Shevuot 24a — the Talmud in English

Only

in a prohibition that comes by itself,

where the person did not create the prohibition through his speech, but it came by itself—for example, an animal that became a carcass before Yom Kippur, which was initially forbidden by the prohibition of a carcass, and when Yom Kippur arrives, the prohibition of Yom Kippur takes effect upon the carcass [and one who eats it is liable for a sin-offering because of the prohibition of Yom Kippur]—despite the principle that one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition, because the prohibition of Yom Kippur is a “comprehensive prohibition”: until twilight of Yom Kippur this person was forbidden only to eat a carcass, and when Yom Kippur entered he also became forbidden to eat a slaughtered animal, and since he became forbidden to eat a slaughtered animal, he also became forbidden to eat a carcass by the prohibition of Yom Kippur. But

in a prohibition that comes

upon the person

through himself,

as a result of his oath or his vow,

we do not say

that if he includes in his oath permitted things together with forbidden things, the oath takes effect also upon the forbidden things because of a “comprehensive prohibition.”

And we raise it

granted, according to Reish Lakish,

who establishes the Mishna as referring to one who explicitly swore not to eat a half-measure of the prohibition,

for that reason Rabbi Shimon exempts.

For Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the Rabbis in the Mishna and exempts one who eats carcasses and improperly slaughtered animals from a guilt-offering for an oath, even though he swore even concerning a half-measure of the carcass, since he holds that concerning a half-measure of the prohibition as well he is already under oath.

As it was taught: Rabbi Shimon says: Anything

is the measure of eating

for

which one is

liable for lashes

for all the prohibitions of the Torah,

but they said

by a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai that the measure of eating is

an olive-size only for

liability to a

sacrifice,

specifically a sin-offering.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, the oath does not take effect even upon a half-measure of the prohibition.

But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who establishes the Mishna as referring to one who swore with an “inclusion,”

what is the reason of Rabbi Shimon, who exempts?

And we answer:

Is that the reason?

Behold, the entire reason to make him liable is

only because of a comprehensive prohibition—

—

Rabbi Shimon follows his own position, for he does not accept a comprehensive prohibition!

As it was taught: Rabbi Shimon says: One who eats a carcass on Yom Kippur

is

exempt

from a sin-offering, because the prohibition of Yom Kippur cannot take effect upon the prohibition of a carcass, since one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition.

It follows that Rabbi Shimon holds that even in a comprehensive prohibition, such as the prohibition of Yom Kippur, one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition. Therefore, also with an oath concerning an oath, he exempts even where there is a comprehensive prohibition.

And we raise another difficulty: Behold, we hold below [27a] that one is liable for an oath-offering only for an oath of such a kind that is possible in “negative and affirmative”—that is, it is possible to swear concerning it both for an obligation and for a negation, as it is stated, “to do harm or to do good”—which implies a matter and its opposite.

Granted, according to Reish Lakish, it is possible

to find one who swore not to eat a half-measure of a carcass

in

“negative and affirmative,”

since it is also possible to swear affirmatively that he will eat a half-measure of a carcass, for this is not considered swearing to nullify a commandment, since according to Reish Lakish a half-measure is permitted by Torah law.

But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who establishes the Mishna as referring to one who swore concerning a complete measure of the prohibition, and his oath took effect because he also included permitted things in it—yet we said above that the Mishna is speaking of one who explicitly said that he was swearing concerning carcasses, since otherwise carcasses are food unfit for eating.

If so, this is difficult:

granted, “

negative

”

—it is possible to find it, as stated, in a case in which he swore not to eat carcasses and slaughtered animals.

But “

affirmative

—how is it possible to find it!?

For if he swears that he will eat carcasses, the oath does not take effect to make him liable to eat carcasses and thereby nullify the oath of Sinai, even if he includes in his oath that he will also eat slaughtered animals. And since it is impossible to find it in the “affirmative,” one is not liable for an oath-offering even for the “negative”!?

By force of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts the answer given above concerning the contradiction in the Mishna from its beginning to its end—that the beginning speaks of an unspecified oath, while the end speaks of one who specified it.

Rather,

the entire Mishna is indeed speaking of one who swore without specification, “I will not eat,” and nevertheless he is liable in the latter clause for carcasses and improperly slaughtered animals, because they are considered food fit for eating. And what is stated in the first clause—that for food unfit for eating he is exempt—is

as Rava

said:

“An oath: I will not eat,”

and he ate dust, he is exempt.

And the first clause is speaking of this: dust is indeed something unfit for eating. But carcasses and improperly slaughtered animals are fit for eating; rather, “a lion lies upon them”—a prohibition lies upon them like a lion, preventing one from eating them.

And since the entire Mishna is speaking of an unspecified oath, what Rabbi Yoḥanan also answered, “with an inclusion of permitted things together with forbidden things,” is speaking of one who swore without specification, “I will not eat.” Consequently, permitted things are also included in his oath, and therefore the oath takes effect also upon the forbidden things. And this oath can indeed be found in “negative and affirmative,” for he can swear without specification, “I will eat,” and fulfill his oath by eating permitted things.

Rav Mari said: We too have learned [this]

in our Mishna, that a carcass is considered something fit for eating.

As we learned:

“Konam, my wife is forbidden to me if I ate today, and he ate carcasses, animals with fatal defects, creeping things, and crawling things—behold, his wife is forbidden to him.”

Thus, eating forbidden things is considered eating".

And we reject Rav Mari’s proof:

Is it so now?!