Shevuot 21b (כא:) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this: If so,

say the latter clause

of that same Mishna [below, 29a]: “Which is a shevuat shav? One who swore to alter something known to people—for example, he said of a stone pillar that it is made of gold”...

This is a shevuat shav, for whose intentional violation one is liable to lashes, whereas for its unwitting violation one is exempt

from a sacrifice, since there is no sacrifice for a shevuat shav.

And we analyze: The expression

“This is”—

what does it exclude?

Does it not exclude

one who intentionally swore concerning the past,

“I ate,” or “I did not eat,”

who is not lashed

for it [as here it is impossible to explain as above, that it comes to exclude liability for a sacrifice, since there is likewise no sacrifice for a shevuat shav].

And this is difficult for Rabbi Abbahu, who renders one liable to lashes for “I ate and I did not eat”?

Rabbi Abbahu explains:

No,

the Mishna did not come to exclude a false oath concerning the past from lashes; rather, it comes to include it as liable to a sacrifice.

And this is what it is saying: A shevuat shav,

this is

the oath

for whose unwitting violation one is exempt from a sacrifice. But

“I ate and I did not eat,”

for its unwitting violation one is liable to a sacrifice.

And it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who renders one liable

for a sacrifice for a shevuat bitui

concerning the past just as for one concerning the future!

Although the verse concerning a sacrifice for an oath says “to do harm or to do good,” which indicates the future, we expound the additional phrase in the verse, “for anything that a person expresses in an oath,” to teach that one is also liable for the past. [Nevertheless, with regard to a shevuat shav, when everyone knows that his words have no effect, Rabbi Akiva concedes that there is no liability for a sacrifice, as will be explained below [26a], where an exclusion is derived concerning one who swore to nullify a mitzva—i.e., a shevuat shav—for which he is exempt from a sacrifice].

And we question: How can the latter clause be established as the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who renders one liable for a sacrifice even for an oath concerning the past?

Did you not say that the first clause is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael,

who exempts one from a sacrifice for an oath concerning the past? Is it possible to say that

the first clause is Rabbi Yishmael

while

the latter clause is Rabbi Akiva!?

And we answer: Rather,

the entire Mishna is

the opinion of Rabbi Akiva,

and the first clause

of the Mishna, which states: “This is a shevuat bitui, for whose intentional violation one is liable to lashes and for whose unwitting violation one brings an ascending and descending offering,”

does not exclude “

I ate and I did not eat”

from a sacrifice; rather, it excludes

one who swore that he

would eat and

ultimately

did not eat

intentionally, who is exempt

from lashes,

since there is no action involved, and this is unlike the oath “I will not eat,” after which he ate, for which he is liable to lashes, since it involves an action.

But he is liable for a sacrifice

if he swore that he would eat and ultimately did not eat, as is explicit in the verse, “to do harm or to do good.”

And we examine this:

And what is different?

From where do you know to distinguish and say that the first clause of the Mishna comes to exclude only “I will eat and he did not eat” from lashes? Perhaps the first clause comes to exclude “I ate and I did not eat” from lashes as well, so that its formulation will correspond to that of the latter clause, which, as we said, speaks of “I ate and I did not eat” in order to include liability with regard to a sacrifice?

But this would again be difficult for Rabbi Abbahu?

And we answer:

It is reasonable

that the first clause comes to exclude only “I will eat and he did not eat,” since the first clause

deals with the future,

with an oath that “I will not eat”; therefore it

excludes a future oath,

the oath that “I will eat and he did not eat.” For it would be surprising to say that it

deals with the future

but

excludes the past, “

I ate and I did not eat.”

We learned in the Mishna:

“If one swore, ‘I will not eat,’ and ate any amount, he is liable,”

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

It was asked of them:

What is the reason that Rabbi Akiva renders one liable for an oath for eating any amount?

Is it that

Rabbi Akiva, throughout the entire Torah, agrees with Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one is liable

to lashes for eating any prohibited substance in the Torah, even

for the slightest amount?

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says:

The measure of eating for every prohibition is

any amount—

for

liability

to lashes.

And they said

by tradition from the halakha given to Moses at Sinai that the measure for eating a prohibited substance is

an olive-bulk only with regard to

liability for a

sacrifice,

when one ate it unwittingly.

And here, with regard to an oath, Rabbi Akiva would hold that even with regard to liability for a sacrifice, any amount suffices. For liability for a sacrifice in the case of an oath is incurred because the person violated his oath, and since Rabbi Akiva holds like Rabbi Shimon that eating any amount is considered “eating,” when a person swears, “I will not eat,” his intention is to prohibit himself even from eating any amount. Consequently, when he eats any amount, he has violated his oath and is appropriately liable for a sacrifice. [This is unlike other prohibited foods, where the sacrifice is brought for the eating itself, whereas here the sacrifice is brought for the desecration of his oath].

