Shevuot 31b (לא:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Pappa said to them: If the Rabbis derive it from the law of a deposit,

that one who was compelled by his own oath is liable for an oath of testimony,

everyone agrees

that he is liable even outside the court. For everyone agrees

that one derives both the source and all its details from the analogy.

And Rabbi Meir and the Sages did not disagree about this!

Rather, this is the reason for the Sages'

view that one brings the offering for an oath of testimony only when he was compelled to swear in court: They do not derive it from the analogy between the law of testimony and the law of a deposit. Rather,

they derive it

that the law of one who was compelled by his own oath

by means of a kal va-chomer

from the oath of testimony itself:

And if one compelled by others is liable

for an oath of testimony,

is it not all the more so that one compelled by himself is liable!?

And since they derive it by means of a kal va-chomer

from the oath of testimony itself, we say:

The limitation applicable to a law derived through an a fortiori inference is that it can have no greater scope than the original law. Just as one compelled by others

with regard to an oath of testimony

is liable only in court, but not outside the court,

so too one compelled by himself

is liable in court, but not outside the court!

The Sages said to Rav Pappa: Can you say that they do not disagree with regard to whether one derives both the source and all its details!?

But did we not learn with regard to a deposit: An oath concerning a deposit applies to men and women, to relatives and nonrelatives, to those qualified and those disqualified, in court and outside court—

when compelled by himself!

And when compelled by others he is not liable

for an oath concerning a deposit

until he denies it in court, the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: Whether compelled by himself or compelled by others, once he denies it, he is liable.

But

with regard to one compelled by others in the case of a deposit, from where do the Sages derive that he is liable?

After all, the Torah does not state, with regard to an oath concerning a deposit, that one is liable when compelled by others! Rather,

is it not that they derive it

by means of an analogy

from

an oath of

testimony?

And

since we derive it by means of an analogy,

conclude from this that they disagree with regard to whether one derives both the source and all its details.

According to the Sages, we say: Derive the law of an oath concerning a deposit from the oath of testimony, but establish it in its own setting. Since we do not find that an oath concerning a deposit is specifically required to be made in court, the Sages therefore say that one who was compelled by others in the case of a deposit is liable even outside court.

Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that one derives both the source and all its details. Since we derive the law of one compelled by others in the case of a deposit from an oath of testimony, we must apply to it all the particulars of that law and say: Just as with regard to testimony, the law of one compelled by others applies only in court, so too, with regard to an oath concerning a deposit, one compelled by others is liable only in court.

And Rav Pappa answers:

With regard to that

Mishna concerning an oath concerning a deposit,

yes,

it indeed proves that they disagree as to whether one derives both the source and all its details, or derives the source but establishes the law in its own setting, for there is no way to derive the law of one compelled by others with regard to an oath concerning a deposit except by means of an analogy.

But from this,

from our Mishna,

there is no proof.

For it is possible to say that we do not derive the law of one compelled by himself with regard to an oath of testimony from an oath concerning a deposit by means of an analogy. Rather, we derive it by a kal va-chomer from one compelled by others with regard to the oath of testimony itself.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one is liable for intentional violation of the oath.

And the Gemara asks:

From where are these matters

derived—that one is liable to bring the offering for an oath of testimony even when he acted intentionally? After all, the law of an oath of testimony is written in the same passage as the offering of a sliding-scale sin-offering, and that passage also states the laws of an oath of expression and of impurity involving the Sanctuary and its sacred objects. In those cases, one brings a sin-offering only for an unwitting transgression. If so, from where do we derive that the law of an oath of testimony differs from them?

For the Sages taught: In all of them,

the cases stated in the passage concerning the sliding-scale offering—oaths of expression and impurity involving the Sanctuary and its sacred objects—

the verse states: “And it was hidden.” But here,

with regard to an oath of testimony,

the phrase “and it was hidden” is not stated—

from here we learn

to impose liability

for an offering in the case of an oath of testimony

for an intentional transgression just as for an unwitting one!

We learned in the Mishna:

And one is liable for its unwitting violation together with intentionality concerning the testimony.

And the Gemara asks:

What are the circumstances of an unwitting violation together with intentionality concerning the testimony?

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is referring to one who says: I know that this oath is prohibited, but I do not know whether

one is liable to bring an offering for it or not.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one is not liable for its unwitting violation alone.

And we discuss this:

Shall we say that we have already learned

in our Mishna

the matter of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi,

who disagreed earlier [26a] concerning Rav's statement, each swearing that his own position was correct? After Rav himself ruled in accordance with one of them, the other said: “Did I then swear falsely?” Rav calmed him and said to him: “Your heart compelled you!”

That is, our Mishna states that for a completely unwitting act, when he thought that he was swearing truthfully, there is no liability to bring an offering for an oath. If so, this raises a difficulty: What concern was there about having sworn falsely, and why did Rav have to calm him by telling him that his heart had compelled him? After all, this is an explicit Mishna here, which states that he is not liable!?

