Shevuot 30a (ל.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

The oath of testimony,

which the claimant imposes on his fellow concerning testimony, that he come and testify in court to what is known to him. If he lied and denied it, saying that he knows no testimony on his behalf, he is liable to bring the oath-offering for testimony,

applies—

to men and not to women,

because women are not qualified to testify.

To those who are unrelated

and not

to relatives.

For if the witnesses are related to the litigants, they are disqualified from testifying.

To those qualified to testify, and not to those disqualified

from testifying, such as a robber and the like.

And it does not apply

to the oath of testimony

except to those fit

to testify.

This excludes a king, who does not testify because of his dignity [or it excludes one who plays with dice, who is disqualified from testifying by rabbinic decree].

The oath of testimony applies both

in the presence of a court

and

not in the presence of a court.

All this applies when the witness takes the oath of testimony

on his own initiative.

But if he does not take an oath himself, but the oath is imposed upon him

by others,

for they imposed an oath on him that he come to testify, and he lied, denied it, and claimed that he knows no testimony, then

they are not liable

for that oath imposed by others

until they deny it

the witnesses

in court—

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: Whether

the witness took an oath

on his own initiative, or whether

the oath was imposed upon him

by others, they are not liable

the witnesses

until they deny it in court!

And they are liable

the witnesses to bring the offering for the oath of testimony, both

for intentionality with regard to the oath,

when they were completely deliberate: they knew the truth, that their denial under oath was false, and they also knew the severity of their actions, that they thereby became liable to a sliding-scale offering.

And

whether

for its inadvertence,

when they did not know the gravity of the matter, that they were becoming liable to an offering. But this inadvertence occurred together

with intentionality with regard to the testimony:

they knew the testimony, and nevertheless denied it under oath and said that they did not know.

But

they are not liable

for an offering

for its inadvertence

when the oath of testimony was entirely inadvertent: when they had forgotten the testimony, and at the time they took the oath or had an oath imposed upon them to come and testify, they genuinely believed that they did not know the testimony, and therefore swore that they did not know.

And for what are they liable for intentionality with regard to the oath—

a sliding-scale offering!

Gemara:

The Gemara asks:

From where are these matters derived,

that a woman is disqualified from testifying?

For the Sages taught:

The Torah states [Deuteronomy 19]: “By the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall the matter be established! When a false witness rises against a person to testify against him falsely.

And the two men shall stand

who have the dispute before the Lord, before the priests and the judges.”

And we interpret:

“And the two men shall stand”—

the verse is speaking of witnesses,

not of the litigants. For earlier it says, “When a witness rises.” Since the verse uses the word “men” with regard to witnesses, the verse comes to teach that women are not qualified to testify.

You say

that the verse is speaking

of witnesses, or perhaps it refers only to the litigants?

When it says, “who have the dispute,” the litigants have already been mentioned. What, then, do I establish

as the beginning of the verse,

“And the two men shall stand”?—

The verse is speaking of witnesses!

And if you wish to say

that there is a refutation of these words, here is a gzerah shavah that cannot be refuted:

Here it says, “two

men,” and

there it says [above it], “By the mouth of

two

witnesses the matter shall be established.”

Just as there it refers to witnesses,

so here it refers to witnesses!

We ask about this:

What is meant by “and if you wish to say”?

What was the possible refutation?

And we answer:

Lest you say, since the Merciful One did not write

“And the two men shall stand

and those who have the dispute,”

but wrote, “the two men who have the dispute,” I would say that

the entire

verse

speaks of the litigants [it refers to them]—

Therefore, one should learn from the fact that

here it says “two,” and there it says “two”: just as there it refers to witnesses, so here it refers to witnesses.

That is, although the connecting letter vav does not appear in this verse [“and those who have the dispute”], we should nevertheless read it as follows: “And the two men shall stand”—the witnesses. And likewise, the two litigants who have the dispute shall stand.

Another beraita was taught: “And the two men shall stand”—

the verse is speaking of witnesses!

You say that it refers to witnesses, or perhaps it refers only to the litigants?

You have said:

Is it possible that only

two

men

come to court,

whereas

three do not come to court?!

This proves that the verse is speaking of witnesses, since it is customary to bring two witnesses, as more than two are unnecessary. But litigants, if there are several litigants, customarily all come to court.

And if you wish to say

that there is a refutation of these words, you can learn it by means of a gzerah shavah:

here it says “two,” and there it says “two”—

just as there it refers to two witnesses, so here it refers to two witnesses!

We ask about this:

What is meant by “and if you wish to say”?

And we answer:

Lest you say that the verse speaks of the claimant and the defendant,

with all claimants considered as one and all defendants considered as one, and all of them together are called “the two men”—

here it says “two,” and there it says “two”: just as there it refers to witnesses, so here it refers to witnesses!

Another beraita was taught: “And the two men shall stand”—

the verse is speaking of witnesses! You say that it refers to witnesses, or perhaps it refers only to the litigants? You have said: Is it possible that only

men

come to court,

whereas

women do not come to court?! And if you wish to say—

here it says “two,” and there it says “two”: just as there it refers to witnesses, so here it refers to witnesses!

We ask about this:

What is meant by “and if you wish to say”?

And we answer:

Lest you say

that since

it is not the practice of a woman

to come to court,

because “all the glory of the king’s daughter is within,”

the wording of the verse, “and the men shall stand,” is therefore appropriate with regard to the litigants. You can learn it by means of a gzerah shavah:

here it says “two,” and there it says “two”—

just as there it refers to witnesses, so here it refers to witnesses!

The Sages taught: “And the two men shall stand”—

it is a mitzva

for the litigants to stand

before the judges.

Although above we interpreted this verse as referring to witnesses, this does not mean that it excludes the litigants; rather, it also includes the witnesses.

Rabbi Yehuda said: I heard that if they wished,

the judges

may seat both of them—

they may seat them! What is

the

prohibited

way to sit?—

That one of the litigants should not be seated while the other stands; that one should speak as much as he needs, while the other is told

by the judge:

“Shorten your words!”

Alternatively: “With righteousness shall you judge your fellow”—

judge your fellow favorably.

That is, the verse is not speaking of litigants who come before the judge. Rather, it is guidance for one who sees his fellow do something that can be evaluated either as a transgression or as a meritorious act: he must resolve the doubt and judge him favorably, and not suspect him of having committed a transgression.

Rav Yosef taught: “With righteousness shall you judge your fellow,” “‘your fellow’” means

“one who is your

companion.”

One who is with you

in Torah and mitzvot—

make an effort to judge him favorably!

It is explained below that if a judge has several cases to adjudicate, he must adjudicate the case of a Torah scholar first, because the scholar has precedence.

The Gemara brings an incident in which the case of a Torah scholar was given precedence:

Rav Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, had a case before Rav Naḥman.

Rav Yosef sent word

to Rav Naḥman to inform him:

Ulla—

our colleague, a companion in Torah and mitzvot!

Rav Naḥman said

in astonishment:

Why did he send me

Rav Yosef such a message? Was his intention

to flatter him,

so that he would find favor in his eyes?

He reconsidered and said

Rav Naḥman: Apparently, Rav Yosef’s intention was to inform me of this in order

to give precedence to his case.

To adjudicate his case before other cases, because he is a Torah scholar.