Shevuot 29b — the Talmud in English

Rather:

Thus Moses said to Israel: You are not swearing according to your own understanding—for that would be an oath that has a dispensation—but according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to my understanding, which is an oath that cannot be released, for an oath according to the understanding of others cannot be released, since every vow and oath according to the understanding of the many has no release. And Moses said this to them:

so that there should be no release for their oath.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And if I have not seen a snake like the beam of

the olive press.”

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

And

when

not

is such a thing possible?

But that

snake

that existed in the days of Shapur the king—there was one

snake

that was established as being able

to swallow

thirteen stables of straw,

the equivalent of thirteen full stables of straw.

And we answer:

Shmuel said:

This statement, that he said “like the beam of the olive press,” is referring to a case in which he swore that he saw a snake

with grooves,

made with furrows, like the beam of the olive press, which has furrows.

And we object:

All

snakes

are also grooved with furrows!?

And we answer: Here we are dealing with a case in which he swore

that its back was grooved,

for the furrows were on its back, whereas with other snakes the furrows are only in the region of their throats.

Mishna:

An oath of utterance applies to men and to women, to relatives and to non-relatives [for example: “I will give to a relative or to a non-relative”],

to those fit

to testify

and to those unfit

to testify,

before a court and not before a court.

And this oath applies only when he swears

on his own initiative [or when others administered an oath to him and he said “Amen,” for he is considered to have sworn on his own initiative], and not when he is sworn by others, when they say to him: “We administer an oath to you that you ate!” and he answers them: “I did not eat.” For an oath administered by others applies only with an oath of testimony or with an oath of deposit.

or others administered the oath to him and he said “Amen,” which is considered as though he swore on his own initiative; but not when he is administered an oath by others, as when they say to him: “We administer an oath to you that you ate!” and he answers them: “I did not eat.” For an oath administered by others applies only with regard to an oath of testimony or an oath of deposit].

And for its intentional violation

of an oath of utterance

they are liable to lashes, and for its inadvertent violation

an offering

that varies upward and downward.

A vain oath—

applies to men and to women, to non-relatives and to relatives,

for example, when he swears concerning his relative that he is a woman,

to those fit

to testify

and to those unfit

to testify.

Before a court and not before a court. And on his own initiative

alone, and not when others administered an oath to him.

And for its intentional violation

of a vain oath

they are liable to lashes, and for its inadvertent violation—

he is exempt

from an offering!

This one,

an oath of utterance,

and this one,

a vain oath,

when sworn by others, he is liable.

And this is only when the oath administered by others is in a manner considered as though he had sworn on his own initiative.

How so? He said: “I did not eat today,”

or

“I did not put on phylacteries today,”

and his fellow said to him:

“I administer an oath to you”

that this was so!

And he said: “Amen!”

Then he is

liable,

because one who says “Amen” is considered as though he had uttered the oath with his mouth, and this is not considered “sworn by others.”

Gemara:

Shmuel said: Anyone who answers “Amen” after an oath

that another person administers to him—

is considered like one who utters an oath with his mouth, as it is written: “And the woman shall say: Amen, Amen!” [And later, on page 36a, Rashi explains that the proof from the sota is that, apart from saying “Amen,” the woman says nothing, while it is written: “And the priest shall administer an oath to the woman.” Since she does not deny the words of the priest, she is not considered sworn by others, and necessarily the force of what the verse says, “And the priest shall administer an oath,” is that she is sworn by herself through answering “Amen.” But with an oath of testimony or an oath of deposit, he is called sworn by others because they deny the claim concerning which they are being required to swear: one who demands testimony from his fellow says, “I administer an oath to you that you know testimony for me!” and the respondent answers him, “I do not know testimony for you!” And similarly with an oath of deposit, the claimant says, “I administer an oath to you that you are liable to me!” and the respondent says, “I am not liable to you.”]

and later, on page 36a, Rashi explains that the proof from the sota is that, apart from saying “Amen,” the woman says nothing, and it is written: “And the koen shall administer an oath to the woman.” Since she does not deny the koen’s words, she is not considered one who was administered an oath by others. Rather, it necessarily follows that what the verse means by “the koen shall administer an oath” is that she is administered an oath by herself through answering “Amen.” With regard to an oath of testimony or an oath of deposit, however, one is called “administered an oath by others” because they deny the claim concerning which they are being made to swear. In the oath of testimony, the claimant says to the other: “I administer an oath to you that you know testimony on my behalf!” and the defendant answers him: “I do not know testimony on your behalf!” Similarly, with an oath of deposit, the claimant says: “I administer an oath to you that you are liable to me!” and the defendant says: “I am not liable to you”].

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: The Mishna and the baraita also indicate this

that one who answers “Amen” after an oath is considered like one who utters an oath with his mouth.

For it teaches

in the Mishna:

An oath of testimony applies to men but not to women

because women are not fit to testify.

