Shevuot 31b — the Talmud in English

Rav Pappa said to them: If the Sages derive it from the deposit,

that one who is sworn by his own declaration is liable for an oath of testimony,

everyone agrees

that he is liable even outside the court. For everyone agrees

that one derives from it and derives all its details from it.

And Rabbi Meir and the Sages did not disagree about this!

Rather, this is the reason of the Sages

that they obligate a sacrifice for an oath of testimony only when he swears in court: because they do not derive the case of one who is sworn by his own declaration from the deposit by a gzera shava, but rather

they bring it to it,

they derive the law of one who is sworn by his own declaration

by a kal va-chomer

from the oath of testimony itself—

And if, when sworn by others, he is liable

for an oath of testimony,

when sworn by himself, is it not all the more so!?

And since they bring it to it by a kal va-chomer

from the oath of testimony itself, we say:

The sufficiency of what comes from the law is that it be like the subject of the law. Just as one who is sworn by others

for an oath of testimony

in court—is liable; outside the court—not,

so one who is sworn by himself

in court—is liable; outside the court—not!

The Sages said to Rav Pappa: Can you say that they do not disagree over “derive from it and derive all its details from it”!?

But we learned with regard to a deposit: The oath of the deposit applies to men and to women, to distant persons and to relatives, to those fit and to those disqualified, before a court and not before a court—

when sworn by himself!

And when sworn by others he is not liable

for an oath of the deposit

until he denies it in court, the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: Whether when sworn by himself or when sworn by others, once he denies it, he is liable.

And yet,

as for one who is sworn by others concerning a deposit, from where do the Sages derive that he is liable?

But the Torah did not state, with regard to the oath of the deposit, an oath by others! Rather,

is it not that they derive it

by a gzera shava

from

the oath of

testimony.

And

since we derive it by a gzera shava,

conclude from this that they disagree over “derive from it and derive all its details from it.”

According to the Sages, we say: Derive the oath of the deposit from it—from the oath of testimony—and leave it in its place, for with regard to the oath of the deposit we do not find that its liability is specifically in court. Therefore the Sages said that in the deposit one who is sworn by others is liable even outside court.

Whereas Rabbi Meir holds: Derive from it and derive all its details from it. Since we derive the case of one who is sworn by others concerning a deposit from the oath of testimony, we must discuss it according to all its details and say: Just as with testimony the law of one who is sworn by others was stated as applying only in court, so with the oath of the deposit one who is sworn by others is liable only in court.

And Rav Pappa answers:

From that

Mishna of the oath of the deposit

yes,

it is indeed proven that they disagree whether we say “derive from it and derive all its details from it” or whether we say “derive from it and leave it in its place,” for we have no possibility of deriving the case of one who is sworn by others concerning a deposit except by a gzera shava.

But from this,

from our Mishna,

there is nothing to infer from it.

For one can say that we do not derive the case of one who is sworn by himself in an oath of testimony from the oath of the deposit by a gzera shava, but by a kal va-chomer from one who is sworn by others in the oath of testimony itself.

We learned in the Mishna:

And they are liable for intentionality concerning the oath.

And the Gemara discusses it:

From where are these matters

that they are liable for a sacrifice for an oath of testimony even intentionally? But the law of an oath of testimony is written in the same section as the sacrifice of a sin-offering that varies according to means, and in that section the laws of oaths of utterance and impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred things are also stated, and concerning them a sin-offering is required only for inadvertence. If so, from where do we distinguish between them and an oath of testimony?

For the Sages taught: In all of them,

stated in the section of the sacrifice that varies according to means—in oaths of utterance and in impurities of the Sanctuary and its sacred things—

“and it was concealed” is stated. But here,

in an oath of testimony,

“and it was concealed” was not stated in it—

from here we learn

to obligate

a sacrifice for an oath of testimony

for intentionality like for inadvertence!

We learned in the Mishna:

And they are liable for its inadvertence together with intentionality concerning the testimony.

And the Gemara discusses it:

What are the circumstances of its inadvertence together with intentionality concerning the testimony?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: It is when he says: I know that this oath is forbidden, but I do not know whether

they are liable for a sacrifice for it or not.

We learned in the Mishna:

And they are not liable for mere inadvertence concerning it.

And we raised the question:

Let us say that we have learned

in our Mishna

the matter of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi,

who disagreed earlier [26a] concerning Rav’s statement, and each one swore that the truth was according to his statement. After Rav himself stated the matter in accordance with one of them, the other said: “And did I swear falsely?” Rav calmed him and said to him: “Your heart compelled you”!

