Shevuot 28a (כח.) — the Talmud in English

But if

even

a portion of the loaf remained,

any amount

at all,

also

he should be able to have his oath annulled, since he has not yet violated it so long as any amount of the loaf remains?

And we answer:

Alternatively, if you wish, say

that it is discussing one who swore

“that I will not eat.” Alternatively, if you wish, say

that it is discussing one who swore

“that I will not eat it.”

There is no difficulty at all, as we shall explain:

Alternatively, if you wish, say

that it is discussing one who swore

“that I will not eat,”

and violated his oath when he ate an olive-bulk, and nevertheless he can have it annulled. For

since the annulment is effective for him with regard to the last olive-bulk,

which he has not yet eaten,

the annulment is likewise effective for him with regard to the first olive-bulk

which he ate. For as long as part of the loaf remains, his oath remains in force with regard to what remains. And when he asks a Sage to annul it, thereby uprooting his oath retroactively, the uprooting does not apply separately to each part of the loaf; rather, his entire oath is annulled from the outset, with the result that he did not violate his oath by eating the olive-bulk that he had already eaten.

Alternatively, if you wish, say

that it is discussing one who swore concerning the loaf

“that I will not eat it,”

but nevertheless only

if

he left from it

an olive-bulk is it considered

this olive-bulk

eligible for having the oath annulled with regard to it,

since when the Sage addresses the question concerning the olive-bulk, the loaf is permitted.

But if

he did not leave an olive-bulk of the loaf, but only less than an olive-bulk remained,

this is not considered

this small amount

eligible for having the oath annulled with regard to it,

since the Sage does not address the question concerning it in order to permit his oath.

The Gemara raises an objection: One who vowed to observe two periods of naziriteship, and counted

the first period of naziriteship,

and set aside an offering for it, and afterward had the first period annulled—

the second period of naziriteship is counted for him

in the time of the

first!

This proves that even after the first period of naziriteship has ended, he can have it annulled. If so, why, after he has eaten the loaf, can he not have his oath annulled?

And we answer:

Here,

with regard to naziriteship,

with what are we dealing? With a case in which he had not yet completed the atonement

through the nazirite offerings, so that his naziriteship still remained, since he was still required to attain atonement for the obligation arising from his vow of the first period of naziriteship; therefore, he could have it annulled.

And we challenge this:

But it was taught in a baraita

that even if he had already

completed the atonement

by bringing the nazirite offerings, nevertheless he can have the first period annulled!?

And we answer: Since he had still

not shaved

his hair, he was still included within the first period of naziriteship.

And it is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer,

who says that

the nazirite’s shaving prevents him

from drinking wine and becoming impure.

And we challenge this:

But it was taught in a baraita

that even if he had

shaved

his hair, so that nothing of his first period of naziriteship remained, he can have it annulled and fulfill the second period of naziriteship during the days in which he observed the first period!?

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: Are you comparing naziriteship

with an oath,

that you raise this difficulty?

Naziriteship is different. Since he vowed to observe two periods of naziriteship but observed only the first, we must determine:

What caused the

second period of naziriteship

not to take effect

until now? It is, of course, the

first period,

because he must first count the days of the first period of naziriteship and only afterward those of the second. It follows that the obligation to count the days of the second period now results from counting the days of the first, and therefore it is considered as though the first period still exists. Once he has it annulled now

and it

no longer exists, the days counted for the first period of naziriteship count for him as days of the second period of naziriteship.

Ameimar said: Even if he ate

the

entire loaf, he can have the oath annulled,

because something of his oath still remains. For

if

he ate it

unintentionally,

he is still

in need of an offering,

and as long as he has not attained atonement through an offering, his oath remains. And likewise,

if

he ate it

intentionally,

he is still

liable to lashes.

he must receive.

But

if he ate it intentionally and they had already

bound him to the post

in order to administer lashes to him, then he can

no longer

have the oath annulled, even though they had not yet administered the lashes to him. This is

in accordance with the statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said:

One who became liable to receive lashes in court

and they bound him to the post, and he ran

away,

from the court,

is

exempt

from lashes, because the verse “and your brother shall be degraded before your eyes” has already been fulfilled with regard to him—for once he has been degraded, he is your brother.

But the Gemara rejects Ameimar’s statement that merely binding him to the post renders him like one who has received lashes, so that he can no longer have the oath annulled:

That is not so! There,

it is because he

ran

from the post and was disgraced by his flight, and thereby the verse “and your brother shall be degraded” was fulfilled with regard to him.

But

here, he did not run;

he was merely bound to the post, and that is insufficient for the verse “and your brother shall be degraded” to be considered fulfilled with regard to him and to exempt him from lashes.

The explanation of the following passage follows the interpretation of the Ritva of Rashi’s approach!

Rava said:

One who said:

“An oath that I will not eat this loaf if I eat

a loaf

this,”

his law is as follows:

a.

And he ate the

loaf

first unintentionally, and the second intentionally, he is exempt!

This means that he swore conditionally concerning the first loaf: if he ate it, he would be prohibited from eating the second loaf. Later he forgot his oath and ate the first loaf unintentionally, as he did not remember at the time of eating that by eating this loaf he would become prohibited from eating the second loaf. It follows that at the moment the oath took effect, namely, when he ate the first loaf, the requirement that “the person be aware of the oath” was not present, since he had forgotten his oath and did not remember that he was now becoming prohibited from eating the second loaf as a result of eating the first loaf. And whenever, at the time the prohibition of his oath takes effect, he is not a person aware of the oath who remembers his oath, his oath does not take effect at all. Therefore, even if he eats the second loaf intentionally, remembering his oath that if he ate the first loaf he would become prohibited from eating the second, he is exempt for eating the second loaf, because the oath did not take effect!

b. And if he ate the

first intentionally,

knowing, at the time he ate the loaf concerning which he had made the condition, of his oath that by eating it he would become prohibited from eating the second loaf, his oath took effect. Therefore, if afterward he eats the

second loaf unintentionally,

having forgotten his oath, he is

liable

to bring an offering, as is anyone who violates his oath unintentionally.

c. He ate

both unintentionally;

at the time he ate the loaf concerning which he had made the condition, he had forgotten his oath that by eating it he would become prohibited from eating the second loaf. The oath did not take effect, as in the first case, and he is

exempt

for eating the second loaf, because he was not prohibited from eating it.

The phrase “both unintentionally” was stated to teach that it makes no difference which loaf was eaten first—the loaf concerning which he had made the condition or the loaf regarding which he became prohibited—because at the time the oath took effect, namely, when he ate the loaf concerning which he had made the condition, he did not know of the oath, and therefore it did not take effect.