Shevuot 29a — the Talmud in English

But if

he ate figs and set aside a sacrifice

for eating the figs,

and afterward ate grapes by themselves,

he is not liable for an additional sacrifice on account of his first oath, since he has already set aside a sacrifice for eating the figs; the figs no longer combine with the grapes to make him liable for a sacrifice for his first oath, and for eating the grapes by themselves he is not liable for a sacrifice, because

the grapes are half the measure

of his oath concerning grapes and figs,

and for half a measure one is not liable for a sacrifice!

And if so,

here too, for example, when he said, “An oath that I will not eat ten,” and then went back and said, “An oath that I will not eat nine,” and he ate nine and set aside a sacrifice

for his oath not to eat nine,

and afterward ate

a fig

as a tenth,

he is not liable on account of his first oath not to eat ten, since once he set aside a sacrifice for eating the nine, the tenth does not combine with the nine; whereas for eating the tenth by itself he is not liable for a sacrifice, because

the tenth is half a measure

of his oath not to eat ten,

and for half a measure he is not liable

for a sacrifice.

Mishna:

What is an oath of vanity

for which one is flogged, but is not liable for a sacrifice?

a.

He swore to alter

the thing

known to a person.

For example:

he said

with an oath

concerning a stone pillar that it is of gold.

Or

concerning a man that he is a woman, and concerning a woman that she is a man!

b.

He swore concerning something that cannot

come to be:

“If I did not see a camel flying in the air, and if I did not

see a snake like the beam of an oil press!”

c.

He said to witnesses, “Come and testify for me,”

and they said to him:

“An oath that we will not testify for you!”

Thus they are swearing to nullify their duty, for witnesses are obligated to testify, and this is something that is impossible.

d.

He swore to nullify the mitzva.

For example:

“Not to make a sukka, not to take a lulav, and not to put on tefillin,”

for his oath does not take effect, and he is not liable on its account as an oath of expression.

This is an oath of vanity, for which, for its deliberate violation, one is liable for lashes, and for its unwitting violation one is exempt

from a sacrifice.

One who says

“An oath that I will eat this loaf,”

and then swears again oppositely,

“An oath that I will not eat it,”

his first oath is

an oath of expression, and the second

is

an oath of vanity.

For he has no power to swear to nullify his first oath. Therefore, if

he ate it,

he violated

an oath of vanity

alone, and is exempt from the sacrifice. And if

he did not eat it, he violated the oath of expression,

and is liable for a sacrifice.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that one who swears to alter what is known to a person has thereby made an oath of vanity.

Ulla said: And this is when it is recognizable to three people,

but when it is recognizable only to two, this is not an oath of vanity, but rather an oath of falsehood.

We learned in the Mishna:

He swore concerning something that cannot

come to be, such as

“If I did not see a camel flying in the air.”

And we raised an objection concerning this: What is it saying? But

“An oath

that I saw

a flying camel

it did not say,

and if so, it is difficult:

what

oath is this when he says, “If I did not see”?

And we answer:

Abaye said: Read

in the Mishna:

“An oath that I saw

a flying camel.”

Rava said:

Here it is speaking

of one who says, “All the produce in the world shall be forbidden

by an oath

to me, if I did not see a camel flying in the air.”

Ravina said to Rav Ashi:

Why is it an oath of vanity?

Perhaps this man saw a large bird [צפור גדולה]

[a large bird]

and gave it a name

and called it

“camel,” and when he swears

that he saw a flying camel

according to his own understanding,

for he called the large bird by the name “camel,”

he swore.

And it turns out that he spoke truthfully in his oath?

And if you say that we follow his mouth and do not follow his understanding,

and according to what he utters, a flying camel is an actual camel,

but it was taught in a beraita: When they administer an oath to him,

the defendant, an oath concerning a deposit,

they say to him: “Know that we are not administering an oath to you according to your understanding, but according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to the understanding of the court!”

And the Gemara infers:

What is the reason

that we need to tell him that they are administering an oath to him according to the understanding of the court?

