Shevuot 30b — the Talmud in English

Alternatively,

Rav Yosef's intention was in the case of

shuda of the judges,

where the judge must decide according to his own assessment to whom to give it, because the matter cannot be decided according to the law [for example: one who commanded his property to a person with a particular name, and two people bearing that name came, and it is impossible to determine who the recipient is. The judge then decides according to his own assessment]. Therefore, Rav Yosef informed him that Ulla was worthy to receive it, since he was a sage and a righteous man.

Ulla said: The dispute

between Rabbi Judah and the Sages as to whether the litigants are obligated to stand before the judges is only

with regard to litigants. But with regard to witnesses, everyone agrees—

that they must stand! For it is written: “And the two men shall stand.”

And we derive by a gzera shava that this refers to witnesses.

Rav Huna said: The dispute

between Rabbi Judah and the Sages is only

at the time of deliberation

of the judges.

But at the time of the final judgment, everyone agrees—

the judges sit and the litigants stand. For it is written: “And Moses sat to judge the people—

and the people stood”!

Another version:

The dispute is at the time of deliberation. But at the time of the final judgment, everyone agrees: the judges sit and the litigants stand. For witnesses are considered like the final judgment, and it is written with regard to them: “And the two men shall stand.”

The wife

[of]

Rav Huna had a case before Rav Naḥman. He said

Rav Naḥman:

What shall I do? If I rise before her—

the claim of the litigant will become blocked,

when he sees how I honor her. And if

I do not rise before her,

she is

the wife of a scholar,

and the wife of a scholar is like a scholar, for it is a mitzva to rise in her honor?!

Rav Naḥman said to his attendant

[his servant]:

Go and make a wild goose fly over me and throw it upon me

[make a wild goose fly over me and throw it upon me],

and I shall rise,

and in this way I shall rise before her without her litigant noticing it, since he will think that I rose because of the flying of the wild goose.

And we ask: What did Rav Naḥman gain by his act?

But the Master said: The dispute is at the time of deliberation. But at the time of the final judgment, everyone agrees: the judges sit and the litigants stand.

And if so, Rav Naḥman was obligated to sit by virtue of this law. And how did he stand? And we answer:

Rav Naḥman sat like one who is loosening his shoes,

who sat at the time of making the wild goose fly like one who loosens his shoes, who is neither standing nor sitting,

and said

briefly:

So-and-so, you are entitled; so-and-so, you are liable!

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: This Torah scholar—

and an ignoramus who have a case with one another—

we seat the Torah scholar,

the judges insist that he sit.

And to the ignoramus as well we say to him: Sit!

But

if he stands

the ignoramus and stands before the judges,

we have no concern.

We do not turn to him again and ask him to sit, as we turn to the Torah scholar.

Rav bar Shevarya had a case before Rav Pappa. He seated him,

Rav Pappa seated Rav bar Shevarya,

and he also seated his litigant. The court messenger came, struck him,

kicked him,

and made the ignoramus stand, and Rav Pappa did not say to him

the ignoramus:

Sit!

And we challenge:

How could Rav Pappa do this? But the claim of the ignoramus would become blocked!

Rav Pappa said: He reasoned

the ignoramus:

He

[Rav Pappa],

he was the one who seated me

[for he had seated me initially], and only

the messenger

of the court

was the one who was not appeased by me,

for I had not done him a favor and he does not love me.

And Rabba bar Rav Huna said: This Torah scholar and an ignoramus who have a case with one another—

the Torah scholar should not precede him and sit

before the judge, before the litigant, the ignoramus, arrives, even though he sits and remains silent.

Because it appears

that the matter

is like one who arranged his case for him,

that they will suspect him of presenting his arguments to the judge before his litigant arrived; and we say below that one who presents his arguments to a judge not in the presence of his litigant transgresses “You shall not bear a false report.”

And we said this

that it is forbidden for the Torah scholar to precede him and sit before the judge

only when his time is not fixed,

when he has no fixed time to study with the judge.

But if his time is fixed

for that Torah scholar to study with the judge—

we have no concern. For he reasons

the ignoramus:

He is occupied at his appointed time!

He is occupied with the fixed study time, and he does not suspect that perhaps the Torah scholar will arrange his arguments before he arrives.

And Rabba bar Rav Huna said: This Torah scholar who knows testimony, and it is demeaning for him to go to a court of judges inferior to him to testify before them,

for it is not honorable for him to appear and testify before judges lesser than he,

should not go!

He is permitted to refrain from testifying on account of his honor.

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said: We too have learned

that the honor of Torah scholars overrides a positive commandment in the Torah: for it was taught in a beraita,

He found a sack or a basket, and it is not his way

of the finder

to take it

for himself because he is old or a Torah scholar, since this is not fitting for his honor,

he shall not take it,

and he does not transgress “You may not disregard it,” because it is stated, “and you disregard”—sometimes you disregard!

And these words

that it is permitted for a Torah scholar to refrain from testifying on account of his honor apply

in monetary matters. But in a matter of prohibition,

where through his testimony he can prevent the commission of a prohibition [for example, when they are about to permit a woman to marry because they ruled for her that her husband had died, and he knows that her husband is still alive]—

“There is no wisdom and no

understanding and no counsel against the Lord”!

[Proverbs 21].

And likewise they said:

Wherever there is desecration of the Name, one does not accord honor to a rabbi.

For it is preferable to fulfill the will of the Lord by preventing prohibitions than the honor of the Torah scholar.

Rav Yemar knew testimony for Mar Zutra. He came before Ameimar

to testify before him.

Ameimar seated them all.

Rav Ashi said to Ameimar:

How did you seat the witnesses as well?

But Ulla said: The dispute

between Rabbi Judah and the Sages as to whether it is permitted to sit before the judges is only

with regard to litigants, but with regard to witnesses everyone agrees that they must stand!?

Ameimar said to him: This is a positive commandment and that is a positive commandment [“And the men shall stand” is a positive commandment, and the honor of Torah scholars is also a positive commandment]. And

the positive commandment of honoring Torah is preferable! [

Mnemonic: Advocate, ignorant person, robbery, deception.

The Sages taught: From where [do we know] that a judge should not act as an advocate for his words,

that he should not try to strengthen the basis of his judgment when his own heart doubts whether it is true. [Or: that he should not advise the litigant how to argue—commentary of Rabbi Hananel]—

The verse states: “From a false matter distance yourself”!

And from where [do we know] that a judge should not have an ignorant student sit before him

so that he will not mislead him with his words?

The verse states: “From a false matter distance yourself”!

And from where [do we know] that a judge who knows that his fellow is a robber, and likewise a witness who knows that his fellow is a robber—from where [do we know] that he should not join with him,

not for judgment and not for testimony, even though he himself knows that this is the truth,

the verse states: “From a false matter

distance yourself”!

From where [do we know] that a judge who knows that a case is fraudulent,

who recognized from the words of the witnesses that their testimony is not true, but cannot prove this, should not say:

Since the witnesses testify

and there is no possibility of refuting their testimony,

I shall decide it according to the judgment

as is established by their testimony,

and shall the ![](pamud.bmp "

exact location of the page")

chain

[of the sin]

hang upon the necks of the witnesses? The verse states: “From a false matter distance yourself”!