Shevuot 23b — the Talmud in English

And we still challenge this:

But perhaps

if he had said this: “Bread of wheat, and of barley, and of spelt,” the meaning of his words would have been that he prohibits himself from bread in which all three of these kinds are found

by way of mixture,

that wheat, barley, and spelt are mixed in it. But bread of each kind by itself does not prohibit him. And therefore he says, “Bread of wheat, and bread of barley, and bread of spelt,” in order to say that he also prohibits himself from bread of a single kind. And from where do we know that his intention was to divide his oath into three separate oaths?

And we answer: If his intention was to prohibit himself from each bread separately, and not only from a mixture of all three of them,

say

he should say,

“And likewise of barley, and likewise of spelt,”

for then it is impossible to err and think that his intention is bread mixed from all three kinds.

“Bread”

“bread”—

why do I need this!?

Infer from this

that he says this in order

to divide

his oath for each bread separately.

We learned in the Mishna:

“An oath: I shall not drink,” and he drank many beverages, he is liable for only one; “An oath: I shall not drink wine, oil, and honey,” and he drank, he is liable for each and every one.

And we raised the matter:

With regard to the first case,

Granted, there

with regard to bread of wheat, bread of barley, and bread of spelt,

that you say

that he is therefore considered to have made three separate oaths, because

the extra wording

“bread”

“bread”—

is for liability

for each and every one.

But here,

where he said, “An oath: I shall not drink wine, oil, and honey,”

what was there

for him

to say?

For he did not add an unnecessary word in his statement, and if so, from where do we know that his intention was to divide his oath,

perhaps he came to exempt himself from other beverages,

for he wishes to prohibit himself only from wine, oil, and honey, but not from other beverages, and therefore he mentioned all three of them?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: Here, we are dealing with

wine, oil, and honey

that are placed

before him,

for he should have said

“An oath: I shall not drink these,”

without specifying each one separately. Rather, certainly, his intention is to divide his oath for each kind separately.

And we still challenge this:

But perhaps

if he had said this, it would have been understood from his words that only

these

beverages placed before him

are what I shall not drink,

but other beverages

of another kind

of that type

I shall drink,

and therefore he did not say, “An oath: I shall not drink these.”

And the question returns: From where do we know that he intends to divide his oath? Perhaps he intends to say that he wishes to prohibit himself only from these three types of beverage, and not from other types?

And we answer:

Rather,

because

he said [

that he could have said] when the beverages were placed before him,

“An oath that I shall not drink such as these,”

for then he would be prohibited from beverages of these types, and not only from those actually placed before him. And since he did not say this, it is implied from his words that he intends to divide his oath.

And we wonder:

But perhaps

if he had said so, it would have been implied from his wording that specifically

“such as these,”

of such a measure,

is what I shall not drink,

but

less than this and more than this,

a little less or a little more than the quantity before him,

I shall drink.

And therefore he could not use this wording?

And we answer:

Rather,

from this we prove it,

as when he says

because he could have said,

“An oath: I shall not drink from the kind of these,”

for there is no possibility of erring and thinking that he intends only these beverages, nor only the quantity of beverages before him, since he says, “from the kind of these.”

And we challenge this:

But perhaps

then it would have been implied that only other beverages

of the kind of these are what I shall not drink, but these themselves

the beverages placed before him,

I shall drink!?

And we answer:

Say

he could say,

“I shall not drink these and those of their kind,”

and there would be no possibility of erring in his words. And since he did not say this, but said, “Wine, oil, and honey,” it is implied that he intends to divide his oath.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said:

Here

we are dealing with one whom

[

his fellow is urging,

who said to him:

“Come and drink wine, oil, and honey with me,” and he refuses to drink with him,

for he should have said

“An oath: I shall not drink with you,”

and this oath would have referred only to the wine, oil, and honey that he urged him to drink with him, even though he did not specify them in his wording. If so,

“wine, oil, and honey”

why do I need

to say it?

Rather, certainly, he intended to divide his oath and

to make himself liable for each and every one.

We learned there [

below, 36b]: One who demanded that his fellow return his deposit that he had deposited with him, and said to him,

“Give me the wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession,”

and the defendant denied it to him and swore falsely, and said,

“An oath that you have nothing in my possession,”

he is liable for only one,

one guilt-offering of an oath of deposit, for here there is only one oath.

And if he said to him,

“An oath that you have no wheat, barley, or spelt in my possession,”—

he is liable

for a sacrifice

for each and every one.

For here there are three separate oaths, since he specified each kind separately, and did not suffice to say, “An oath that you have nothing in my possession.”

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if

his claim was only for the value of

a peruta

one

from all of them,

from the wheat, barley, and spelt together, the peruta

combines

to make him liable for one sacrifice for all of them, even though he swore only concerning a third of a peruta for each and every kind [and in order to make him liable for a sacrifice for an oath of deposit, the denial must be at least worth a peruta].

Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagreed

how to interpret the Mishna, according to which he is liable for each and every one when he specified wheat, barley, and spelt, and also how to interpret Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that one peruta from all of them combines—

One

of them

said:

What is written in the Mishna, that he is liable for each one, does not mean that he is liable for four guilt-offerings for four oaths: one for the general oath that he said at the beginning of his words, “An oath that you have nothing in my possession,” whose meaning is that you have nothing in my possession, and three for three additional oaths that he specified—wheat, barley, and spelt. Rather,

he is liable for the specified ones.

He is liable only for the three specified oaths, whereas

for the general one,

for the general oath, “that you have nothing in my possession,”

he is not liable,

because it is not considered an oath in its own right, but refers to the particulars stated later in the oath.

