Shevuot 21b — the Talmud in English

And we object: If so,

say the latter clause of that same Mishna [below 29a]:

What is an oath of vanity? One who swears to alter what is known to people—for example, he said about a stone pillar that it is of gold...

This is an oath of vanity, for whose intentional violation one is liable to lashes, and for whose unintentional violation one is exempt

from an offering, for there is no liability for an offering for an oath of vanity.

And we infer:

This is—

what does it exclude?

Is it not to exclude

one who intentionally swore about the past,

“I ate,” and “I did not eat,”

who does not receive lashes

for it [since here it is impossible to explain as above, that it comes to exclude from liability for an offering, since an oath of vanity also has no offering].

And this is difficult for Rabbi Abbahu, who obligates lashes for “I ate and I did not eat”

? And Rabbi Abbahu answers:

No,

the Mishna does not come to exclude a false oath about the past from lashes; rather, it comes to include it for an offering.

And this is what it says: An oath of vanity,

this is

the oath

for whose unintentional violation one is exempt from an offering. But

“I ate and I did not eat,”

for whose unintentional violation one is liable for an offering.

And it is Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, who obligates

an offering for an oath of expression

for the past just as for the future! Although in the verse concerning an offering for an oath it says “to do harm or to do good,” which implies the future, we derive from the additional wording of the verse, “for whatever a person expresses in an oath,” that one is also liable for the past. [Nevertheless, with an oath of vanity, where everyone knows that his words have no substance, Rabbi Akiva agrees that there is no liability for an offering, as explained below [26a], that there is an exclusion concerning one who swears to annul a mitzva—that is, an oath of vanity—for which he is exempt from an offering].

Although the verse concerning an offering for an oath says, “to do harm or to do good,” which indicates the future, we derive from the additional wording of the verse, “for whatever a person expresses in an oath,” that one is also liable to bring an offering for an oath concerning the past. [Nevertheless, with regard to an oath taken in vain, where everyone knows that his words have no effect, Rabbi Akiva agrees that there is no liability to bring an offering, as explained below, 26a, where an exclusion is derived concerning one who swears to nullify a mitzva, meaning an oath taken in vain, for which he is exempt from bringing an offering].

And we wonder: How is it possible to establish the latter clause as Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, who obligates an offering even for an oath concerning the past

But you said, the first clause is Rabbi Ishmael’s opinion,

who exempts from an offering for the past. Is it possible to say:

the first clause is Rabbi Ishmael’s opinion

is,

and the latter clause Rabbi Akiva’s!?

And we answer: Rather, actually,

the entire [Mishna] is Rabbi Akiva’s opinion

is,

and the first clause of the Mishna, in which it says, “This is an oath of expression, for whose intentional violation one is liable to lashes and for whose unintentional violation one is liable for a sliding-scale offering,”

and the first clause of the Mishna, which states: “This is an oath expressing a statement of intent, for deliberate violation of which one is liable to lashes, while for its unintentional violation he is liable to a sliding-scale offering,”

is not to exclude

“I ate and I did not eat”

from an offering; rather, it is to exclude

one who swore that he

will eat

and ultimately

did not eat

intentionally, who is exempt

from lashes, since there is no deed in it, and it is unlike an oath “that I will not eat,” and he ate, for which he is liable to lashes since there is a deed in it.

since he performed no action. This is unlike the oath, “I will not eat,” which he violates by eating and for which he is liable to lashes, since he performs an action.

But for an offering, he is liable

when he swore that he would eat and ultimately did not eat, as stated explicitly in the verse, “to do harm or to do good.”

And we examine this:

And what is different—how do you know to distinguish and say that the first clause of the Mishna comes to exclude only “I will eat” and he did not eat from lashes? Perhaps the first clause also comes to exclude “I ate and I did not eat” from lashes, so that the matter will correspond to the latter clause, which we said speaks of “I ate and I did not eat” to include it with regard to an offering?

—what basis do you have for dividing the cases and saying that the first clause of the Mishna comes to exclude only the case of “I will eat,” but he did not eat, from liability to lashes? Perhaps the first clause also comes to exclude “I ate, or, I did not eat,” from liability to lashes, so that its subject would parallel that of the latter clause, which we said speaks of “I ate, or, I did not eat,” in order to include liability to bring an offering?

And it would again be difficult for Rabbi Abbahu

And we answer:

It is reasonable that the first clause comes to exclude only “I will eat” and he did not eat, since the first clause

that the first clause comes to exclude only “I will eat,” but he did not eat, since the first clause

speaks of the future, of an oath that “I will not eat,” and therefore

speaking of an oath that he will not eat. Therefore,

it excludes the future, the oath that “I will eat” and he did not eat. For it would be astonishing to say that it

oath—that is, the oath that he will eat but did not eat. For it would be surprising to say that it

speaks of the future,

and

excludes the past, “I ate and I did not eat.”

