Shevuot 26b — the Talmud in English

Which is it

[how is it possible]

that an inadvertent violation of an utterance concerning the past

should make one liable for a sacrifice?

But in either case,

if he knew

at the time that he swore concerning the past that he was lying,

he is intentional

and does not bring a sacrifice.

And

if he did not know

that he was lying, but thought that this was the truth,

he is compelled,

and one who is compelled is exempt from the sacrifice, as it is stated: “the person under an oath” [and if he is inadvertent in that he does not know at all that it is forbidden to swear falsely, you have no greater compulsion than this]!?

[In an oath concerning the future, an inadvertent act is understandable, for at the time of the oath his mind is settled, and he is called “the person under an oath”; only afterward did he forget that he had sworn and violate his oath.]

He said to him

Rav Naḥman: An inadvertent violation of an utterance-oath concerning the past is possible

in the case of one who says

at the time when he swears falsely concerning the past:

I know that this oath is forbidden

[and I know that my oath is false],

but I do not know whether one is liable for it to bring a sacrifice

in a case of inadvertence

or not.

And this too is called inadvertence, since he lacks knowledge of all the details of the stringency of the prohibition: he does not know that one must bring a sacrifice for doing this thing even if he did it inadvertently.

And the Gemara explains:

According to whom,

according to which tannai did Rav Naḥman say that such inadvertence is sufficient for him to be considered inadvertent?

According to Munbaz, who said

in tractate Shabbat [69a], with regard to other obligations of a sin-offering,

inadvertence concerning the sacrifice

alone

is called inadvertence.

And even if he is intentional, knowing that the matter is forbidden by a prohibition and that one is liable to karet for it, since he does not know the obligation of the sacrifice in a case of inadvertence, he is called inadvertent, since he does not know the stringency of the prohibition.

But the halakha is not in accordance with Munbaz. And according to the Rabbis, who disagreed with Munbaz and hold that inadvertence concerning the sacrifice alone is not considered inadvertence, it still remains difficult: how is an inadvertent violation of an utterance-oath concerning the past possible according to them?

And we answer:

You may even say: the Rabbis.

The Rabbis disagreed with Munbaz only with regard to the entire Torah, for it is not an innovation

that a person becomes liable for a sacrifice.

But here,

with an utterance-oath,

for it is an innovation, since throughout the entire Torah we do not find a prohibition

alone, without an obligation of karet,

for which one brings

for it

a sacrifice

when inadvertent, because

we derive it from idolatry,

for all the transgressions were equated with idolatry, to teach that only for transgressions for which one is liable to karet when intentional, like idolatry, does one bring a sacrifice when inadvertent.

But here,

with an utterance-oath,

one brings

a sacrifice even for a prohibition alone that does not involve karet. Therefore,

even the Rabbis agree

that for inadvertence concerning the sacrifice alone one brings a sacrifice.

Ravina asked Rava:

A person

swore concerning a loaf

that he would not eat it,

and is endangered by it,

for he may become endangered by hunger if he does not eat it, and he ate it inadvertently,

what is

that he should be liable for a sacrifice? And Rava was astonished at him: If he is

endangered—

let the master permit him

to eat it at the outset. Since, if he had come before us to ask what his law was, we would permit him to eat it at the outset, it is obvious that if he ate it inadvertently he did not violate a prohibition, and he is exempt from the sacrifice!?

Ravina answered him:

Rather,

my question is when he is not in danger if he does not eat the loaf, but is merely

distressed

by hunger,

and ate it through inadvertence concerning the oath,

having forgotten his oath, when it is clear to us that even if he had remembered his oath, he would still have eaten it because of his hunger,

what is the law?

He said to him,

Rava:

We learned

in a beraita, expounding a verse stated in the passage concerning a sin-offering, that only one who is inadvertent in such a way that he

would withdraw upon knowledge,

for had he known that he was sinning, he would have withdrawn and refrained from sinning,

brings a sacrifice for his inadvertence.

But one who

would not withdraw upon knowledge,

for even had he known that this was a sin he would not have separated from it,

does not bring a sacrifice for his inadvertence.