And it would be appropriate that they should disagree

Indeed, Rabbi Akiva and the Sages should have disagreed

in general,

with regard to all Torah prohibitions concerning liability to lashes—whether one is liable for any amount—as Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree.

And the fact that they disagree here

with regard to an oath is

to inform you of the power of the Sages,

that even in the case of an oath they exempt him if he ate only any amount.

For although it could be said: Since

if the one who swore

specified

that he was swearing concerning eating any amount, he would be

liable

even according to the Sages for any amount, [for the Sages too agree that liability for a sacrifice for an oath is not due to “eating a prohibited substance,” but because he violated his oath; therefore, even according to them, if he explicitly said that he was swearing concerning eating any amount, it is obvious that he violated his oath and is liable for a sacrifice], then even when he

simply

stated his words, he

is likewise liable

for any amount, because one who swears intends his words in accordance with ordinary usage, and in ordinary speech eating any amount is also called eating; he does not intend the Torah measure of eating, which is an olive-bulk.

It teaches us that they exempt

the Sages, because they hold that anyone who swears concerning eating has in mind the Torah measure of eating, which is an olive-bulk.

This is one side of the question; and on the other hand:

Or perhaps, in general,

Rabbi Akiva

agrees with the Sages,

that one is lashed for eating prohibited substances only for an olive-bulk.

And here, this is the reason

that he renders one liable for any amount:

Since

one who

specifies

that he swore concerning any amount

is liable.

Therefore, even when he

simply

states his words, he

is likewise

liable.

For even in an unspecified oath, he is like one who specifies, since he does not intend to swear concerning the Torah measure of eating, which is an olive-bulk, but according to ordinary usage, in which it means any amount. This is the second side of the question.

Come and hear: For the Sages said to

Rabbi Akiva

in response

in our Mishna:

Where do we find one who eats any amount

who is

liable, so that this

one who swore

is liable

for any amount?

And if it is so,

if we say that the reason for Rabbi Akiva is that he holds like Rabbi Shimon, according to whom the measure of eating for every Torah prohibition is any amount,

let him say to them:

He should have responded to the Sages:

I, throughout the entire Torah, agree with Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that the measure of eating is any amount, and therefore one is liable for an oath as well for any amount. Why did he need to give them another reason: “Where do we find one who speaks and brings a sacrifice, so that this one speaks and brings a sacrifice”?

Rather, it is certainly the case that Rabbi Akiva holds that liability is for any amount only with regard to an oath.

And we reject the proof: Actually, Rabbi Akiva, throughout the entire Torah, agrees with Rabbi Shimon; but here

he said this according to the position of the Sages

as his reason for liability.

And this is what he is saying:

According to my position, throughout the entire Torah I agree with Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that one is liable for any amount. Therefore, with regard to an oath as well, one is liable even for a sacrifice for any amount, since the one who swore intended to prohibit himself from eating any amount, because it is considered “eating” by Torah law.

Rather,

according to your position,

that throughout the Torah you hold that eating means only an olive-bulk,

at least concede to me

with regard to an oath that one is liable for eating any amount, because

since one who specifies is liable

for any amount,

one who states it without specification is likewise liable

for any amount.

This is Rabbi Akiva’s intent: You are compelled to concede that an oath differs from all other prohibitions of the Torah in that one brings a sacrifice for speech alone. Since liability for the sacrifice is because he violated his word, he likewise violated his word by eating any amount. For even when he simply said, “I will not eat,” his intention is any amount, as though he had specified this.

And the Sages said to him: No!

One who swears without specification does not intend any amount; rather, he intends the measure established by the Torah, which is an olive-bulk.

Come and hear:

From what we learned in tractate Nazir:

Rabbi Akiva says: A nazirite who soaked his bread in wine, and it contained

in the mixture of the bread and the wine

enough to combine

together to make

an olive-bulk,

and he ate it,

is liable

to lashes. This is because the prohibitions of a nazirite have a special law that permitted food combines with the prohibited food to complete an olive-bulk.

And if it enters your mind

that Rabbi Akiva

in general agrees with Rabbi Shimon, why do I need the bread to combine

to make an olive-bulk? He should be lashed for the wine alone, for any amount, as with all Torah prohibitions!?

And furthermore,

there is another proof from that which

we learned

in the Mishna below [22b]: One who said,

“An oath: I will not eat,”

and he ate carrion and tereifot, creeping things and crawling creatures,

he is

liable

for a sacrifice for an oath, because he ate something fit for consumption, although it is subject to a prohibition.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts from a sacrifice, because he is already bound by an oath from Sinai not to eat forbidden foods; therefore, his oath not to eat does not take effect with regard to those foods that he is already bound by an oath not to eat in any event. This is as though he had sworn to fulfill a mitzva, in which case the oath does not take effect.

from bringing an offering, because he is already under an oath taken at Mount Sinai not to eat forbidden foods. Therefore, his oath not to eat does not take effect with regard to those foods, since he is already under an oath not to eat them regardless. This is like someone who swears to fulfill a mitzva, in which case the oath does not take effect.

