Shevuot 28b (כח:) — the Talmud in English

d. However, if he ate

both intentionally,

meaning that when he ate the first loaf he knew that he had stipulated that by eating it he would become prohibited from eating the second, and when he ate the second he had been warned not to eat it, the matter is divided:

If he ate it

first,

in fulfillment of its condition,

the loaf concerning which he stipulated that if he ate it he would become prohibited from eating the second,

and then ate it in its prohibited state, he is liable

to lashes for it.

But if he

ate it in its prohibited state

first—before he ate the loaf concerning which he had stipulated, he went ahead and ate the loaf that would become prohibited if he ate the condition-loaf, although at the time he ate it, it was still permitted, because the condition-loaf had not yet been eaten—

and then ate it in fulfillment of its condition, this is the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish

as to whether one is flogged for such an eating. For when the witnesses warning him say, “Do not eat the loaf that will become prohibited, lest you eat the condition-loaf,” it is uncertain to the witnesses warning him whether he will in fact eat the condition-loaf. Thus, their warning is a warning concerning uncertainty. Therefore,

according to the one who says that a warning concerning uncertainty is considered a warning, he is liable

here to lashes,

but according to the one who says that it is not considered a warning,

he is

exempt!

And if he

made them dependent

on eating the two loaves

each upon the other,

swearing concerning one of them:

“I will not eat this one if I eat that one.”

And he then swore concerning the second:

“I will not eat this one if I eat that one,”

his ruling is as follows:

a. If he

ate this one intentionally with regard to itself,

meaning that at the time he ate it, he remembered that he had sworn that this loaf, which he was now eating, would be prohibited to him if he ate the second loaf, but this eating was

unintentional with regard to the other,

as he had forgotten the additional oath that if he ate this loaf, eating the second would be prohibited to him—for with regard to the second oath, this loaf is the condition-loaf and the second is the prohibited loaf. It follows that the second oath did not take effect, because at the time the second oath was to take effect, namely, when he ate the first loaf, he had forgotten his second oath [while his first oath was still pending, depending on whether at the time he ate the second loaf he would remember his first oath, by which he had prohibited to himself the loaf he had eaten first if he ate the second loaf

and

afterward he also ate

this one,

the second loaf,

intentionally with regard to itself,

remembering his oath that if he ate the first loaf this loaf would become prohibited to him, but this oath did not take effect, because when he ate the first one he had forgotten that he had sworn that if he ate it he would become prohibited from eating the second, and the eating of the second loaf was

unintentional with regard to the other,

as he had forgotten his oath that if he ate it, he would become prohibited from eating the first one,

he is exempt

because at the time he ate the condition-loaf [and here each loaf was a “condition-loaf” with regard to the other], he had forgotten his oath; and whenever he had forgotten the oath at the time it was supposed to take effect, his oath did not take effect.

b. And if he ate the loaves

this one unintentionally with regard to itself,

as at the time he ate the prohibited loaf he had forgotten that he had sworn that it would become prohibited to him if he ate the second condition-loaf,

and intentionally with regard to the other,

as at the time he ate the first loaf he remembered that eating this loaf was the condition with regard to the other, and knew at the time of his eating that thereby eating the second loaf would become prohibited,

and

he likewise ate

this one,

the second loaf,

unintentionally with regard to itself and intentionally with regard to the other,

he is

liable

for two, on account of the two oaths that he swore concerning the two loaves.

[See Rashi, who writes that he is liable to bring an offering only for the second; he is not liable for the first, because he ate it before the prohibition took effect.]

c. And if he ate

both inadvertently,

having forgotten that each one was the condition with regard to the other, he is

exempt

from anything, for neither oath took effect, since the verse “a person, when he takes an oath” does not apply to him.

d. And if he ate

both intentionally,

knowing at each eating that the oath concerning one took effect with regard to the other, then for eating the

second he is liable

to lashes. But for eating the

first

there is

a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish

as to whether he is flogged for a warning concerning uncertainty. For when they warn him, “Do not eat the first one, lest you eat the second and thereby become prohibited from eating the first,” they do not know whether he will in fact eat the second.

Rav Mari said: We too have learned

in the Mishna in accordance with Rava’s statement, that one who makes his oath dependent on a condition must remember his oath at the time the oath takes effect, when the condition is fulfilled; and if he does not remember it then, his oath does not take effect.

As we learned:

Oaths taken in error,

for which one is exempt—

how so?

If one says:

“Konam”

this matter is upon me

“if I ate or if I drank”

today, and he thought that he had neither eaten nor drunk today, and afterward

remembered that he

indeed

had eaten and drunk

today, his vow is not a vow. Similarly, if he said: “Konam, this matter is upon me if

I eat

or

I drink

today,” and afterward

forgot

his vow and

ate and drank,

he is

permitted

to partake of the thing he had prohibited to himself, because the vow never took effect.

And it was taught concerning this: Just as oaths taken in error are permitted, so too oaths taken in error are permitted!

Eifa

[the name of an amora]

taught

the tractate

Shevuot in the presence of Rabba. Avimi, his brother, encountered him. He said to him

Avimi said to his brother Eifa: If one says,

“An oath that I did not eat,”

and repeats and says,

“An oath that I did not eat,”

what is the ruling;

how many times does he become liable?

He said to him,

Eifa:

He is liable only once!

He said to him,

Avimi:

You are mistaken!

For this is not the law of one oath upon another, as we say that only when one swears concerning the future can he not become liable a second time by an oath after he has already become liable once. But here, when he swears falsely concerning the past,

each

of his

oaths

has emerged from his oaths

as false,

and there is no effective oath here such that one could say that an additional oath cannot take effect upon it.

Avimi again asked Eifa:

“An oath that I will not eat nine

figs,” and he then swore a second time: “An oath that I will not eat

ten

figs—

what is the ruling?”

He said to him: He is liable for each and every one

of the two oaths, as he thought that this was not one oath upon another, because the second oath concerns ten figs, whereas the first concerns only nine figs.

He said to him: You are mistaken!

For his second oath concerning ten cannot take effect upon his oath concerning nine.

“If he does not eat nine, he does not eat ten,”

as he cannot eat the tenth fig without first eating nine figs, and it follows that his oath not to eat nine is also an oath not to eat ten: he cannot violate his second oath concerning ten unless he first violates his first oath concerning nine. In such a case we say that one oath does not take effect upon another.

He further asked him:

“An oath that I will not eat ten,

and he then swore an oath that I will not eat

nine,”

and he ate ten—

what is the ruling?”

He said to him: He is liable only once,

because he thought that his oath concerning nine could not take effect upon the first oath that he had sworn concerning ten.

He said to him: You are mistaken!

For by virtue of the first oath, only

“he does not eat ten”; but he may eat nine, at least,

and it follows that he can go back and swear that he will not eat nine. Once he eats nine, he becomes liable on account of his second oath, and once he eats ten, he is liable twice, since at that point he has also become liable by virtue of his first oath not to eat ten.

Abaye said: Sometimes you can find this

statement of

Eifa

—that one who swore concerning ten and nine and ate ten is liable only once—

in accordance with what my master said,

in accordance with the statement of Rabba, who is called “my master.”

For Rabba said:

If one swore

an oath that I will not eat figs and grapes

together on one day, but he may eat figs separately,

and then said: An oath that I will not eat figs

separately, then if he eats figs he becomes liable once on account of his second oath, and if he then eats grapes he becomes liable twice, also on account of his first oath.