That is, our Mishna says that for complete inadvertence, when he thought that he was swearing truthfully, there is no liability for a sacrifice for an oath. If so, the question arises: What was the concern about a false oath, and why did Rav need to calm him and say that his heart compelled him? This is an explicit Mishna here, that he is not liable!?

And we answer:

No!

The law of our Mishna would not have calmed him, because

even though we learned

explicitly in it that he is exempt from a sacrifice for an oath if he was inadvertent,

it was necessary

for Rav to say to him: “Your heart compelled you.”

For

it might enter your mind to say

only

here,

with an oath of testimony,

where “and it was concealed” is not written

in it,

“and it was concealed,”

it is

that we require inadvertence resembling intentionality,

so that only if he had knowledge is he liable.

But there,

with an oath of utterance,

where

“and it was concealed” is written

in it,

there would be room to say

that even the slightest inadvertence concerning it,

and even if his heart compelled him, so that he thought he had sworn truthfully, he would be liable. Therefore

it teaches us

Rav that even with an oath of utterance, where his heart compelled him, he is exempt.

Mishna:

a.

An oath of testimony: how is it?

If he said to two: “Come and testify for me!”

and they said to him:

“An oath that we do not know testimony for you!”

Or if they said to him,

without swearing:

“We do not know testimony for you!”

And he said to them:

“I administer an oath to you!” And they said: “Amen.”

These are liable

for a sacrifice for an oath of testimony, which is a sin-offering that varies according to means.

b.

If he administered an oath to them five times outside court,

even if they denied it to him five times,

and they came to court and admitted

that they knew testimony for him, they are

exempt.

For they are liable for an oath of testimony only if the denial was in response to an oath administered in court.

c. And if they

denied

in court, after they had been sworn outside court, they are

liable

for five sin-offerings,

for each one

of the five oaths. For the denial at the end in court relates to all five oaths that the claimant administered to them outside court, to come and testify for him, and they are found to have had five oaths and five denials.

d. And if

he administered an oath to them five times before court

to come and testify on his behalf,

and they denied

in court,

they are liable for only one!

Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason the Sages said that if the witnesses were sworn five times outside court, and they came and denied in court, they are liable for five sin-offerings? Whereas if they were sworn five times in court, they are liable for only one sin-offering, even if they remained silent and denied only at the end; and we do not say that their denial at the end relates to all five oaths, so that they would be liable for five sin-offerings, as with witnesses who were sworn five times outside and afterward denied in court, whom we consider as though there were five oaths and five denials?

Since

from the time they were sworn the first time in court, they

can no longer return and admit

that they know testimony for him. For since they were sworn that they did not know testimony for him, how can they return and become fit for testimony? We have the principle in the laws of testimony: once the witness has stated testimony in court, he can no longer return and state testimony. And if we say that their denial at the end also relates to the first oath [just as we said concerning those who were sworn outside court and came and denied in court], it follows that already after the first oath they were not fit to testify. If so, how can they become liable for a sacrifice for an oath of testimony for the second oath, when at that time they were already unfit to testify?

But if they were sworn outside court several times and afterward denied in court, then, although the denial relates also to the first oath, they are still fit to testify, since they have not yet stated their testimony in court. They can retract what they said—that they did not know testimony—and they can testify. Therefore they are also liable for all the additional oaths.

e.

If both of them denied together,

the two witnesses denied in response to the oath, one within the time of speech of the other,

both are liable.

Because within the time of speech of the first one’s denial, the second was still fit to testify together with the first, since within the time of speech the first can retract his denial. But if they denied

one after the other, the first

alone

is liable, and the second is exempt.

For from the moment the first denied, the second became a single witness, who is unfit to testify, and his denial is not considered a denial of testimony!

f.

If one denied

of the witnesses,

and one admitted

of them,

the one who denied is liable,

and the one who admitted is exempt.

The Gemara establishes that at first both denied, and one of them then admitted within the time of speech, saying that he knew testimony for him. It teaches us that his retraction is effective, because within the time of speech is considered speech.

g.

There were two groups of witnesses

who were fit to testify for him.

The first group

denied,

the first

that he approached and administered an oath to come and testify for him,

and afterward the second group denied,

the group

second,

to whom he administered the oath last,

both are liable, because the testimony can be established through both of them.

And as for the fact that the first group cannot claim: “We caused you no loss, since the second group is still fit to testify for you”—this will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Shmuel said: The witnesses saw one

who was running after them

in order to ask them to come and testify on his behalf, and they preceded him

and said to him: “Why are you running after us? An oath that we do not know testimony for you!”

These are

exempt

from a sacrifice for an oath of testimony, for they are liable for an oath of testimony

only once they hear

first

from his mouth,

the claimant’s: “Come and testify for me”!