Shevuot 23a — the Talmud in English

And tirosh

is it not

wine [wine]

—

and

nevertheless

it is written

here,

“and you shall eat,”

so it follows that drinking is included in eating.

And we raised it against this:

Perhaps

the Torah speaks of wine in the language of eating in a case where he eats the wine

by means of

eating

anigron.

And what is anigron?

For Rabba bar Shmuel said: anigron

is

the water of silki—

a dish of spinach.

Aksigron

is

the water of all the cooked vegetables,

a dish of other vegetables.

They were accustomed to put wine into the anigron, and therefore the wine too is considered eating, and from where do we know that drinking is included in eating?

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: From here

we learn that drinking is included in eating, as it is stated [there 26]:

“And you shall give the money for whatever your soul desires, for cattle and for sheep and for wine and for strong drink

and for whatever your soul asks of you, and you shall eat there.”

But

wine is wine, and

nevertheless

it is written

“and you shall eat”!

And we ask:

Perhaps here too

it is speaking of wine that he eats

by means of anigron?

And we answer: It is indeed possible to eat “wine” by means of anigron, but in this verse

“strong drink”

is also written,

whose meaning is

something that intoxicates,

a thing that intoxicates, that is, it is used in the manner of drunkenness, whereas in the form of eating this is not the manner of drunkenness!

And still it may be challenged:

Perhaps

“strong drink” in the verse is not wine at all, but rather

a dried fig

a dried fig

called “Ke'ilit” [a place-name], which intoxicates [and eating it too is a manner of drunkenness]?

[a place-name], which intoxicates [and consuming it too is a manner of drunkenness]?

For it was taught [a beraita from which it can be learned that a Ke'ilit dried fig intoxicates]:

[in a beraita from which it can be learned that a Ke'ilit dried fig intoxicates]:

A priest who

ate a Ke'ilit dried fig and drank honey

that had been cooked with water, or

drank milk,

all of which are intoxicating substances, like wine,

and entered the Temple and performed the service is liable

for lashes. For the prohibition against performing the service after drinking wine was stated not only with regard to wine, but with regard to every intoxicating substance.

If so, perhaps the intention of the verse when it says “and you shall eat” with regard to strong drink is specifically a Ke'ilit dried fig, which is food, whereas drinking is never included in eating?

And we answer:

Rather, he derives

by a gezera shava

“strong drink” -

“Strong drink”

from the nazirite: just as there,

with regard to a nazirite, “strong drink” stated there is

wine,

so too here,

with regard to second tithe, the strong drink in question is

wine,

for, as stated, the manner of drunkenness with wine is only in the form of drinking, and nevertheless the Torah says of it, “and you shall eat”; and it is proven that drinking is included in eating.

Rava said: We too have learned this

in our Mishna, that drinking is included in eating:

For we learned:

“An oath: I shall not eat,” and he ate and drank, he is liable for only one

If you grant that drinking is included in eating,

therefore

it was necessary for the tanna to teach us that he is liable for only one

despite the fact that he performed two acts contrary to his oath.

But if you say that drinking is not included in eating,

it is obvious that he is liable for only one. For

“An oath: I shall not eat,” and he ate and performed work—

was it necessary

for the tanna

to teach us that he is liable for only one

for the eating but not for the work!? After all, he did not swear at all with regard to work. And likewise, if we say that drinking is not included in eating, the tanna need not teach us that he is not liable for the drinking, for it was not included in his oath!?

Abaye said to him

to Rava:

But what

do you wish to say, that

drinking is included in eating?

If so,

let us say

the latter clause

of our Mishna:

“An oath: I shall not eat and I shall not drink,” and he ate and drank—

he is liable for two

for the eating separately and for the drinking separately.

But

since he said

first, “An oath:

I shall not eat,”

immediately

he became forbidden

also

with regard to drinking,

for drinking is included in eating. And if so,

when he said

afterward

“I shall not drink,”

why is he liable

in addition for the drinking? And

if he had said

twice, “An oath:

I shall not drink,” “

An oath: I shall not drink,”

two times, would he be liable for two? After all, the second oath does not take effect at all, since he is already sworn and standing with regard to drinking. Here too, he is already sworn and standing with regard to drinking through his first oath, “I shall not eat”; so how can the second oath, “I shall not drink,” take effect!?

He said to him

Rava:

There

in our Mishna, it is speaking of a case where he

said first, “An oath:

I shall not drink,”

and afterward he said “An oath:

I shall not eat.”

For

indeed,

drinking is included in eating,

but

eating is not included in drinking,

so it follows that through his first oath, “I shall not drink,” he was not yet forbidden with regard to eating. Therefore his second oath took effect, to become forbidden also with regard to eating, and if he ate and drank he is liable for two.

And we challenge Rava:

But

if he

said,

“An oath: I shall not eat and I shall not drink,”

and he ate and drank, what

according to your words, is the law?—

He is liable for only one!

For, as stated, the first oath includes drinking as well, and an oath does not take effect upon an oath.

If so, instead of teaching in the first clause

of our Mishna:

“An oath: I shall not eat,” and he ate and drank, he is liable for only one,” let it teach

the greater novelty, that even if he said

“An oath: I shall not eat and I shall not drink,”

he is liable for only one,

despite the fact that he specified in his wording a separate oath for eating and a separate one for drinking,

and all the more so

when he said, “An oath:

I shall not eat”

alone,

that he is liable for only one, since he did not specify eating and drinking separately!?

Rather,

Rava explains:

Actually,

there is no need to alter the wording in the latter clause of our Mishna; rather, it is

as it teaches: “An oath: I shall not eat and I shall not drink.”

But here it is different,

for drinking is not included in “I shall not eat,” since

when he said “

I shall not eat”

and afterward said “

I shall not drink,”

and drinking is included in “I shall not eat,” why did he need to say again, “I shall not drink”? Rather, it is necessarily the case that

he revealed his mind that this eating of which he said

at the beginning of his words

is eating alone, and only in his second oath did he swear with regard to drinking. Thus there is no oath upon an oath, and therefore, if he ate and drank, he is liable for two.

a klyatvu o pitii on dal tol'ko vo vtoroy fraze. Zdes' net klyatvy posle klyatvy, poetomu, esli on s''el i vypil, on obyazan za dve klyatvy.

Rav Ashi said: The Mishna too is precise

that drinking is included in eating, for it teaches:

“An oath: I shall not eat,” and he ate foods unfit for eating and drank liquids unfit for drinking—

he is exempt.

And we infer:

This

is so only if he drank liquids

that are fit—he is liable!

And why

is he liable for the drinking?

This

“An oath: I shall not eat”

alone

did he say!?

Rather, certainly drinking is included in eating!

And we reject this:

Perhaps

the Mishna is speaking of a case where he

said two:

“An oath: I shall not eat,” “An oath: I shall not drink.”

It is only that the tanna did not take the trouble to write this, because the principal point of his statement is to teach us that one is not liable for foods and liquids that are unfit.

We learned in the Mishna:

“An oath: I shall not eat, and he ate bread

of wheat

and bread of barley and bread of spelt, he is liable for only one. An oath: I shall not eat bread of wheat and bread of barley and bread of spelt, and he ate, he is liable for each one individually.”

And we raised it against this: Why is he liable for each one individually?

Perhaps

he did not intend by his words to divide his oath into three separate oaths; rather, he specified these three types of bread because he wishes to prohibit only those to himself, and

he comes to exempt himself from other things,

for had he said merely, “An oath: I shall not eat,” he would have become forbidden with regard to all foods in the world!?

And we answer: If that had been his intention,

he should have said “An oath: I shall not eat

wheat, barley, and spelt.”

Why, then, did he need to mention “bread” with regard to each one of them? Rather, certainly he intends to make a separate oath take effect with regard to each bread.

And we still challenge:

Perhaps

he did not suffice with saying only “wheat, barley, and spelt” because it would have been implied from his words that he wishes to prohibit himself only

to chew [to bite] the wheat, barley, and spelt in his mouth while they are whole, and not the eating of bread made from them; therefore he added and said “bread,” to prohibit himself only from eating bread made from wheat, barley, and spelt? And we answer: If that had been his intention—

kusat'] pshenitsu, yachmen' i polbu v polnom vide, a ne est' khleb, vypechenኖyy iz nikh. Poetomu on dobavil slovo «khleb», chtoby zapretit' sebe tol'ko khleb iz pshenitsy, yachmenya i polby? I otvechaem: esli by takova byla ego tsel',

he should have said “An oath: I shall not eat

bread of wheat, barley, and spelt,”

for this wording is sufficient to prove that he prohibits himself only from eating bread of all the types he specified, and not from chewing. Why, then, did he need to add “bread” for each one of them? Rather, certainly his intention is to prohibit every bread through a separate oath.

And we still challenge:

Perhaps

if he had said, “bread of wheat, barley, and spelt,” it would have been implied that indeed

bread of wheat

he intends to prohibit himself

to eat

as bread, whereas

barley and spelt

he intends to prohibit himself only

to chew; therefore he repeated “bread” with regard to each one of them, in order to become forbidden with regard to all of them only when eating bread made from them. We still have no proof that he wishes to divide his oath with regard to each bread separately?

i poetomu on snova skazal «khleb» pri kazhdom iz nikh, chtoby zapretit' sebe vse eti produkty tol'ko v vide khleba. No vse eshche net dokazatel'stva, chto on khotel razdelit' klyatvu na kazhdyy vid khleba otdel'no?

And we answer: He still did not need to mention “bread” with regard to each one individually; rather,

he should have said

“bread of wheat and of barley and of spelt,”

and that would have sufficed, because since he says “bread” first and afterward “and of,” it is implied that he also intends to prohibit the barley and spelt as the bread mentioned previously, and not as chewing. Rather, certainly his intention is to divide his oath.