Shevuot 20a (כ.) — the Talmud in English

And Abaye explains:

Our Mishna

is speaking

when they are not importuning him to eat,

and therefore, when he simply says, “I swear that I will eat,” he intends to obligate himself to eat.

Whereas the

beraita

is speaking

when they are importuning him to eat,

and he does not accede to his fellow’s entreaties; rather,

he says

to him:

“I will not eat, and I will not eat! When he swears,

if afterward he swears and says, “I swear that I will eat from you,”

this is what he means:

he certainly intends to say:

“I swear that I will not eat!”

Rav Ashi said: Read

in the beraita:

“I swear that I will not eat from you,”

but “I swear that I will eat” indeed means that he obligates himself to eat, as it appears from our Mishna.

And we challenge this:

If so,

that the case is one in which he says, “I swear that I will not eat from you,”

what does it teach us?

What does the beraita need to inform us of this? It was already stated previously that “I swear that I will not eat from you” is forbidden.

And we answer:

Lest you say

that one who says, “I swear that I will not eat” has

merely stumbled in his wording.

His intention was not to swear that he would not eat, but the opposite: to swear that he would eat, except that he stumbled in his speech and mistakenly said “that I will not eat” instead of “that I will eat.”

It teaches us

the beraita that we do not take into consideration a verbal slip; rather, he is forbidden to eat from his fellow’s food.

The Sages taught:

One who says concerning a loaf:

“Utterance

this loaf is upon me,” is treated as one who says:

“An oath

that I will not eat it.”

And similarly, one who says:

“Issar

this loaf is upon me,” is treated as one who says:

“An oath

that I will not eat it.”

And what is the

prohibition

of

“issar”?

If you say

that

“issar” is the language of

an oath,

then he is

liable

for it as though he had sworn;

but if not,

if “issar” is not the language of an oath, he is

exempt.

And we wonder: How can the beraita say in its latter clause,

“If you say: ‘Issar

is the language of

an oath,’”

implying that the matter is uncertain?

But you said

in the first clause of the beraita that there is no uncertainty at all, but certainly

“issar

is the language of

an oath”?

And we answer:

Abaye said: This is what

the tanna means: One who says,

“Utterance

this loaf is upon me” is genuinely the language of

an oath,

and if he eats the loaf, he is liable to bring a sacrifice.

But one who says,

“Issar

this loaf is upon me” is merely

associating it with an oath,

as though he swore concerning a particular loaf that he would not eat it, and then said concerning another loaf, “This is like that.” This is called “association” with an oath, for he associates the second with the first. Likewise, one who says, “Issar: this loaf is upon me,” is not as though he had explicitly said, “I swear that I will not eat this loaf”; rather, it is as though he associated this loaf with another loaf that had been prohibited by an oath.

The beraita continues:

The prohibition

of

“issar,”

what is it?

If you say

that in every case of

association with an oath

it is

considered as though he uttered an oath,

as though he had actually sworn, and he is liable to a sacrifice and lashes if he violated his oath, then even one who says, “Issar: this loaf is upon me,” is

liable

for a sacrifice and lashes if he ate it, since he used the language of association.

But if not,

if one is liable to a sacrifice and lashes only when he actually swore, and not for association with an oath, then one who says, “Issar” is

exempt

from a sacrifice and lashes.

And we explain:

And from where

is it established that

“utterance” is the language of

an oath

?

As it is written:

“Or if a person swears, expressing

with his lips.”

We find the expression “utterance” used in connection with an oath.

And we refute this: If so,

“issar”

also

is found to be used in connection with an oath,

as it is written

[Numbers 30:14]:

“Every vow and every oath of prohibition,”

so why does the beraita say that “issar” means only association with an oath and not an oath itself?

Rather,

you must necessarily say:

From where

is it established that

“issar” is the language of

association with an oath

alone

and not

the language of an oath itself?

As it is written

[there, verse 11]:

“Or she imposed an issar upon herself by an oath,”

meaning that she prohibited it and associated it with another matter that had previously been prohibited by an oath.

If so,

“utterance”

also,

why is it obvious to the beraita that it is genuinely the language of an oath?