And if so, it is necessarily said that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement refers only to the first clause of the Mishna, which teaches: “An oath that you have nothing in my possession; he is liable for only one.” Since here there is only one oath concerning the wheat, barley, and spelt, therefore the peruta from all three combines. But in the latter clause, where each kind is an oath in its own right, the three kinds do not combine to form one peruta; rather, there must be a peruta’s worth from each and every kind.

And one

of them

said: For the general one too, he is liable.

In addition to the three guilt-offerings that he brings for the three oaths, one for each kind, he must bring another guilt-offering for the general oath at the beginning of his words.

And if so, it is possible to say that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement applies also to the latter clause of the Mishna: there the peruta combines with regard to the general oath, but not with regard to the three oaths, for which there must be a peruta’s worth in each and every kind.

And we raised the matter:

Here,

in our Mishna, concerning the oath, “I shall not eat bread of wheat, and bread of barley, and bread of spelt,” for which he is liable for each and every one,

what

is the law? Do Rav Aḥa and Ravina also disagree here, and would the one who makes him liable for four guilt-offerings for an oath of deposit also make him liable here for four sin-offerings: one for the general oath, “An oath: I shall not eat” [and his intention is concerning the three kinds that he will immediately specify ], and three for each kind separately?

Rava said: How can you compare them!?

Is it possible to compare this to that!?

Granted,

there,

concerning an oath of deposit, it is possible to say that he

is liable

for one guilt-offering

for the general one, and is liable

in addition for three guilt-offerings

for the specified ones.

For if he swears and then swears again,

even if he swears concerning the same money twice,

he is liable for two,

he becomes liable for two oath-offerings, for concerning an oath of deposit he is liable for a sacrifice for every oath concerning which he denies money, even if he denies the same money many times. And therefore, even if we say that the general oath at the beginning of his words is an oath in its own right, it is possible to make him liable again for the three specified oaths that follow, despite the fact that he has already sworn concerning the same money.

But

here,

in our Mishna, if

it could enter your mind

that what he said at the opening of his words, “An oath: I shall not eat,”

is included in the general one,

is a general oath concerning all the kinds that he will specify afterward, then

for the specified ones, why is he liable!?

How is it possible to make him liable again for the three specified oaths? For he is already

sworn and standing

concerning these kinds by virtue of the first oath, and an oath does not take effect upon an oath!?

Rather, certainly, concerning our Mishna everyone agrees that when he said at the beginning of his words, “An oath: I shall not eat,” he did not intend to swear a general oath.

We learned in the Mishna:

“An oath: I shall not eat,”

and he ate foods unfit for eating and drank beverages unfit for drinking, he is exempt.

And we raised the matter:

This itself is difficult!

The Mishna contradicts itself from the first clause to the latter clause:

You said

in the first clause:

“An oath: I shall not eat,” and he ate foods that are not fit for eating and drank beverages that are not fit for drinking, he is exempt.

And then it teaches

in the latter clause:

“An oath: I shall not eat,” and he ate unslaughtered carcasses, animals with fatal defects, creeping things, and crawling things, he is liable.

But unslaughtered carcasses and animals with fatal defects are foods that are not fit for eating, and if so, it is difficult—

what is different in the first clause, that he is exempt, and what is different in the latter clause, that he is liable!?

And we answer:

This is not difficult.

That is, if there is no other difficulty here, this difficulty has an answer:

The first clause,

where he is exempt, is speaking

in an unspecified case,

where he said only, “I shall not eat.” Therefore his oath does not include foods that are unfit for eating, including unslaughtered carcasses and animals with fatal defects.

And

if

the latter clause,

where he is liable, is speaking

in a case where he specified,

where he explicitly swore that he would not eat unslaughtered carcasses and animals with fatal defects. But there is another difficulty here, greater than this:

the one who specifies also is itself difficult—

why

does his oath take effect concerning unslaughtered carcasses and animals with fatal defects, when he is

sworn

and standing

from Mount Sinai

concerning the eating of unslaughtered carcasses and animals with fatal defects!?

And we answer:

Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan say:

The latter clause speaks

of a comprehensive oath,

in his oath

including permitted things together with prohibited things. For example, he said: “An oath: I shall not eat neither slaughtered meat nor the meat of an unslaughtered carcass.” And since the oath takes effect concerning the permitted things, it also takes effect concerning the prohibited things.

For example, he said, “An oath that I will not eat either slaughtered meat or the meat of an unslaughtered animal.” Since the oath takes effect with regard to the permitted items, it also takes effect with regard to the prohibited items.

And Resh Lakish said: You do not find

that his oath takes effect concerning things prohibited for eating

except either

[

in a case where he specifies

explicitly that he swears not to eat even

half a measure

of the prohibition, concerning which he is not sworn from Mount Sinai,

and according to the opinion of the Rabbis,

who hold that one who swears without specification that he will not eat is prohibited only with an olive-sized measure; therefore he must swear explicitly concerning half a measure, so that his oath will take effect concerning half a measure of the prohibition.

Or in an unspecified case,

or even when he swears without specification that he will not eat,

and according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says

that even without specification

a person prohibits himself

by his oath

with any amount.

And we raised the matter:

Granted, Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say in accordance with Resh Lakish

because

he establishes it for the Mishna

that he wishes to establish our Mishna

according to everyone,

whereas according to Resh Lakish our Mishna is subject to the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Akiva.

But for what reason did Resh Lakish not say in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan,

that it is speaking of a comprehensive oath in which he includes prohibition and permission together? And we answer:

He could say to you,

Resh Lakish:

When we say

that a prohibition can take effect upon a prohibition [and likewise that an oath can take effect upon an oath], it is in

a comprehensive prohibition,