And we raised a difficulty: Why, according to the Sages, is he liable?

And after all,

he is already bound by an oath from Sinai

not to eat forbidden foods; how, then, can an oath take effect with regard to something that he is already obligated to observe?

Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yohanan, who say:

This is referring

to

one who

includes

in his oath

permitted foods together with forbidden foods. He did not swear only not to eat animal carcasses, but not to eat unspecified food, including permitted foods. And since the oath takes effect with regard to the permitted foods, it also takes effect with regard to the forbidden foods.

He did not swear only not to eat carcasses; rather, he swore not to eat in general, including permitted foods. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the permitted foods, it also takes effect with regard to the forbidden foods.

Rabbi Shimon maintains that we do not say “since,” and one prohibition does not take effect upon another even when the second prohibition also includes things that had previously been permitted.

And Reish Lakish said: You cannot find

according to the Sages that one would be liable for a sacrifice for an oath concerning forbidden foods

unless

his oath forbade him from eating even less than the minimum measure of the prohibition, for which he is not already bound by an oath from Sinai, and it is only through the oath that it becomes forbidden to him.

There are two ways in which a person’s oath could also forbid him less than the minimum measure:

a.

If

or

if he explicitly states

in his oath that he swears not to eat even

less than the minimum measure

of the prohibition,

and according to the Sages

in our Mishna, who maintain that he is forbidden even any amount only when he explicitly states this, whereas when he swears without specification, he is forbidden only an olive-bulk.

b.

If he swore without specification,

it is also possible to say that he swore without specification not to eat, and nevertheless the oath takes effect even with regard to less than an olive-bulk,

and according to Rabbi Akiva, who says: A person

who swears without specification not to eat

forbids himself

even

any amount.

Rabbi Shimon exempts him because he maintains, in accordance with his own position, that even with regard to less than the minimum measure of the prohibition he is already bound by an oath from Sinai not to eat it. Therefore, the oath does not take effect even with regard to less than the minimum measure.

And we conclude the proof:

And if it enters your mind

that Rabbi Akiva

generally agrees with Rabbi Shimon,

then how can the statement of the Sages be understood as referring to Rabbi Akiva? According to Rabbi Shimon, even with regard to

any amount

of the prohibition,

also

he is already bound by an oath

from Sinai

and the oath therefore does not take effect even with regard to any amount!?

Rather, no; derive from this that, generally, Rabbi Akiva agrees with the Sages

that the measure of eating is an olive-bulk. Therefore, when one swears not to eat less than an olive-bulk of the prohibition, his oath takes effect, since he is not already bound by an oath with regard to less than an olive-bulk. And therefore, even in the case of a nazir who soaked his bread in wine, he is liable only if the bread combines with the wine to complete an olive-bulk.

Derive from this!

We learned in the Mishna:

They said to Rabbi Akiva: Where

have we found

that one who eats any amount is liable?

And we raised a difficulty:

A

nd

if

we have not found that one who eats any amount is liable,

yet

we have found that one who eats

a complete ant

is flogged for it even according to the Sages, since anyone who eats an entire forbidden creature, even if it does not contain an olive-bulk, is flogged for it according to everyone!?

And we answer:

A complete creature is different

because the significance of a complete creature makes one liable for lashes even for less than an olive-bulk. But with regard to something that is not a complete creature, we have not found that one is liable for any amount.

And we raised another difficulty:

Yet

we have found

consecrated property

from which one who eats even less than an olive-bulk is liable for a sacrifice for misuse, provided that it is worth a peruta!?

And we answer:

We require

that it contain at least

the value of a peruta,

and that is its measure. For one who eats consecrated property is not liable for eating as an act of eating a forbidden substance, but for misusing consecrated property. Misuse is not measured by the measures of eating, but by the measure of the monetary benefit that he derives from the consecrated property. The measure of benefit is a peruta, and it follows that even with regard to consecrated property, he is not liable for benefit worth “anything whatsoever”!

And we raised another difficulty:

Yet

we have found

one who explicitly states

in his oath that he swears concerning any amount, and he is liable, even according to the Sages!?

And we answer:

One who explicitly states it is also—

like a complete creature.

Just as one is liable for a complete creature in the case of other prohibitions because of its significance, so too, when one swears and explicitly states in his oath that even any amount is forbidden to him, he has thereby endowed that amount with significance by forbidding it to himself. But in the case of an unspecified prohibition, we have not found that one is liable for any amount.

And we raised another difficulty:

Yet

one who swears not to eat

dust

is liable for any amount. Since dust is not fit for eating, it is not relevant to speak of a measure of eating, and he is liable even for any amount!?

Rather,

from the fact that the Sages did not find any case in which one is liable for any amount—