“I ate, or, I did not eat.”

We learned in the Mishna:

“An oath that I will not eat,” and he ate any amount, he is liable,

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

They raised a question before them: What is the reason of Rabbi Akiva, who obligates one for an oath for any amount?

What is the reason that Rabbi Akiva holds that one who swears is liable for eating any amount?

Is it that

Rabbi Akiva, throughout the entire Torah, holds like Rabbi Shimon, who obligates lashes for eating any prohibited substance in the Torah, even

lashes for eating any prohibited substance in the Torah, even

for the slightest amount?

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says: The measure of eating for every prohibition is

The measure of eating for every prohibition is

any amount—

for

liability for

lashes.

And they said by tradition from Moses at Sinai that the measure of eating a prohibition is

by tradition transmitted to Moses from Sinai that the measure of eating a prohibited substance is

an olive’s bulk only with regard to liability for an

liability to bring an

offering, when he ate unintentionally. And here, with regard to an oath, Rabbi Akiva will hold that even with regard to liability for an offering, any amount suffices. For the liability for the offering for an oath comes because the person deviated from his oath, and since Rabbi Akiva holds like Rabbi Shimon that eating any amount is considered “eating,” when a person swears that he will not eat, his intention is to prohibit himself even from eating any amount. Consequently, when he eats any amount, he has deviated from his oath, and it is fitting that he should become liable for an offering. [And this is unlike other prohibited foods, where the offering comes for the eating, whereas here the offering comes for the violation of his oath].

when he ate it unintentionally.

And here, with regard to an oath, Rabbi Akiva would hold that even for liability to bring an offering, any amount is sufficient. For the offering for an oath is brought because the person violated his oath, and since Rabbi Akiva holds like Rabbi Shimon that eating any amount is considered “eating,” when a person swears that he will not eat, his intention is to prohibit himself even from eating any amount. Therefore, when he eats any amount, he has violated his oath and should be liable to bring an offering. [This is not comparable to other prohibited foods, where the offering is brought for the act of eating, whereas here the offering is brought for the violation of the oath].

And properly they should have disputed: In truth, Rabbi Akiva and the Sages should have disputed

Indeed, Rabbi Akiva and the Sages should have disagreed

in general, concerning all the prohibitions of the Torah with regard to lashes, whether one is liable for any amount, just as Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disputed.

with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah concerning liability to lashes—whether one is liable for any amount—as Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree.

And the fact that they dispute here, with regard to an oath, is

with regard to an oath is

to make known to you the force of the Rabbis, that even with an oath they exempt him if he ate only any amount.

that they exempt him even in the case of an oath if he ate only any amount.

For even though it could be said: Since if the one who swore

if the person who swore

specified his words, saying that he was swearing concerning eating any amount, he would be

that he was swearing concerning eating any amount, he would be

liable even according to the Rabbis for any amount, [since the Rabbis too agree that liability for an offering for an oath is not because of “eating a prohibition,” but because he violated his oath; therefore, according to them as well, if he explicitly said that he was swearing concerning eating any amount, it is obvious that according to their view too he violated his oath and is liable], then even if he

even according to the Rabbis for any amount [since the Rabbis also agree that liability to bring an offering for an oath is not because of “eating a prohibited substance,” but because he violated his oath. Therefore, even according to their view, if he explicitly said that he was swearing concerning eating any amount, it is obvious that he violated his oath and is liable to bring an offering], then even if he

left his words unspecified, he is

his words without specification, he

also liable for any amount, because the one who swears intends by his language the language of people, and in the language of people eating any amount is also called eating; his intention is not the measure of eating according to the Torah, which is an olive’s bulk.

for any amount, because one who swears intends his words according to ordinary human speech. In ordinary human speech, eating any amount is also called eating; he does not intend the Torah’s measure of eating, which is an olive-bulk.

It teaches us that the Rabbis exempt, because they hold that everyone who swears concerning eating has in mind the measure of eating according to the Torah, which is an olive’s bulk.

because they hold that when one swears concerning eating, his intention is the measure of eating established by the Torah, namely, an olive-bulk.

This is one side of the question, and on the other hand:

or perhaps, in general,

Rabbi Akiva

holds like the Rabbis, that for all prohibitions involving eating, one receives lashes only for an olive’s bulk.

that one is lashed for eating a prohibited substance only for an olive-bulk.

