Shevuot 27a — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

If one swore to nullify the mitzva, but did not nullify it -

he is exempt.

And likewise, if one swore

to fulfill

the mitzva,

but did not fulfill it,

he is

exempt,

despite

it having been warranted by the law that he should be

one who swore to fulfill the mitzva

liable, in accordance with the words of Rabbi Judah ben Beteira.

And so

said Rabbi Judah ben Beteira: What if

regarding a matter of

discretion, concerning which he was not adjured at Sinai

to do it,

he is liable for it

when he swore to do it;

a mitzva, concerning which he was adjured at

Sinai

to do it,

is it not logically the case that he should be liable for it

also on account of his oath?

The Sages said to him:

The

no, if you have said regarding an oath concerning a matter of discretion, for in it he made a prohibition, can you say so regarding an oath concerning a mitzva, in which he did not make a prohibition, for if one swore to nullify

the mitzva

but did not nullify it,

he is

exempt,

and it follows that we do not apply to it, “to do harm or to do good.”

Gemara:

The Sages taught: One might have thought that if one swore to nullify the mitzva but did not nullify it, he should be liable?

And I would have said that he is able to swear, because this is the meaning of “to do harm”

to nullify a mitzva?

The verse states, “to do harm or to do good” -

just as doing good refers to a matter of discretion,

which is not applicable to nullifying a mitzva,

so too, doing harm refers to a matter of discretion. I exclude one who swore to nullify the mitzva but did not nullify it, who is exempt!

One might have thought that if one swore to fulfill the mitzva but did not fulfill it, he should be liable

for his oath, because “to do good” applies to it?

The verse states, “to do harm or to do good” -

just as doing harm refers to a matter of discretion,

as will be explained below,

so too, doing good refers to a matter of discretion. I exclude one who swore to fulfill the mitzva but did not fulfill it, who is exempt!

One might have thought that if one swore to do harm to himself

by injuring himself

but did not do harm, he should be exempt? [

Because one might have thought that it is forbidden for a person to injure himself and he cannot undertake to injure himself],

the verse states, “to do harm or to do good” -

just as doing good refers to a matter of discretion, so too, doing harm refers to a matter of discretion; I shall include one who swore to do harm to himself but did not do harm, for he has the discretion

to injure himself and to do harm to himself!

One might have thought that if one swore to do harm to others but did not do harm

to them,

he should be liable? The verse states, “to do harm or to do good” -

just as doing good refers to a matter of discretion, so too, doing harm refers to a matter of discretion; I exclude one who swore to do harm to others, for he does not have the discretion

to do harm to them!

From where is it derived to include

one who swore regarding

doing good to others

that he is liable to fulfill it, even though he is not liable when he swore regarding doing harm to others?

The verse states, “or to do good.” The extra “or” comes for exposition, to include doing good to others.

The extra word “or” is expounded to include doing good to others.

And what is doing harm to others

to which his oath does not apply?

“I will strike so-and-so, and I will injure his brain!”

Now the Gemara explains the beraita:

And from where

“to do harm or to do good”

are written regarding a matter of discretion? Perhaps they are written regarding a matter of mitzva,

and the verse came to make one who swore to fulfill a mitzva, or one who swore to nullify a mitzva, liable?

It cannot enter your mind!

Because

we require doing good to be analogous to doing harm, and doing harm to be analogous to doing good.

Therefore, it is impossible to establish “doing harm” as referring to a matter of mitzva,

for doing harm is juxtaposed with doing good -

just as doing good is not

the nullification of a mitzva,

for the nullification of a mitzva is not doing good,

so too, doing harm is not the nullification of a mitzva.

And from now, if these verses speak of a matter of mitzva, necessarily this “doing harm” regarding which he swore is not “I will not eat matza,” but “I will not eat leaven,” analogous to doing good, that he will eat matza; and if so,

“doing harm” itself -

is doing good

in relation to the mitzva, for he swore not to eat leaven; and why was it necessary to write it at all, since it is included in “doing good”?

Likewise, it is impossible to establish “doing good” as referring to a matter of mitzva, because

doing good is juxtaposed with doing harm -

just as doing harm is not the fulfillment of a mitzva,

for one who swore to fulfill a mitzva is not included in “doing harm,”

so too, doing good is not the fulfillment of a mitzva.

And if so, this “doing good,” if you wish to establish it as referring to a matter of mitzva, necessarily it is not regarding the fulfillment of a mitzva, but regarding the nullification of a mitzva, such as, “I will eat leaven on Passover”; and if so,

doing good itself -

is doing harm.

But “doing harm” has already been written in this verse, so why do I need to write it again in the language of “doing good”?

Therefore, necessarily, the verse is not speaking of a matter of mitzva, but of a matter of discretion!

And we raised an objection to this:

If so,

that you expound the juxtaposition of doing harm to doing good in such a manner,

even regarding a matter of discretion, you will not find it

applicable to these verses. For if we say that one swore to do harm to himself, meaning that he should eat something harmful to the body, we must juxtapose doing harm to doing good and say: just as doing good is with something beneficial to the body, so too, “doing harm” is with something beneficial to the body. Necessarily, then, it refers to one who swore that he would not eat things harmful to the body. And if so, this doing harm is doing good!? And likewise regarding “doing good”: if we say that he swore that he would eat things beneficial to the body, this is not in accordance with the juxtaposition of doing good to doing harm. Necessarily, then, it speaks of one who swore that he would eat things harmful to the body. And if so, this “doing good” is doing harm!?

Rather,

the Gemara retracts the derivation from the juxtaposition of doing harm and doing good, and we derive that these verses speak of a matter of discretion.

Since “or” was necessary

as an extra word

to include doing good to others, infer from it

that the verses

are written regarding a matter of discretion; for if it enters your mind that they are written regarding a matter of mitzva,

one could object:

now, doing harm to others

which is the nullification of a mitzva

was included; is doing good to others necessary? But if it speaks of a matter of discretion, this is satisfactory, for it was necessary to include doing good to others, even though he cannot swear to do harm to them, and it is not included in “to do harm or to do good.”

And we challenge this:

And this “or”

how do we expound it to include doing good to others? But

it is needed to divide,

for an oath to do harm alone, or to do good alone, makes one liable for an offering. For if “or” were not written, I would have thought that he is not liable for an offering until he swears regarding both, to do harm and to do good?

And we answer:

A verse is not needed to divide.

For wherever the conjunction “and” is written, its meaning is to divide.

And we raise an objection:

This works according to Rabbi Jonathan,

who said that it means each one separately.

But according to Rabbi Josiah,

who said that it means both together, unless the verse explains to you that each one is separate,

what is there to say? “Or” is necessary to divide. And from where is doing good to others included?

For it was taught: “A man who curses his father and his mother

shall surely be put to death.”

I have only

that he is liable to death

if

he curses

his father and his mother

together; if he curses

his father but not

his

mother,

or

his mother but not his father, from where

is it derived that he is liable to death?

The verse states

at the end of the verse, “A man who curses his father and his mother,”

“His father and his mother he cursed,”

to expound from it -

his father he cursed, his mother he cursed!

For it attached his father to the curse at the beginning of the verse and his mother to the curse at its end, to teach you that he is liable for cursing each one of them separately;

the words of Rabbi Josiah. Rabbi Jonathan says: It means both together,

but it also

means

each

one separately,