Shevuot 22a (כב.) — the Talmud in English

Mozhno reshit'

eto

vopros, kotoryy zadal Rava:

tot, kto skazal: «

Klyanus', chto ne budu est'

zemlyu,

i s"el zemlyu — v kakom kolichestve

on dolzhen za eto otvetit'? Dolzhen li on otvetit' za kazayutsya v olivku, kak pri lyuboy drugoy klyatve [po mneniyu mudretsov], ili, poskol'ku zemlya ne yavlyaetsya pishchey, on dolzhen otvetit' dazhe za samuyu maluyu chast'?»?

Mozhno reshit'

otsyuda, chto on ne neset otvetstvennosti

do tekh por, poka ne budet

kazayushchayasya v olivku?!

I otvergayut:

kogda my govorim

«my ne nashel sluchaya, kogda chelovek obyazalsya by za s"edennuyu samuyu maluyu chast'»,

my govorim o veshchestve, yavlyayushchemsya pishchey,

a ne o zemle, kotoraya ne yavlyaetsya pishchey; v otnoshenii zemli on, deystvitel'no, mozhet okazat'sya obyazannym dazhe za samuyu maluyu chast'. Poetomu otsyuda nel'zya sdelat' vyvod, chto poklyavshiysya ne est' zemlyu obyazan tol'ko za kazayushchuyusya v olivku.

I snova rassuzhdayut:

ved'

my vstrechaem v razdele

konamot

sluchay, kogda chelovek zapreshchaet sebe veshch' i govorit: «Konam, eta lepeshka zapreshchena mne», — i emu zapreshcheno s"est' dazhe samuyu maluyu chast' etoy lepeshki, poskol'ku on ne upomyanul slovo «est'»?

I otvechayut:

konamot tozhe

schitayutsya yavno ukazannymi.

Poskol'ku on skazal ne «Konam, eta lepeshka zapreshchena mne dlya edy», a prosto «Eta veshch' zapreshchena mne», eto ravnosil'no tomu, kak esli by on yavno ukazal, chto khochet zapretit' sebe dazhe men'she razmera, neobkhodimogo dlya edy. Zakony konamot podobny zakonam klyatvy: zapret svyazan s narusheniem proiznesennogo slova, a ne s samim aktom edy.

My uchili v Mishne:

skazal im

Rabbi Akiva:

«Gde my vstrechaem, chtoby chelovek tol'ko govoril i prinosil zhertvu? Ved' zdes' on tol'ko govorit i prinosit zhertvu».

I rassuzhdayut:

i

esli

ne

vstrechaetsya, chto zhertvu prinosyat za odno lish' proiznesennoe slovo?!

Ved' porugatel' Imeni

— po mneniyu Rabbi Akivy [Keritot 3a] on obyazan prinosit' zhertvu hataat, esli sdelal eto neumyshlenno, khotya eto lish' proiznesennoe slovo?!

I otvechayut: «Gde my vstrechaem, chto chelovek govorит

i zapreshchaet»,

eto my imeem v vidu.

To est' proiznesennym slovom chelovek nakladyvaet na veshch' zapret dlya sebya, tak chto potom za eto on obyazan prinosit' zhertvu.

A

esli

etot

porugatel' Imeni

tol'ko govorит i gre4it!

On gre4it uzhe v moment proizneseniya slova, i net nichego udivitel'nogo v tom, chto za svoe slovo on obyazan prinosit' zhertvu.

I snova rassuzhdayut:

ved' nazirey

tol'ko govorит, zapreshchaet sebe nazireystvo i obyazuetsya prinosit' zhertvy v den' brit'ya?

I otvechayut: «Gde my vstrechaem cheloveka, kotoryy govorит i

prinosit zhertvu za

oskvernenie

svoego slova»,

eto my imeem v vidu, a

esli

etot

nazirey, kotoryy

prinosit zhertvu —

on prinosit ee, chtoby emu razreshili pit' vino!

