Shevuot 25a (כה.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

We are speaking of a sin-offering.

I said that only with regard to sin-offerings does the tanna count only those sin-offerings that come for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet, but not with regard to a guilt-offering. And for an oath of utterance one is liable to bring a sin-offering; therefore it was not counted, since, as stated, its sin-offering comes for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by lashes, rather than karet.

Ravina said: When it teaches, it refers to something upon which it takes effect

only

with regard to something that is subject to eating.

For example, notar, forbidden fat, eating consecrated food in a state of ritual impurity, and Yom Kippur, whose prohibitions apply only to food. But

an oath, which takes effect

even

with regard to something that is not subject to eating, is not taught!

And we challenge this:

But consecrated property takes effect even with regard to wood and stones,

and nevertheless the tanna counts a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property, although consecrated property applies even to wood and stones!?

And we conclude:

Rather, when it teaches, it refers to something upon which it takes effect

only

with regard to something that has substance,

since even consecration can take effect only upon something that can be touched with the hands. But

an oath, which takes effect

even

with regard to something that has no substance, such as “

an oath

that I will sleep”

and “

that I will not sleep,”

since sleep is something that cannot be touched,

is not taught!

Mishna:

One may take an oath concerning matters relating to oneself,

and concerning matters relating to others.

Whether the oath concerned the person taking the oath himself or concerned another person.

And concerning matters that have substance, and concerning matters that have no substance.

Whether the oath concerned something that has substance or something that has no substance, such as sleep, or something that provides no benefit to a person, such as throwing a bundle into the sea, one is liable for them on account of an oath of utterance.

How so?

With regard to matters relating to others:

If he said, “

An oath that I will give

something

to so-and-so,”

or he said, “An oath

that I will not give

it to him,” or, “An oath

that I gave

it to him,” or, “

that I did not give it to him.”

With regard to matters that have no substance: He said, “An oath

that I will sleep,”

or, “

that I will not sleep,” “

that I slept,”

or, “

that I did not sleep.”

Or he said, “An oath

that I will throw a bundle into the sea,”

or, “

that I will not throw it,” “

that I threw it,”

or, “

that I did not throw it.”

Rabbi Yishmael says: He is not liable

on account of an oath of utterance

unless

he swore

concerning the future.

He disagrees with the first tanna in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter, who holds him liable even when he swore concerning the past, such as: “That I ate,” or, “That I did not eat.”

As it is stated

in the passage concerning the offering for an oath [Leviticus 5:4]: “

To do harm or to do good.”

This indicates that it applies specifically when one swore concerning the future.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so,

if you infer that it must specifically resemble what is written in the verse, “to do harm or to do good,” then

I know of no case

in which he would be liable on account of an oath of utterance

unless

he swore concerning

matters involving harm or benefit,

such as, “I will eat,” which benefits him, and, “I will not eat,” which causes him affliction.

With regard to matters involving neither harm nor benefit, how do we know

that he is liable for them?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yishmael:

From the amplification of the verse.

From what is stated [there], “For whatever a person expresses by oath,” we learn that he is liable even for matters involving neither harm nor benefit.

He said to him,

Rabbi Akiva:

If the verse amplifies this,

establishing liability even for matters involving neither harm nor benefit,

the verse amplifies

also

this,

establishing liability also for an oath concerning the past.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

There is

a stringency with vows over oaths,

and likewise there is

a stringency with oaths over vows—

The stringency with vows

over oaths is

that vows take effect with regard to a mitzva,

to annul the performance of the mitzva,

just

as they take effect with regard to

a matter

that is

optional.

For example, if a person prohibits sitting in a sukka to himself as a konam, he may not sit in the sukka despite thereby nullifying the mitzva of sukka.

Unlike oaths,

which do not take effect to annul a mitzva; if one swore not to sit in a sukka, the oath does not take effect upon him.

The stringency with oaths

over vows is

that oaths take effect with regard to something that has no substance,

such as when one swore not to sleep,

just

as they take effect with regard to

something that has substance.

Unlike vows,

which do not take effect with regard to something that has no substance. For example, if one said, “Konam: I will not sleep,” the vow does not take effect upon him, since sleep is something that has no substance. It does take effect, however, if he says, “Konam: My eyes are prohibited to me with regard to sleep,” since the vow then applies to the eye, which has substance.

We learned in the Mishna:

How so?

He said, “An oath that I will give

to so-and-so and that I will not give.”

