Shevuot 26a — the Talmud in English

And if you wish, say:

Abaye did not retract, because he never said these two statements; rather,

he said one of them; Rav Pappa said the other!

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Ishmael says: He is liable only for that which is in the future.

The Sages taught: “To do harm or to do good.”

I have derived only

from here

that

when he swore concerning matters

that contain harm or benefit

to a person, such as: “I shall eat” and “I shall not eat.”

Matters that contain neither harm nor benefit

to a person, such as when he swore: “I shall throw a pebble into the sea,” or “I shall not throw it,”

from where

is it established that he is liable?

The verse states

at the beginning of the verse [Leviticus 5:4]: “

Or if a person swears, expressing with his lips.”

This indicates every matter concerning which he swore, even matters that contain neither harm nor benefit.

I have derived

that he is liable on account of an utterance-oath

only

if he swore

for the future,

as it is stated, “to do harm or to do good”; he swore

for the past—from where

is it established that he is liable?

The verse states

at the end of the verse: “

For everything that a person expresses in an oath,”

to include even the past,

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Ishmael says: “

To do harm or to do good”;

the verse teaches that they are liable only if he swore

for the future!

Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so,

that it must be specifically as it is written,

I have derived

that he is liable

only

for

matters that contain benefit or harm.

Matters that contain neither harm nor benefit—from where

is it established that he is liable for them?

He said to him,

Rabbi Ishmael:

From the amplification of the verse,

as it is stated: “For everything that a person expresses in an oath.”

He said to him,

Rabbi Akiva:

If the verse amplified this,

that he is liable even for matters that contain neither harm nor benefit,

the verse amplified

also

this,

that he is liable both for the future and for the past!

And we raised an objection:

Rabbi Akiva has argued well to Rabbi Ishmael,

so what is the reason that Rabbi Ishmael disagrees?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Ishmael, who served Rabbi Nehunya ben Ha-Kanah, who expounded the entire Torah,

would expound wherever the Torah writes a general statement and afterward specifies it,

by the

principle of

generalization and specification—

he too expounds by the

principle of

generalization and specification.

Whereas

Rabbi Akiva, who served Nahum of Gamzu, who expounded the entire Torah by the

principle of

amplification and restriction—

he too expounds by the

principle of

amplification and restriction.

And the difference between them is that one who expounds by generalization and specification holds that the specification that follows the generalization always comes to explain and define the generalization: the intention is only what is stated in the specification and no more, not even something similar to the specification. Therefore, when there is in the Torah a generalization, a specification, and a generalization, where the final generalization comes to add to the specification, it is sufficient that we add to it and include also things similar to the specification, and no more.

Whereas one who expounds by amplification and restriction holds that the specification does not come to uproot the generalization entirely, but only to restrict a little of it: it does not include everything, but only something similar to the specification. Therefore, when there is another generalization after the specification, it necessarily comes to include everything. The specification comes only to exclude one thing, which is entirely unlike the specification and is fit to be excluded from the generalization.

And we explain:

What is Rabbi Akiva’s [method], that he expounds

here

amplifications and restrictions?

For it was taught: “

Or if a person swears”—

the verse amplified

every oath. “

To do harm or to do good”—

it restricted

[the law to] only things that contain harm or benefit. “

For everything that a person expresses”—

it again amplified

everything.

And according to the principle of

amplification, restriction, and amplification,

we expound that the verse

amplified everything

except for one thing that was restricted. Therefore, here too, concerning an oath,

what did it amplify

the verse?

It amplified every matter!

For an utterance-oath applies even to a matter that contains neither harm nor benefit, and both for the future and for the past.

And what did it restrict—

it restricted

only one who swears concerning

a mitzva

to annul it, which is a matter that is impossible [and it also restricted one who swears a vain oath, such as to change something known to every person, which too is a matter that is impossible].

And Rabbi Akiva holds like the tanna of this beraita.

But

whereas

Rabbi Ishmael expounds generalization and specification— “

Or if a person swears, expressing with his lips”—

generalization. “

To do harm or to do good”—

specification. “

For everything that a person expresses”—

it returned and generalized.

And according to the principle of

generalization, specification, and generalization—

you may infer only something similar to the specification.