Zhertva prinositsya tol'ko dlya togo, chtoby razreshit' emu pit' vino, a ne v kachestve iskupa za oskvernenie svoego slova, i poetomu iz etogo nel'zya privesti dokazatel'stvo tyazhesti proiznesennogo slova, narushenie kotorogo vedet k obyazannosti prinosit' zhertvu.

I snova rassuzhdayut:

ved' posvyashchennoe

— my vstrechaem, chto chelovek govorит i zapreshchaet posvyashchennuyu veshch'; esli zhe on narushaet svoe slovo, to est' nezakonno pol'zuetsya posvyashchennym, on obyazan prinosit' zhertvu za nezakonnoe pol'zovanie?!

I otvechayut: «Gde my vstrechaem cheloveka, kotoryy govorит i

zapreshchaet tol'ko samomu sebe

»,

eto my imeem v vidu, a

esli

eto

posvyashchennoe —

ono zapreshchaet vsemu miru!

I snova rassuzhdayut:

ved' konamot

— my vstrechaem, chto chelovek govorит i zapreshchaet tol'ko samomu sebe, a esli s"el iz nee, obyazan prinosit' zhertvu, kak chelovek, nezakonno pol'zuyushchiysya posvyashchennym, ved' «konam» — eto vyrazhenie posvyashcheniya, kotoroe zapreshchaet veshch' samomu sebe, kak zhertvu?!

I otvechayut:

on schitaet

Rabbi Akiva, chto

v konamot net nezakonnogo pol'zovaniya posvyashchennym.

Ved' oni ne nazyvayutsya «posvyashchennymi Gospodu», poskol'ku dlya vseh ostal'nykh lyudey oni yavlyayutsya obychnymi veshchami.

Skazal Rava: spor

mezhdu Rabbi Akivoy i mudretsami o poklyavshemся v otnoshenii lepeshki, chto ne budet ee est', i s"evshim ee, — dolzhen li on otvetit' za samuyu maluyu chast' ili tol'ko za kazayushchuyusya v olivku, — imeet mesto tol'ko

pri neutochnenii

svoikh slov.

No pri yavnom ukazanii

v ego klyatve, chto on ne budet est' dazhe samuyu maluyu chast',

vse soglasny

v tom, chto on obyazan dazhe

za samuyu maluyu chast'.

Pochemu?

Potomu chto

yavno ukazannoe tozhe schitaetsya samostoyatel'noy veshch'yu.

Podobno tomu kak znachimost' samostoyatel'noy veshchi obyazyvaet cheloveka, s"evshego ee, dazhe za samuyu maluyu chast', tak i yavnaya klyatva ne est' dazhe samuyu maluyu chast' pridает s"edennoy maloy chasti znachimost', kak esli by ona sostavlyala polnuyu meru v kazayushchuyusya v olivku.

I skazal Rava: spor

Rabbi Akivy i mudretsov imeet mesto tol'ko

v

sluchae poklyavshegosya

«ne budu est'»,

no

v

sluchae poklyavshegosya

«ne budu probovat'» —

vse soglasny

v tom, chto on obyazan

za samuyu maluyu chast', ved' dlya «probovaniya» ne ustanovlena mera kazayushcheysya v olivku!

since no olive-bulk measure was stated with regard to “tasting”!

I vozrazhayut Rave: poskol'ku ty skazal, chto pri yavnom ukazanii on obyazan za samuyu maluyu chast', togda

eto ochevidno,

chto i za «ne budu probovat'» obyazyvayutsya za samuyu maluyu chast', ved' eto ravnosil'no yavnomu ukazaniyu, chto ego namerenie otnositsya k samoy maloy chasti?

I otvechayut:

mozhno bylo by podumat', chto «

poprobuyu»

tozhe

yavlyaetsya vyrazheniem, oboznachayushchim edу, i

kak govorят lyudi,

kogda khotyat poest', oni govoryat: «Poedim nemnogo»?

On uchit nas,

chto poskol'ku on yavno ne upomyanul v svoikh slovakh vyrazhenie «est'», smysl ego slov mozhet byt' ponyat kak zapret sebe probovat' samuyu maluyu chast'.

