Shevuot 29a (כט.) — the Talmud in English

But if

he ate figs and designated an offering

for eating the figs,

and afterward ate grapes separately,

he is not liable to bring an additional offering on account of his first oath, since he had already designated an offering for eating the figs. Once that has occurred, the figs can no longer combine with the grapes to render him liable for an offering on account of his first oath. And for eating the grapes by themselves he is not liable to bring an offering, because

the grapes constitute half the requisite measure

of his oath concerning grapes and figs,

and one is not liable to bring an offering for half the requisite measure!

And if so,

here too, it is referring to a case where he said: “An oath that I will not eat ten,” and then repeated and said: “An oath that I will not eat nine”; and he ate nine and designated an offering

for his oath not to eat nine,

and afterward ate

a fig

as the tenth,

he is not liable on account of his first oath, not to eat ten, for once he designated an offering for eating the nine, the tenth cannot combine with the nine. And for eating the tenth by itself he is not liable to bring an offering, because

the tenth constitutes half the requisite measure

of his oath not to eat ten,

and one is not liable for half the requisite measure

as an offering.

Mishna:

What is an oath taken in vain

for which one is flogged, but is not liable to bring an offering?

a.

One who swears to change

a matter

known to people.

For example,

he says

under oath

concerning a stone pillar that it is made of gold.

Or

concerning a man that he is a woman, or concerning a woman that she is a man!

b.

One who swears concerning something that cannot

come to pass:

“If I have not seen a camel flying in the air, and if I have not

seen a snake as large as an olive press beam!”

c.

He says to witnesses: “Come and testify for me,”

and they say to him:

“An oath that we will not testify for you!”

They have thus sworn to nullify the obligation incumbent upon witnesses to testify, and that is something impossible.

d.

One who swears to nullify a mitzva.

For example,

“that I will not make a sukka, that I will not take a lulav, and that I will not put on tefillin,”

as his oath does not take effect, and he is not liable on its account as an oath of utterance.

This is an oath taken in vain, for deliberate violation of which one is liable to lashes, while for its inadvertent violation one is exempt

from bringing an offering.

One who says:

“An oath that I will eat this loaf,”

and then swears the opposite,

“An oath that I will not eat it,”

his first oath is

an oath of utterance, and the second

is

an oath taken in vain.

For he has no power to swear so as to nullify his first oath. Therefore, if he

ate it,

he violated

only the oath taken in vain

and is exempt from bringing an offering. But if he

did not eat it, he violated the oath of utterance

and is liable to bring an offering.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that one who swears to change a matter known to people has taken an oath in vain.

Ulla said: And this is the case when it is recognizable to three people,

but if it is recognizable only to two, this is not an oath taken in vain, but rather a false oath.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who swears concerning something that cannot

come to pass, for example,

“If I have not seen a camel flying in the air.”

And we raised a difficulty concerning this: What is it saying? But

“An oath

that I have seen

a flying camel”

it does not say,

and if so, the difficulty arises:

What

kind of oath is this when he says, “If I have not seen”?

And we answer:

Abaye said: Teach

in the Mishna:

“An oath that I have seen

a flying camel.”

Rava said:

Here it is speaking

of one who says: “Let all the produce in the world be forbidden

to me by oath

if I have not seen a camel flying in the air.”

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Why is this an oath taken in vain?

Why is it so?

Perhaps this man saw a large bird

(a large bird

and gave it the name

)

and gave it the name

“camel,” and when he swore

according to his own understanding,

that he calls the large bird by the name “camel,”

he swore truthfully.

Is it not the case that he spoke the truth in his oath?

And if you would say that we follow his words, and do not follow his intention,

so that according to what he uttered, “flying camel” means an actual camel,

but it was taught in a beraita: When they administer an oath to him,

the defendant, an oath concerning a deposit,

they say to him: “Know that we do not administer this oath to you according to your understanding, but according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to the understanding of the court!”

And the Gemara infers:

What is the reason

that we need to tell him that the oath is administered according to the understanding of the court?