And we inquire:

What

was the oath that he swore,

“I will give”

to so-and-so?

If you say

that he swore that he would give

charity to a poor person,

but

he is already adjured

and bound by the oath at Mount Sinai

to give charity,

as it is stated

in Deuteronomy 15:10: “

You shall surely give him.”

How can the oath take effect in this case!?

And we answer:

Rather,

the case is one in which he swore, “I will give

a gift to a wealthy person,”

with regard to whom there is no mitzva.

We learned in the Mishna:

“That I will sleep and that I will not sleep.”

And we raise an objection:

Is that so? But Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who says, “

An oath that I will not sleep for three days,”

is flogged

for violating an oath taken in vain, since it is impossible for a person not to sleep for three days. Thus, as soon as he swore, it was already an oath taken in vain, and therefore he is flogged for it immediately,

and he may sleep at once.

If he wishes, he may sleep immediately, because the oath did not take effect upon him at all.

How, then, does the Mishna say that an oath not to sleep takes effect upon him?

And we answer:

There,

the case is

that he said

that he would not sleep for

three

days, which is impossible.

Here,

the case is

that he did not say three

days, but swore concerning a shorter period, and therefore his oath takes effect.

We learned in the Mishna:

“That I will throw a stone into the sea, and that I will not throw it.”

It was stated:

One who says: “

An oath that so-and-so threw a stone into the sea,”

or “

that he did not throw it”—

Rav said: He is liable

for an oath of expression.

And Shmuel said: He is exempt.

And we explain:

Rav said: He is liable

because

it exists in the category of “

lo ve-hen”—that is, this oath can be taken both affirmatively and negatively, since he can swear that so-and-so threw it and that he did not throw it.

And Shmuel said: He is exempt

because it does not exist in the category of the future.

Since

it is not applicable to the future, as he cannot swear that so-and-so will throw a stone or will not throw one in the future, because so-and-so is not under his control, such that he could impose an obligation upon him through his oath. If he were to swear in this manner, it would be a vain oath and not an oath of expression. Therefore, even when he swears concerning the past, this is not an oath of expression for which he is liable to bring an offering, since it is impossible to swear concerning the future, which is the primary form of an oath of expression, as it is stated: “to do harm or to do good.”

And we raised a difficulty:

Shall we say that Rav and Shmuel

Shall we say that

disagree

in accordance with the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva—

As we learned

in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yishmael says: He is liable only for what is destined to occur, as it is stated: “

to do harm

or to do good.”

Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, I have only matters that involve harm and good.

From where do I derive matters that involve neither harm nor good?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yishmael:

From the inclusionary wording of the verse.

He said to him,

Rabbi Akiva:

If the verse included this, it included that as well.

And if so, we can say:

Rav follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva,

who holds a person liable for an oath of expression even when it concerns the past; therefore Rav rules that one who swears concerning the past that so-and-so threw the stone or did not throw it is liable.

And Shmuel

exempts him because

he follows the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael,

who holds that one is liable for an oath of expression only for an oath concerning the future?

And we reject this:

According to Rabbi Yishmael, everyone agrees

that one is not liable for an oath that so-and-so threw the stone.

Because

now,

even if he swore concerning himself, which is

a matter applicable to the future,

since a person can swear to impose an obligation upon himself for the future, nevertheless

Rabbi Yishmael does not hold him liable for it

when he swears

concerning the past.

All the more so when he swears concerning another person, which is

a matter not applicable to the future,

since he cannot swear concerning another person with regard to the future,

is it necessary

to say that he is not liable for an oath of expression when he swears concerning that person with regard to the past?

Rather, necessarily,

when Rav and Shmuel disagree,

Rav and Shmuel

disagree according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva,

which is the basis of their dispute:

Rav

holds

in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva,

and therefore he holds a person liable for an oath concerning the past even when he swears that so-and-so threw the stone, because according to Rav there is no distinction between one who swears concerning himself and one who swears concerning another person.

And Shmuel said: Rabbi Akiva held a person liable only in that case,

when he swears

concerning the past, but only for a matter applicable to the future,

that is, in the case of an oath by which a person swears concerning himself, where he can swear and become obligated regarding the future; only in such a case

does Rabbi Akiva hold him liable

even

concerning the past,

as, for example, when he swears, “I threw it.”

But in a matter not applicable to the future,

in an oath concerning a particular person,

no,

Rabbi Akiva does not hold him liable for it when he swears concerning the past that so-and-so threw a stone into the sea or did not throw it.