And here, this is the reason that he obligates for any amount:

that he holds one liable for any amount:

since one who

specifies that he swore concerning any amount is

who specifies

that he swears concerning any amount

liable. Therefore, even when he

Therefore, even if he

leaves his words unspecified, he is

his words without specification, he

also

liable. For even when unspecified, he is like one who specifies, since his intention is not to swear concerning the measure of eating according to the Torah, which is an olive’s bulk, but according to the language of people, which is any amount. And this is the second side of the question.

For even when he does not specify, he is like one who specifies, since he does not intend the Torah’s measure of eating, which is an olive-bulk, but ordinary human speech, according to which eating means any amount. This is the second side of the question.

Come and hear: for the Sages said to him,

the Sages

to Rabbi Akiva

in our Mishna:

Where do we find that one who eats any amount

who

is liable, for this is the one who swore,

the one who swore,

is liable for any amount?

for any amount?

And if it is so, if we say that the reason of Rabbi Akiva is that he holds like Rabbi Shimon, that with all the prohibitions of the Torah the measure of their eating is any amount,

if we say that the reason for Rabbi Akiva is that he holds like Rabbi Shimon, according to whom the measure of eating for every Torah prohibition is any amount,

let him say to them—he should have answered the Sages:

He should have responded to the Sages:

I, throughout the entire Torah, hold like Rabbi Shimon, that the measure of eating is any amount, and therefore with an oath too one is liable for any amount. Why did he need to give them another reason, “Where do we find one who speaks and brings an offering, for this one speaks and brings an offering

?

Rather, certainly, Rabbi Akiva holds that only with regard to an oath is its liability for any amount.

And we reject the proof: Actually, Rabbi Akiva throughout the entire Torah holds like Rabbi Shimon, and here

he said it to them according to the words of the Rabbis, this reason.

as an argument to them.

And this is what he said:

According to me, throughout the entire Torah I hold like Rabbi Shimon, that one is liable for any amount. Therefore, with an oath too one is liable even for an offering for any amount, since the intention of the one who swore was to prohibit himself from eating any amount, since it is considered “eating” according to the Torah.

that one is liable for any amount. Therefore, even in the case of an oath, one is liable to bring an offering for any amount, because the person who swore intended to prohibit himself from eating any amount, since it is considered “eating” by Torah law.

But

according to you, who throughout the Torah hold that eating is only an olive’s bulk,

that throughout the Torah you hold that eating means only an olive-bulk,

at least concede to me concerning an oath that one is liable for eating any amount, because

that in the case of an oath one is liable for eating any amount, because

since one who specifies is liable for any amount,

for any amount,

one who leaves it unspecified is also liable for any amount.

for any amount.

And this is Rabbi Akiva’s intention: against your will, you must concede that an oath differs from all the prohibitions of the Torah, in that one brings an offering for speech alone. And since the liability for the offering is because he violated his speech, therefore, even by eating any amount he violated his speech. For even if he said, without specification, “I will not eat,” his intention is any amount, as though he had specified this.

And the Rabbis said to him: No!

One who swears without specification does not intend any amount, but rather the measure established by the Torah, which is an olive’s bulk.

Come and hear:

from what we learned in tractate Nazir:

Rabbi Akiva says: A nazirite who soaked his bread in wine, and there is in it—in the mixture of the bread and the wine—

the amount

sufficient to combine

together

an olive’s bulk,

and he ate it,

is liable for lashes. This is because with the prohibitions of a nazirite there is a special law that the permitted substance joins the prohibited substance to complete the measure of an olive’s bulk.

to lashes. This is because the prohibitions of a nazirite include a special rule that permitted matter combines with the prohibited matter to complete an olive-bulk.

And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Akiva

that Rabbi Akiva

in general holds like Rabbi Shimon, why do I need to combine the bread with the wine to reach the measure of an olive’s bulk? Is he not lashed for wine alone, for any amount, as with all the prohibitions of the Torah

with the wine to form an olive-bulk? He should be lashed for consuming any amount of wine alone, as with all prohibitions of the Torah!?

And furthermore, there is another proof from the fact that

we

learned

in a Mishna below [22b]: If one said,

“I swear that I will not eat,”

And furthermore, another proof, from what we learned in a Mishna below [22b]: one who said, one who said, “An oath that I will not eat,” and he ate carcasses and terefot, repulsive creatures and creeping things,

he

is liable for an offering for an oath, because he ate something fit for eating, although there is a prohibition upon it.

to bring an offering for the oath, because he ate food fit to be eaten, although it is prohibited.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts

from a korban, because he is sworn and standing from Mount Sinai not to eat forbidden things; therefore his oath not to eat does not take effect with regard to those things from which he is sworn and standing in any case not to eat. For this is as though he swore to fulfill the mitzva, in which case the oath does not take effect.

