Shevuot 22b (כב:) — the Talmud in English

And the Sages say: Neither he nor his fellow committed me'ila, because there is no me'ila with konamot!

This is difficult for Ravina, who interprets the beraita as referring to a me'ila offering, for according to the Sages there is no me'ila with konamot at all!?

And we answer:

Reverse the beraita:

“This loaf is forbidden to me as consecrated property”;

both this one—

the one who made the vow—

and this one—

his fellow—

did not commit me'ila, because there is no me'ila with konamot; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: He—

the one who made the vow himself—

committed me'ila, but his fellow did not commit me'ila,

for the Sages hold that there is me'ila with konamot.

And we challenge this:

If so,

now that you reverse the text and attribute to Rabbi Meir the view that there is no me'ila with konamot, what of that which was taught in the beraita above:

“Rabbi Meir says: Konamot are like oaths,”

meaning that with them too, two loaves do not combine; and Ravina explained that the beraita is discussing combining them for a me'ila offering, implying that

rather, with konamot, it is only that they do not combine

the two loaves to reach the value of a peruta required for a me'ila offering;

but there is me'ila with them

if each one individually had the value of a peruta.

But Rabbi Meir said,

according to your version:

“There is no me'ila with konamot at all”!?

And we answer: When Rabbi Meir said that konamot do not combine, like oaths,

he said this according to the position of the Sages,

to them.

And this is what he said:

“According to my position, there is no me'ila with konamot at all,”

even if one benefited from each loaf by the value of a peruta. “But

according to your position,”

you who hold that there is me'ila with konamot,

at least concede to me that konamot

are

like oaths,

in that the two loaves do not combine to reach the value of a peruta.

And the Sages

responded to Rabbi Meir that there is a difference between oaths and konamot, because with

oaths

it is logical that the two loaves should not combine to reach the measure of an olive-bulk, since

there is

that

which

Rav Pinhas

said:

Oaths are different, because since the loaves are distinct, so that one would be liable for two sin-offerings, they therefore do not combine. But

with konamot, there is no principle of Rav Pinhas,

for the loaves forbidden through konamot are not distinct with regard to a me'ila offering; therefore, it is logical that they should combine to reach the value of a peruta.

Rava said:

One who says,

“An oath that I will not eat,”

and he ate earth—

is exempt,

for earth is not fit for eating and is not included in his oath.

Rava raised a dilemma:

One who says,

“An oath that I will not eat earth,”

is certainly forbidden to eat earth as well, since he explicitly prohibited himself from eating earth; but the question is:

how much

earth is he forbidden to eat?

The alternatives of the dilemma are as follows: Perhaps,

since he said

in the language of eating,

“that I will not eat,”

he intends an olive-bulk,

which is the measure of eating.

Or perhaps, since

earth

is not something that people eat,

the measure of eating does not apply to it, and he intends to prohibit himself even

with the slightest amount?

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Rava raised another dilemma:

If you say in the preceding dilemma that one who swears not to eat earth is forbidden even the slightest amount, since it is not fit for eating, what is the halakha concerning one who says:

“An oath that I will not eat a grape seed,”

of grapes—

how much

is he forbidden to eat?

Perhaps

since it is eaten through admixture,

for the usual way to eat the seed is mixed with the grapes, it is considered an ordinary food, and therefore

he

—the one who swore—

intends an olive-bulk

of it, as with all measures of eating.

Or perhaps, since

the grape seed is eaten only in a manner

“in which people do not eat it by itself,”

as the seed itself is not eaten, but only when it is mixed with other food, it is considered something unfit for eating; therefore

he intends even the slightest amount?

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Rav Ashi raised a dilemma:

If you say that anyone who swears concerning a grape seed is forbidden only an olive-bulk, what is the halakha

with a nazirite,

who is in any event forbidden to eat a grape seed,

who said:

“An oath that I will not eat a grape seed,”

how much

is he forbidden to eat?

Perhaps it should be said

that since an olive-bulk

of grape seeds

is a Torah prohibition

for him, and he knows that the oath does not take effect with regard to an olive-bulk, since he is already under oath concerning it from Sinai, then

when he swears

to prohibit himself,

he is swearing concerning what is permitted, and he intends even the slightest amount,

which is permitted to him by Torah law and which he wishes to prohibit upon himself through the oath.

Or perhaps, since he said

“that I will not eat,”

he intends an olive-bulk,

which is the measure of eating, and consequently his oath does not take effect, since concerning an olive-bulk he is already under oath from Sinai?

Ta shma

from what we learned in the Mishna below: One who says,

“An oath that I will not eat,”

and he ate carcasses and tereifot, repugnant creatures and creeping animals, is liable.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts him!

And we inquire concerning this: Why is he liable

for his oath according to the Sages? Is he not

already under oath from Sinai?

Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yohanan said:

What are we dealing with here?

With a case of inclusion,

in his oath,

of permitted things together with forbidden things.

Since the oath takes effect upon the permitted things, it also takes effect upon the forbidden things.

And Reish Lakish said: You cannot find

according to the Sages that one becomes liable for an oath not to eat forbidden things unless he prohibited himself through his oath from eating a half-measure.

There are two possible ways to understand this:

A.

If he specified,

prohibiting himself even from

a half-measure,

concerning which he is not already under oath from Sinai,

and according to the Sages,

who hold that anyone who swears without specification swears concerning an olive-bulk; therefore, he must explicitly state that he is also swearing concerning a half-measure.

B.

If he swore without specification, and according to Rabbi Akiva, who says: A person

who swears without specification not to eat

prohibits himself from even the slightest amount!

The Gemara now infers from the fact that Reish Lakish interprets the statement of the Sages as referring to one who explicitly specified that he was prohibiting himself from a half-measure:

But an animal carcass, concerning which he is already under oath from Sinai, is analogous to a grape seed with regard to a nazirite.

An animal carcass is analogous to the case of a nazirite, in that he is already under oath not to eat a grape seed.

And the reason

that one who swears is forbidden even a half-olive-bulk of an animal carcass is

that he specified

in his oath that he was prohibiting himself from a half-measure.

Had he not specified,

he

would intend to swear only

concerning an olive-bulk.

Even if he explicitly mentioned in his oath that he swore not to eat an animal carcass, we still say that he intends only at least an olive-bulk of an animal carcass; otherwise, Reish Lakish could have interpreted the statement of the Sages as referring to one who explicitly swore not to eat carcasses and tereifot, in which case he would not need to specify further that he intended to swear concerning a half-measure. If so, the same applies to a nazirite who swears not to eat a grape seed: if he did not explicitly specify that he was prohibiting himself from even the slightest amount, he intends an olive-bulk.

Conclude from this!

And we challenge this:

Rather,

if so,

resolve

from it as well

Rava’s dilemma: “An oath that I will not eat earth—how much?”

Resolve that it is not until there is an olive-bulk

of earth that he violates his oath,

for an animal carcass,

which is forbidden to eat and is not eaten,

is analogous to earth, and the reason

that he is prohibited from eating a half-measure is

that he specified

in his oath that he was prohibiting himself from a half-measure.

Had he not specified,

even if he explicitly stated that he was swearing concerning an animal carcass,

he intends an olive-bulk.

The same should apply to earth: although it is unfit for eating, he intends only an olive-bulk?

And we reject this:

No,

it is not so. Earth differs from an animal carcass, even though neither is eaten.

For earth is not fit for eating at all.

One can say that the person who swore does not intend the measure of eating applicable to other prohibitions, since the designation “eating” does not apply to earth at all; rather, he intends not to put earth into his mouth, even the slightest amount. But

an animal carcass is fit for eating,

and the measure of eating applies to it. Rather,

a lion crouches over it.

The Torah’s warning not to eat it is like a lion crouching over it, preventing one from approaching it and eating it.

Mishna:

A. One who says:

“An oath that I will not eat,”

although he is also forbidden to drink, because drinking is included in eating, nevertheless this is only one oath.

And

therefore, if he

ate and drank, he is liable for only one

offering. This is like a person who ate an olive-bulk and then ate another olive-bulk under the same oath, unwittingly, who is liable for only one offering for the two acts of eating.

B. One who says:

“An oath that I will not eat and that I will not drink,”

his words are considered two separate oaths, one concerning eating and the other concerning drinking,

and

therefore, if he

ate and drank, he is liable for two!

C. One who says:

“An oath that I will not eat,” and he ate wheat bread, barley bread, and spelt bread—

he is liable for only one,

since he did not specify each species separately in his oath.

D. But if he said:

“An oath that I will not eat wheat bread, barley bread, or spelt bread,” and he ate

all three of these species,

he is liable for each one individually.

Therefore he specified each species separately, because he wanted a separate oath to take effect upon each species individually.

5. He who says:

“An oath that I will not drink,” and he drank many beverages—

is liable only once.

6. But if he said:

“An oath that I will not drink wine, oil, or honey,” and he drank

from all of them,

he is liable for each and every one.

7. He who says:

“An oath that I will not eat,” and he ate foods unfit for consumption, and drank beverages unfit for drinking—

is exempt,

because they are not included in his oath, as they are not fit for eating.

8. But if he said:

“An oath that I will not eat,” and he ate neveilot, tereifot, creeping creatures, and crawling things—

he is liable,

because they are fit for consumption; it is only that the prohibition prevents their consumption.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts him,

because he is already under oath from Sinai concerning the consumption of forbidden foods, and therefore the oath does not take effect upon them.

9.

He said: “Konam, my wife is forbidden to me from benefit”

I hereby vow not to derive benefit from my wife]

“if I ate today!” And he ate

on that day

neveilot, tereifot, creeping creatures, and crawling things—

his wife is forbidden to him.

For he ate foods fit for consumption, and Rabbi Shimon will agree here as well, since the entire reason he exempts in the first clause is that he is already under oath, and not because they are unfit for consumption.

Gemara:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin said that Shmuel said:

He who says:

“An oath that I will not eat,” and he drank, is liable,

because drinking is included within eating!

And the source for this is—

If you wish, say:

it is based on reasoning;

and if you wish, say:

it is based on a verse.

And the Gemara explains:

If you wish, say: It is based on reasoning:

for it is ordinary human speech to refer to drinking with the language of eating. The proof is

that one person says to his fellow: “

Let us taste something,”

and

at the end

they enter

they go in

and eat and drink!”

And if you wish, say: It is based on a verse:

From the verse we learn that

drinking is included within eating

.

For Reish Lakish said: From where do we know that drinking is included within eating?

As it is stated

Deuteronomy 14:23]: “

And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place that He will choose to cause His Name to rest there, the tithe of your grain and your wine.”