Skazal Rav Pappa: spor

Rabbi Akivy i mudretsov imeet mesto tol'ko

v klyatvakh, no v konamot —

vse soglasny, chto obyazanost' nastupaet za samuyu maluyu chast'!

Pochemu?

Potomu chto

v konamot tozhe, poskol'ku on ne upominaet v svoikh slovakh nazvanie «

edy»

in his words,

eto podobno yavnomu ukazaniyu

ne est' samuyu maluyu chast',

schitaetsya yavno ukazannym.

Meytivi

Ravu Pappe iz sleduyushchey baraйty:

dva konama

— dve lepeshki, kotorye chelovek zapretil sebe konam,

soedinyayutsya

vmeste dlya dopolneniya razmera kazayushcheysya v olivku. Esli on s"el iz kazhdoy po polovine kazayushcheysya v olivku, on podlezhit porke za «ne oskvernyay».

No

dve klyatvy

— poklyavshiyся otnositel'no dvukh lepeshok, chto ne budet ikh est',

ne soedinyayutsya

dlya kazayushcheysya v olivku.

Rabbi Meir govorit: konamot

yavlyayutsya

kak klyatvy,

tak chto i konamot ne soedinyayutsya.

A esli ty schitaesh'

v sootvetstvii so slovami Rav Pappy, chto v konamot

obyazan za samuyu maluyu chast', —

zachem nuzhno soedinyat'

dva konama? Ved' on obyazan za samuyu maluyu chast'!

I otvechayut: baraйta govorит o sluchae, kogda on

skazal: «

eda iz

etoy lepeshki

zapreshchena mne konam», —

a zatem skazal o vtoroy lepeshke: «

eda iz etoy zapreshchena mne konam». Poskol'ku v svoikh slovakh on upomyanul slovo «eda», trebuetsya razmer kazayushcheysya v olivku.

I vozrazhayut:

esli tak, pochemu zhe oni soedinyayutsya

dvе edy iz dvukh lepeshok dlya kazayushcheysya v olivku po mneniyu pervogo tanna? Ved'

v konce koncov, naprav' svoe vnimanie syuda,

zdes'

k etoy lepeshke,

net razmera, i naprav' svoe vnimanie tuda — net razmera.

Ved' trebuetsya, chtoby razmer kazayushcheysya v olivku byl v kazhdoy lepeshke otdel'no, poskol'ku on upomyanul slovo «eda» otnositel'no kazhdoy lepeshki v otdel'nosti?

I otvechayut: zdes' o kakom sluchae idet rech'? O sluchae, kogda on

skazal: «

eda iz obeikh lepeshok zapreshchena mne konam». On ob"edinil obe lepeshki v odno ponyatie «eda», i poetomu dostatochno, chtoby razmer edy iz nikh vmeste sostavlyal kazayushchuyusya v olivku.

I vozrazhayut: esli tak,

analogichno etomu

[po analogii s etim],

v otnoshenii klyatv

tozhe sleduet govorit' o sluchae, kogda on

skazal: «

Klyanus', chto ne budu est' iz obeikh».

Togda voznikayet vopros:

pochemu oni ne soedinyayutsya

? Ved' on ne upomyanul slovo «eda» otnositel'no kazhdoy lepeshki otdel'no, a upomyanul ego otnositel'no obeikh vmeste?!

I otvechayut:

skazal Rav Pinhas: klyatvy otlichayutsya,

poskol'ku v ikh sluchae govorilos' tak: «Klyanus', chto ne budu est' iz etoy i iz etoy»

i poskol'ku oni razdelены

dve lepeshki

dlya zhertv hataat,

tak kak esli on s"el kazayushchuyusya v olivku iz kazhdoy lepeshki, dazhe v odno zatmenie soznaniya, on obyazan prinosit' dve zhertvy hataat, nesmotrya na to, chto zapretil ikh sebe odnoi klyatvoy; i poskol'ku lepeshki razdeleny i sozdali dve prichiny obyazannosti po zhertvam hataat, oni schitayutsya dvumya klyatvami, i poetomu

ne soedinyayutsya polovina kazayushcheysya v olivku iz odnoy i polovina iz drugoy

dlya obyazannosti porкой i zhertvoy hataat.