Accordingly, this person too, who would have eaten the loaf because of his distress even had he known of the prohibition of the oath, is not called one who “would withdraw upon knowledge,” and is exempt from a sacrifice.

Shmuel said: If he resolved in his heart

to swear,

he must

also

express it with his lips

—his oath. And if he did not express it with his lips, the oath does not take effect through his thought alone.

For it is stated: “

to express with the lips”!

He challenged

this from that which was taught: “To express

with the lips”—

and not in the heart.

If he resolved in his heart, from where

does it follow that the oath takes effect?

The verse says: “

For everything that a person expresses in an oath,” to include even when he swore only in his heart.

to include even a case in which he swore only in his heart.

And we raised an objection:

This itself is difficult: you said—

“with the lips and not in the heart,” and then you said—

“if he resolved in his heart, from where

does it follow that the oath takes effect upon him even if he merely resolved it in his heart?

Rav Sheshet said: This is not difficult.

This is what it says: “

With the lips”—

and not if he resolved in his heart to express it

with his lips,

for he intended to express the oath with his lips,

and

in the end

did not express it

with his lips. The oath does not take effect even though he resolved in his heart to swear, because he did not intend the oath to take effect until he expressed it with his lips.

If he resolved in his heart without qualification,

and did not intend to express the oath with his lips as well,

from where

does it follow that it takes effect?

The verse says: “

For everything that he expresses”!

The beraita is thus resolved.

But according to Shmuel it is difficult.

For he says that even when he merely resolves in his heart without qualification, the oath does not take effect!?

Rav Sheshet said: Resolve it and say it this way,

that according to Shmuel the beraita must be explained differently: “

With the lips”—

and not if he resolved in his heart to express

with his lips

wheat bread,

for he wanted to say in his oath that he was forbidding wheat bread to himself,

and

in the end

he expressed

with his lips by mistake

barley bread. He is not forbidden barley bread, because he did not intend to forbid it to himself, and thus “his mouth and his heart are not in agreement”; nor is he forbidden wheat bread, because he did not express it with his lips.

He is not prohibited from barley bread, because he did not intend to forbid it to himself; thus, “his mouth and his heart are not in agreement.” Nor is he prohibited from wheat bread, because he did not express it with his lips.

If he resolved in his heart to express

with his lips

wheat bread, and expressed merely “bread,” from where

does it follow that he is forbidden wheat bread alone?

The verse says: “

For everything that a person expresses,”

and the additional expression comes to teach that we follow a person’s thought when it does not contradict his speech, and therefore he is forbidden only that bread which he thought to forbid to himself.

He challenged

Shmuel from that which was taught: It is stated concerning one who vows to bring a sacrifice [Deuteronomy 23:24]: “

What comes from your lips you shall observe and perform.”

I have only

that the vow takes effect

when

he

expressed

the vow

with his lips; if he resolved in his heart

to make a vow,

from where

does it follow that the vow also takes effect then?

The verse says [2 Chronicles 29:31]: “And

all

generous of heart

burnt-offerings”!?

And this is difficult for Shmuel, who said that one must specifically express the oath with his lips?

And we answer:

That there is a difference there,

in the case of one who vows to bring a sacrifice,

for it is explicitly written

there: “And

all generous of heart.”

And we challenge:

Should we not derive from it?

Why should we not derive from there also with regard to an utterance-oath that it takes effect even through thought?

And we answer:

Because teruma and consecrated matters are two verses that come as one.

Besides the verse “And all generous of heart burnt-offerings,” which is stated concerning consecrated matters, there is another verse concerning the teruma of the work of the Tabernacle [Exodus 35:22]: “All generous of heart brought.”

And every two

verses that come as one do not teach!

For only in consecrated matters and in the teruma of the work of the Tabernacle do matters take effect through thought alone, but not in other places.

And we raise an objection:

This works according to the one who says:

two verses that come as one do not teach,

but according to the one who says:

two verses that come as one do teach,

what is there to say

that, if so, we should derive from sacred matters and the contribution of the Tabernacle, concerning an oath of expression, that thought should also be effective in it?!

And we answer: An oath of expression

is non-sacred, whereas

the vows of offerings and the contribution of the Tabernacle are

sacred.

And we do not derive non-sacred matters from sacred matters!