Shevuot 25b (כה:) — the Talmud in English

I vot zdes my rassuzhdali:

skazhem,

Rav Shmuel,

soglasno mneniyu

Rabi Yehudy ben Betiry i rabbanov oni raskhodyatsya vo mneniyakh.

Ibo my uchili nizhe [27a]:

«

Poklyavshiysya narushit zapoved, no ne narushivshiy ee» —

svoboden ot nakazaniya.

I ravno poklyavshiysya

ispolnit zapoved, no ne ispolnivshiy ee

ee —

svoboden ot nakazaniya,

nesmotrya na to,

chto po logike sleduet

poklyavshemusya ispolnit zapoved, no ne ispolnivsheму,

byt obyazannym, soglasno slovam Rabi Yehudy ben Betiry».

Ibo Rabi Yehuda ben Betira skazal:

poklyavshiysya ispolnit zapoved obyazan prigovorit zhertvu za narushenie svoey klyatvy

po kal va-homer:

Esli

poklyavshiysya sdelat

razreshennoe delo, kotoroe ne

vmeneno emu na gore Sinay

sdelat,

obyazan za nee

kogda poklyalsya sdelat ee, no ne sdelal,

to poklyavshiysya ispolnit

zapoved, kotoraya vmenena emu na gore Sinay, tem bolee dolzhen byt obyazannym za nee

takzhe iz-za svoey klyatvy?

Skazali emu

mudreцы:

Net!

Eto ne kal va-homer. Ved

esli ty skazhesh o klyatve razreshennogo dela,

chto po ney obyazyvayut, eto potomu,

chto v etom sluchae Pisanie sdelalo ego

the

zapretom,

kotoromu mozhno poklyastsya kak sdelat, tak i ne sdelat.

No mozhesh li ty skazat eto o klyatve zapovedi, ved v etom sluchae Pisanie ne sdelalo ego

the

zapretom,

kotoromu nelzya poklyastsya ne sdelat zapoved: ved skazano «sdelat zlo ili dobro», iz chego sleduet, chto rech idet o dele, k kotoromu primenimy i «net», i «da».»

Skazhem, Rav,

kotoryy obyazyvaet za klyatvu v proshlom, dazhe kogda ona ne mozhet otnositsya k budushchemu,

govorit soglasno mneniyu Rabi Yehudy ben Betiry,

kotoryy ne trebuet, chtoby k klyatve primenyalis «net» i «da», i poetomu takzhe ne trebuet, chtoby ona mogla otnositsya i k budushchemu, i k proshlomu.

A Shmuel, kotoryy govorit soglasno mneniyu rabbanov,

kotorye trebuyut, chtoby klyatva mogla otnositsya k «net» i «da», poetomu on ne obyazyvaet za klyatvu v proshlom, kogda nevozmozhno, chtoby ona otnosilas k budushchemu?

I otvergayut eto:

soglasno mneniyu Rabi Yehudy ben Betiry vse soglasny,

chto za klyatvu v proshlom obyazyvayut, dazhe kogda ona ne mozhet otnositsya k budushchemu. Ved

teper,

«net i da»

Rabi Yehuda ben Betira ne trebuet,

nesmotrya na to, chto eto pryamо skazano v stihe «sdelat zlo ili dobro». A

«k budushchemu i k proshlomu»,

chto ne skazano priamo v stihe [chto klyatva vklyuchaet takzhe proshloe], razvе

trebuet?!

Rav i Shmuel raskhodyatsya

v mneniyakh

rabbanov: Shmuel

schitaet

soglasno mneniyu rabbanov,

kotorye trebuyut, chtoby klyatva otnosilas k «net i da», i po tomu zhe printsipu trebuyut, chtoby ona otnosilas «k budushchemu i k proshlomu».

A Rav

schitaet sleduyushchim obrazom:

kogda rabbanы ne obyazyvayut

za klyatvu, kotoraya ne otnositsya k

«

net i da

», eto potomu,

chto napisano

«sdelat zlo ili dobro»

v pryamom tekste, no

«k budushchemu i k proshlomu»,

vyvodimo iz dopolnitelnykh slov stikhov,

vsyu klyatvu o proshlom Pisanie ne upominaet priamo, a ona vyvoditsya iz tolkovaniya [kak obyasnyaetsya v Mishne v slovakh Rabi Akivy],

obyazyvayut rabbanы

za klyatvu o proshlom, dazhe kogda ona ne mozhet otnositsya k budushchemu. Poetomu poklyavshiysya, chto takoy-to brosil kamень v more, obyazan, nesmotrya na to, chto ne mozhet poklyastsya, chto etot chelovek brosit ego v budushchem.

Rav Hamnuna vozrazil

Shmuelu iz togo, chto my uchili nizhe [29b]: Tot, kto skazal

«ya segodnya ne el»

ili

«segodnya ne nakladyval tefillin»

i ego drug skazal emu:

«Ya zaklinayu tebya

chto ty govorish pravdu

! I skazal on: Amen!»

takoy chelovek

esli eto bylo lozhyu, kak esli by on sam poklyalsya.

Vpolne ponyatno,

pochemu on obyazan za klyatvu

«ya ne el

segodnya»: eto khorosho, ved eta klyatva

imeet formu

«ya ne budu est»,

tak kak on mozhet poklyastsya i o budushchem, chto ne budet est segodnya.

No

to, chto on obyazan za klyatvu

«ya ne nakladyval

tefillin segodnya», predstavlyaet trudnost:

razve ona imeet formu «ya ne budu nakladyvat»,

ved mozhno li emu poklyastsya o budushchem, chto on ne budet nakladyvat tefillin segodnya, ved eto klyatva narushit zapoved? I eto trudnost dlya Shmuelya, kotoryy schitaet, chto klyatva vyrazheniya sushchestvuet tolko togda, kogda ona mozhet otnositsya takzhe k budushchemu?

I otvechayut:

On —

sam Rav Hamnuna —

vozrazil emu i on

takzhe

otvetil

[to est otvetil]

emu:

V Mishne eto prepodano o raznykh sluchayakh. —

Klyatva

«ya ne el»

yavlyaetsya klyatvoy vyrazheniya,

i

za nee on obyazan

prigovorennoy zhertvoy, a klyatva

«ya ne nakladyval»

tefillin ne yavlyaetsya klyatvoy vyrazheniya, za kotoruyu polagaetsya zhertva, a tolko

i

za nee on obyazan

poluchit udary, poskolku poklyalsya v lozhi.

because he swore a false oath.

Rava vozrazil

Shmuelu na osnovanii togo, chto my uchili nizhe [29a]:

Kakova klyatva suetnaya [za kotoruyu nakazyvayut udarami, no ne obyazyvayut prigovorennoy zhertvoy]? —

[for which one receives lashes but for which one is not liable for an offering]?—

Poklyavshiysya izmenit

izvestnuyu

vsem

lyudyam

veshch, naprimer

for example, if he

skazav

v klyatve

o kamennom stolbe, chto on zolotoy.

I Ulla skazal: eto v tom sluchae, kogda ego vidyat tri cheloveka

kak minimum i tot stolb yavlyaetsya kamennym; tolko togda veshch schitaetsya vsem izvestnoy i eto klyatva suetnaya.

I Rava delaet vyvod:

prichina v tom, chto vidno

treм chelovekam; poetomu on narushaet zapret klyatvy suetnoy.

A esli ne vidno

treм chelovekam,

on narushaet zapret klyatvy vyrazheniya

i obyazan prigovorit zhертvu.

No pochemu?! Ved

takaya klyatva ne otnositsya k budushchemu, ved

ne

mozhet on poklyastsya o kamennom stolbe, chto on

stanet zolotym?!

I otvechayut:

On,

Rava,

vozrazil emu i otvetil emu:

i vot kak sleduet delat vyvod iz Mishny:

Esli vidno,

chto stolb kamennyy,

on narushaet zapret klyatvy suetnoy;

a

esli ne vidno, on narushaet zapret klyatvy lozhi.

Abaye skazal: Rav soglasen v sluchae, kogda chelovek govorit drugomu: «

Klyanus, chto ya znayu dlya tebya svidetelstvo», a

okazalos

[vyясnilos], chto

on ne znaet dlya nego

svidetelstva,

on svoboden

ot klyatvy vyrazheniya,

tak kak eto ne vklyuchaetsya v «

net i da»: ved esli on poklyalsya

«ya ne znayu dlya tebya svidetelstva»,

on ne obyazalsya by za nee klyatvoy vyrazheniya, a tolko klyatvoy o svidetelstve [u nee osobye usloviya: on dolzhen imenno otretsat v sudе i byt godnym davat svidetelstvo]; poetomu takzhe esli on poklyalsya, chto znaet dlya nego svidetelstvo, on ne obyazan iz-za klyatvy vyrazheniya. Abaye soobshchaet nam, chto hotya Rav ne schitaet, chto klyatva vyrazheniya dolzhna otnositsya «i k budushchemu, i k proshlomu», on soglasen, chto ona dolzhna otnositsya k «net i da».

Poklyavshiysya svoemu drugu: «

Ya znal

dlya tebya svidetelstvo», ili poklyavshiysya: «

Ya ne znal

dlya tebya svidetelstva» [i eto ne klyatva o svidetelstve; smotri primechanie ], zavisit ot

raznoglasiya

mezhdu Ravom i Shmuelem.

Rav obyazyvaet, ved zdes imeyutsya «net i da»: on mozhet poklyastsya kak «ya ne znal», tak i «ya znal». A Shmuel osvobozhdaet, poskolku zdes net budushchego: on ne mozhet poklyastsya svoyemu drugu, chto «ya budu znat dlya tebya svidetelstvo» ili «ya ne budu znat dlya tebya svidetelstvo», ved ne v ego vlasti uznat dlya nego svidetelstvo v budushchem. Takzhe ne v ego vlasti ne znat dlya nego svidetelstva, poskolku inogda chelovek uznaet chto-libo neumyshlenno.

Ravno i poklyavshiysya svoemu drugu: «

Ya svidetelstvoval

dlya tebya» ili

«ya ne svidetelstvoval

dlya tebya» — zavisit eto ot

raznoglasiya

Rava i Shmуelya. Zdes net budushchego, poskolku on ne mozhet poklyastsya, chto v budushchem budet svidetelstvovat za druga v sude ili ne budet svidetelstvovat, ved takim obrazom on poklyalsya ispolnit zapoved ili otmenit ee, poskolku cheloveku zapovedano priyti i svidetelstvovat dlya druga o izvestnom emu svidetelstve.

I rassuzhdali:

Vpolne ponyatno soglasno mneniyu Shmuelya, kotoryy govorit: za delo, kotoroe ne mozhet otnositsya k budushchemu, ne obyazyvayut,

daже kogda on poklyalsya

v proshlom; poetomu Pisanie vyvelо klyatvu

o svidetelstve iz chisla klyatv vyrazheniya,

sozdav dlya nee osobyy razdel, nesmotrya na to chto za nee obyazyvayut prigovorennuyu zhertvu, kak i za klyatvu vyrazheniya. Ved inache my ne obyazyvali by poklyavshegosya svoemu drugu, chto on ne znaet dlya nego svidetelstva, na osnovanii klyatvy vyrazheniya, poskolku eta klyatva ne otnositsya k budushchemu: on ne mozhet poklyastsya, chto v budushchem ne uznaet dlya nego svidetelstva, ved eto ne v ego vlasti, i poetomu Pisanie dolzhno bylo sozdat osobyy razdel o klyatve svidetelstva.

No soglasno mneniyu Rava,

kotoryy obyazyvaet iz-za klyatvy vyrazheniya dazhe kogda ona ne otnositsya k budushchemu,

dlya kakoy gалахicheskoy tseli Pisanie vyvelo

klyatvu o svidetelstve iz chisla klyatv vyrazheniya i soz­dalo dlya nee osobyy razdel, ved ona i tak vklyuchena v klyatvu vyrazheniya?

I otvechayut:

Ucheniki mudretsov skazali pered Abaye,

chtoby obyasnit mnenie Rava, chto imenno poetomu Pisanie soz­dalo razdel o klyatve svidetelstva:

chtoby obyazat ego dvumya.

Esli poklyavshiysya byl goden svidetelstvovat dlya nego i otрetsya pered sudом, on budet obyazan dvumya zhertvami: odnoy iz-za klyatvy vyrazheniya, a drugoy iz-za klyatvy o svidetelstve.

Skazal im

Abaye: obyazat

dvumya — tak skazat nelzya!

Ved on nikogda ne budet obyazan bolshe chem odnoy zhertvoy.

Ibo bylo peredano:

v razdele o prigovorennoy zhertve, kotoryy vklyuchaet tri razdela — klyatvu o svidetelstve, ritualnuyu nechistotu v otnoshenii Svyatilishcha i ego svyatyn i klyatvu vyrazheniya, skazano [Vayikra 5:5]: «I budet, kogda on stanet vinovnym

v odnom iz etikh».

I my tolkuem: kogda on stanet vinovnym

v odnom,

v odnom iz trekh razdelov, napisannykh v razdele o prigovorennoy zhertve [klyatve o svidetelstve, klyatve vyrazheniya i ritualnoy nechistote v otnoshenii Svyatilishcha i ego svyatyn],

ty obyazyvaesh ego, no ne obyazyvaesh ego dvazhdy!

Nевozmozhno obyazat za odno i to zhe deystvie na osnovanii dvukh razdelov; sledovatelno, nelzya skazat, chto za klyatvu o svidetelstve obyazyvayut dvumya zhertvami.