No v konamot, dazhe esli on skazhet o dvukh lepeshkakh: «Eda iz etoy i iz etoy zapreshchena mne konam», oni ne razdelyayutsya v otnoshenii zhertvy za nezakonnoe pol'zovanie posvyashchennym [daже po mneniyu togo, kto schitaet, chto v konamot est' nezakonnoe pol'zovanie posvyashchennym]: esli on poluchil pol'zu ot obeikh v odno zatmenie soznaniya, on obyazan prinosit' tol'ko odnu zhertvu za nezakonnoe pol'zovanie, i poetomu dve lepeshki soedinyayutsya dlya razmera kazayushcheysya v olivku [ved' on upomyanul tol'ko odno slovo «eda» otnositel'no dvukh lepeshok].

But with consecrations, even if he says concerning two loaves, “Eating from this one and from this one is a konam upon me,” they are not divided with regard to a sacrilege-offering [even according to the one who says that there is sacrilege with consecrations]. If he derived benefit from both of them during one period of unawareness, he is liable for only one sacrilege-offering, and therefore the two loaves combine toward an olive-bulk [for he mentioned only one expression of “eating” concerning the two loaves].

And we raise an objection:

If so,

with regard to that which is taught in the beraita:

Rabbi Meir says: Konamot

are

like oaths,

and they do not combine.

Granted, oaths

do not combine

since they are divided

with regard to the two loaves, making one liable for sin-offerings.

But konamot,

where the loaves are not divided with regard to liability for sin-offerings,

why should they not

combine!?

And we answer:

Reverse it,

and say:

Rabbi Meir says: Oaths

combine

like konamot!

Does he not accept

the view of Rabbi Meir

of Rav Pinḥas,

who says: Since they are divided with regard to liability for sin-offerings, they do not combine; rather, since he mentioned only one expression of “eating” with regard to the two loaves, they combine with regard to the measure of an olive-bulk?

Ravina said

to resolve the objection to Rav Pappa from the beraita:

When Rav Pappa said

that with regard to konamot, according to everyone, the measure is any amount,

he said this

only with regard to lashes. Since he did not mention the term “eating,” he is liable to lashes for any amount, for violating his utterance.

When that was taught

—that konamot combine—it was with regard to

an offering for me'ila,

since one is liable to bring an offering for me'ila for konamot, just as for consecrated property,

as we require

that he derive benefit amounting to at least

the value of a peruta

from the konam in order to become liable for it for me'ila. For with consecrated property itself, the measure for me'ila is the value of a peruta, and konam cannot be more stringent than it, since its entire prohibition is only because he prohibited it to himself like consecrated property. And concerning this the beraita says that the two loaves combine, so that if he derived benefit from both together amounting to the value of a peruta, he is liable to bring an offering for me'ila.

And we raise an objection:

Does this mean that the Rabbis hold

that, according to Rabbi Meir,

there is me'ila with konamot!?

But it was taught:

If one says,

“This loaf is consecrated property,”

[actual consecrated property],

and he or another person eats it, he has committed me'ila.

Therefore, it has redemption,

since its sanctity is transferred through redemption and it becomes non-sacred property, as it is stated with regard to consecrated property: “And he shall redeem it according to your valuation.”

But if he said,

“This loaf is consecrated to me,”

he did not consecrate the loaf; rather, he merely prohibited it to himself like consecrated property. Therefore, if he himself ate it, he

has committed me'ila,

since he prohibited it to himself like consecrated property. But if

another person

ate it, he

has not committed me'ila,

since it was not prohibited to the other person.

Therefore, it has no redemption

that could permit it, since redemption is stated only with regard to consecrated property and not with regard to prohibitions,

the words of Rabbi Meir.