Shevuot 28b — the Talmud in English

d. But if he ate

both intentionally,

meaning that at the time of eating the loaf he knew concerning which he had stipulated that by eating it he would become forbidden through the second, and at the time of eating the second they warned him not to eat it, the matter is divided:

if he ate it

first

for its condition,

the loaf concerning which he stipulated that if he ate it he would become forbidden through the second,

and afterward ate it for its prohibition, he is liable

for lashes for it.

But if he

ate it for its prohibition

first—before he ate the loaf concerning which he had stipulated, he hastened and ate the loaf through which he became forbidden on the condition that he would eat the loaf of the condition, although at the time of his eating it, it was still a permitted loaf, because the loaf of the condition had not yet been eaten—

and afterward ate it for its condition, it is the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish

whether one is flogged for such an eating. For when they warn him, “Do not eat the loaf that becomes forbidden, lest you eat the loaf of the condition,” it is uncertain to the witnesses warning him whether he will indeed eat the loaf of the condition. Thus, his warning is a warning of uncertainty. Therefore,

according to the one who says that a warning of uncertainty is called a warning, he is liable

here for lashes,

and according to the one who says that it is not called a warning,

he is

exempt!

And if he

made them dependent

on eating the two loaves

each upon the other,

for he swore concerning one of them:

“I will not eat this one if I eat that one.”

And he then swore concerning the second:

“I will not eat this one if I eat that one,”

his law is:

a. If he

ate this one intentionally in itself,

for at the time of eating he remembered that he had sworn that this loaf, which he was now eating, would become forbidden to him if he ate the second loaf, but this eating was

unintentionally concerning its fellow,

for he had forgotten the additional oath, that if he ate this loaf the eating of the second would become forbidden to him—for with regard to the second oath, this loaf is the loaf of the condition, and the second is the forbidden loaf. It follows that the second oath did not take effect, because at the time the second oath was to take effect, namely, at the time of eating the first loaf, he had forgotten his second oath

and

afterward he also ate

this one,

the second loaf,

intentionally in itself,

for he remembered his oath that if he ate the first loaf this loaf would become forbidden to him, but this oath did not take effect, because when he ate the first one he had forgotten that he had sworn that if he ate it he would become forbidden through the second, and the eating of the second loaf was

unintentionally concerning its fellow,

for he had forgotten his oath that if he ate it he would become forbidden through the eating of the first; he is

exempt,

because at the time of eating the loaf of the condition [and here each loaf was a “loaf of the condition” for its fellow], he had forgotten his oath, and whenever he had forgotten the oath at the time when it needed to take effect, his oath did not take effect.

b. And if he ate the loaves,

this one unintentionally in itself,

for at the time of eating the forbidden loaf he had forgotten that he had sworn that he would become forbidden through it if he ate the second loaf of the condition,

and intentionally concerning its fellow,

for at the time of eating the first loaf he remembered that the eating of this loaf was the condition for its fellow, and knew at the time of his eating that through this the eating of the second loaf became forbidden,

and

he likewise ate

this one,

the second loaf,

unintentionally in itself and intentionally concerning its fellow,

he is

liable

for two, on account of the two oaths that he swore concerning the two loaves.

[See Rashi, who wrote that he is liable for an offering only for the second, but is not liable for the first, because he ate it before the prohibition took effect.]

c. And if he ate

both unintentionally,

for he had forgotten that each one was the condition for its fellow, he is

exempt

from anything! For neither oath took effect, since we do not apply to him, “A person under oath.”

d. And if he ate

both intentionally,

for he knew of the taking effect of the oath at each eating concerning its fellow, then for the eating of the

second he is liable

for lashes. But for the eating of the

first

it is

the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish

whether he is flogged for a warning of uncertainty. For at the time when they warn him, “Do not eat the first, lest you eat the second and thereby become forbidden through the first,” they do not know whether he will indeed eat the second.

Rav Mari said: We too have learned

in accordance with Rava’s words, that one who makes his oath dependent on a condition must remember his oath at the time when the oath takes effect, through the fulfillment of the condition, and if he does not remember it then, his oath does not take effect!

For we learned:

Oaths of error,

for which one is exempt,

how so?

One who says:

“Konam”

this thing is upon me

“if I ate or if I drank”

today, and he thought that he had neither eaten nor drunk today, and afterward

remembered that he

indeed

had eaten and drunk

today—his vow is not a vow. And likewise, if he said: “Konam, this thing is upon me if

I eat

or

I drink

today,” and afterward

forgot

his vow

and ate and drank,

he is

permitted

to partake of the thing that he had forbidden to himself, for the vow did not take effect at all.

And it was taught concerning this: Just as oaths of error are permitted, so oaths of error are permitted!

Eifa

[the name of an amora]

was teaching

the tractate

Shevuot in the study hall of Rabba. Avimi, his brother, encountered him. He said to him:

Avimi said to Eifa, his brother: One who says

“An oath that I did not eat,”

and again says

“An oath that I did not eat”—

what is it,

how much does he become liable?

He said to him:

Eifa:

He is liable only once!

He said to him,

Avimi:

You have erred!

For this is not the law of an oath upon an oath, since only when one swears concerning the future do we say that he cannot become liable another time through an oath after he has already become liable once. But here, when one swears falsely concerning the past,

each

of

the oaths

of his oaths

has emerged as false,

and there is no taking effect of an oath here, such that it could be said that an additional oath does not take effect upon it.

And Avimi again asked Eifa:

“An oath that I will not eat nine

figs,” and he then swore another time: “An oath that I will not eat

ten

figs”—

what is it?

He said to him: He is liable for each one and one

of the two oaths. For he thought that this was not an oath upon an oath, because the second oath was concerning ten figs, while the first was only concerning nine figs.

He said to him: You have erred!

For his second oath concerning ten cannot take effect upon his oath concerning nine. For

“If he does not eat nine, he does not eat ten,”

since he cannot eat the tenth fig without eating nine figs before it. It follows that his oath that he will not eat nine is also an oath that he will not eat ten, for he cannot transgress his second oath concerning ten without first transgressing the first one concerning nine. And in such a case we say: an oath does not take effect upon an oath.

And they further asked him:

“An oath that I will not eat ten,”

and he then swore an oath that he would not eat

nine,

and he ate ten—

what is it?

He said to him: He is liable only once,

because he thought that his oath concerning nine could not take effect upon the first oath that he swore concerning ten.

He said to him: You have erred!

For through the first oath, only

“ten he does not eat; but nine, at least, he may eat,”

and it follows that he can return and swear that he will not eat nine, and when he ate nine he became liable through his second oath, and when he ate ten he is liable twice, for now he also became liable through his first oath not to eat ten.

Abaye said: Sometimes you find this

that

Eifa

said—that one who swore concerning ten and nine and ate ten is liable only once,

as the master said,

in accordance with the words of Rabba, who was called “master.”

For Rabba said:

One who swore

“An oath that I will not eat figs and grapes”

together on one day, but he may eat figs separately,

and afterward said, “An oath that I will not eat figs”

separately—if he eats figs, he becomes liable once on account of his second oath, and if he returns and eats grapes, he becomes liable twice, also on account of his first oath.