Shevuot 31a (לא.) — the Talmud in English

Mnemonic: three-A, student, and three-T; litigants, owner of debt and merit; rags; hearing; and causing to hear. ].

From where is it derived that a student

who sits before his teacher while he is adjudicating a case,

and sees

the student

a merit for the poor person and a liability for the wealthy person,

while his teacher does not see this,

from where is it derived that he must not remain silent

the student, but must call his teacher’s attention to it?

The verse states: “Distance yourself from falsehood”!

From where is it derived that a student who sees that his teacher has erred in judgment may not say: “I will wait until he concludes the case, refute him, and construct the ruling from my own reasoning, so that the judgment will be called by my name”? The verse states: “Distance yourself from falsehood”! [

The falsehood lies in his silence, because he does not correct his teacher before he concludes the case].

From where is it derived that when a student’s teacher says to him: “You know that even if they give me one hundred maneh, I would not fabricate

[a lie]. And now I tell you that

I have one maneh with so-and-so, and I have only one witness against him! From where is it derived that he may not join

the student

with him,

with the other witness, to testify in favor of his teacher as a second witness?

The verse states: “Distance yourself from falsehood”!

And we raise an objection:

Is this, “Distance yourself from falsehood,” the source for that?! He is certainly lying,

because the student testifies that he himself saw how the debt was incurred, whereas he saw nothing and merely believed his teacher,

and the Merciful One said: “You shall not bear false witness against your fellow”!

And we answer:

Rather,

here it is speaking

of a case where he said to him,

his teacher:

“Certainly, I have one witness; come, you, stand there, and do not say anything, for you will not utter a falsehood,”

rather, my intention is that the defendant will acknowledge the truth on his own, because when he sees you together with the witness, he will think that I have two witnesses.

And even so, it is prohibited

to do so,

because it is stated: “Distance yourself from falsehood”!

From where is it derived that one to whom his fellow owes one maneh may not say: “I will claim two hundred from him, so that he will admit the maneh to me and become liable to take an oath, and I will roll upon him an oath concerning another matter,”

concerning a claim involving land that I have against him, for which one does not take an oath?

The verse states: “Distance yourself from falsehood”!

From where is it derived that one to whom his fellow owes one maneh, and he claimed

the creditor claimed from his fellow

two hundred, may not say

the defendant, who is being required to pay two hundred unlawfully,

“I will deny it”

the entire claim for two hundred

“in court, and I will admit to him”

afterward to the truth—that I owe him one maneh—

“outside the court, so that I will not become liable to him for an oath, and he will not roll upon me an oath concerning another matter,”

which I need not take for him?

The verse states: “Distance yourself from falsehood”!

From where is it derived that when three people are owed one maneh by a single person, one of them may not be

among them

a litigant

and claim the entire maneh,

while two

of the others will be

witnesses, so that they will collect the maneh and divide it

among themselves?

The verse states: “Distance yourself from falsehood”!

For litigants are not permitted to testify, even though this is the truth, and only in this manner would they be able to collect what is owed to them.

From where is it derived that when two people come to court, one dressed in rags and the other dressed in a garment worth one hundred maneh, they say to him

the wealthy man—

“Dress

a garment

like him,”

like the poor man, or

“Dress him

in a garment

like yours”? The verse states: “Distance yourself from falsehood”!

For the expensive garment may cause the judges to show partiality and may silence the claims of the opposing party. It follows that this garment, the itztela, lends support to falsehood through its impressive appearance.

When

litigants

would come before Rava bar Rav Huna

to have him adjudicate their case,

he would say to them: “Remove your puzmekh,”

remove the important socks from your feet,

“and come down to judgment”!

From where is it derived that a judge may not hear the words of one litigant before the other litigant comes? The verse states: “Distance yourself from falsehood”!

From where is it derived that a litigant may not present his arguments to a judge before the other litigant comes? The verse states: “Distance yourself from falsehood”!

Rav Kahana taught

the prohibition against a judge accepting the words of one litigant before the other comes,

from “You shall not bear

a false report,” whose meaning is, “You shall not accept.” But he derived the prohibition against a litigant presenting his arguments to a judge before the other comes from

“You shall not cause to hear

a false report” [that is, lo tisa can also be read in another manner—lo tasi, “you shall not cause to hear”], teaching that one who presents his arguments when his opponent is not present is not embarrassed by words of falsehood; and this is the meaning of “a false report.”

That which is written in the Book of Ezekiel [18]:

“And that which is not good he did

among his people—and behold, he died because of his iniquity.” What is the meaning of “he did not do what is good”? Rav and Shmuel disagree about it:

Rav said: This is

one who involves himself in a quarrel that is not his, that is,

one who comes with authorization

from his fellow to collect on his behalf a debt owed to him. His action is not a good deed because the creditor himself might have been willing to compromise with the debtor, whereas he, who comes as an authorized agent, is not permitted to compromise. It follows that the debtor loses the opportunity to compromise with his creditor.

