Shevuot 23b (כג:) — the Talmud in English

We still challenge this:

Perhaps

if he had said, “Bread of wheat, and of barley, and of spelt,” the meaning of his words would have been that he prohibits himself from bread containing all three of these species

by mixture,

in which wheat, barley, and spelt are mixed together. But bread of each species individually would not be prohibited to him. Therefore, he says, “Bread of wheat, and bread of barley, and bread of spelt,” to indicate that he also prohibits himself from bread of a single species. And from where do we know that his intention was to divide his oath into three separate oaths?

And we resolve: If his intention was to prohibit himself from each type of bread individually, and not only from a mixture of all three,

say

that he should say, “

And likewise of barley, and likewise of spelt,”

in which case it would be impossible to mistake his intention as referring to bread mixed from all three species. “

Bread,” “

bread”—

why do I need this?

Infer from this

that he says this in order

to distinguish

his oath with regard to each bread separately.

We learned in the Mishna:

“An oath that I will not drink,” and he drank many kinds of beverages, he is liable for only one offering. If he said, “An oath that I will not drink wine, oil, and honey,” and he drank, he is liable for each one individually.

And we raise a difficulty:

With regard to this,

granted, there

in the case of bread of wheat, bread of barley, and bread of spelt,

you say

that he is considered to have taken three separate oaths because

the word “

bread” “

bread” is superfluous for him—

to render him liable

for each one individually.

But here,

where he says, “An oath that I will not drink wine, oil, and honey,”

what would there have been

for him

to say?

He did not add any superfluous word to his statement, so from where do we know that his intention was to divide his oath,

perhaps he came to exempt himself from other beverages,

as he wishes to prohibit himself only from wine, oil, and honey, but not from other beverages, and therefore he mentioned all three?

And we resolve:

Rav Pappa said: Here, we are dealing with

wine, oil, and honey

that are placed

before him,

so if

his intention was only to prohibit himself from these three, he should have said, “

An oath that I will not drink these,” without specifying each one individually. Rather, evidently, his intention was to divide his oath with regard to each species separately.

We still challenge this:

Perhaps

if he had said this, his words would have implied that only beverages

these

that are placed before him

are what I will not drink,

but other beverages

of another kind

of the same type

I will drink,

and that is why he did not say, “An oath that I will not drink these.”

The question therefore returns: From where do we know that he intended to divide his oath? Perhaps he intended to say that he wishes to prohibit himself only from these three types of beverage, and not from other types?

And we resolve:

Rather,

because

he said—

[that he could have said,] when the beverages were placed before him,

“An oath that I will not drink things such as these,”

in which case he would be prohibited from beverages of these types, and not only from those actually placed before him. Since he did not say this, his words indicate that he intended to divide his oath.

And we object:

Perhaps

if he had said so, his wording would have implied that specifically

things such as these,

of this quantity, are what

I will not drink,

but

less than this or more than this,

slightly less or slightly more than the quantity before him,

I will drink.

And therefore he could not have used this wording?

And we resolve:

Rather,

from this we prove it,

as when he says

because he could have said, “

An oath that I will not drink from the type of these,”

as there would be no possibility of mistaking his intention as referring only to these beverages, nor only to the quantity of beverage before him, since he says, “from the type of these.”

And we challenge this:

Perhaps

then it would have been understood that only other beverages of

this type are what I will not drink; but these themselves

those beverages placed before him,

I will drink!?

And we resolve:

Say

that he could say, “

I will not drink these and anything of their type,”

and there would be no room for misunderstanding his words. Since he did not say this, but instead said, “Wine, oil, and honey,” it indicates that he intended to divide his oath.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said:

Here we are dealing

with a case where

[his fellow]

was urging him,

saying to him, “Come and drink wine, oil, and honey with me,”

and he refuses to drink with him.

He should have said

“An oath that I will not drink with you,”

and this oath would have referred only to the wine, oil, and honey that he was urged to drink with him, even though he did not specify them in his wording. If so,

“wine, oil, and honey”

why does he need

to say them?

Rather, evidently, he intended to divide his oath and

to render himself liable for each one individually.

We learned there

[below, 36b]: One who demanded that his fellow return the deposit that he had entrusted to him, and said to him,

“Give me the wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession,”

and the defendant denied the claim and swore falsely, saying,

“An oath that you have nothing in my possession,”

is liable for only one,

one guilt-offering for an oath concerning a deposit, since there is only one oath here.

But if he said to him,

“An oath that you have no wheat, barley, or spelt in my possession,” he is

liable

for an offering

for each one individually.

There are three separate oaths here, since he specified each species individually, rather than suffice with saying, “An oath that you have nothing in my possession.”

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if

his claim was only for the value of

a peruta

one

in total

from the wheat, barley, and spelt together, the peruta

combines

to render him liable for one offering for all of them, even though he swore only regarding one-third of a peruta of each species [and in order to render him liable for an offering for an oath concerning a deposit, the denial must be for at least the value of a peruta].

Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree

about how to interpret the Mishna, which states that he is liable for each one individually when he specified wheat, barley, and spelt, and also about how to interpret Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that one peruta from all of them combines—

One

of them

said:

What is written in the Mishna, that he is liable for each one, does not mean that he is liable for four guilt-offerings for four oaths: one for the general oath that he said at the beginning of his statement, “An oath that you have nothing in my possession,” whose meaning is that you have nothing in my possession, and three additional oaths that he specified—wheat, barley, and spelt. Rather,

he is liable for the specified oaths.

He is liable only for the three specified oaths, whereas

for the general oath,

the oath “that you have nothing in my possession,” he

is not liable,

because it is not considered an oath in its own right; rather, it refers to the particulars stated later in the oath.

