Shevuot 24b (כד:) — the Talmud in English

There:

in the case of the Mishna’s konem vow,

since initially

before he vowed,

he ate

the unslaughtered animal,

and afterward he swore to him,

afterward he said in his own words, “If I ate today,”

he thereby deemed it significant,

for by eating the unslaughtered animal he demonstrated that he does not find it repulsive.

Rather, here,

where he first swore generally, “I will not eat,”

did he deem it significant

the unslaughtered animal at the time of his oath? Therefore, if he subsequently eats an unslaughtered animal, it is possible that he is exempt, as though he had eaten foods unfit for consumption.

Rava said: What is the reason of the one who holds “

the prohibition takes effect inclusively”?

What is the rationale of the Rabbis, who maintain that although one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition, if the additional prohibition also encompasses permitted items, which now become prohibited together with the additional prohibition, the second prohibition takes effect?

It is analogous to “

a prohibition that adds.”

When the additional prohibition adds a stringency that was not present in the first prohibition, everyone agrees that it takes effect upon the prior prohibition. The same applies when the additional prohibition encompasses permitted items together with it: It takes effect upon the first prohibition.

The difference between “a prohibition that adds” and “the prohibition takes effect inclusively” is that a prohibition that adds imposes upon the object itself a new prohibition that had not previously applied to it. For example, the fat of a sacrifice that became notar is called a prohibition that adds, because until it became notar, the fat was prohibited for consumption only to an Israelite, but it was permitted to be offered to the Most High. Once it became notar, an additional prohibition was imposed upon it: It became forbidden even to be offered on the altar. Since the status of notar took effect with regard to the prohibition against offering it, which is a new prohibition and not a prohibition upon a prohibition, the status of notar also takes effect with regard to human consumption, so that one is liable for notar as well, although with regard to human consumption it was already forbidden as forbidden fat.

“The prohibition takes effect inclusively” does not add a prohibition to the object itself, but to the person, who is now prohibited from items that had previously been permitted to him. For example, an unslaughtered animal on Yom Kippur: The prohibition of Yom Kippur adds nothing to the unslaughtered animal, since even now it is forbidden only for consumption, as it was previously. Rather, it adds and extends the prohibition to the person, so that he becomes prohibited from all foods. Since the prohibition of Yom Kippur takes effect upon the person to prohibit him from other foods, it also takes effect upon the unslaughtered animal, which becomes prohibited to him on account of Yom Kippur as well.

And as for the one who exempts, who does not hold of

the prohibition taking effect inclusively, although he acknowledges a prohibition that adds, because he maintains:

When

one says that a prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition, this applies specifically with regard to

a prohibition that adds,

because it is

within a single piece,

as the second prohibition adds a prohibition to the very piece that had already been prohibited. But with regard to a prohibition that takes effect inclusively, which is

with regard to two pieces,

as the second prohibition adds only another piece,

we do not say

that since the additional prohibition takes effect upon the person with regard to this piece, it should also take effect with regard to this piece.

And Rava said: According to the one who holds that a prohibition takes effect inclusively

and takes effect upon another prohibition, if

he said, “

An oath: I will not eat figs, and he went back and said ‘

An oath: I will not eat figs and grapes,’”

since it takes effect

his second oath

with regard to grapes,

which he had not previously been sworn against,

it also takes effect with regard to figs,

because in his second oath he included the permitted grapes as well. Therefore, if he eats figs, he is liable on account of two oaths.

And we raise an objection:

It is obvious,

since this is an inclusive prohibition!?

And we answer:

Lest you say

that only

a prohibition

that takes effect inclusively,

which comes on its own, is said

to take effect upon another prohibition, as, for example, Yom Kippur takes effect upon an unslaughtered animal, but

a prohibition that comes

through the person

on his own, we do not say

that it takes effect upon another prohibition.

Rava teaches us

that the authority who holds that a prohibition takes effect inclusively holds this even with regard to a prohibition by which a person prohibits himself.

Rava son of Rabba raised an objection

against Rava’s assertion that even with regard to a prohibition that comes on its own one says that an inclusive prohibition takes effect, from what we learned in tractate Keritot [13b]:

There is

a person who

eats a single eating,

one olive-bulk,

and is liable to bring four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering.

