Shevuot 20a — the Talmud in English

And Abיי explains:

“The Mishna

our Mishna speaks

when they do not press him to eat,

and therefore, when he says simply, “An oath that I shall eat,” his intention is to obligate himself to eat.

Whereas the

beraita

speaks

when they press him to eat,

and he does not comply with his fellow’s urgings, but

he says

to him:

“I shall not eat and I shall not eat!” For when he swears,

if afterward he swears and says, “An oath that I shall eat yours,”

this is what he is saying,

certainly his intention is to say:

“An oath that I shall not eat!”

Rav Ashi said: “Read

in the beraita

‘An oath that I shall not eat yours,’

but “an oath that I shall eat” indeed means that he undertakes to eat, as it appears from our Mishna.

And we object:

if so,

that it is speaking where he says, “An oath that I shall not eat yours,”

what does it teach us?

What does the beraita need to teach us this, when it was already stated previously, “An oath: I shall not eat yours,” that he is forbidden?

And we answer:

“Lest you say

perhaps one might say that one who says, “An oath that I shall not eat”

his tongue stumbled for him.

His intention was not to swear that he would not eat, but, on the contrary, to swear that he would eat, except that he stumbled in his speech and mistakenly said “that I shall not eat” instead of “that I shall eat.”

It teaches us

the beraita that we are not concerned about a stumbling of his speech; rather, he is forbidden to eat of his fellow’s food.

The Sages taught:

one who says concerning a loaf:

“An utterance

this loaf is upon me” this is like one who says

“An oath

that I shall not eat it.”

And likewise one who says:

“Isar

this loaf is upon me,” this is like one who says

“An oath

that I shall not eat it.”

And what is the

prohibition

of

“isar”?

“If you say

‘isar’

is the expression of

an oath,

then he is

liable

for it as though he swore,

and if not,

but “isar” is not the expression of an oath, then he is

exempt.

And we wonder: how does the beraita say in its latter clause

“If you say that isar

is the expression of

an oath

,” implying that there is a doubt concerning the matter?

But you said

in the first clause of the beraita that this is not at all a doubt, but certainly

“isar”

the expression of

an oath?

And we answer:

Abיי said: “This is what

the tannaitic author of the beraita is saying: one who says

‘Utterance

this loaf is upon me’—this is the expression of

an oath

in actuality, and if he ate the loaf, he is liable for an offering.

But one who says

“Isar

this loaf is upon me”—this is only

making something dependent on an oath,

as though he swore concerning a certain loaf that he would not eat it, and then said concerning another loaf, “This is like that”; this is called “making dependent on an oath,” making the second dependent on the first. So too, one who says, “Isar: this loaf is upon me,” is not as though he explicitly says, “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” but as though he makes this loaf dependent on another loaf that was prohibited by an oath.”

And the beraita continues:

“The prohibition

of

‘isar’

what is it?

“If you say

in every case of

making dependent on an oath,

that

it is considered like uttering an oath with his mouth,

as though he actually swore, and he is liable for an offering and lashes if he violated his oath, then also one who says, “Isar: this loaf is upon me”

is liable

for an offering and lashes if he ate it, since he used an expression of making dependent.

and if not,

if one is liable for an offering and lashes only when he actually swore and not for making dependent on an oath, then also one who says “Isar”

is exempt

from an offering and lashes.”

And we explain:

“And from where

is ‘utterance’

the expression of

an oath

?”

For it is written:

“Or a person who swears, expressing

with the lips.”

Thus we find the expression “utterance” in connection with an oath.

And we object: if so,

“Isar”

also

we find that it is said in connection with an oath,

as it is written [

Numbers 30:14 ]

“Every vow and every oath of prohibition,”

and why does the beraita say that “isar” is only the expression of making dependent on an oath and not the expression of an oath itself?

Rather,

you are compelled to say

“from where

is ‘isar’

the expression of

making dependent on an oath

only

it,

and not the expression of an oath itself?

For it is written [

there, 11 ]

“Or she imposed a prohibition of isar upon herself by an oath,”

that is, she prohibited it and made it dependent on another thing that had previously been prohibited by an oath.

