Shevuot 25b — the Talmud in English

We were discussing this:

Let us say

Rav Shmuel,

disagree in the dispute ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the Rabbis.

For it was taught

below [27a]:

If one swore to nullify a mitzva but did not nullify it—

he is exempt.

And likewise, one who swore

to fulfill a mitzva but did not fulfill it

it—

is exempt,

even though

it would follow by logical inference

that one who swore to fulfill a mitzva but did not fulfill it

should be liable, according to the words of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira—

For Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said:

One who swore to fulfill a mitzva is liable for an offering for violating his oath

by a kal va-chomer:

And if

one who swore concerning a

voluntary matter, which he is not

sworn concerning from Mount Sinai

to perform it,

is nevertheless liable for it

when he swore to perform it but did not perform it,

one who swore to fulfill

a mitzva concerning which he is sworn from Mount Sinai—does it not follow that he should be liable for it

also because of his oath?

The Sages said to him:

The Sages,

No!

This is not a kal va-chomer. For

if you say concerning an oath of a voluntary matter

that one is liable for it, this is because

the verse made it

the

prohibition,

so that one can swear concerning it both to perform and not to perform.

Can you say this concerning an oath of a mitzva, concerning which the verse did not make it

the

prohibition,

for he cannot swear not to perform a mitzva; therefore, even when he swore to fulfill the mitzva, his oath does not take effect. For it is stated, “to do harm or to do good,” and this implies a matter that contains both a prohibition and a permission.

Let us say: Rav

who holds one liable for an oath concerning the past, even when it does not apply to the future,

spoke according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira,

who does not require that the oath be capable of taking effect in both “prohibition and permission,” and therefore also does not require that it be capable of taking effect concerning both the future and the past.

And Shmuel spoke according to the Rabbis,

who require that the oath be possible in both “prohibition and permission,” and therefore he does not hold one liable for an oath concerning the past when it is impossible for it to apply to the future?

And we reject this:

According to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, everyone agrees

that one is liable for an oath concerning the past even when it does not apply to the future. For

now,

“prohibition and permission”

he does not require,

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, even though it is explicit in the verse, “to do harm or to do good.” “

The future and the past,”

which is not explicit in the verse [that an oath includes the past]—

does he require it!?

When do Rav and Shmuel disagree?

Rav and Shmuel,

according to the Rabbis: Shmuel

holds

like the Rabbis,

who require that the oath be in “prohibition and permission,” and the same law is that it must be “the future and the past.”

And Rav

holds:

When the Rabbis do not hold one liable

for an oath that is not

in

“prohibition and permission,”

this is because

it is written “

to do harm or to do good”

explicitly, but “

the future and the past,”

which come from scriptural amplifications,

the entire oath concerning the past is not explicit in the verse but is learned through exposition [as explained in the Mishna in the words of Rabbi Akiva],

the Rabbis hold liable

for an oath concerning the past even when it does not apply to the future. Therefore, one who swore that a certain person threw a pebble into the sea is liable, although he cannot swear that the person will throw one.

Rav Hamnuna raised an objection

to Shmuel: We learned below [29b]: One who said,

“I did not eat today,”

or

“I did not put on phylacteries today,”

and his fellow said to him:

“I administer an oath to you

that you are speaking the truth,”

and he said: “Amen!”

he is

liable,

if this was false, as though he had sworn himself.

Granted,

that he is liable for what he swore,

“I did not eat

today,” is understandable, for this oath

exists in

“I will not eat,”

as he can also swear concerning the future that he will not eat today.

But

for what he is liable for an oath of

“I did not put on

phylacteries today,” this is difficult:

does it exist in “I will not put them on,”

can he swear concerning the future that he will not put on phylacteries today, when this is an oath to nullify a mitzva? And this is difficult for Shmuel, who holds that an oath of expression exists only when it is also possible concerning the future?

And we answer:

It was he,

Rav Hamnuna himself, who

raised the objection to it, and he

also

resolved

it [answered it]:

it:

It is taught with regard to different sides.—

Indeed, the oath that

“I did not eat”

is an oath of expression

to

be liable for it

an offering,

but the oath that

“I did not put on”

phylacteries is not an oath of expression for which one is liable to bring an offering, but only

to

be liable for it

lashes,

because he swore a false oath.