I rassuzhdali:

A u Abaye,

kotoryy govorit, chto za klyatvu o svidetelstve nelzya obyazat dvumya zhertvami,

dlya kakoy gалахicheskoy tseli Pisanie vyvelo

klyatvu o svidetelstve, ved on v lyubom sluchae obyazan odnoy zhertvoy iz-za klyatvy vyrazheniya?

I otvechayut:

Dlya togo, o chem bylo peredano: vo vsem

skazannom v razdele o prigovorennoy zhertve, krome klyatvy o svidetelstve, to est v klyatve vyrazheniya i v ritualnoy nechistote v otnoshenii Svyatilishcha i ego svyatyn,

skazano

«i skryto bylo»,

iz chego sleduet, chto rech idet imenno o neostorozhnom postupke,

a

esli

zdes,

v otnoshenii klyatvy o svidetelstve,

ne skazano

«i skryto bylo» —

iz etogo my uchim

obyazat

za klyatvu o svidetelstve

zhertvoy i pri umyshlennom postupke, kak i pri neostorozhnom!

I imenno radi etoy novizny — chto obyazannost deystvuet takzhe pri umyshlennom postupke — Pisanie soz­dalo osobyy razdel o klyatve o svidetelstve.

The Sages said to Abaye: Say

that the exclusion indicated by “for one” comes to exclude only a case in which he took an oath of testimony

intentionally; he is liable to one

. For when he acted intentionally, he can be held liable only on account of the oath of testimony and not on account of an oath of expression. But if he violated the oath of testimony

unintentionally,

when it is possible to hold him liable also on account of an oath of expression, indeed

he is liable to two

sacrificial offerings?

Abaye said to them: Is this not what I told you

—that the Torah wrote a special exclusion, “

for one,”

in order to teach that only

one do you hold him liable, but you do not hold him liable for two.

And if

you say that the exclusion applies only in a case in which he took an oath of testimony

intentionally, is there a possibility of two?

For when he acted intentionally, there is no possibility at all of holding him liable for two sacrificial offerings, since intentional violation creates liability only for an oath of testimony and not for an oath of expression. Why, then, would the Torah have needed to write an exclusion concerning this case?

It must therefore be that the exclusion teaches that even when he acted unintentionally, he is liable to only one.

Rava said:

There is no need for the exclusion of “for one” to teach us that one is not liable to two offerings for an oath of testimony,

because it was

the passage concerning the offering for an oath of testimony

a matter that

was

included

in the category of an oath of expression

and then set apart to be interpreted through a novel law,

for special laws were stated concerning it: only those fit to testify are liable for it, and only when the denial [that he knows testimony on his behalf] took place in court. And with regard to any matter that was included in a general category and then set apart to be interpreted through a novel law,

you have in it only its novel aspect!

You hold him liable only for the matter stated concerning it. Therefore, for an oath of testimony one is liable only for the offering for an oath of testimony, and not for the offering for an oath of expression.

And we challenge this:

By implication

, from Rava’s statement you learn

that Abaye,

who requires a special exposition of “for one” to exclude liability for two in the case of an oath of testimony,

holds

that this is not a matter that was set apart to be interpreted through a novel law, in which case you have in it only its novel aspect. Rather, with every oath of testimony,

the oath exists in the world.

It also bears the designation of an oath of expression. He is exempt from two offerings only because of the exclusion of “for one.”

There is a practical difference in this: if the person who took the oath was disqualified from giving testimony, or if the denial took place outside court, in which case he is exempt on account of an oath of testimony, at least he should be liable to an offering on account of an oath of expression.

And challenge this:

But Abaye said: Rav concedes with regard to one who says

to his fellow “

I swear that I know testimony on your behalf,”

and it was discovered that he did not know any testimony on his behalf, that he is exempt

from an oath of expression,

since it does not exist

as an oath of expression in both the negative and affirmative formulations, for if he swore, “

I do not know testimony on your behalf,”

this is not an oath of expression but an oath of testimony.

But according to what we have said according to Abaye, even when one swears, “I do not know testimony on your behalf,” it is possible that at times it should have the status of an oath of expression, such as when the witnesses are disqualified or when the denial takes place outside court, and if so, when one swears, “I know testimony on your behalf,” he should have been liable on account of an oath of expression, since it exists in both the negative and affirmative formulations".

And we answer:

Abaye retracted that statement

, and holds that indeed one who swears to his fellow that he knows testimony on his behalf is liable on account of an oath of expression, since, as stated, this oath exists in both the negative and affirmative formulations.