If so,

“utterance”

also,

why is it obvious to the beraita that it is the actual expression of an oath,

since it is written

in it, as with “isar” [Leviticus 5:4],

“for everything that a person expresses in an oath,”

which implies that he made it dependent on something prohibited by an oath, and not that it is the expression of an oath itself?

And Abaye retracted his derivation above -

Rather, said Abaye:

“Mivta”

which is an expression of

oath

we derive

from here, from what is written [in Numbers 30:7]:

“And if she shall be married to a man, and her vows shall be upon her, or the utterance of her lips, by which she has bound herself.”

But

“oath”

it did not say.

It did not say, “by which she has bound herself by an oath,” which would indicate that the [second] oath is an hatpasa [the extension of the prohibition of one oath to another].

And necessarily,

with what

did she

bind herself?

With

the expression

“mivta”

alone!

It follows that “mivta” is an expression of oath.

Rava said

in explanation of the beraita:

I will always say to you—

an hatpasa by an oath is not like one who utters an oath

from his mouth,

and the tanna of the beraita was not uncertain about this law at all. Rather,

and this is what it is saying:

“Mivta”

is an expression of

oath.

“Isser”

also

is an expression of

oath

[and not an hatpasa by an oath]. But

its prohibition

[his prohibition]

of

“isser,”

which we said is an expression of oath, is not so in every matter, for sometimes it comes in the expression of a vow. For

the Torah placed it

in the expression “isser”

between a vow and an oath

[as it proceeds to explain], to teach us that if

he uttered it

as an “isser”

in the expression of a vow,

for example, if he said, “This loaf is an isser upon me,” which is the expression of a vow that prohibits the object upon him, it is a

vow

and there is no obligation of an offering upon him. And if he uttered it

in the expression of an oath,

that he said, “It is an isser that I shall not eat this loaf,” whereby he prohibits himself from the object, it is an

oath

and he is liable to bring an offering for it.

[And this is the explanation of the beraita: The prohibition [of] an isser [depends on this]: If you say the isser [in the expression of] an oath, he is liable [to bring an offering]. And if not, [rather, if he said it in the expression of a vow], he is exempt from an offering].

And the Gemara explains:

Where did it place

the “isser” between a vow and an oath?—For it is written [there, verse 11]:

“And if in her husband’s house she vowed, or bound herself with an isser upon her soul by an oath.”

And

[Abaye and Rava] proceeded in accordance with their dispute in explaining the beraita, whether it is speaking of an hatpasa by an oath]—

according to their positions.

For it was stated: An hatpasa by an oath—

Abaye said: It is like one who utters an oath from his mouth

and he is liable.

And Rava said: It is not like one who utters an oath from his mouth

and he is exempt.

A meitivi

to Rava from that which was taught in a beraita:

Which

is

the “isser”

stated in the Torah?

One who says: “It is incumbent upon me not to eat meat

and not to drink wine, like the day on which his father died”

[as I prohibited myself from eating meat on the day on which my father died, forever], or

like the day on which so-and-so died,

or

like the day on which Gedaliah son of Ahikam was killed

[the Fast of Gedaliah], or

like the day on which he saw Jerusalem in its destruction,

it is

prohibited

from eating meat and drinking wine.

And Samuel said:

the prohibition is only on the condition that \-

he had already taken a vow concerning that day and continued from it.

For he had already previously accepted upon himself by a vow that he would not eat meat and would not drink wine on the day on which his father died, forever, and likewise on the day on which so-and-so died, and on the day on which Gedaliah son of Ahikam was killed, and on the day on which he saw Jerusalem in its destruction; specifically when he prohibited upon himself by a vow the eating of meat and the drinking of wine on that day.

The Gemara now holds that the prohibition is because of an hatpasa by a vow, whereby he extended his vow by means of another vow. And concerning this the beraita says, “Which is the isser stated in the Torah,” regarding which the prohibition “He shall not profane his word” was stated.

If so, it is proven that an hatpasa by a vow has the status of the vow itself in every respect.

And now raise a difficulty:

Granted, according to Abaye

it is satisfactory,

since an hatpasa by a vow

just as we find here that an hatpasa by a vow is a

vow,

so too

an hatpasa by an oath

is a

oath.