Shevuot 26a (כו.) — the Talmud in English

And if you wish, say instead:

Abaye did not retract his statement, because he never said both of these statements; rather, he said only

one of them; Rav Pappa said the other!

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yishmael says: He is liable only for an oath concerning the future.

The Sages taught: “To do harm or to do good.”

I have derived

from here

only

when one swears concerning matters

that involve harm and benefit

to a person, such as: “I will eat,” or, “I will not eat.”

Matters that do not involve harm or benefit

to a person, such as one who swears: “I will throw a stone into the sea,” or, “I will not throw it”—

from where

do we know that he is liable?

The verse states

at the beginning of the verse [Leviticus 5:4]: “

Or if a person swears, expressing with his lips.”

This indicates that the ruling applies to every matter concerning which one swears, even matters that do not involve harm or benefit.

I have derived

that he is liable for an oath of utterance

only

if he swears

concerning the future,

as it is stated, “to do harm or to do good.” If one swears

concerning the past, from where

do we know that he is liable?

The verse states

at the end of the verse: “

for whatever a person expresses in an oath,”

to include even an oath concerning the past—

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Yishmael says: “

To do harm or to do good”—

the verse teaches that one is liable only if he swears

concerning the future!

Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so,

if the requirement is specifically that the oath be as written,

I have derived

that he is liable

only

for

matters that involve benefit or harm.

Matters that do not involve harm or benefit—from where

do we know that he is liable for them?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yishmael:

From the amplification of the verse,

as it is stated: “for whatever a person expresses in an oath.”

He said to him,

Rabbi Akiva:

If the verse amplifies this,

so that he is liable even for matters that do not involve harm or benefit,

the verse amplifies

also

this,

so that he is liable both for an oath concerning the future and for one concerning the past!

And we considered this:

Rabbi Akiva has argued well against Rabbi Yishmael;

what, then, is Rabbi Yishmael’s reason for disputing him?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Yishmael, who served Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana, who expounded the entire Torah,

would expound every place where the Torah first states a general rule and then specifies it

by the

measure of

generalization and specification—

he too expounds by the

measure of

generalization and specification.

Whereas

Rabbi Akiva, who served Naḥum of Gam Zu, who expounded the entire Torah by the

measure of

amplification and limitation—

he too expounds by the

measure of

amplification and limitation.

The difference between them is that one who expounds according to generalization and specification maintains that the specification following the generalization always comes to explain and define the generalization: its meaning is limited to what is stated in the specification, and not beyond it—not even to something similar to the specification. Therefore, when the Torah contains a generalization, a specification, and another generalization, the final generalization comes to add to the specification; it is sufficient to add matters similar to the specification, but no more.

By contrast, one who expounds according to amplification and limitation maintains that the specification does not entirely uproot the generalization; it merely limits part of it. The generalization does not include every matter, but only matters similar to the specification. Therefore, when there is an additional generalization after the specification, it necessarily comes to include everything. The specification comes only to exclude one matter that is entirely unlike the specification and is therefore appropriate to exclude from the generalization.

And we explain:

What is Rabbi Akiva’s basis for expounding

here

amplifications and limitations?

As it was taught: “

Or if a person swears”—

the verse amplifies

every oath. “

To do harm or to do good”—

it limits

the law to matters that involve harm or benefit. “

For whatever a person expresses”—

it amplifies again

everything.

And according to the measure of

amplification, limitation, and amplification,

we expound that the verse

amplifies everything

except for one matter that is limited. Therefore, here too, with regard to an oath,

what did the verse amplify?

It

amplified every matter!

An oath of utterance applies even to a matter that does not involve harm or benefit, and both to an oath concerning the future and to one concerning the past.

And what did it limit? It

limited

only one who swears concerning

a mitzva

in order to nullify it, since that is impossible [and it likewise limited one who takes an oath in vain, such as swearing to change something known to everyone, which is also impossible].

Rabbi Akiva agrees with the tanna of this beraita.

And

whereas

Rabbi Yishmael expounds generalization and specification— “

Or if a person swears, expressing with his lips”—

a generalization. “

To do harm or to do good”—

a specification. “

For whatever a person expresses”—

it returns to a generalization.

