Shevuot 29b (כט:) — the Talmud in English

Rather,

this is what Moses said to Israel: You are not taking an oath according to your own understanding, which would be an oath that can be released; rather, it is according to the intention of the Omnipresent and according to my intention, and it is an oath that cannot be released. For an oath taken according to the intention of others cannot be released, since any vow or oath taken according to the intention of the public cannot be released. And Moses said this to them

so that there would be no release for their oath.

We learned in the Mishna:

And if I did not see a snake as large as a

beam of an oil press.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

“And”

and

is it not

possible for such a thing to exist?

But that

snake

that existed in the days of King Shapur was one

snake

that was capable of swallowing

that was capable of swallowing

thirteen stables

full of thirteen stables of straw.

And we answer:

Shmuel said: This statement, that one swears he saw a snake as large as an oil-press beam, is referring to one who swore that he saw a snake

The statement in the Mishna, “as large as an olive press beam,” refers to a case in which one swore that he saw a snake

with ridges,

made with grooves, like an oil-press beam that has grooves.

And we object:

Are all

snakes

also grooved with grooves!?

And we answer: Here we are dealing with one who swore

that its back was grooved,

meaning that the grooves were on its back, whereas in other snakes the grooves are only in the area of their throats.

Mishna:

An oath of utterance applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives [for example: I will give to a relative or to a non-relative]]

to those qualified

to testify

and to those disqualified

to testify,

before a court and not before a court.

This oath applies only when he swears

on his own initiative [

or others administered the oath to him and he said “Amen,” which is considered as though he swore on his own initiative; but not when he is administered an oath by others, as when they say to him: “We administer an oath to you that you ate!” and he answers them: “I did not eat.” For an oath administered by others applies only with regard to an oath of testimony or an oath of deposit].

And for its intentional violation one is liable to lashes

of an oath of utterance

and for its unwitting violation

an offering

that varies according to one’s means.

A vain oath—

applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives

for example, one swears concerning his male relative that he is a woman,

to those qualified

to testify

and to those disqualified

to testify.

Before a court and not before a court, and on his own initiative

alone, but not when others administered the oath to him.

And for its intentional violation one is liable to lashes

for a vain oath

and for its unwitting violation—

he is exempt

from an offering!

With regard to both this,

an oath of utterance,

and that,

a vain oath,

one who is administered an oath by others is liable.

This applies only when the oath administered by others is in a manner considered as though he swore on his own initiative.

How so? If he said: I did not eat today,

or

I did not put on phylacteries today,

and his fellow said to him:

I administer an oath to you

that this is what happened!

And he said: “Amen!”

he is

liable,

because one who says “Amen” is considered as though he uttered the oath himself, and this is not considered “one who was administered an oath by others.”

Gemara:

Shmuel said: Anyone who answers “Amen” after an oath

that another person administers to him—is

considered as though he uttered the oath himself, as it is written: “And the woman shall say: ‘Amen, amen.’” [

and later, on page 36a, Rashi explains that the proof from the sota is that, apart from saying “Amen,” the woman says nothing, and it is written: “And the koen shall administer an oath to the woman.” Since she does not deny the koen’s words, she is not considered one who was administered an oath by others. Rather, it necessarily follows that what the verse means by “the koen shall administer an oath” is that she is administered an oath by herself through answering “Amen.” With regard to an oath of testimony or an oath of deposit, however, one is called “administered an oath by others” because they deny the claim concerning which they are being made to swear. In the oath of testimony, the claimant says to the other: “I administer an oath to you that you know testimony on my behalf!” and the defendant answers him: “I do not know testimony on your behalf!” Similarly, with an oath of deposit, the claimant says: “I administer an oath to you that you are liable to me!” and the defendant says: “I am not liable to you”].

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: The Mishna and the beraita also indicate this precisely,

that one who answers “Amen” after an oath is considered as though he uttered the oath himself.

As it teaches

in the Mishna:

An oath of testimony applies to men but not to women,

because women are not fit to testify.

To non-relatives but not to relatives, to those qualified

to testify

but not to those disqualified

to testify.

And it applies only to those fit to testify,

excluding a king, who does not testify.

An oath of testimony applies both

before a court,

and

not before a court,

when the witness swore the oath

on his own initiative.

And when the witness was administered an oath

by others, they are not liable until they deny

knowledge of the testimony

in court; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Conversely,

it is taught in a beraita: How is an oath of testimony administered?—

He said to the witnesses: “Come and testify for me.”

And they answered him:

“We swear that we do not know testimony on your behalf!” Or they said

to him, without taking an oath:

“We do not know testimony on your behalf!”

And he administered an oath to them:

“I administer an oath to you

that you do not know testimony on my behalf,”

and they said: “Amen.”

then

whether

the administering of the oath accompanied by the saying of “Amen”

was before a court or not before a court, whether on their own initiative or by others, once they denied

they are

liable; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir!

But

they conflict,

the Mishna and the beraita,

with each other!

For in the Mishna Rabbi Meir holds one liable when administered an oath by others only for denial in court, whereas in the beraita he holds one liable even when the denial was not before a court.

Rather, must one not conclude from here that the case

in which the beraita holds one liable when administered an oath by others even outside court is because

he answered “Amen”,

and he is considered to have sworn on his own initiative;

whereas the case

in which the Mishna holds one liable only in court is because

he did not answer “Amen”,

and he is considered one who was administered an oath by others, and is liable only in court.

And we conclude:

Conclude from here!

Ravina said in the name of Rava: The Mishna here also indicates this precisely,

that a distinction must be made between one who answers “Amen,” who is considered to have sworn on his own initiative, and one who does not answer “Amen,” who is considered to have been administered an oath by others.

For it teaches: An oath of utterance applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives, to those qualified and those disqualified, before a court and not before a court

when he swore

on his own initiative.

And it follows:

On his own initiative, yes; when administered by others, no

is he liable.

And it teaches in the latter clause: Both this one and that one, when administered an oath by others, are liable! And if so, they conflict

the first clause and the latter clause

with each other!? Rather, must one not conclude from here that the case in which he answered “Amen”

after his fellow administered the oath to him, so that he is considered as though he uttered the oath himself and is therefore liable even when he swore outside court, is

the case in which he did not answer “Amen.”

We raise an objection:

But then, Shmuel,

who said that anyone who answers “Amen” after an oath is considered as though he uttered the oath himself,

what does he teach us?

For this very law is demonstrated by the Mishna.

And we answer:

Shmuel teaches us the inference from the Mishna,

to teach us that with regard to the oath of utterance, where it teaches “on his own initiative,” it states this precisely: When the oath is administered by others, he is exempt until he says “Amen,” at which point he is considered as one who swore on his own initiative. And similarly, in the latter clause, where it teaches that one who was administered an oath by others is liable, this applies specifically when he answered “Amen”; do not say that it merely states the ordinary manner in which the matter occurs.

We have returned to you, chapter “Two Oaths.”

Introduction to the Chapter on the Oath of Testimony

Until now, the tractate dealt with the laws of oaths of utterance that a person takes. Now the tractate begins to deal with the laws of the oath of testimony, which introduces the concept of an oath imposed by another: a person imposes an oath on his fellow when he demands that he come and testify on his behalf concerning testimony that he knows to be favorable to him, and he can impose an oath on him regarding this, saying to him: “I impose an oath upon you that you come and testify for me”! "

This “imposition of an oath” has legal force, and it obligates the one who denies it in a sacrifice for the oath of testimony, even if the witness did not take an oath, but merely denied the demand that he testify, saying that he knows no testimony on his behalf.

The Torah’s innovation—that a person has the power to demand of his fellow, in the language of an imposed oath, and if his fellow lies and denies a demand expressed in the language of an imposed oath, he becomes liable to a special oath-offering [which is not the regular offering for a false oath!]—is stated in only two places: in the oath of testimony, as explained. And in the oath of deposit, which is derived from the oath of testimony by means of a gzerah shavah: a person can demand from his fellow money that he deposited with him, or any debt that he owes him, by imposing an oath, saying to him: “I impose an oath upon you that I deposited money with you!” If the other lies and denies it, saying: “You have no money with me!” he is liable for this to a “sacrifice for the oath of deposit,” even though he did not take an oath, but merely denied the monetary claim expressed by the claimant in the language of an imposed oath.

The source of the oath of testimony is the verse in the section of Leviticus [5:1]: “If a person sins, having heard the voice of an oath, and he is a witness, whether he saw or knew; if he does not testify, he shall bear his iniquity.”

The Sages explain that hearing the voice of the oath means that a person can demand that his fellow come and testify on his behalf by making the “voice of an oath” heard against him. This means imposing an oath: he demands of his fellow in the language of an imposed oath, so that the severity of the imposed oath takes effect upon him if he denies it and says that he knows no testimony on his behalf.