Rava raised an objection

to Shmuel from what we learned below [29a]:

What is an oath of vanity

[for which one receives lashes but for which one is not liable for an offering]?—

One who swore to alter

the known

matter to

everyone

person,

for example, if he

said

by oath

concerning a stone pillar that it is gold.

And Ulla said: This is when it is recognizable to three people

at least that this pillar is made of stone; only then is the matter considered public knowledge and it is an oath of vanity.

And Rava infers:

The reason is that it is recognizable

to three people; therefore he transgresses because of an oath of vanity.

But if it is not recognizable

to three people, he

transgresses because of an oath of expression,

and is liable for an offering.

And why!? But

such an oath does not apply to the future, for

he cannot

swear concerning a stone pillar that it

will be gold!?

And we answer:

It is he,

Rava, who

raised the objection to it, and he resolved it:

and this is how the Mishna must be inferred—

If it is recognizable

that the pillar is made of stone, he

transgresses because of an oath of vanity;

but

if it is not recognizable, he transgresses because of a false oath.

Abaye said: And Rav concedes in the case of one who says to his fellow, “

I swear that I know testimony for you,” and

it was discovered

[it became clear]

that he did not know it

as testimony,

that he is exempt

because of an oath of expression,

since it is not included within “prohibition and permission”; for if he swears,

“I do not know testimony for you,”

he does not know testimony for you,

he will not be liable for it because of an oath of expression, but because of an oath of testimony [and it has special requirements: he must specifically deny it to him in court and be fit to testify]. Therefore, even if he swore that he knows testimony for him, he is not liable because of an oath of expression. And Abaye comes to teach us that although Rav does not hold that an oath of expression must be in “the future and the past,” he nevertheless concedes that it must be in “prohibition and permission.”

One who swore to his fellow,

“I knew

testimony for you,” or swore,

“I did not know

testimony for you” [which is not an oath of testimony; see note ], the matter depends upon the

dispute

between Rav and Shmuel.

Rav holds him liable, for it exists in “prohibition and permission,” since he can swear, “I did not know,” and also, “I knew.” And Shmuel exempts him, because it does not apply to the future: he cannot swear to his fellow, “I will know testimony for you,” or, “I will not know testimony for you,” for it is not in his control to know testimony for him in the future. Nor is it in his control not to know testimony for him, since at times a person learns of something without intending to do so.

And likewise, one who swore to his fellow,

“I testified

for you,” or

“I did not testify

for you,” the matter depends upon the

dispute

between Rav and Shmuel. For it does not apply to the future, since he cannot swear that he will testify for his fellow in the future in court, or that he will not testify, because by this he is swearing to fulfill the mitzva or to nullify it, for a person is commanded to come and testify for his fellow concerning testimony that he knows.

And we discuss it:

Granted, according to Shmuel, who said: For a matter that does not apply to the future, one is not held liable for it

even when he swears

concerning the past, for this reason the Merciful One removed an oath

of testimony from the category of an oath of expression,

for the Torah wrote a special passage for an oath of testimony, although one is liable for a sin-offering for it, as for an oath of expression; for if not, we would not hold one who swore to his fellow that he did not know testimony for him liable because of an oath of expression, since this oath does not apply to the future, as he cannot swear that he will not know testimony for him in the future, since this is not in his control, and therefore the Torah had to introduce a special passage concerning an oath of testimony.

But according to Rav,

who holds one liable because of an oath of expression even when it does not apply to the future,

for what halakhic purpose did the Merciful One remove

the oath of testimony from the category of an oath of expression and write a special passage concerning it, when it is included within an oath of expression?

And we answer:

The Rabbis said before Abaye

to explain Rav’s view, that the Torah wrote the passage of an oath of testimony in order

to make him liable for two.

For if the person who swore was fit to testify for him and denied it before the court, he would be liable for two offerings: one because of an oath of expression, and the other because of an oath of testimony.

He said to them

Abaye: To make him liable for

two, you cannot say this!

For he will never be liable for more than one offering.

For it was taught:

It is stated in the passage of the ascending-and-descending offering, in which three matters are included—an oath of testimony, ritual impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects, and an oath of expression [Leviticus 5:5], “And it shall be when he is guilty

of one of these.”

And we expound: When he is guilty

of one,

of one of the three passages written in the passage of the ascending-and-descending offering [an oath of testimony, an oath of expression, and ritual impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects],

you make him liable, but you do not make him liable for two!

For it is impossible to impose liability for the same act because of two passages, and if so, it is impossible to say that one is liable for two because of an oath of testimony.

And we discuss it:

And for Abaye,

who says that it is impossible to impose liability for two because of an oath of testimony,

for what halakhic purpose did the Merciful One remove

the oath of testimony, when in any event he is liable for one offering because of an oath of expression?

And we answer:

For that which was taught: In all of them,

in all that are stated in the passage of the ascending-and-descending offering except for an oath of testimony, namely, an oath of expression and ritual impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects, it is

stated “

and it was hidden,”

which implies specifically an unintentional act,

but

if

here,

in the case of an oath of testimony,

“and it was hidden”

were not stated—

from here we learn

to make him liable

for an offering for an oath of testimony

for an intentional act as for an unintentional act!

And because of this novelty—that one is liable even for an intentional act—the Torah wrote the law of an oath of testimony in a special passage.

The Sages said to Abaye: Say

that the exclusion of “for one” comes to exclude only when he swore an oath of testimony

deliberately, he is liable for one

for when it was deliberate, he can be made liable only on account of the oath of testimony and not on account of an oath of utterance. But if he violated the oath of testimony

inadvertently,

when it is possible to make him liable also on account of an oath of utterance, indeed

he is liable for two

offerings?

Abaye said to them: Is this not what I said to you

that the Torah wrote a special exclusion “

for one”,

in order to teach that only

one do you make him liable, but you do not make him liable for two.

And if

you say that the exclusion applies only in a case where he swore an oath of testimony

deliberately, is there [a possibility of] two?

For when it was deliberate, there is no relevance at all to making him liable for two offerings, because there is liability when it was deliberate only for the oath of testimony and not for an oath of utterance. And why did the Torah need to write an exclusion concerning this?

It is necessarily that the exclusion comes to say that even when it was inadvertent, he is liable for only one.

Rava said:

There is no need for the exclusion of “for one” to teach us that one is not liable for two [offerings] for an oath of testimony,

because it was

the section of the offering for an oath of testimony

a matter that

was

included

in an oath of utterance

and went out to be judged through a new matter,

in that special laws were stated concerning it: only those fit to testify are liable for it, and only when the denial [that he does not know testimony concerning him] was in court. And every matter that was included and went out to be judged through a new matter,

you have in it only its innovation alone!

And you make him liable only for the matter stated in it. Therefore, for an oath of testimony one is liable only for the offering of an oath of testimony, and not for the offering of an oath of utterance.

And we challenge this:

From the general implication

you learn from Rava’s words

that Abaye,

who requires a special teaching of “for one” to exclude an oath of testimony from two [offerings],

holds

that here there is not a matter that went out to be judged through a new matter, so that you have in it only its innovation; rather, in every oath of testimony,

the oath exists in the world.

It also has the designation of an oath of utterance. And only because of the exclusion of “for one” is he exempt from two offerings.

And there is a practical consequence to this: if the one who swore was disqualified from testimony, or if the denial was outside the court, in which case he is exempt on account of an oath of testimony, then at least he should be liable for an offering on account of an oath of utterance.

And challenge this:

But Abaye said: Rav concedes in one who says

to his fellow “

An oath [that] I know testimony concerning you”,

and it was found that he did not know it, that he is exempt

from an oath of utterance,

since it does not exist

for an oath of utterance in “no and yes,” for if he swore, “

I do not know testimony concerning you,”

that is not an oath of utterance but an oath of testimony.

But according to what we said according to Abaye, even when one swore, “I do not know testimony concerning you,” it is possible at times that the law of an oath of utterance applies to it, such as with those disqualified [from testimony] and outside the court, and if so, when one swore, “I know testimony concerning you,” he should have been liable on account of an oath of utterance, since it exists in “no and yes”?

And we answer:

Abaye retracted that statement,

and holds that indeed one who swears to his fellow that he knows testimony concerning him is liable on account of an oath of utterance, since, as stated, this oath exists in “no and yes”.