And according to the measure of

generalization, specification, and generalization,

you may infer only matters similar to the specification.

Therefore, here too we expound:

Just as the specification, “

to do harm or to do good,” is

explicitly

an oath

concerning the future, so too all

oaths for which one is liable on account of an oath of utterance are only oaths similar to the specification, namely,

concerning the future

alone!

And according to Rabbi Yishmael,

the final generalization benefits

him by

the generalization

that follows it,

to include even matters that do not involve harm or benefit,

provided that they resemble the specification, namely, that they concern

the future.

Conversely,

the specification benefits

him by

excluding even matters that involve harm or benefit

when they do not resemble the specification, in that they concern

the past.

And we considered this:

Let us reverse the interpretation,

and say that the generalization comes to include even an oath concerning the past, while the specification comes to exclude matters that do not involve harm or benefit?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Since it is possible to include only oaths that are

similar to

“to do harm or to do good,”

namely, only

one

whose prohibition is due to

“he shall not profane his word,”

for he swears concerning the future and can still fulfill his oath, and he is warned not to profane his word.

This excludes

an oath concerning the past,

whose prohibition is not due to

“he shall not profane his word,”

since his word has already been profaned from that moment,

but is due to

“You shall not lie”—“you shall not swear falsely in My Name”—for at the moment when one swears, the oath will result in a falsehood.

[“You shall not swear in My Name falsely.”]

And we offer another answer:

Rav Yitzḥak bar Avin said: The verse states, “

Or if a person swears, expressing with his lips.”

From here Rabbi Yishmael derives that only

one whose oath precedes his expression,

meaning that the oath comes before the act about which he expresses himself, swearing to perform it or not to perform it,

but not one whose expression

precedes the oath. This excludes

one who swears concerning the past: “

I ate, or I did not eat,”

whose act

is the subject of his oath

preceded the oath.

The Sages taught:

In the passage concerning an oath of utterance it is stated: “for whatever a person expresses in an oath, and it is hidden from him.” And we expound: “

a person in an oath”—

this indicates that he must be a “person” at the time of the oath, with a settled mind and not mistaken regarding his oath;

this excludes one who is coerced,

such as one who swore concerning the past, “I ate,” while mistaken and believing that he had sworn truthfully, that he had indeed eaten. [Later the Gemara will ask: If so, how can an oath concerning the past ever be inadvertent?] “

And it is hidden”—

this excludes one who acts intentionally,

who does not bring an offering. “

From him”—

that the oath was hidden from him,

meaning that when he violated his oath [which concerned the future], he forgot that he had sworn.

One might have thought

that he would also be liable when

the object was hidden from him,

meaning that he remembered the oath but was mistaken about the object concerning which he had sworn [and later the Gemara will explain which case is intended].

The verse states: “

in an oath—

and it is hidden from him,”

to teach

that for the forgetting of the oath

alone

is he liable, but he is not liable for the forgetting of the object.

The Master said: “

A person in an oath”—

this excludes one who is coerced.

And we explain:

What are the circumstances

in which one is coerced with regard to an oath?

It is like the case of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi.

When they would rise from before Rav,

after attending his lecture and disputing what he had said,

one would say: “An oath”

[“I swear”]

“that this is what Rav said!” And the other would say: “An oath, that this is what Rav said!”

When they came before Rav,

and came before Rav,

he agreed with one of them.

He established that one of them had stated the matter correctly.

The other said to him,

to Rav:

“And I—did I swear falsely?”

Did I violate an oath taken falsely!?

Rav said to him:

“Your heart coerced you!”

You thought that you were swearing to the truth. Therefore, you are exempt from an oath taken falsely, for this is not included in “a person in an oath.” [

The continuation of the Master’s statement]: “

And it was hidden from him”—

that the oath was hidden from him; one might have thought that the object was hidden from him as well; the verse states

“in an oath”—

“and it was hidden from him,”

for the forgetting of the oath he is liable, but he is not liable for the forgetting of the object!

