Shevuot 25a — the Talmud in English

And we resolve:

We are speaking of a sin-offering.

Only regarding sin-offerings did I say that the tanna counts only those sin-offerings that come for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet, but not regarding the guilt-offering. And for an oath of utterance one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and therefore it was not counted, since, as stated, its sin-offering comes for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by a prohibition.

Ravina said: When he teaches, it is a matter that takes effect

only

on a matter that is a food matter.

Such as notar, forbidden fat, eating sacred food in a state of ritual impurity, and Yom Kippur, whose prohibition applies only to foods. Whereas

an oath, which takes effect

even

on a matter that is not fit for eating, he does not teach!

And we challenge this:

But consecration takes effect also on wood and stones,

and nevertheless the tanna counts the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property, although consecration applies also to wood and stones!?

And we conclude:

Rather, when he teaches, it is a matter that takes effect

only

on a matter that has substance,

for even consecration can take effect only on a thing that can be touched by hand. Whereas

an oath, which takes effect

even

on a matter that has no substance, such as “

an oath

that I will sleep”

and “

that I will not sleep,”

for sleep is a matter that cannot be touched,

he does not teach!

Mishna:

One who swears about matters concerning himself,

and one who swears about matters concerning others.

Whether the oath concerned the one who swore himself, or whether it concerned another person.

And one who swears about matters that have substance, and one who swears about matters that have no substance.

Whether the oath concerned a matter that has substance, or whether it concerned a matter that has no substance, such as sleep, or such as a matter that has no benefit to a person, such as throwing a bundle into the sea—he is liable for them on account of an oath of utterance.

How so?

Matters concerning others:

He said, “

An oath that I will give

something

to so-and-so,”

or he said, “An oath

that I will not give

to him,” or, “An oath

that I gave,”

or,

“that I did not give to him.”

Matters that have no substance: He said, “An oath

that I will sleep,”

or,

“that I will not sleep,”

“that I slept,”

or,

“that I did not sleep.”

Or he said, “An oath

that I will throw a bundle into the sea,”

or,

“that I will not throw,”

“that I threw,”

or,

“that I did not throw.”

Rabbi Ishmael says: He is liable

on account of an oath of utterance

only

if he swore

about the future.

And he disagrees with the first tanna in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter, who obligates him even when he swore about the past, such as, “that I ate,” and, “that I did not eat.”

As it is stated in the passage concerning the offering for an oath [Leviticus 5:4], “

to do harm or to do good.”

“To do harm or to do good.”

This implies specifically when he swore about the future.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so,

since you infer that it must specifically be similar to what is written in the verse, “to do harm or to do good,” then

I have

that he is liable on account of an oath of utterance

only

when he swears about

matters in which there is harm or benefit,

such as, “I will eat,” which benefits himself, and, “I will not eat,” which afflicts himself.

Matters in which there is neither harm nor benefit—from where

do we know that he is liable for them?

He said to him,

Rabbi Ishmael:

From an enlargement of the verse,

as it is stated [there], “For everything that a person expresses in an oath”; from this we learn that he is liable also for matters in which there is neither harm nor benefit.

He said to him,

Rabbi Akiva:

If the verse enlarged it to this,

that one is liable also for matters in which there is neither harm nor benefit,

the verse enlarged it

also

to this,

that one is liable also for an oath concerning the past.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: There is

a

stringency in vows over oaths,

and likewise there is

a stringency in oaths over vows—

The stringency in vows

over oaths is

that vows take effect with regard to a mitzva,

to nullify the fulfillment of the mitzva,

just as

they take effect with regard to a

matter

that is

optional.

For example, a person forbids upon himself by a konam sitting in a sukka—he is forbidden to sit in the sukka, even though by doing so he nullifies the mitzva of sukka.

That is not so with oaths,

which do not take effect to nullify a mitzva, for one who swears not to sit in a sukka—the oath does not take effect upon him.

The stringency in oaths

over vows is

that oaths take effect with regard to a matter that has no substance,

such as one who swears that he will not sleep,

just as they take effect with regard to

a

matter that has substance.

That is not so with vows,

which do not take effect with regard to a matter that has no substance. For example, if he said, “Konam that I will not sleep,” the vow does not take effect upon him, since sleep is a matter that has no substance; rather, if he says, “Konam, my eyes with regard to sleep,” then the vow takes effect upon the eye, which has substance.

We learned in the Mishna:

How so?

He said, “An oath that I will give

to so-and-so, and that I will not give.”

And we inquire about this:

What

was the oath that he swore,

“I will give”

to so-and-so?

If you say

that he swore that he would give

charity to a poor person,

then he is

already sworn

and standing from Mount Sinai

regarding giving charity,

as it is stated [Deuteronomy 15:10],

in Deuteronomy 15:10: “

“You shall surely give to him.”

And how can the oath take effect upon this!?

And we resolve:

Rather,

it is referring to one who swore, “I will give”

a gift to a wealthy person,

with whom there is no mitzva.

We learned in the Mishna:

“That I will sleep, and that I will not sleep.”

And we are astonished:

Is that so? But Rabbi Yohanan said: One who says, “

An oath that I will not sleep for three days,”

they flog him

for violating an oath of futility, since it is an impossible matter that a person should not sleep for three days; it follows that as soon as he swore, it was already an oath of futility, and therefore he is flogged for it immediately,

and he sleeps immediately.

If he wishes, he may sleep immediately, because the oath did not take effect upon him at all.

And how does the Mishna say that an oath that he will not sleep takes effect upon him?

And we resolve:

There,

it is referring to a case where

he said

that he would not sleep

three

days, which is an impossible matter.

Here,

it is referring to a case where

he did not say three,

days, but swore concerning less than that, and therefore his oath takes effect.

We learned in the Mishna:

“that I shall throw a stone into the sea and that I shall not throw it.”

It was stated:

one who says, “

An oath that so-and-so threw a stone into the sea,”

or “

that he did not throw it”—

Rav said: He is liable

because of an oath of utterance.

And Samuel said: He is exempt.

And we explain it:

Rav said: He is liable,

for

it exists in “

the negative and the affirmative,”

for this oath can be taken both affirmatively and negatively, since he can swear that so-and-so threw it and that he did not throw it.

And Samuel said: He is exempt,

because

it is absent in the future.

For he cannot swear that so-and-so will throw a stone or will not throw it in the future, since so-and-so is not under his control, such that he could obligate him through his oath; and if he swears thus, it would be a vain oath and not an oath of utterance. Therefore, even when he swears concerning the past, this is not an oath of utterance for which he becomes liable to bring an offering, since it is impossible to swear concerning the future, which is the principal [case] of an oath of utterance, as it is stated: “to do harm or to do good.”

And we raise a difficulty concerning it:

Shall we say that

Rav and Samuel

differ with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva—

As we learned

in our Mishna:

Rabbi Ishmael says: He is liable only for the future, as it is stated, “

to do harm

or to do good.”

Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, I have only matters in which there is harm or good.

From where [do I derive liability for] matters in which there is neither harm nor good?

He said to him,

Rabbi Ishmael:

From the inclusion of the verse.

He said to him,

Rabbi Akiva:

If the verse included this, the verse included that.

And if so, let us say:

Rav follows the view of Rabbi Akiva,

who makes one liable for an oath of utterance even concerning the past; and therefore Rav holds that one who swears concerning the past that so-and-so threw it or did not throw it is liable.

And Samuel

exempts because

he follows the view of Rabbi Ishmael,

who holds that one is liable because of an oath of utterance only for an oath concerning the future?

And we reject this:

According to Rabbi Ishmael, everyone agrees

that one is not liable for an oath that so-and-so threw it.

For

now,

even if he swore concerning himself, which is

a matter that exists in the future,

since a person can swear to obligate himself for the future, nevertheless

Rabbi Ishmael does not make him liable for it

when he swears

concerning the past.

All the more so if he swears concerning another person, which is

a matter that is absent in the future,

since he cannot swear concerning another person with regard to the future,

is it necessary

to say that he is not liable because of an oath of utterance if he swears concerning him about the past?

Rather, necessarily,

when Rav and Samuel differ,

Rav and Samuel

differ according to Rabbi Akiva;

that is what they differ about:

Rav

held

like Rabbi Akiva,

and therefore he makes one liable for the past, even when he swears that so-and-so threw it, because according to Rav there is no distinction between whether he swears concerning himself or whether he swears concerning another person.

And Samuel said: Rabbi Akiva made him liable there only,

when he swears

concerning the past, but [only regarding] a matter that exists in the future,

in an oath that a person swears concerning himself, for he can swear and obligate himself concerning the future; only then

does Rabbi Akiva make him liable

even

concerning the past,

as, for example, when he swears, “I threw it.”

But regarding a matter that is absent in the future,

in an oath concerning a certain person,

not

does Rabbi Akiva make him liable for it when he swears concerning the past that so-and-so threw a stone into the sea or did not throw it.