyone agrees with regard to witnesses concerning a sota.

c.

There is a dispute with regard to witnesses concerning a sota.

d.

Everyone agrees with regard to a single witness.

e.

Everyone agrees with regard to a witness whose opponent is suspected concerning an oath!

And all this will be explained shortly.

And since Abaye said that everyone agrees with regard to the testimony of a single witness [meaning that it does not establish monetary liability], it is impossible to say that Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon disagrees.

Rather, everyone

holds that

when a single witness comes, he comes for an oath

only;

he comes

not for monetary liability.

And here, this is the subject of their dispute,

the first tanna and Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon:

One master,

Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon,

holds that an act that causes monetary liability is considered like money.

Had the single witness come and testified, he would have obligated the defendant to swear; and in most cases the defendant does not stand and swear against the witness, because most people do not swear falsely but prefer to pay. Consequently, the witness’s denial concerned something that causes monetary liability, for it is considered like money.

And the other master,

the first tanna, who exempts a single witness,

holds

that something that causes monetary liability

is not considered like money,

and consequently his denial did not concern money.

The substance of the matter—

Abaye said: a. Everyone agrees with regard to a witness concerning a sota. b. Everyone agrees with regard to witnesses concerning a sota. c. There is a dispute with regard to witnesses concerning a sota. d. Everyone agrees with regard to a single witness. e. Everyone agrees with regard to a witness whose opponent is suspected concerning an oath!

And the Gemara explains:

a.

Everyone agrees that, with regard to a witness concerning a sota, he is liable

for the offering for an oath of testimony when he denied the testimony and swore falsely

in the case of a witness concerning impurity.

If her husband had warned her not to seclude herself with a certain man, and she subsequently secluded herself [and there are two witnesses concerning the warning and the seclusion], and there is one witness who saw that she became impure during this seclusion,

the Merciful One deemed him trustworthy

to exempt the husband from the obligation of the ketובה.

As it is written: “And there is no witness against her” [as will be explained below]. If the husband demanded that he come to testify and exempt him from the obligation of the ketובה, and the witness denied it and swore falsely that he knew nothing of this impurity, he is liable for the offering for an oath of testimony. For he denied under oath testimony concerning money, since the husband could have been exempted from paying the ketובה.

as the derivation will be explained later ], and the husband demanded that the witness come and testify to exempt him from the obligation of the marriage contract, but the witness denied it and swore falsely that he knew nothing about this defilement; he is liable for the offering for the oath of testimony. For he denied under oath a monetary matter, since the husband could have been exempted from paying the marriage contract.

And the source for the reliability of a single witness concerning impurity, to exempt the husband from paying the ketובה, is derived from the verse

“And there is no witness against her”

—“and she was not seized.” And we expound from this verse:

“Everyone who has

any testimony concerning her,” even that of a single witness, renders her forbidden to her husband and causes her to forfeit her ketובה.

b.

And everyone agrees that, with regard to witnesses concerning a sota, he is exempt,

even if the two witnesses swore

in the case of witnesses concerning the warning,

who heard how the husband warned her not to seclude herself with a particular man. They are exempt from an offering for an oath because their failure to testify does not cause the husband a direct monetary loss, but only constitutes a cause of a cause of monetary loss. For even if they testify concerning the warning, the husband remains obligated to pay her ketובה until he brings witnesses concerning the seclusion; and even witnesses concerning the seclusion do not exempt him from the obligation to pay the ketובה, but it is possible that the woman, fearing the drinking of the bitter waters, will recoil and confess that she committed adultery, thereby exempting the husband from the obligation to pay the ketובה. Therefore, with regard to such a cause of a cause of monetary loss, everyone agrees that failure to testify does not make one liable for an offering for an oath of testimony.