And Shmuel said: This is one who purchases a field that has litigation concerning it,

because there are claimants who assert that it belongs to them, and nevertheless he purchases it, relying on his own force to prevent the claimants from taking it from him. The claimants may in fact be correct, in which case he is holding a stolen field.

We learned in the Mishna:

“The oath of testimony applies only to those fit to testify.”

To exclude what?

Rav Pappa said: To exclude a king,

who neither testifies nor has others testify on his behalf; this is not because he is disqualified, but because of the honor of the king.

And Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: To exclude one who plays with dice,

who is disqualified only by rabbinic ordinance.

The one who says

to exclude

one who plays with dice, all the more so a king,

who is unfit to testify by Torah law, and therefore the oath of testimony does not apply to him.

And the one who says

to exclude

a king,

the oath of testimony applies only to a king.

But with regard to one who plays with dice,

the oath of testimony does apply to him, because

by Torah law he is fit

to testify;

and

only

the Sages disqualified him.

Therefore, by Torah law the oath of testimony takes effect upon him, and the verse “when a person hears the sound of an oath” applies to him. Accordingly, with regard to liability for the offering of the oath of testimony, which is a matter of Torah law, we leave him subject to his Torah status, and he is liable to bring an offering for his oath of testimony.

We learned in the Mishna:

“The oath of testimony applies in the presence of

a court and not in the presence of a court,

of his own initiative; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages say: They are not liable until they deny the testimony in court.”

And we discuss it:

With regard to what do

Rabbanan and Rabbi Meir

disagree?

The Rabbis said before Rav Pappa: They disagree

whether one derives from it and from it, or derives from it and leaves it in its place.

That is: When a matter is learned from another matter by means of a gezera shava, must all the details be learned from the teaching source, as though the matter being learned had been written in the place of the teaching source [and this is “derive from it and from it”—as though it were actually “from it”? Or may one learn only a particular detail, saying “derive from it” with regard to that detail through the gezera shava, while nevertheless “leave [the matter being learned] in its place”; with regard to the other details, it “remains in its place” and is not entirely compared to the teaching source?

The oath of testimony stated in the Torah concerns one who is sworn by the mouth of others, as it is written: “When a person hears the sound of an oath—and he is a witness.” Below, the derivation by means of a gezera shava from “the oath of a deposit” is brought; therefore, a witness who swears on his own initiative is also liable for the offering of the oath of testimony. "

The oath of a deposit” is an oath that the bailee himself takes. It includes every type of monetary claim that a defendant falsely denies and falsely swears concerning his denial, for which he is liable because of his denial by oath—to bring the offering of the oath of a deposit!

And since we learn the law of one who swears on his own initiative with regard to the oath of testimony by means of a gezera shava from one who swears on his own initiative with regard to the oath of a deposit, Rabbanan and Rabbi Meir disagreed about how to draw the conclusion from the gezera shava.

Rabbi Meir maintains: Derive from it and from it, from the oath of a deposit.

That is, derive the law of the oath of testimony, “from it,” from the oath of a deposit. "

And “from it” of the oath of a deposit teaches you all the details of the law of the oath of testimony, as though the oath of testimony had been stated within the entire passage concerning the oath of a deposit.

And this is how we derive it from the oath of a deposit:

Just as with regard to a deposit, one who is sworn by his own mouth is liable,

so too, with regard to testimony, one who is sworn by his own mouth is liable.

This is “derive from it”!

“And from it,”

the oath of a deposit, you may also learn the remaining details of the oath of testimony:

Just as the oath of a deposit

applies

both

when the defendant swore falsely

in court and when not in court,

so too

the oath of

testimony

for which he is liable to bring an offering applies

both

when the oath was

in court and when not in court!

And Rabbanan maintain: Derive from it and leave it in its place.

Indeed, we must learn from the oath of a deposit to make one who swears on his own initiative liable for the oath of testimony. But the gezera shava is learned only with regard to this detail; from this point onward, with regard to the remaining details, “leave it in its place”: establish the law of the oath of testimony in its own place, and judge it according to the law stated in the Torah in its own context, in the passage concerning the oath of testimony, which is in court. For it is not stated there that one is liable to bring an offering for the oath of testimony even when it is not in the presence of a court.

And this is how we derive it from the oath of a deposit:

Just as with regard to a deposit, one who is sworn by his own mouth is liable,

so too, with regard to testimony, one who is sworn by his own mouth is liable.

This is “derive from it.”

But

“leave it in its place”:

Just as one who is sworn by the mouth of others,

as stated with regard to the oath of testimony,

in court, yes; when not in court, no; so too, one who is sworn by his own mouth

with regard to testimony [although you learned the essential law concerning him from the oath of a deposit],

in court, yes; when not in court, no.

This is because of “leave it in its place,” according to the law of the oath of testimony, which was stated in the Torah specifically with regard to court!