And these are they:

a person

who is impure and ate forbidden fat. And it is

the fat of a sacrifice that

became notar from consecrated property,

after the time for eating the sacrifice had passed. And he ate it

on Yom Kippur.

Thus, there are four sin-offerings here: for eating forbidden fat, for eating notar, for eating on Yom Kippur, and for eating sacrificial food while impure. In addition, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property, because he benefited from consecrated property.

Rabbi Meir says:

At times

even

one additional sin-offering is incurred; for example, if this occurred on

Shabbat, and he carried

that olive-bulk of fat

in his mouth

from a private domain to a public domain while eating, in which case he is

liable

for an additional sin-offering, on account of the prohibition against carrying on Shabbat.

They said to him

the Sages said to Rabbi Meir: The liability for the sin-offering due to carrying

is not of the same category.

That sin-offering is not brought for the eating, but for the labor of carrying, whereas we count only sin-offerings brought for the eating itself.

And if it is so,

that even an inclusive prohibition that comes through the person himself takes effect upon another prohibition, then

it could be found

that for that same olive-bulk he would be liable even to

five

sin-offerings,

for example, if he said, “

An oath: I will not eat

dates and forbidden fat,”

for according to Rava the oath takes effect upon the forbidden fat even though it is a prohibition upon a prohibition, because this oath also includes the permitted dates.

Since it takes effect

his oath

with regard to dates, it also takes effect with regard to the forbidden fat.

It follows that he is liable for an additional sin-offering because he violated his oath by eating the forbidden fat. And we answer: Indeed, an inclusive prohibition takes effect even when it comes on its own; however,

when he teaches,

the tanna of the Mishna counts only

an

inclusive

prohibition that comes on its own.

Whereas

an

inclusive

prohibition that comes through the person himself, he does not teach.

And we challenge this:

But what of consecration,

which is a prohibition that comes through the person himself, since a person consecrates an item through his speech, and nevertheless the tanna counts it, as the guilt-offering for misuse is brought for deriving benefit from consecrated property—!?

And we answer: The Mishna is speaking

of a

sacrifice,

of a firstborn whose sanctity comes from the womb,

automatically and not through a person’s consecration.

Alternatively, if you wish, say: When he teaches

the Mishna, it teaches only

something that has no possibility of inquiry,

prohibitions such as these, which cannot be permitted through inquiry before a Sage. Therefore,

an oath, which does have the possibility of inquiry,

as a Sage can release the oath,

he does not teach!

And we challenge this:

But what of consecration,

which can be subject to inquiry like any vow, and yet it teaches the guilt-offering for misuse—!?

And we answer:

We established this as referring to a firstborn,

which cannot be subject to inquiry, since its sanctity does not result from a person’s vow, but is inherent in it.

Alternatively, if you wish, say: When he teaches,

he teaches specifically a

fixed offering,

as all the sin-offerings and the guilt-offering enumerated in the Mishna are fixed offerings, for which there is no distinction between a wealthy person and a poor person. But

the graduated offering,

which is brought for an oath, where a poor person brings a different offering from a wealthy person,

he does not teach.

And we challenge this:

What of an impure person who ate consecrated food, for which the offering is a graduated offering,

and yet it teaches it—!?

And we answer: The Mishna is speaking

of a ruler,

who ate consecrated food in impurity and does not bring a graduated offering, but rather a fixed offering.

And it is Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, who says: A ruler brings a goat,

as a sin-offering for his transgression involving the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred foods, whether he is wealthy or poor.

Rav Ashi said: When he teaches, he teaches something upon which the prohibition takes effect at a measure.

Only prohibitions for which one is liable only upon consuming an olive-bulk. But

an oath, upon which it takes effect

even upon

less than the measure,

for if he explicitly swore concerning less than the measure, he is liable for it,

he does not teach!

And we challenge this:

What of consecration,

for which one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for misuse even for eating less than an olive-bulk, and yet it teaches it—!?

And we answer:

Here, we require

that the misuse be at least worth

a peruta,

as that is the measure for misuse. This is not so with regard to an oath, which has no measure at all.

And Rav Ashi of Meḥoza said in the name of Rabbi Zeira: When he teaches,

he teaches only something for which one is liable for

intentional violation with karet.

But an oath is something for which

intentional violation incurs only lashes,

without karet,

he does not teach!

And we challenge this:

What of the guilt-offering

for misuse,

for which intentional violation incurs only lashes,

and yet it teaches it?