And we answer:

No!

The ruling of our Mishna would not have calmed him, because

even though we learned

explicitly in it that he is exempt from an offering for an oath if he acted unwittingly,

it was still necessary

for Rav to tell him: “Your heart compelled you.”

For

it might enter your mind to say that only

for

here,

with regard to an oath of testimony,

where

the phrase

“and it was hidden”

is not written,

we require an unwitting act analogous to an intentional one,

so that he is liable only when he had awareness of the matter.

But there,

with regard to an oath of expression,

where

the phrase

“and it was hidden”

is written, it might have been said

that even the slightest degree of unwittingness

would suffice, and even one whose heart compelled him, because he thought that he had sworn truthfully, would be liable. Therefore

he teaches us

Rav's statement: Even with regard to an oath of expression, when one's heart compelled him, he is exempt.

Mishna:

1.

What is the procedure for an oath of testimony?

If one said to two people: “Come and testify for me!”

and they said to him:

“By oath, we do not know testimony concerning you!”

Or if they said to him,

without taking an oath:

“We do not know testimony concerning you!”

and he said to them:

“I administer an oath to you!” And they answered: “Amen.”

They are liable

to bring the offering for an oath of testimony, which is a sliding-scale sin-offering.

2.

If he administered an oath to them five times outside court,

even if they denied it to him five times,

and they came to court and admitted

that they knew testimony concerning him,

they are exempt.

One is liable for an oath of testimony only when the denial took place in court, after the oath was administered there.

3. And if

they denied it

in court, after they had been placed under oath outside court, they are

liable

to bring five sin-offerings,

for each and every one

of the five oaths. Since the denial ultimately took place in court, it is attributed to all five oaths that the claimant administered to them outside court, asking them to come and testify for him; consequently, they have incurred five oaths and five denials.

4. And if

he administered an oath to them five times in court

that they should come and testify on his behalf,

and they denied it

in court,

they are liable for only one!

Rabbi Shimon said: Why did the Sages say that if the witnesses were placed under oath five times outside court and came and denied it in court, they are liable to bring five sin-offerings, whereas if they were placed under oath five times in court, they are liable for only one sin-offering, even if they remained silent and denied it only at the end? Why do we not say that their final denial is attributed to all five oaths, so that they should be liable to bring five sin-offerings, just as in the case of witnesses who were placed under oath five times outside court and subsequently denied it in court, where we consider them as having incurred five oaths and five denials?

Since

from the time they were placed under oath the first time in court, they

can no longer return and admit

that they know testimony concerning him. Since they were placed under oath that they did not know testimony concerning him, how can they later return and become fit to testify? After all, we have a rule with regard to the laws of testimony: Once a witness has delivered testimony in court, he may no longer return and deliver testimony. If we say that their final denial is also attributed to the first oath [just as we said with regard to those who were placed under oath outside court and came and denied it in court], it follows that immediately after the first oath they were no longer fit to testify. If so, how could they become liable for an oath-of-testimony offering for the second oath? At that time they were already unfit to testify.

But if they were placed under oath several times outside court and subsequently denied it in court, then, although the denial is also attributed to the first oath, they are still fit to testify, since they have not yet delivered their testimony in court. They can retract their statement, “We do not know testimony,” and testify. Therefore, they are liable for each of the additional oaths as well.

5.

If both denied it simultaneously,

the two witnesses denied it within the time required for one to retract the statement of the other,

both are liable.

Since, during the time required for the first one's denial, the second was still fit to testify together with the first, because within that period the first can retract his denial. But if they denied it

one after the other, the first

alone

is liable, and the second is exempt.

For from the moment the first denied it, the second became a sole witness, who is unfit to testify, and his denial is not considered a denial of testimony.

6.

If one

of the witnesses

admitted

and one of them

denied it,

the one who denied it is liable, and the one who admitted it is exempt.

The Gemara establishes that initially both denied it, and then one of them returned and admitted, within the time required for retraction, that he knew testimony concerning him. And it teaches us that his retraction is effective, because within that period a statement is considered equivalent to the statement that preceded it.

7.

If there were two sets of witnesses

who were fit to testify on his behalf,

the

set

first

whom he approached and placed under oath to come and testify for him

denied it,

and afterward

the second set denied it,

the one whom he placed under oath last,

both are liable, since the testimony could be established through either set.

And the reason the first set cannot claim, “We caused you no loss, since the second set is still fit to testify on your behalf,” will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Shmuel said: If the witnesses saw someone

running after them

in order to ask them to come and testify on his behalf, and they preceded him

and said to him: “Why are you running after us? By oath, we do not know testimony concerning you!”

they are

exempt

from bringing an offering for an oath of testimony, since one is liable for an oath of testimony

only once they hear

first

from his mouth

of the claimant: “Come and testify for me!”