Shevuot 19b (יט:) — the Talmud in English

And even in the first one

and even in the first scenario], in which he did not become purified from the first walk until he also walked a second time,

in any event

he is impure; he knew of his impurity before entering, so why should he be exempt!?

and his impurity was known to him before he entered; so why should he be exempt!?

He said

he explained:

Rava:

In fact, this concerns the first scenario mentioned by the first tanna. Rabbi Shimon did not disagree even according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda’s understanding of Rabbi Shimon, since he certainly knows that he is impure—

Rather,

with what are we dealing here? That is, the scenario in which the first tanna, according to Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, according to Rabbi Shimon, disagreed is a different scenario:

That is, the case in which the first tanna, according to Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, according to Rabbi Shimon, disagree is a different case:

For example, he walked the first time

but did not enter,

and

he walked the second time and entered, and

when he walked the second time, he forgot that he had walked the first time. In this scenario, the first tanna, according to Rabbi Shimon, holds that he is liable. Although according to Rabbi Shimon we should exempt him, as in the case of sprinkling and repeating the sprinkling, since before the entry that creates liability he did not have certain knowledge, but only knowledge of a doubtful impurity—for he does not remember the first walk—and because

he has

“a partial awareness”

and not “knowledge of a doubt”: In the case of one who sprinkled and repeated the sprinkling, although he knows all the facts, his impurity is doubtful at every entry. Here, however, had he remembered all the facts that had previously been known to him, he would have had certain knowledge; because of his forgetfulness, he does not know with certainty. This is not knowledge of a doubt, but rather “partial awareness

”.

And it is in this that they disagree,

the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda:

The first tanna

according to Rabbi Shimon

holds: We say:

“Partial awareness”

is equivalent to complete awareness.

But Rabbi Shimon holds: We do not say that

“partial

awareness”

is equivalent to complete awareness.

The Gemara now returns to the beginning of the beraita, where we learned:

If he walked the first time and entered, sprinkled and repeated the sprinkling and immersed, then returned, walked the second time and entered, he is liable.

But Rabbi Shimon exempts him,

and we challenge the first tanna:

But why is he liable!?

It is

knowledge of a doubt,

for before each entry he is in fact uncertain whether he is impure, and there is no knowledge here sufficient to render him liable!?

He said

he explained:

Rabbi Yohanan: Here they treated knowledge of a doubt as knowledge.

And Reish Lakish said: Whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who said: We do not require knowledge at the outset;

Since today he knows that he certainly entered the Temple while impure, this is sufficient to render him liable to a sliding-scale offering, like other sin-offerings, for knowledge at the end is sufficient to render one liable for them.

a. One who unwittingly eats forbidden fat, not knowing at the time of eating that he ate forbidden fat, and later learns that it was forbidden fat, is liable to a sin-offering.

b. One who eats two olive-bulks of forbidden fat one after the other is liable to only one sin-offering. However, if he learned between one eating and the other that he had eaten forbidden fat, the “acts of awareness divide,” and he is liable to a sin-offering for each eating.

c. One who eats forbidden fat, thinking that it is permitted fat, and later becomes uncertain whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, is liable to a provisional guilt-offering.

And they raise a contradiction between Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Yohanan, and between Reish Lakish and Reish Lakish:

As it was taught in a beraita: He ate doubtful forbidden fat and learned of it,

that is, one who ate forbidden fat thinking that it was permitted fat, and later learned that it was uncertain whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, and then ate another

portion of doubtful forbidden fat

afterward

and learned

of it:

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Just as he brings a sin-offering for each

and every one,

as will be explained later in the discussion,

so he brings a provisional guilt-offering for each and every one,

because the awareness of the doubt in between divides the provisional guilt-offerings.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said in the name of Rabbi Shimon:

He brings only one provisional guilt-offering,

and the awareness in between does not divide,

as it is stated in the passage concerning a provisional guilt-offering [Leviticus 5:17]: “And if a person sins, and performs one of all the commandments of the Lord that may not be done, and he did not know, and he bears his guilt. And he shall bring an unblemished ram from the flock, according to your valuation, as a guilt-offering, to the priest; and the priest shall atone for him

for his unwitting act in which he acted unwittingly” [

which indicates multiple unwitting acts] —

the Torah included many unwitting acts, but only one provisional guilt-offering.

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagreed in explaining what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi meant by “Just as he brings a sin-offering for each and every one”:

And Reish Lakish said: Here Rabbi taught that awareness of doubts divides the sin-offerings,

that is, Rabbi’s intention is to say: Just as, if he had awareness of a doubt between one eating and the next, and ultimately learned with certainty that he had eaten forbidden fat, the awareness of the doubt in between would be effective in obligating him to bring two sin-offerings—[“awareness of a doubt divides the sin-offerings”—]so awareness of a doubt is effective in separating them with regard to a provisional guilt-offering.

that is, Rabbi means the following: Just as, had he acquired awareness of uncertainty between one eating and the next and had ultimately learned with certainty that he had eaten forbidden fat, the intermediate awareness of uncertainty would have been effective in making him liable for two sin-offerings—“awareness of uncertainty is divided into separate sin-offerings”—so awareness of uncertainty is effective in separating them with regard to a provisional guilt-offering.

