Shevuot 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

Only

with a prohibition that comes on its own,

where the person did not create the prohibition through his speech, but it came on its own—for example, an animal that became a neveila before Yom Kippur, when it was initially forbidden as a neveila, and when Yom Kippur arrived, the prohibition of Yom Kippur took effect upon the neveila, [and one who ate it would be liable to bring a sin-offering because of the prohibition of Yom Kippur]. Although one prohibition does not take effect upon another, this is because the prohibition of Yom Kippur is an “inclusive prohibition”: until twilight on Yom Kippur, this person had been forbidden only to eat a neveila, but when Yom Kippur began, he also became forbidden to eat a slaughtered animal. Since he became forbidden to eat a slaughtered animal, he likewise became forbidden to eat a neveila, under the prohibition of Yom Kippur. However,

with a prohibition that comes

upon a person

through his own agency,

as a result of his oath or vow,

we do not say

that if, in his oath, he includes permitted items together with prohibited ones, the oath takes effect upon the prohibited items as well, by virtue of an “inclusive prohibition.”

We raise a difficulty:

Granted, according to Reish Lakish,

who establishes the Mishna as referring to one who explicitly swore not to eat half the measure of a prohibited item,

this is why Rabbi Shimon exempts him.

Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the Rabbis in the Mishna and exempts one who eats neveilot and tereifot from bringing an oath-offering, even though he swore also concerning half the measure of a neveila, since he maintains that one is already under oath even concerning half the measure of a prohibition.

As it was taught: Rabbi Shimon says: For any amount

—which is the measure of eating—

one is liable to

lashes

for

all the Torah’s prohibitions.

But they said

by halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai that the measure of eating is

an olive-bulk only for

liability to bring a

sin-offering,

and nothing more.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, the oath does not take effect even upon half the measure of the prohibition.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who establishes the Mishna as referring to one who swore through an “inclusive” oath,

what is the reason for Rabbi Shimon, who exempts him?

And we answer:

What, is this the reason?

Behold, the entire reason to obligate him is

only because of an inclusive prohibition—

—

Rabbi Shimon follows his own view, as he does not accept the concept of an inclusive prohibition!

As it was taught: Rabbi Shimon says: One who eats a neveila on Yom Kippur

—he is

exempt

from bringing a sin-offering, because the prohibition of Yom Kippur cannot take effect upon the prohibition of neveila, since one prohibition does not take effect upon another.

Thus, Rabbi Shimon maintains that even with an inclusive prohibition, such as the prohibition of Yom Kippur, one prohibition does not take effect upon another. Therefore, with an oath concerning an oath as well, he exempts the person even when the oath contains an inclusive prohibition.

And we raise another difficulty: Is it not an established principle that we will state below [27a], that one is liable to bring an oath-offering only for an oath that can exist in the form of “no” and “yes”—that is, one can swear concerning it both affirmatively and negatively—as it is stated, “to do harm or to do good,” which implies a matter and its opposite?

Granted, according to Reish Lakish, one can find it

in the case of one who swore not to eat half the measure of a neveila,

in

“no and yes”: one could also swear affirmatively that he would eat half the measure of a neveila, and this would not be considered an oath to nullify a mitzva, since according to Reish Lakish half the measure is permitted by Torah law.

mozhno takzhe poklyast''sya s obyazatel''stvom est'' polovinu minimal''nogo kolichestva padali, i eto ne schitaetsya klyatvoy, narushayushchey zapoved'', tak kak, po mneniyu Resh Lakisha, polovinu minimal''nogo kolichestva Torah zapreshchaet tol''ko po postanovleniyu mudretsov.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who establishes the Mishna as referring to one who swore concerning a complete measure of the prohibition, with his oath taking effect because he included permitted items in it—behold, we said above that the Mishna is speaking of one who explicitly stated that he was swearing concerning neveilot, since otherwise neveilot are foods unfit for consumption.

If so, this poses a difficulty:

Granted,

“no,”

one can find it

as stated, in a case where he swore not to eat neveilot and slaughtered animals.

But

“yes”—

how can one find it!?

If he swears that he will eat neveilot, the oath cannot take effect to obligate him to eat neveilot and thereby nullify the oath imposed at Mount Sinai, even if he includes in his oath that he will also eat slaughtered animals. And since it cannot be found in the form of “yes,” one is not liable to bring an offering even for the “no”!?

By virtue of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts the earlier answer to the contradiction between the beginning and the end of the Mishna—that the beginning refers to an unspecified oath, while the end refers to one who specified the prohibited foods.

Rather,

the entire Mishna is speaking of one who swore without qualification, “I will not eat.” Nevertheless, he is liable at the end of the Mishna for eating neveilot and tereifot, because they are considered foods fit for consumption. And the statement at the beginning, that one is exempt for eating foods unfit for consumption, refers

to the case described by Rava—

As Rava said:

“An oath: I will not eat,

and he ate dust—he is exempt.”

The beginning of the Mishna is speaking of dust, which is indeed something unfit for consumption. Neveilot and tereifot, however, are fit for consumption; it is merely that “a lion crouches over them”—an imposing prohibition rests upon them and prevents one from eating them.

Since the entire Mishna is speaking of an unspecified oath, Rabbi Yohanan’s answer as well—“through including permitted things together with prohibited things”—refers to one who swore without qualification, “I will not eat.” Consequently, permitted items are also included in his oath, and therefore the oath takes effect upon the prohibited items as well. This oath can indeed be found in the form of “no and yes,” since he can swear without qualification, “I will eat,” and fulfill his oath by eating permitted foods.

Rav Mari said: We too have learned this

in our Mishna, that a neveila is considered something fit for eating.

as we learned:

“My wife shall be forbidden to benefit from me as a konam if I ate today,” and he ate neveilot, terefot, shekatzim, and remashim; his wife is forbidden to him.

Thus, eating forbidden foods is considered eating.”

We reject Rav Mari’s proof:

How can you say so?!