Is it not because we say: Perhaps

the defendant

gave him wooden chips,

for the defendant gave the claimant small pieces of wood

and gave them the name “coins,”

calling them by the name “coins,”

so that when he swears

that he returned the coins that the claimant demands from him,

he swears according to his own understanding,

meaning that in his view he is swearing that he returned the pieces of wood to him. And that is why it was necessary to administer the oath to him according to the understanding of the court! And it is thereby proven that if they did not administer the oath to him according to the understanding of the court, the oath would be according to his own understanding, and we would not follow his words. The difficulty therefore returns: Perhaps this man saw a large bird and called it by the name “camel”; and when he swears, he swears according to his own understanding?

And we answer:

No.

Nothing can be proven from there to show that he may swear according to his own understanding, because

there, it is because of Rava’s stratagem

that we need to tell him that we are not administering the oath according to his own understanding, but according to the understanding of the court. We are concerned that the defendant may deposit the amount of the claim with the claimant without his knowledge, and the defendant will swear that he returned the debt or the deposit, and afterward take it back from the claimant without him noticing the deception. This is like the incident that occurred with Rava, in which the defendant extended a cane to the claimant, with money concealed inside it, and asked him to hold the cane until he swore to him. After the oath—[that he had returned the claim]—he took the cane, with the money concealed inside it, back from the claimant. Therefore, they instituted that the defendant be administered the oath according to the understanding of the court. For there, even if we follow his words and not his intention, he is able to deceive the claimant: He swears that he returned the debt or the deposit to him, and indeed he returned it to him, but by means of deception he subsequently takes it back.

Come and hear: And so too we find that when Moses administered an oath to Israel, he said to them: “Know that I am not administering this oath to you according to your understanding, but according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to my understanding!”

And why

did Moses need to administer the oath to them according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to his own understanding?

Let him say to them:

“Fulfill whatever the deity says!” Is it not because

perhaps

they would conceive in their minds

that they were accepting upon themselves to fulfill the words of

idolatry,

which they, according to their own understanding, call a deity? And it is thereby proven that we follow their intention, and the difficulty returns: Perhaps the one who swears saw a flying camel, intending the entity that he calls a camel?

And we reject this:

No.

Nothing can be proven from here, because Moses had to administer the oath to them according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to his own understanding

because idolatry is also called a deity, as it is written: “The gods of silver and the gods of gold,”

and for that reason he needed to administer the oath to them according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to his own understanding.

And we challenge this:

Let

Moses say to Israel:

“Fulfill the Torah,”

and he would not need to administer the oath to them according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to his own understanding. Since he did not do so, it is apparently possible that the Children of Israel would call “Torah” those things that are contrary to the Torah; therefore he needed to administer the oath to them according to the understanding of the Omnipresent. And it is thereby proven that ordinarily one swears according to his own understanding?

And we answer: If Moses had said, “Fulfill the Torah,” they could have said that they would fulfill only

one Torah

alone, whereas one must fulfill the Written Torah and the Oral Torah.

And we challenge this:

Let

Moses say to them:

“Fulfill the two Torahs!”

And we answer: Perhaps they would conceive that the two Torahs are

the law of the sin-offering and the law of the guilt-offering,

and they would not swear concerning the other mitzvot.

And we challenge this:

Let

him say to them:

“Fulfill the entire Torah!”

And we answer: Perhaps they would conceive that

idolatry

is what is called Torah.

As the Master said: “Idolatry is especially severe, for anyone who denies it is considered as though he affirms the entire Torah,”

and they would accept upon themselves not to worship idolatry alone, but not the other mitzvot.

And we challenge this: Let him say to them,

“Fulfill a mitzva!”

and this would not have any other possible meaning?

And we answer: If he said this, they would conceive that they were to fulfill

one mitzva

alone.

And we challenge this: Let him say to them,

“Fulfill mitzvot!”

And we answer:

Mitzvot

means

only two!

And we challenge this: Let him say to them,

“Fulfill all the mitzvot in their entirety!”

And we answer: This would mean

the mitzva of ritual fringes

alone,

as the Master said: “The mitzva of ritual fringes is equivalent to all the mitzvot in their entirety!”

And we challenge this:

Let him say to them: “Fulfill the six hundred thirteen mitzvot!”

And we answer:

According to your reasoning,

since you wanted to say that the reason Moses said to them “not according to your understanding” was that perhaps they would conceive whatever they wished, give it a name, and swear concerning it, why did Moses tell them that he was administering the oath

according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to his own understanding

? What need was there for this? In order to exclude an oath according to their own understanding, one of the two would have sufficed: either according to Moses’ understanding or according to the understanding of the Omnipresent.