Shevuot 27a (כז.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

If one swore to nullify a mitzva, but did not nullify it -

he is exempt.

And likewise, if one swore

to fulfill

the mitzva,

but did not fulfill

it, he is

exempt,

even though

it would follow by logical reasoning that

one who swears to fulfill the mitzva

should be liable, in accordance with the words of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira.

And thus

said Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira: Just as,

with regard to

an optional matter, concerning which he is not under oath from Sinai

to do it,

he is liable for it

when he swears to do it,

with regard to a mitzva, concerning which he is under oath from

Sinai

to do it,

is it not logical that he should be liable for it

also because of his oath?

The Sages said to him

:

No. If you say that with regard to an oath concerning an optional matter, in which he has done a prohibition, can you say the same with regard to an oath concerning a mitzva, in which he has not done a prohibition? For if one swore to nullify

the mitzva

but did not nullify it,

he is

exempt,

and consequently the phrase “to do evil or to do good” does not apply to it".

Gemara:

The Sages taught: One might have thought that if one swore to nullify a mitzva but did not nullify it, he should be liable.

And one might have said that he is able to swear, because that is the meaning of “to do evil" -

to nullify a mitzva?

The verse states: “to do evil or to do good” -

just as doing good is optional,

and does not apply to the nullification of a mitzva,

so too, doing evil is optional. I exclude one who swore to nullify a mitzva but did not nullify it, as he is exempt!

One might have thought that if one swore to fulfill a mitzva but did not fulfill it, he should be liable

for his oath, because “to do good” applies to it"?

The verse states: “to do evil or to do good” -

just as doing evil is optional,

as will be explained below,

so too, doing good is optional. I exclude one who swore to fulfill a mitzva but did not fulfill it, as he is exempt!

One might have thought that if one swore to do evil to himself

by injuring himself

but did not do evil, he should be exempt? [

Because one might have said that a person is forbidden to injure himself, and therefore he cannot obligate himself to injure himself],

the verse states: “to do evil or to do good” -

just as doing good is optional, so too, doing evil is optional; I include one who swore to do evil to himself but did not do evil, for he has the option

of injuring himself and doing evil to himself!

One might have thought that if one swore to do evil to others but did not do evil

to them,

he should be liable? The verse states: “to do evil or to do good” -

just as doing good is optional, so too, doing evil is optional; I exclude one who swore to do evil to others, as he does not have the option

of doing evil to them!

From where is it derived to include

one who swore concerning

doing good to others

that he is liable to fulfill it, although he is not liable when he swears concerning doing evil to others?

The verse states: “or to do good.” The superfluous “or” comes to teach, to include doing good to others.

The extra word “or” is expounded to include doing good to others.

And what is doing evil to others

to which his oath does not apply?

“I will strike so-and-so and wound his head!”

Now the Gemara explains the beraita:

And from where do you know that the verses

“to do evil or to do good”

are written with regard to an optional matter? Perhaps they are written with regard to a mitzva,

and the verse comes to render liable one who swears to fulfill a mitzva or one who swears to nullify a mitzva?

That cannot enter your mind!

Because

we require doing good to be analogous to doing evil, and doing evil to be analogous to doing good.

Therefore, it is impossible to interpret “doing evil” as referring to a mitzva,

as doing evil is juxtaposed to doing good -

just as doing good is not

the nullification of a mitzva,

since the nullification of a mitzva is not doing good,

so too, doing evil is not the nullification of a mitzva.

Therefore, if these verses are speaking about a mitzva, necessarily this “doing evil” concerning which he swore is not “I will not eat matza,” but “I will not eat leaven,” analogous to doing good, which is eating matza. And if so,

“doing evil” itself

is doing good

with regard to the mitzva, since he swore not to eat leaven; and why was it necessary to write it at all, when it is included in “doing good"!?

Likewise, it is impossible to interpret “doing good” as referring to a mitzva, because

doing good is juxtaposed to doing evil -

just as doing evil is not the fulfillment of a mitzva,

since one who swears to fulfill a mitzva is not included under “doing evil,”

so too, doing good is not the fulfillment of a mitzva.

And if so, if you wish to establish this “doing good” as referring to a mitzva, necessarily it does not concern the fulfillment of a mitzva, but its nullification, such as: “I will eat leaven on Passover.” And if so,

“doing good” itself

is doing evil.

But “doing evil” has already been written in this verse, so why do I need it to be written again in the language of “doing good"!?

Therefore, necessarily the verse is not speaking about a mitzva, but about an optional matter!

We raise an objection:

If so,

that you expound the juxtaposition of doing evil to doing good in this manner,

even with regard to an optional matter, you cannot find

these verses applicable. For if we say that swearing to do evil to oneself means that he will eat something harmful to the body, we must juxtapose doing evil to doing good and say: Just as doing good refers to something beneficial to the body, so too, “doing evil” refers to something beneficial to the body. Necessarily, then, it refers to one who swore that he would not eat things harmful to the body. And if so, this “doing evil” is doing good!? And likewise with “doing good”: if we say that he swore that he would eat things beneficial to the body, that would not accord with the juxtaposition of doing good to doing evil. Necessarily, then, it refers to one who swore that he would eat things harmful to the body. And if so, this “doing good” is doing evil!?

Rather,

the Gemara retracts the derivation from the juxtaposition of doing evil and doing good, and derives that these verses are speaking about an optional matter

from the fact that “or” was necessary

as a superfluous word

to include doing good to others; infer from this

that the verses

are written with regard to an optional matter, for if it enters your mind that they are written with regard to a mitzva,

one could raise the following difficulty:

Now that doing evil to others

which is the nullification of a mitzva

was included, is it necessary to state that doing good to others is included? However, if the verses are speaking about an optional matter, this is understandable, as it was necessary to include doing good to others, despite the fact that one cannot swear to do evil to them, and it is not included in “to do evil or to do good.”

And we challenge this:

And this “or,”

how do we expound it to include doing good to others? But

it is needed to divide,

as an oath to do evil alone or to do good alone renders one liable to bring an offering. For if “or” were not written, I would have said that he is not liable to bring an offering until he swears concerning both doing evil and doing good.

And we answer:

A verse is not needed to divide.

For wherever a connective vav is written, its meaning is to divide.

We raise an objection:

This works according to Rabbi Yonatan,

who said that the meaning is each one separately.

But according to Rabbi Yashya,

who said that the meaning is both together, unless the verse clarifies that each one is separate,

what can be said? The “or” is needed to divide. And from where do we derive the inclusion of doing good to others?

As it is taught in a beraita: “A man who curses his father and his mother

shall surely be put to death.”

I have

that he is liable to receive the death penalty

only

one who curses

his father and his mother

together. With regard to one who curses

his father but not

his

mother,

or

his mother but not his father, from where

do we know that he is liable to receive the death penalty?

The verse states

at the end of the verse “A man who curses his father and his mother,”

“He has cursed his father and his mother,”

to derive from it:

He has cursed his father; he has cursed his mother!

It juxtaposes his father with the curse at the beginning of the verse and his mother with the curse at its end, to teach you that he is liable for cursing each of them separately.

These are the words of Rabbi Yashya. Rabbi Yonatan says: The meaning is both together,

but it also

means

each

one separately,