And we inquire concerning it: Why is he liable

according to the Sages? But

he is sworn from Mount Sinai

not to eat forbidden things, and how can an oath take effect concerning something that he is obligated with regard to?

Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yohanan, who say:

the matter here concerns

one

who

includes

in his oath

permitted things together with forbidden things.

For he did not swear only not to eat carcasses, but not to eat without specification, including even permitted things. And since the oath takes effect concerning the permitted things, it also takes effect concerning the forbidden things.

And Rabbi Shimon holds that we do not say “since,” and one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition even when the second prohibition also includes things that had previously been permitted.

And Reish Lakish said: You find no case

according to the Sages in which he would be liable for a korban for an oath concerning forbidden things,

unless

he thereby prohibits himself through his oath from eating even half the measure of the prohibition, concerning which he is not sworn from Mount Sinai, and only through the oath is he prohibited from it.

And there are two ways in which it is possible for a person to prohibit himself through his oath also with regard to half a measure:

A.

If

or

if he specifies

in his oath that he swears not to eat even

half a measure

of the prohibition,

and according to the Sages

in our Mishna, who hold that only when he specifies is he prohibited even from any amount, but when he swears without specification he is prohibited only from an olive’s bulk.

B.

If it is without specification,

it is also possible to say that the case concerns one who swore without specification not to eat, and nevertheless the oath takes effect also concerning less than an olive’s bulk,

and according to Rabbi Akiva, who says: A person

who swears without specification not to eat

prohibits himself

even

from any amount.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts, because he maintains according to his own position that also with regard to half a measure of the prohibition he is sworn and standing from Mount Sinai not to eat; therefore the oath does not take effect even with regard to half a measure.

And we conclude the proof:

And if it enters your mind

that Rabbi Akiva

generally holds like Rabbi Shimon,

then how is it possible to establish the words of the Sages according to Rabbi Akiva? For according to Rabbi Shimon, even concerning

any amount

of the prohibition

also

he is sworn

and standing from Mount Sinai

and the oath again does not take effect even concerning any amount!?

Rather, no; infer from this: Generally, Rabbi Akiva holds like the Sages

that the measure of eating is an olive’s bulk. Therefore, one who swears not to eat less than an olive’s bulk of the prohibition—his oath takes effect, because he is not sworn and standing concerning less than an olive’s bulk. Therefore, also in the case of a nazirite who soaked his bread in wine, he is liable only if the bread joins to complete the measure of an olive’s bulk.

Infer from this!

We learned in the Mishna:

They said to Rabbi Akiva: Where

have we found

that one who eats any amount is liable?

And we inquire concerning it:

And

when

not

have we found that one who eats any amount is liable?

But

we have found that one who eats

an ant

whole is lashed for it even according to the Sages, for everyone agrees that one who eats an entire forbidden creature is lashed for it even if it does not contain an olive’s bulk!?

And we answer:

A creature is different

for the importance of a creature entails lashes even for less than an olive’s bulk, but concerning something that is not a creature, we have not found that one is liable for any amount.

And again we inquire concerning it:

But

we have found

consecrated property

from which one who eats even less than an olive’s bulk is liable for a korban for misuse of consecrated property, provided that it contains the value of a peruta!?

And we answer:

We require

that it contain at least

the value of a peruta

and that is its measure. For one who eats consecrated property is not liable for eating as an act of eating a forbidden thing, but for misusing consecrated property; and misuse is not measured by measures of eating, but by the measure of the monetary benefit that he derives from the consecrated property. The measure of benefit is a peruta, and it follows that, also with consecrated property, he is not liable for benefit of “any amount”!

And again we inquire concerning it:

But

we have found

one who specifies

in his oath that he swears concerning any amount, so that he is liable even according to the Sages!?

And we answer:

One who specifies also—

is considered like a creature.

Just as one is liable for a creature with regard to other prohibitions because of its importance, so too, when one swears and specifies in his oath that even any amount will be prohibited to him, he has made that any amount significant by prohibiting it to himself. But with an unspecified prohibition, we have not found that one is liable for any amount.

And again we inquire concerning it:

But

one who swears not to eat

earth

is liable for it for any amount, since earth is not fit for eating, it is not relevant to speak of a measure of eating, and he is liable for it even for any amount!?

Rather,

from the fact that the Sages did not find anything for which one would be liable for any amount—