Is it not because we say: Perhaps

the defendant

gave him small pieces of wood,

for the defendant gave the claimant small pieces of wood,

and gave them the name “coins,”

for the defendant called them by the name “coins,”

so that when he swears

that he returned the coins that he is being sued for,

he is swearing according to his own understanding,

for in his understanding he is swearing that he returned the pieces of wood, and therefore it was necessary to administer the oath to him according to the understanding of the court! And it follows that if they had not administered the oath to him according to the understanding of the court, the oath would have been according to his understanding, and we would not follow his mouth. The difficulty therefore returns: perhaps this man saw a large bird and called it by the name “camel.” And when he swears, he swears according to his own understanding?

And we answer:

No,

it is not proven from there that he can swear according to his own understanding. For

there, it is because of Rava’s reed

that we need to tell him that we are not administering the oath to him according to his understanding, but according to the understanding of the court. For we are concerned that perhaps the defendant will deposit the amount of the claim with the claimant without his knowledge, and the defendant will swear that he returned the debt or the deposit, and afterward return and take it from the claimant without his noticing the deception. And this is as occurred in an incident involving Rava: the defendant extended to the claimant a reed inside which money was hidden, and asked him to hold the reed until he swore to him; after the oath [in which he swore that he had returned the claim], he went back and took the reed, together with the money hidden inside it, from the claimant’s hand. Therefore they instituted that the defendant be administered an oath according to the understanding of the court, for there, even if we follow his mouth and not his understanding, he is able to deceive the claimant: he swears that he returned the debt or the deposit to him, and indeed he returned it, except that by a deceptive means he afterward takes it back.

Come and hear: And so we find when Moses administered an oath to Israel. He said to them: “Know that I am not administering an oath to you according to your understanding, but according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to my understanding!”

And why

did Moses need to administer an oath to them according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to his understanding?

Let him say to them:

“Fulfill what the deity said!” Is it not because

perhaps

they would understand

that they were accepting upon themselves to fulfill the words of

idolatry,

which they call, in their own understanding, a deity! And it follows that we follow their understanding, and the difficulty returns: perhaps one who swears that he saw a flying camel means what he calls a camel?

And we reject this:

No.

Nothing is proven from here, because Moses needed to administer an oath to them according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to his understanding

because idolatry is also called a deity, as it is written: “The gods of silver and the gods of gold,”

and for that reason he needed to administer an oath to them according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to his understanding.

And we object:

Let Moses say to Israel

: Moses to Israel:

“Fulfill Torah,”

and he would not have needed to administer an oath to them according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to his understanding. And since he did not do so, it follows that it is possible that the Israelites would call “Torah” things that are contrary to the Torah; therefore he needed to administer an oath to them according to the understanding of the Omnipresent, and it follows that ordinarily they swear according to their own understanding?

And we answer: If Moses had said, “Fulfill Torah,” they could have said that they would fulfill only

one Torah,

whereas it is necessary to fulfill the Written Torah and the Oral Torah.

And we object:

Let

Moses say to them

“Fulfill two Torahs!”

And we answer: Perhaps they would think that the two Torahs are

the Torah of a sin-offering and the Torah of a guilt-offering,

and they would not swear concerning the other mitzvot.

And we object:

Let

him say to them

“Fulfill the entire Torah!”

And we answer: Perhaps they would understand that

idolatry

is what is called Torah.

For the master said: Idolatry is severe, for whoever denies it is like one who acknowledges the entire Torah,

and they would accept upon themselves not to worship idolatry alone, but not the other mitzvot.

And we object: Let him say to them

“Fulfill a mitzva!”

and this would not have another meaning?

And we answer: If he said this, they would understand that they were to fulfill

one mitzva

alone.

And we object: Let him say to them

“Fulfill mitzvot!”

And we answer:

“Mitzvot” -

two

alone is implied!

And we object: Let him say to them

“Fulfill all the mitzvot in their entirety!”

And we answer: It would imply

the mitzva of tzitzit

alone,

for the master said: The mitzva of tzitzit is equivalent to all the mitzvot in their entirety!

And we object:

Let him say to them: “Fulfill six hundred and thirteen mitzvot!”

And we answer:

And according to your reasoning,

that you wanted to say that what Moses told them—not according to your understanding—was because perhaps they would understand whatever they wished, give it a name, and swear concerning it, why did Moses tell them that he was administering an oath to them

according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to his understanding

what need is there for this? For in order to exclude an oath according to their understanding, one thing would suffice: either according to Moses’ understanding or according to the understanding of the Omnipresent.