Therefore, here too we expound:

Just as the specification, “

to do harm or to do good,”

explicitly

is an oath

for the future, so all

the oaths for which they are liable on account of an utterance-oath are only oaths similar to the specification, namely

for the future

alone!

And according to Rabbi Ishmael,

the final generalization benefits

him,

the generalization

at the end,

to include even matters that contain neither harm nor benefit,

provided that they are similar to the specification, that they be

for the future.

And conversely,

the specification benefits

him,

the specification, to exclude even matters that contain harm or benefit

when they are not similar to the specification, in that they are

for the past.

And we raised an objection:

Shall I reverse it?

And say that the generalization comes to include even the past, while the specification comes to exclude matters that contain neither harm nor benefit?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yitzhak said: Because it is possible to include only oaths that are

similar

to “

to do harm or to do good,”

namely only

one whose prohibition is on account of “

He shall not profane his word,”

for he swears for the future and can still fulfill his oath, and he is warned not to profane his word.

This one is excluded,

an oath concerning the past,

whose prohibition is not on account of “

He shall not profane his word,”

for his word has already been profaned from now,

but on account of “

You shall not lie” [“You shall not swear in My Name falsely”],

for at the time that you swear, the oath will emerge as false.

And we give another answer:

Rav Yitzhak bar Avin said: The verse states “

Or if a person swears, expressing with his lips.”

And from here Rabbi Ishmael derives that only

one for whom the oath precedes the utterance,

that the oath is before the act concerning which he expresses himself and swears to do it or not to do it,

but not where the utterance

precedes the oath; this one is excluded,

one who swears concerning the past: “

I ate and I did not eat,”

for the act

about which he swears

preceded the oath.

The Sages taught:

It is stated in the passage of the utterance-oath: “For everything that a person expresses in an oath, and it is hidden from him.” And we expound: “

the person in an oath”;

this indicates that he must be a “person” at the time of the oath, whose mind is settled and who is not mistaken in his oath,

excluding one under duress,

such as one who swore concerning the past, “I ate,” and he is mistaken, thinking that he swore truthfully, that he indeed ate. [And below the Gemara will ask: if so, how is it possible for an oath concerning the past to be inadvertent?] “

And it is hidden”—

excluding one who acts deliberately,

who does not bring an offering. “

From him”—

that the oath was hidden from him,

for when he violated his oath [which he swore for the future], he forgot that he had sworn.

It could

be that he is liable also in a case

where the object was hidden from him,

where he remembers the oath but is mistaken concerning the object about which he swore [and below the Gemara will explain in what manner this is speaking]?

The verse states “

in an oath—

and it is hidden,”

to teach that

for the unawareness of the oath

alone

is he liable, but he is not liable for the unawareness of the object.

The master said: “

the person in an oath”—

excluding one under duress.

And we explain:

What are the circumstances

in which he is under duress concerning the oath?

As in the case of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi.

When they would stand before Rav,

when they rose from his lesson and disagreed about his words,

one would say: An oath

[I swear]

that this is what Rav said! And the other would say: An oath, that this is what Rav said!

When they came before Rav,

and when they came before Rav,

he said in accordance with one of them.

He established that one of them had said as he had.

The other said to him,

to Rav:

And I swore falsely,

and violated an oath of falsehood!?

Rav said to him:

Your heart compelled you!

You thought that you were swearing concerning the truth, and therefore you are exempt from an oath of falsehood, for this is not included in “the person in an oath.” [

Ты считал, что клянёшься об истинном, поэтому не несёшь ответственности за ложную клятву, поскольку не подпадаешь под категорию «человек в клятве». [

continuation of what the master said]: “

And it was hidden from him”—

that the oath was hidden from him; it could be that the object was hidden from him;

the verse states “

in an oath—

and it was hidden from him”:

for the unawareness of the oath he is liable, but he is not liable for the unawareness of the object!

They laughed at this in the West,

the inhabitants of the Land of Israel were astonished by these words of the beraita:

Granted,

the unawareness of

an oath can be found without

the unawareness of

an object, such as when he said: “

An oath that I shall not eat wheat bread,”

and he thought,

afterward, when he violated his oath and ate wheat bread, that

“I shall eat”

is what he said,

that he had sworn the opposite, that he would eat the bread. And it is found

that he forgot his oath, but remembered the object.

He forgot the nature of his oath, but remembered the object concerning which he had sworn.

But

the unawareness of

an object without

the unawareness of

an oath—what are the circumstances?

For such a situation is possible only

when he said: “

An oath that I shall not eat wheat bread,”

and he thought,

afterward, when he violated his oath and ate from the bread, that “bread

of barley”

is what he said

in his oath, so that it is found

that he remembers his oath,

that he remembered that he had sworn not to eat, but

he forgot the object,

he forgot concerning what he had sworn!?

And it is not possible to say this.

Once he has forgotten the object,

then

this is the unawareness of the oath.

After all, he does not remember the nature of the oath, whether he swore concerning wheat or concerning barley!?

Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: This and that are one!

It is not possible for there to be unawareness of the object without unawareness of the oath, and this beraita is corrupt.

Rav Yosef challenged it: It follows

[why do you say] that

unawareness of the object without the oath cannot be found!?

But it can be found, such as when he said: “

An oath that I shall not eat wheat bread,”

and he remembers the oath,

and he extended his hand to the basket

in order

to take

from it

barley bread, and wheat bread came into his hand,

bread

of wheat, and he thought

it was bread of

barley, and he ate it.

And it is found

that he remembers his oath,

he remembers the oath in all its details, and only

the object is what he did not know,

he was mistaken concerning the object.

But we have a case of unawareness of the object without unawareness of the oath, concerning which the beraita intends to say that he is exempt!?

Abaye said to him:

It is still unawareness of the oath. Although he remembers his oath,

does the offering obligate him except for that which he held in his hand

when we come to obligate him to bring an offering, we consider only the extent to which the oath applies to this object concerning which he violated his oath, and if so,

it is unawareness of the oath.

For with regard to this bread that he ate, he thinks that he never swore concerning it at all!?

Another version: Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Ultimately, the offering that he brings for this bread

that he ate,

at any rate, is unawareness of the oath.

For with regard to that bread he is mistaken concerning the oath itself: he thinks that it is barley bread and that he did not swear concerning it!? [The difference between the two versions is only in style and not in content.]

And Rav Yosef could say to you: Once, if he had known

that this bread

is wheat, he would have

would have

separated himself from it.

It is found that the cause of his mistake was the object. Thus,

it is unawareness of the object.

Rava asked Rav Nahman

[according to Rav Yosef, who holds that unawareness of the object without unawareness of the oath is possible]:

One who had

both this and that unawareness in his possession,

who forgot both the object and the oath—he forgot that he had sworn concerning wheat bread, and he also mistakenly thought that it was barley bread—

what is the law?

Is he to be obligated to bring an offering because of the unawareness of the oath, or exempted because of the unawareness of the object?

He said to him,

Rav Nahman:

He has unawareness of the oath in his possession, and he is liable.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary, he has unawareness of the object in his possession, and

it is logical that he should be

exempt!?

Rav Ashi said: We examine—

if it was because of the oath that he withdrew,

because when they reminded him of the oath he stopped eating the bread,

he has unawareness of the oath in his possession,

for it became clear that all his inadvertence was because of forgetting the oath,

and he is liable.

But

if it was because of the object that he withdrew,

because when they told him that this bread was wheat he stopped eating it,

he has unawareness of the object in his possession.

For it is evident that his inadvertence was because of the mistake concerning the bread,

and he is exempt.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does he withdraw because of the mention of the

oath

only because

through this he paid attention to the

object,

that it was wheat bread? Otherwise, why would they now remind him of the oath? And likewise,

does he withdraw because of

their telling him about the

object,

that it was wheat bread,

only because

through this he remembered the

oath—

that he understands that this is why they are calling his attention to the nature of the bread?

It follows that he always withdraws because he remembers both of them together!?

Rather, it makes no difference!

In either case he is exempt, because there is also unawareness of the object here, and the Torah obligated an offering only for unawareness of the oath alone.

Rava asked Rav Nahman

[he challenged him]: