Shevuot 22a — the Talmud in English

Resolve

this

that Rava asked:

One who says, “

An oath that I shall not eat

earth,”

and he ate earth—in what amount

does he become liable for it? Is it for an olive-bulk, as in every oath [according to the Sages], or perhaps, since earth is not fit for eating, he becomes liable for it even for any amount?

Resolve

from here that he is not liable

until there is

an olive-bulk!?

And we reject this:

When we say

that we have not found one who eats any amount and becomes liable,

we are speaking of a substance that is a matter of eating,

and not of earth, which is not fit for eating, for which it is indeed possible that he becomes liable even for any amount. Therefore, you cannot resolve from here that one who swears not to eat earth is liable only for an olive-bulk.

And we further consider this:

But

we have found in the passage of

consecrations

that one who prohibits himself and says, “Konam, this loaf is upon me,” is prohibited from eating even any amount of that loaf, since he did not mention the term “eating”?

And we answer:

Consecrations also—

are considered as though he specified.

Since he did not say, “Konam, this loaf is upon me for eating,” but only, “Konam, this thing is upon me,” he is considered as having specified that he wishes to prohibit himself even from less than the measure of eating. And the laws of consecrations are like those of an oath: the prohibition is upon violating his speech, and not upon the eating itself.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva said to them:

Rabbi Akiva:

Where do we find one who speaks and brings an offering? For this one speaks, and brings an offering.

And we consider this:

And

when

not

have we found that they bring an offering for speech alone!?

But one who curses

the Name—for according to Rabbi Akiva [Keritot 3a], he is liable for a sin-offering if he was unwitting, although it is merely speech—is there not such a case!?

And we answer: “Where do we find one who speaks

and prohibits”

is what we are saying.

That through a person’s speech the thing becomes prohibited to him, until he becomes liable for an offering.

And

if

this

one who curses,

he speaks, and he sins!

For at the very time of his speech he is already sinning, and there is no novelty in his becoming liable for an offering on account of his speech.

And we further consider this:

But a nazirite

speaks, and prohibits himself through naziriteship, and becomes liable for offerings on the day of his shaving?

And we answer: “Where do we find one who speaks who

brings his offering for

the violation of

his speech”

is what we are saying. And

if

this

nazirite who

brings an offering—

it is to permit wine to him that he brings it!

The offering comes only to permit him to drink wine, and not as atonement for the violation of his speech, and from this there is no proof concerning the seriousness of speech, the violation of which brings one to an offering.

And we further consider this:

But consecrated property

is a case where we find that he speaks and prohibits the thing that he consecrated, and if he violates his speech, by committing sacrilege and deriving benefit from the consecrated property, he is liable for a sacrilege-offering—is this not so!?

And we answer: “Where do we find one who speaks and

prohibits only himself

alone”

is what we are saying. And

if

this

consecrated property—

it prohibits the entire world!

And we further consider this:

But consecrations

are a case where we find that he speaks and prohibits only himself, and if he ate from it, he is liable for an offering like one who commits sacrilege with consecrated property, for “konam” is an expression of consecration, which prohibits the thing to himself like an offering—is this not so!?

And we answer:

He holds

that Rabbi Akiva:

There is no sacrilege with consecrations.

For they are not called “holy things of the Lord,” since with regard to every other person they are unconsecrated.

Rava said: The dispute

between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages concerning one who swore regarding a loaf that he would not eat it, and ate it—whether he is liable for any amount or only for an olive-bulk—is only

when he stated

his words without specifying them.

But when he specified

in the language of his oath that he would not eat even any amount—

everyone

agrees that he is liable even

for any amount.

What is the reason?

Because

one who specifies is also considered like a whole creature.

Just as the significance of a whole creature makes one who eats it liable even for any amount, so too his oath, when he explicitly swears not to eat even any amount, gives significance to eating any amount, as though it were significant eating in the measure of an olive-bulk.

And Rava said: The dispute

between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages is only

with

one who swore, “

that I shall not eat,”

but

with

one who swore, “

that I shall not taste”—

everyone

is liable

for any amount,

for no measure of an olive-bulk was stated concerning “tasting”!

And we object to Rava: Since you said that one who specifies is liable for any amount, then

it is obvious

that also for “that I shall not taste” one is liable for any amount, for it is as though he specified that his intention was concerning any amount—is this not so?

And we answer:

It might have been said, “

I shall taste”

also

is an expression of eating, and

as people say

when they wish to eat, “Let us taste something”?

It teaches us

that since he did not explicitly mention in his words the expression “eating,” the meaning of his words is that he intended to prohibit himself from any amount of tasting.

Rav Pappa said: The dispute

between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages is only

with regard to oaths, but with regard to consecrations—

everyone agrees: for any amount!

What is the reason?

Because

with consecrations also, since he does not mention the name of “

eating”

in his words,

it is like one who specified

explicitly that he would not eat any amount—

it is considered so.

He raised an objection

to Rav Pappa from that which was taught:

Two consecrations,

two loaves that he prohibited to himself through a konam,

combine

with one another toward the measure of an olive-bulk. If he ate from them, if he ate half an olive-bulk from each one, he is flogged on account of “he shall not profane.”

But

two oaths,

where he swore concerning two loaves that he would not eat them,

do not combine

toward an olive-bulk.

Rabbi Meir says: Consecrations

are

like oaths, for even consecrations do not combine.

tak chto i konamot ne soedinyayutsya.

And if it enters your mind

as Rav Pappa said, that with consecrations

one is liable for any amount—

why do I need to combine

the two consecrations? After all, he is liable for any amount!

And we answer: The beraita is speaking in a case where he said,

“Eating of

this

loaf

is a konam upon me,”

and then he said concerning the second loaf,

“Eating of this is a konam upon me.”

Since he mentioned in his words the expression “eating,” there must be an olive-bulk measure.

And we object:

If so, why do they combine

the two acts of eating from the two loaves toward an olive-bulk according to the first tanna? After all,

ultimately, go here,

to this loaf,

there is no measure, and go here, there is no measure.

For there must be an olive-bulk measure from each loaf separately, since he mentioned the expression “eating” concerning each loaf individually—is this not so?

And we answer: What are we dealing with here? With a case where he said:

“Eating

of both of them is a konam upon me.”

For he included the two loaves in one act of “eating,” and therefore it is sufficient that there be a measure of eating from both of them together.

And we object: If so,

similarly

with regard to

oaths, there too the case is one where he said:

the case should also be one where he said,

“An oath that I shall not eat from both of them.”

If so, the difficulty is:

And if so, the difficulty is:

why do they not combine

the two loaves? For he did not mention the expression “eating” concerning each loaf separately, but concerning both of them together—is this not so!?

And we answer:

Rav Pinhas said: Oaths are different,

for they are speaking of a case where he said concerning the two loaves, “An oath that I shall not eat from this one and from this one,” and

since they are divided

the two loaves

for sin-offerings,

for if he ate an olive-bulk from each loaf, even in one period of unawareness, he is liable for two sin-offerings, despite having prohibited them to himself through one oath; and since the loaves are divided into two causes of liability for sin-offerings, they are like two oaths. Therefore,

they do not combine

half an olive-bulk from this one and half an olive-bulk from this one for liability for lashes and a sin-offering.

But with consecrations, even if he says concerning two loaves, “Eating from this one and from this one is a konam upon me,” they are not divided with regard to a sacrilege-offering [even according to the one who says that there is sacrilege with consecrations]. If he derived benefit from both of them during one period of unawareness, he is liable for only one sacrilege-offering, and therefore the two loaves combine toward an olive-bulk [for he mentioned only one expression of “eating” concerning the two loaves].

And we object:

If so,

that which is taught in the beraita:

Rabbi Meir says: konamot

are

like oaths,

and do not combine.

It is understandable that oaths

do not combine,

since they are divided

the two loaves for liability of sin-offerings.

But konamot,

where the loaves are not divided for sin-offerings,

why not

combine!?

And we answer:

Reverse it,

and say:

Rabbi Meir says: oaths

combine

like konamot!

And does he not hold

Rabbi Meir

of Rav Pinhas,

who said: since they are divided for sin-offerings, they do not combine; but since he mentioned only one expression of “eating” over the two loaves, they combine with regard to the measure of an olive-size?

Ravina said

to resolve the objection against Rav Pappa from the beraita:

When Rav Pappa said

that with regard to konamot, everyone agrees that [the prohibition applies] with any amount—

with regard to lashes

alone did he say it. Since he did not mention the word “eating,” he receives lashes for any amount for violating his utterance.

When that was taught

that konamot combine—it was with regard to

an offering for me'ila,

for one is liable for an offering for me'ila with regard to konamot, as with consecrated property,

because we require

that he derive benefit at least in the amount of

worth a peruta

from the konem in order to become liable for it for me'ila. For with consecrated property itself, the measure of me'ila is worth a peruta—and konem is no better than it, since its entire prohibition is only because he prohibited it to himself like consecrated property. And concerning this the beraita says that the two loaves combine together: if he derived benefit from both of them worth a peruta, he is liable for an offering for me'ila.

And we object:

Does this mean that the Rabbis hold

that Rabbi Meir, when there is

me'ila with regard to konamot?!

And it was taught:

One who says, “

This loaf is consecrated”

[actual consecration],

and eats it, whether he or another, has committed me'ila.

Therefore it has redemption,

for its sanctity is transferred through redemption and it goes out to non-sacred status, for with consecrated property it is said, “And he shall redeem it according to your valuation

But if he said, “

This loaf is consecrated to me,”

he did not consecrate the loaf, but only prohibited it to himself like consecrated property; and therefore, if he himself ate it—

he has committed me'ila

for he prohibited it to himself like consecrated property. But if

another

ate it,

he has not committed me'ila,

for it was not prohibited to another.

Therefore it has no redemption,

which would permit it, for redemption was said only with consecrated property and not with prohibitions,

the words of Rabbi Meir.