The verse writes

concerning it, as it does concerning “issar” [Leviticus 5:4]:

“Whatever a person expresses by an oath,”

which implies that he associated it with an object prohibited by an oath, and not that it is the language of an oath itself?

And Abaye retracted his derivation above -

Rather, said Abaye:

“Mivta”

which is an expression of

an oath

we derive

from here, from what is written [Numbers 30:7]:

“But if she shall be married to a man, while her vows are upon her, or the utterance of her lips, by which she has prohibited herself.”

But

“an oath”

it does not say.

It does not say, “by which she has prohibited herself by an oath,” which would indicate that the reference is to one who makes an oath by reference to another oath.

And necessarily,

by what

did she

prohibit herself?

By

the expression

“mivta”

alone!

It follows that “mivta” is an expression of an oath.

Rava said,

in explanation of the beraita:

I will always say to you—

one who makes an oath by reference to another oath is not considered as one who utters an

oath from his mouth,

and the tanna of the beraita did not address this law at all. Rather,

this is what it is saying:

“Mivta”

is an expression of

an oath.

“Isar”

too

is an expression of

an oath

and not a reference to another oath. But

its prohibition [

its prohibition ]

of “

isar”

that we said is an expression of an oath does not apply in every case, as sometimes it is used as an expression of a vow. For

the Torah placed

the expression “isar”

between a vow and an oath [

as it proceeds to explain ], to teach us that if

he uttered it

as an “isar”

in the language of a vow,

for example, if he said, “This loaf is an isar upon me,” which is the language of a vow that prohibits the object itself to him, this is a

vow

and he is not liable to bring an offering for it. But if he uttered it

in the language of an oath,

saying, “It is an oath that I will not eat this loaf,” thereby prohibiting himself from the object, this is an

oath

and he is liable to bring an offering for it. [

And this is the explanation of the beraita: The prohibition of an “isar” depends on this: If you understand the “isar” in the language of an oath, he is liable to bring an offering. But if not—that is, if he stated it in the language of a vow—he is exempt from an offering ].

And the Gemara explains:

Where did the Torah place

the “isar” between a vow and an oath? As it is written [there, verse 11]:

“And if in her husband’s house she made a vow or prohibited herself with an isar by an oath.”

And Abaye and Rava followed [

followed ] their respective positions in their dispute concerning the explanation of the beraita, whether it is speaking of one who makes an oath by reference to another oath—

according to their respective approaches.

As it was stated: One who makes an oath by reference to another oath—

Abaye said: He is considered as one who utters an oath from his mouth

and is liable.

And Rava said: He is not considered as one who utters an oath from his mouth

and is exempt.

An objection was raised

against Rava from what was taught in a beraita:

What

is the

“isar”

mentioned in the Torah?

One who says: It is incumbent upon me not to eat meat

and not to drink wine, like the day on which his father died [

as I prohibited myself from eating meat on the day my father died, forever ], or

like the day on which so-and-so died,

or

like the day on which Gedaliah ben Ahikam was killed [

the Fast of Gedaliah ], or

like the day on which he saw Jerusalem in its destruction,

he is

prohibited

from eating meat and drinking wine.

And Shmuel said:

the prohibition applies only on the condition that \-

he had already made a vow from that day onward.

That he had already accepted upon himself, by a vow, that he would not eat meat or drink wine on the day on which his father died, forever, and likewise on the day on which so-and-so died, on the day on which Gedaliah ben Ahikam was killed, and on the day on which he saw Jerusalem in its destruction; specifically, when he prohibited himself by a vow from eating meat and drinking wine on that day.

The Gemara now assumes that the prohibition is due to making a vow by reference to another vow: He made his vow by reference to a different vow. Concerning this the beraita says, “What is the isar mentioned in the Torah,” with regard to which the prohibition of “He shall not profane his word” is stated.

If so, it is proven that making a vow by reference to another vow has the status of the vow itself in every respect.

But now the following difficulty arises:

Granted, according to Abaye

this is understandable,

since one who makes a vow by reference to another vow

just as we find here that making a vow by reference to another vow constitutes a

vow,

so too

one who makes an oath by reference to another oath

constitutes an

oath.