To non-relatives but not to relatives, to those fit

to testify

but not to those unfit

to testify.

And it applies only to those fit to testify,

excluding a king, who does not testify.

And an oath of testimony applies both

before a court,

and

not before a court,

where the witness swore the oath

on his own initiative.

But where the witness was sworn

by others, they are not liable until they deny it

in court that they know the testimony,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

But on the other hand,

it is taught in a baraita: How is an oath of testimony [administered]?—

He said to the witnesses: “Come and testify for me.”

And they answered him:

“An oath that we do not know testimony for you!” Or they said

to him without having sworn:

“We do not know testimony for you!”

And he administered an oath to them:

“I administer an oath to you”

that you do not know testimony for me,

and they said: “Amen,”

then

whether

the administration of the oath, together with the saying of “Amen,” was

before a court or not before a court, whether on his own initiative or by others, once they denied it

then they are

liable, the words of Rabbi Meir!

But

they are difficult,

the Mishna and the baraita,

to one another!

For in the Mishna Rabbi Meir makes one sworn by others liable only for denial in court, whereas in the baraita he makes him liable even when not before a court.

Rather, is it not, learn from this, that here

the reason that in the baraita one sworn by others is liable even when not before a court is

that he answered “Amen,”

and he is considered to have sworn on his own initiative;

here,

the reason that in the Mishna he is liable only in court is

that he did not answer “Amen,”

for he is considered sworn by others, and is liable only in court.

And we conclude:

Learn from this!

Ravina said in the name of Rava: The Mishna here also indicates

that a distinction must be made between one who answers “Amen,” who is considered to have sworn on his own initiative, and one who does not answer “Amen,” who is considered sworn by others.

For it teaches: An oath of utterance applies to men and to women, to non-relatives and to relatives, to those fit and to those unfit, before a court and not before a court

when he swore

on his own initiative.

And it implies:

On his own initiative—yes; by others—not

liable.

And it teaches in the latter clause: This one and this one, when sworn by others, he is liable! And if so, they are difficult

the first clause and the latter clause

to one another!? Rather, is it not, learn from this, that here he answered “Amen”

after his fellow administered the oath to him, for he is considered as though he had uttered the oath with his mouth, and is therefore liable even when he swore outside a court;

here, he did not answer “Amen.”

And we are astonished:

But Shmuel,

who said that anyone who answers “Amen” after an oath is considered like one who utters an oath with his mouth,

what does he teach us?

But this law is demonstrated from the Mishna!

And we answer:

Shmuel teaches us the inference of the Mishna,

to teach us that with regard to an oath of utterance, where it teaches “on his own initiative,” it teaches this precisely: when sworn by others he is exempt until he says “Amen,” and then he is considered as sworn on his own initiative. And likewise in the latter clause, where it teaches that one sworn by others is liable, this is specifically when he answered “Amen”; and do not say that it merely stated the ordinary manner of the matter.

We have returned to you, chapter “Two Oaths.”

Introduction to the Chapter of the Oath of Testimony

Until now, the tractate dealt with the laws of oaths of utterance that a person swears, and now the tractate begins to deal with the laws of the oath of testimony, which contains the innovation of “adjuration,” whereby a person adjures his fellow when he demands of him that he come and testify for him the testimony that he knows to be to his benefit, and he can adjure him concerning this, saying to him: “I adjure you, that you come and testify for me”!

This “adjuration” has validity, and it obligates the one who denies it in a “sacrifice for the oath of testimony,” even if the witness did not swear, but only denied the demand to testify, saying that he does not know testimony concerning him.

The innovation of the Torah, that a person has the power to demand of his fellow in the language of adjuration, and if his fellow lies and denies the demand stated in the language of adjuration, the latter becomes liable for a special oath sacrifice [which is not the regular sacrifice for a false oath!], was stated only in two places: in the oath of testimony, as was explained; and in the oath of deposit, which is learned from the oath of testimony by gzerah shavah, whereby a person can demand from his fellow money that he deposited with him, or any debt that he owes him, by adjuration, saying to him: “I adjure you that I deposited money with you!” And if the latter lies, and denies it, saying: “You have no money with me!” he is liable for a “sacrifice for the oath of deposit,” even though the latter did not swear, but only denied the monetary demand stated by the claimant in the language of adjuration.

The source for the oath of testimony is from the words of Scripture in the portion of Leviticus [5:1]: “If a person sins, and hears the voice of an oath, and he is a witness, or he saw, or he knew; if he does not testify — he shall bear his iniquity.”

And the Sages explain that hearing the voice of the oath means that a person can demand of his fellow that he come and testify for his benefit by causing a “voice of an oath” to be heard against him, the meaning of which is “adjuration”: he demands of his fellow in the language of adjuration, and that is, that the severity of adjuration shall apply to him if he denies and says that he does not know testimony concerning him.