And if so, it must be said that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement refers only to the first clause of the Mishna, which teaches: “An oath that you have nothing in my possession; he is liable for only one.” Since there is only one oath here concerning the wheat, barley, and spelt, the peruta from all three combines. But in the latter clause, where each species constitutes an oath in its own right, the three species do not combine to form one peruta; rather, there must be the value of a peruta from each species individually.

And one

of them

said: He is also liable for the general oath.

In addition to the three guilt-offerings that he brings for the three oaths, one for each species, he must bring another guilt-offering for the general oath at the beginning of his statement.

And if so, it is possible to say that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement applies also to the latter clause of the Mishna: There, the peruta combines with regard to the general oath, but not with regard to the three oaths, for which there must be the value of a peruta from each species individually.

And we raise a difficulty:

Here,

in our Mishna, in the case of an oath that I will not eat bread of wheat, bread of barley, and bread of spelt, where he is liable for each one individually,

what

is the law? Do Rav Aḥa and Ravina also disagree here, so that the one who holds that in the oath concerning a deposit he is liable for four guilt-offerings would also hold that here he is liable for four sin-offerings—one for the general oath, “An oath that I will not eat” [whose intention is regarding the three species that he immediately specifies ], and three for each species individually?

Rava said: Can this really be compared!?

Is it possible to compare these cases!?

Granted,

there,

in the oath concerning a deposit, it is possible to say that he is

liable

for one guilt-offering

for the general oath, and liable

for three additional guilt-offerings

for the specified oaths.

For if he takes an oath and then takes another oath,

even if he swears twice regarding the same money, he

is liable for two,

he becomes liable for two oath-offerings, since with regard to an oath concerning a deposit he is liable for an offering for every oath by which he denies a monetary obligation, even if he denies the same monetary obligation many times. Therefore, even if we say that the general oath at the beginning of his statement is an oath in its own right, it is possible to hold him liable again for the three specified oaths that follow, despite the fact that he has already sworn regarding that same money.

But

here,

in our Mishna,

if it enters your mind

that what he said at the beginning of his statement, “An oath that I will not eat,”

is included in the general oath,

it is a general oath concerning all the species that he will specify afterward, then

for the specified oaths, why is he liable!?

How can he be held liable again for the three specified oaths? For he is already

under oath and bound

with regard to these species by the first oath, and an oath does not take effect upon an oath!?

Rather, evidently, with regard to our Mishna everyone agrees that when he said at the beginning of his statement, “An oath that I will not eat,” he did not intend to take a general oath.

We learned in the Mishna:

“An oath that I will not eat”

and he ate foods unfit for eating and drank beverages unfit for drinking, he is exempt.

And we raise a difficulty:

This very matter is difficult!

The Mishna contradicts itself from its first clause to its latter clause:

You said

in the first clause:

“An oath that I will not eat,” and he ate foods unfit for eating and drank beverages unfit for drinking, he is exempt.

And afterward it teaches

in the latter clause:

“An oath that I will not eat,” and he ate unslaughtered animal carcasses, improperly slaughtered animals, creeping things, or creeping animals, he is liable.

But unslaughtered animal carcasses and improperly slaughtered animals are foods unfit for eating. If so, the difficulty is—

what is different in the first clause, that he is exempt, and what is different in the latter clause, that he is liable!?

And we resolve:

This is not difficult.

That is, if there is no other difficulty here, this difficulty has an answer:

The first clause,

in which he is exempt, is referring

to an unspecified statement,

where he said only, “I will not eat.” Therefore, his oath does not include foods unfit for eating, including unslaughtered animal carcasses and improperly slaughtered animals.

And

if

the latter clause,

in which he is liable, is referring

to one who specified,

who explicitly swore that he would not eat unslaughtered animal carcasses and improperly slaughtered animals. But there is another difficulty here, greater than this one:

The one who specifies is himself also difficult—

why

does his oath take effect with regard to unslaughtered animal carcasses and improperly slaughtered animals, when he is

under oath

and bound

from Mount Sinai

with regard to eating unslaughtered animal carcasses and improperly slaughtered animals!?

And we resolve:

Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yoḥanan say:

The latter clause is referring

to a comprehensive oath,

in which his oath includes

permitted things together with prohibited things.

For example, he said, “An oath that I will not eat either slaughtered meat or the meat of an unslaughtered animal.” Since the oath takes effect with regard to the permitted items, it also takes effect with regard to the prohibited items.

And Reish Lakish said: You cannot find

that his oath takes effect with regard to things prohibited for eating

except either

[or]

when he specifies

explicitly that he swears not to eat even

half a measure

of the prohibited item, concerning which he is not under oath from Mount Sinai,

and this is according to the opinion of the Rabbis,

who hold that one who takes an unspecified oath not to eat is prohibited only from eating an olive-bulk, and therefore he must explicitly swear regarding half a measure, so that his oath will take effect with regard to half a measure of the prohibition;

or when he takes an unspecified oath,

or even when he takes an unspecified oath not to eat,

and this is according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says

that even with an unspecified oath

a person prohibits himself

through his oath

from any amount.

And we raise a difficulty:

Granted, Rabbi Yoḥanan did not state his opinion in accordance with Reish Lakish

because

he establishes the Mishna

as he wishes to establish our Mishna

in accordance with everyone,

whereas according to Reish Lakish our Mishna is subject to the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Akiva.

But for what reason did Reish Lakish not state his opinion in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan,

that the case concerns a comprehensive oath including both a prohibition and a permitted item together? And we resolve:

Reish Lakish could say to you:

Reish Lakish

says

that a prohibition can take effect upon another prohibition [and likewise, that an oath can take effect upon another oath] in a case of

a comprehensive prohibition,