In the West they laughed at this

and the scholars of Eretz Yisrael wondered at these words of the beraita:

Granted,

the forgetting of the

oath can be found without

the forgetting of the

object, for example, when he said: “

An oath that I will not eat wheat bread,” and later, when he violated his oath by eating wheat bread,

he thought

that he had said, “

that I will eat”

when he said the oath, meaning that he had sworn the opposite, that he would eat the bread. It follows

that

he forgot his oath but remembered the object.

He forgot the substance of his oath but remembered the object concerning which he had sworn.

But the forgetting of the

object

without

the forgetting of the

oath—what are the circumstances?

There can be no such case except

when he said: “

An oath that I will not eat wheat bread,” and later, when he violated his oath by eating the bread,

he thought

that in his oath he had said, “

barley bread”

when he said the oath, so that

it turns out

that he remembered his oath,

meaning that he remembered that he had sworn not to eat, but

he forgot the object, forgetting what he had sworn concerning!?

But it is impossible to say this.

Once he forgot the object,

then

this is the forgetting of the oath.

After all, he does not remember the substance of the oath—whether he swore concerning wheat or barley!?

Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: This and that are one!

It is impossible for the object to be forgotten without the oath being forgotten, and this beraita is corrupted.

Rav Yosef challenged this: Apparently

[why do you say] that

the object without the oath cannot be found!?

But it can be found, for example, when he said: “

An oath that I will not eat wheat bread,”

and he remembers the oath,

but extended his hand to the basket

in order

to take

from it

barley bread, and what he took was

bread

of wheat, but he thought

it was bread of

barley, and he ate it.

It follows

that he remembered his oath,

remembering the oath in all its details, and only

did not know the object,

being mistaken about the object.

Here, then, we have a case of forgetting the object without forgetting the oath, and this is the case that the beraita intends to exempt!?

Abaye said to him:

It is still a case of forgetting the oath. Although he remembers his oath,

does the offering render him liable for anything other than what he held in his hand?

When we come to make him liable for an offering, we consider only the extent to which the oath applies to this object, the one concerning which he violated his oath. If so,

it is the forgetting of the oath.

With regard to this loaf that he ate, he believes that he never swore concerning it at all!?

Alternatively: Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Ultimately, the offering that he brings for this loaf

that he ate

is, at any rate, due to the forgetting of the oath.

With regard to that loaf, he is mistaken about the oath itself, believing that it is barley bread and that he did not swear concerning it!? [The difference between the two formulations is stylistic and not substantive.]

And Rav Yosef could have said to you: Once, if he had known

that this bread

was wheat, he

would have

refrained from it.

It follows that the cause of his error was the object. Therefore,

it is the forgetting of the object.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman

[according to Rav Yosef, who maintains that there can be forgetting of the object without forgetting the oath]:

What is the law concerning one who had

both kinds of forgetting in his hand,

meaning that he forgot both the object and the oath: he forgot that he had sworn concerning wheat bread, and was also mistaken in thinking that the bread was barley bread?

What is the law?

Should he be obligated to bring an offering because of the forgetting of the oath, or should he be exempt because of the forgetting of the object?

Rav Naḥman said to him:

Rav Naḥman said to him:

He has the forgetting of the oath in his possession, and he is liable.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary, he has the forgetting of the object in his possession, and

it should follow that he is

exempt!?

Rav Ashi said: We examine the matter—

if he refrained because of the oath,

meaning that when the oath was mentioned to him, he refrained from eating the bread,

he has the forgetting of the oath in his possession,

as it is clear that his entire error resulted from forgetting the oath,

and he is liable.

But

if he refrained because of the object,

meaning that when he was told that this bread was wheat, he refrained from eating it,

he has the forgetting of the object in his possession,

as it is evident that his error resulted from the mistake concerning the bread,

and he is exempt.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Did he really refrain because of the mention of the

oath

only because

by means of this he paid attention to the

object, realizing that it was wheat bread? Otherwise, why would the oath now be mentioned to him? Likewise,

did he really refrain because

he was told about the

object

that it was wheat bread

only because

through this he remembered the

oath, understanding that this was why they were drawing his attention to the nature of the bread?

It follows that he always refrains because he remembers both of them together!?

Rather, it makes no difference!

In either case he is exempt, because the forgetting of the object is present as well, whereas the Torah imposes liability only when there is forgetting of the oath alone.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman

[he challenged him]: