Shevuot 27b — the Talmud in English

until the verse specifies for you, “together”!

And we answer :

You may even say that it is Rabbi Josiah

who requires “or” for division, and we have no extra word from which to expound an inclusion of benefiting others; he derives that the verses speak of a case not involving a mitzva, because he

holds

Rabbi Josiah

according to Rabbi Akiva, who expounds inclusions and exclusions,

for the inclusion includes all oaths, while the exclusion excludes a mitzva matter.

If you say

that, granted, these verses

are written concerning an optional matter,

the exclusion comes and

excludes a mitzva matter; but if you say that they are written concerning a mitzva matter, what does it exclude?

Rather, certainly this exclusion serves to exclude one who swears to annul the mitzva, whereas one who swears to fulfill the mitzva was excluded because it is absent from the negative and affirmative formulations.

We learned in the Mishna :

Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said: If, with regard to an optional matter,

he is liable, with regard to a mitzva is it not all the more so? They said to him: No. If you say this with regard to an oath concerning an optional matter, it is because it contains both a negative and an affirmative formulation?

And we raise the question :

And the Rabbis, who properly answered Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra,

why did he disagree with them? And we answer :

And Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra could say to you —

Is it so that benefiting others,

for which one who swears concerning it is liable,

does not

make one liable even though

it is not included within harming others, and the Merciful One included it

for liability?

Here too,

we can learn from benefiting others

with regard to

one who swears concerning

fulfillment of a mitzva, even though it is absent with regard to annulling a mitzva—the Merciful One included it!

But the Rabbis

hold that we cannot learn from benefiting others with regard to the other mitzvot. For

there it is present

in both the affirmative and the negative, for example,

“I will not benefit”

the wealthy, which does not involve annulling a mitzva; but

here,

with regard to one who swears to fulfill the other mitzvot, it is absent from the negative and affirmative formulations, for

is there such a thing as “I will not fulfill”

a mitzva?

Mishna:

One who says: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,”

and then swore again:

“An oath that I shall not eat it,”

and again swore, for the third time:

“An oath that I shall not eat it,” and ate it—

he is liable for only one

because an oath does not take effect upon an oath.

This oath, which is explained from the beginning of the chapter until here,

is the oath of utterance, for whose intentional violation one is liable to lashes, and for whose unintentional violation one brings a sliding-scale offering!

But for

a vain oath,

which will be explained below,

one is liable to lashes for its intentional violation, and for its unintentional violation is exempt

from an offering!

Gemara:

We learned in the first clause of the Mishna: One who swears concerning a loaf, initially saying that he shall not eat, and afterward that he shall not eat it, is liable for only one, because an oath does not take effect upon an oath.

And we raise the question: Why did the tan­ ####? use two formulations,

why do I need it to teach “an oath that I shall not eat,”

and afterward to teach

“an oath that I shall not eat it”?

Let it teach: “An oath that I shall not eat; an oath that I shall not eat”?

And we answer :

This teaches us

that the reason is that he said

first

“I shall not eat,”

whose meaning is that he shall not eat any of it at all, and he becomes prohibited with regard to every olive-bulk.

And afterward he said, “I shall not eat it,”

whose meaning is the whole of it. And since he had already become prohibited with regard to an olive-bulk of it, he was no longer prohibited with regard to all of it; this

is why he is liable for only one. But

if he

said

first

“I shall not eat it,”

whose meaning is eating all of it,

and afterward he said, “I shall not eat,”

thereby prohibiting himself with regard to an olive-bulk of it,

he is liable for two

when he ate all of it. For his second oath can take effect with regard to an olive-bulk, since in his first oath he prohibited only the eating of all of it; therefore, when he eats an olive-bulk, he becomes liable because of the second oath. And when he finishes eating all of it, he becomes liable because of the first oath.

In accordance with what Rava said, for Rava said: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf”—

once he has eaten an olive-bulk of it, he is liable,

for he said only that he shall not eat, and eating is [defined as] an olive-bulk. But if he said, “An oath

that I shall not eat it,”

his intention is to prohibit the eating of all of it; therefore

he is not liable until he eats all of it.

We learned in the Mishna: One who swears concerning the loaf three times:

“An oath that I shall not eat it” —

he is liable for only one!

And we raise the question :

This additional one,

the third oath,

why do I need it?

For the second oath already teaches us that an oath does not take effect upon an oath. And we answer :

This teaches us: It is liability that is absent

with regard to the second and third oaths,

but the oath

itself

is present, for if it finds room,

it takes effect

the second one, and likewise the third one; if it finds room, it will take effect!

And we explain :

For what halakhic purpose,

that is, how is it possible for the other oaths to take effect?

For what Rava said. For Rava said: If he sought a sage’s release from the first oath,

the second takes its place.

Since the sage uproots the oath from its very beginning, it is as though he never swore at all, and the second oath takes effect retroactively; and likewise, if he sought a release from the second, the third takes effect retroactively.

Let us say that this supports him

Rava:

One who vowed two periods of naziriteship, and counted

the first naziriteship, and at its completion designated

an offering, and afterward sought a release

from his

first

it counts for him

the period of naziriteship

second as the first,

and he need not observe naziriteship any further. For once he sought a release from the first, the second took effect upon him retroactively and he fulfilled it, and now he may bring the offering he designated for the first naziriteship for the second naziriteship!

And it is proved from here that if the factor preventing the second matter from taking effect is uprooted through a sage’s release, the second matter takes effect retroactively.

And we reject this :

Can it be compared?! There, the second naziriteship

at least

is present, for when he counts the first, he must go back and count the second without a release [if he had not sought a release from it]. And it follows that the second naziriteship has no similarity to the matter of an oath not taking effect upon an oath, since here, with naziriteship, the second naziriteship takes effect in every case; therefore, if he sought a release from the first, the second takes effect retroactively. But

here

with regard to an oath, as long as he has not sought a release from the first,

is the second oath present at all,

and from where do we know that it can take effect afterward, retroactively, when he seeks a release from the first?

Rava said: One who swore concerning a loaf

that he shall not eat it,

and ate it. If he left an olive-bulk of it

remaining, then he

may seek a release from it,

and he is permitted to eat the olive-bulk that remains. But if he

ate all of it, he may not seek a release from it,

for his oath no longer exists, and what he transgressed, he transgressed; he is liable to bring an offering if he acted unintentionally, or he is liable to lashes if he transgressed intentionally.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: What are the circumstances

of this oath that he swore concerning the loaf?

If he said

an oath

“that I shall not eat”

this loaf, then

from

the moment he ate

the first olive-bulk, he enacted its prohibition,

and how can a release be effective with regard to a prohibition that has already been enacted?

And if he said

an oath

“that I shall not eat it,” what is the relevance

of the fact

that an

olive-bulk

remained from the loaf so that he could seek a release from it,