Shevuot 26b (כו:) — the Talmud in English

Which is it

how is it possible for there to be

an inadvertent violation of an utterance concerning the past

for which he would be liable to bring an offering?

But in either case,

if he knew

at the time he swore concerning the past that he was lying,

he is intentional

and does not bring an offering.

And

if he did not know

that he was lying, but thought that this was the truth,

he is coerced,

and a coerced person is exempt from bringing an offering, as it is stated: “The person under an oath” [and if he is inadvertent in that he does not know at all that it is forbidden to swear falsely, there is no greater coercion than this]!?

Granted, with regard to an oath concerning the future, inadvertence is possible, since at the time of the oath his mind is settled and he is called “the person under an oath”; only afterward did he forget that he had sworn and violate his oath.

Rav Naḥman said to him

Rav Naḥman: An inadvertent violation of an oath of utterance concerning the past is possible

in a case where he says

at the time that he swears falsely concerning the past:

I know that this oath is forbidden

[and I know that my oath is false],

but I do not know whether one is liable to bring an offering for it

in a case of inadvertence

or not.

This too is called inadvertence, since he lacks knowledge of all the details of the severity of the prohibition: he does not know that one must bring an offering for performing this act even when he performed it inadvertently.

The Gemara explains:

In accordance with whose

according to which tanna did Rav Naḥman say that such inadvertence is sufficient for him to be considered inadvertent?

In accordance with Monbaz, who said

in tractate Shabbat [69a], with regard to other obligations to bring a sin-offering,

inadvertence concerning the offering

alone

is considered inadvertence.

Even if he is intentional, knowing that the matter is forbidden by a prohibition and that one is liable to receive karet for it, since he does not know of the obligation to bring an offering in a case of inadvertence, he is called inadvertent, because he does not know the severity of the prohibition.

But the halakha is not in accordance with Monbaz. According to the Rabbis, who disagree with Monbaz and maintain that inadvertence concerning the offering alone is not considered inadvertence, the difficulty still remains: How is an inadvertent violation of an oath of utterance concerning the past possible according to their view?

And we answer:

You may even say that it is in accordance with the Rabbis.

The Rabbis disagree with Monbaz only with regard to the entire Torah, where it is not a novel ruling

that a person becomes liable to bring an offering.

But here,

with regard to an oath of utterance,

which is a novel ruling, for throughout the entire Torah we do not find a prohibition

alone, without liability to karet,

for which one brings

for it

an offering

when inadvertent, because

we derive it from idolatry:

all transgressions were compared to idolatry, to teach that only for transgressions for which one is liable to karet when intentional, as in the case of idolatry, does one bring an offering when inadvertent.

But here,

with regard to an oath of utterance,

one brings

an offering even for a prohibition alone that does not entail karet. Therefore,

even the Rabbis agree

that one brings an offering for inadvertence concerning the offering alone.

Ravina asked Rava:

A person

swore concerning a loaf

that he would not eat it,

and is in danger because of it,

meaning that he might endanger himself through starvation if he did not eat it, and he ate it inadvertently.

What

is the law as to whether he is liable to bring an offering for it? Rava challenged him: If he

is in danger—

let the Master permit him

to eat it ab initio. Since, if he had come before us to ask what his status was, we would permit him to eat it ab initio, it is obvious that if he ate it inadvertently he did not violate a prohibition and is exempt from bringing an offering!?

Ravina replied to him:

Rather,

my question concerns a case in which he would not be in danger if he did not eat the loaf, but would merely

suffer

from hunger,

and ate it through inadvertence concerning the oath,

having forgotten his oath, while it is clear to us that even if he had remembered his oath, he would have eaten it because of his hunger;

what is the law?

Rava said to him

Rava:

We learned

in a beraita, which expounds from a verse stated in the passage concerning a sin-offering, that only an inadvertent sinner who

would have turned back upon knowing

—that is, if he had known that he was sinning, he would have turned back and refrained from sinning—

brings an offering for his inadvertence.

But one who

would not have turned back upon knowing,

who would not have refrained from it even if he had known that it was a sin,

does not bring an offering for his inadvertence.

Accordingly, this person too, who would have eaten the loaf because of his suffering even if he had known of the oath’s prohibition, is not considered one who would have turned back upon knowing, and is exempt from bringing an offering.

Shmuel said: If he resolved in his heart

to swear,

he must

also

express it with his lips

—his oath. If he did not express it with his lips, the oath does not take effect through his thought alone.

As it is stated: “

To express with the lips”!

He challenged him

from that which is taught in a beraita: “To express

with the lips”—

and not in the heart.

If he resolved in his heart, how do we know

that the oath takes effect?

The verse states: “

For all that a person expresses in an oath,”

to include even a case in which he swore only in his heart.

And we raised a difficulty:

This itself is difficult: You said—

with the lips and not in the heart, and then you said—

if he resolved in his heart, how do we know,

that the oath takes effect even when he merely resolved it in his heart!?

Rav Sheshet said: This is not difficult.

This is what it means: “

With the lips”—

and not when he resolved in his heart to express it

with his lips,

meaning that he intended to express the oath with his lips,

but

in the end

did not express it

with his lips. The oath does not take effect, despite his having resolved in his heart to swear, because he intended that the oath take effect only once he expressed it with his lips.

If he merely resolved it in his heart,

without intending also to express the oath with his lips,

how do we know

that it takes effect?

The verse states: “

For all that he expresses”!

The beraita is thus resolved.

But it remains difficult for Shmuel.

He says that even when he merely resolved it in his heart, the oath does not take effect!?

Rav Sheshet said: Resolve it and say it this way,

that according to Shmuel the beraita must be explained differently: “

With the lips”—

and not when he resolved in his heart to express

with his lips

wheat bread,

for he intended to say in his oath that he was prohibiting wheat bread to himself,

but

in the end

expressed

with his lips, mistakenly,

barley bread

instead. He is not prohibited from barley bread, since he did not intend to prohibit it to himself, so “his mouth and his heart are not in agreement”; nor is he prohibited from wheat bread, since he did not express it with his lips.

If he resolved to express

with his lips

wheat bread, but expressed merely bread, how do we know

that he is prohibited from wheat bread alone?

The verse states: “

For all that a person expresses,”

and this additional phrase teaches that we follow a person’s thought when it does not contradict his speech, and therefore he is prohibited only from the bread that he intended in his heart to prohibit to himself.

He challenged Shmuel

from that which is taught in a beraita: It is stated concerning one who vows to bring an offering [Deuteronomy 23:24], “

What emerges from your lips you shall observe and perform.”

I have only

that the vow takes effect

when

he

expressed

the vow

with his lips; if he resolved in his heart

to make a vow,

how do we know

that the vow takes effect then as well?

The verse states [II Chronicles 29:31], “And

every generous-hearted person

brought burnt offerings”!?

shall bring burnt-offerings”!

This is difficult for Shmuel, who said that one must specifically express the oath with his lips.

And we answer:

That case is different,

the case of one who vows to bring an offering,

as it is explicitly written

there: “And

every generous-hearted person.”

And we challenge this:

Let us derive from it?

Why should we not derive from there that an oath of utterance also takes effect through thought alone?

And we answer:

Because teruma and sacred offerings are two verses that come together to teach one matter.

Besides the verse “And every generous-hearted person brought burnt offerings,” which is stated with regard to sacred offerings, there is another verse concerning the teruma for the work of the Tabernacle [Exodus 35:22]: “Every generous-hearted person brought.”

And any two

verses that come together to teach one matter do not teach beyond themselves!

Thus, the matter takes effect through thought alone only with regard to sacred offerings and the teruma for the work of the Tabernacle, but not in other contexts.

And we challenge:

Granted, according to the one who says:

two verses that come as one do not teach a general principle,

but according to the one who says:

two verses that come as one do teach a general principle,

what can be said:

if so, let us derive from consecrated offerings and the contribution to the Tabernacle, with regard to an oath of expression (shevuat bitui), that thought should also be effective in its case!?

And we answer: An oath of expression

is non-sacred property, and

whereas vows concerning offerings and the contribution to the Tabernacle are

sacred.

And we do not derive laws concerning non-sacred property from sacred property!