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

Rabbi did not intend to say that awareness of the doubt was effective in obligating him to bring two sin-offerings, for with regard to a sin-offering, which requires certain knowledge, only certain knowledge is effective in dividing them. Rather, this is what Rabbi said:

Just as ordinary certain awareness divides the sin-offerings,

that is, with regard to a sin-offering, just as, had he acquired certain knowledge between the two acts of eating, that knowledge would have been effective in obligating him to bring two sin-offerings,

so awareness of doubts divides the provisional guilt-offerings,

since their liability is incurred through awareness of a doubt.

It is thus clear that Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagree concerning the law of “awareness of a doubt”: Does it constitute awareness that divides the offerings? According to Rabbi Yohanan, “knowledge of a doubt is not like knowledge,” whereas according to Reish Lakish, “knowledge of a doubt is like knowledge.” This is the reverse of their positions earlier, where according to Rabbi Yohanan “knowledge of a doubt is like knowledge,” while according to Reish Lakish it is not like knowledge!?

The Gemara elaborates on its objection:

Granted, with regard to Rabbi Yohanan, it is not difficult,

for even in his earlier statement Rabbi Yohanan said,

“Here”—

with regard to knowledge at the outset concerning entry into the Temple—

they treated

knowledge of a doubt as knowledge,” implying:

“But they did not do so throughout the entire Torah;

and the reason for the distinction is:

Here—

with regard to knowledge at the outset concerning entry into the Temple—

it

is that knowledge of a doubt is considered knowledge, because

knowledge is not written explicitly

in the Torah; rather, it is derived

from the implication of the expression

“and it became hidden”:

“and it became hidden”

is what it comes to teach [

it is derived], implying: It is hidden now, but he knew it initially.

But not throughout the entire Torah—

that is, with regard to knowledge at the end concerning a sin-offering—

they treated

knowledge of a doubt as knowledge, because

it is written [Leviticus 4, concerning the sin-offering of a ruler]:

“Or his sin becomes known to him”

“or his sin becomes known to him that he sinned in it, and he shall bring his offering,” explicitly; and this implies that

we require proper knowledge.

But with regard to Reish Lakish,

it is difficult, because

rather than establishing it—while establishing the first tanna of our Mishna—

as the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael,

who does not require knowledge at the outset,

let us establish it as the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi,

who said, “Knowledge of a doubt is considered knowledge”!?

And we answer: In fact, Reish Lakish could have explained the words of the first tanna as following Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rather,

this teaches us

Reish Lakish in his answer:

Rabbi Yishmael does not require knowledge at the outset,

and therefore he explained the matter as following Rabbi Yishmael.

We challenge this: But

it is obvious that he does not require

knowledge at the outset,

since the verses “and it became hidden” were not made superfluous for him,

“and it became hidden,”

for through this

Rabbi Yishmael is liable

for unawareness of the Temple. That is, the source of the requirement for knowledge at the outset is the repetition of the expression “and it became hidden.” Consequently, since Rabbi Yishmael expounds the repetition of “and it became hidden” to render one liable even for unawareness of the Temple, a matter not stated explicitly in the Torah, it necessarily follows that he does not require knowledge at the outset, since there is no superfluous repetition available to teach this law!?

And we answer: Nevertheless, Reish Lakish needed to teach us that according to Rabbi Yishmael knowledge at the outset is unnecessary, because

one might say: When Rabbi Yishmael does not have

knowledge at the outset

from Scripture, that is, it is indeed certain that according to Rabbi Yishmael there is no source in the verse from which to derive knowledge at the outset,

but perhaps

from tradition [

from a halakha given to Moses at Sinai]

he does have

knowledge at the outset—

that is, it is certainly true that according to Rabbi Yishmael there is no source in the written Torah from which to learn the requirement of awareness at the outset;

But

this

teaches us

that

Reish Lakish teaches us that according to Rabbi Yishmael knowledge at the outset is entirely unnecessary.

We have returned to you, the chapter “Knowledge of Impurity”

awareness at the outset—

and

this is what Reish Lakish teaches us,

that according to Rabbi Yishmael awareness at the outset is not required at all.

We will return to you, chapter “Awareness of Impurity.”

Mishna:

The Mishna now explains what we learned at the beginning of the tractate,

“Two expressions of an oath that are four”—

One who says:

“I swear that I will eat today”

something,

and

likewise one who says: “I swear”

“that I will not eat”

today.

These two oaths of utterance, which concern the future, are explicitly stated in the Torah, as it is said [Leviticus 5:4]: “Or if a person swears, expressing with his lips, to do evil or to do good”—that is, he swears concerning the future,

“to do evil”—not to eat, thereby afflicting himself; “to do good”

—that he will eat. And below, in the Mishna [25a], we derive from the verse that even matters that involve neither harm nor benefit to a person are included, whenever one swears, “I will do such-and-such,” or, “I will not do it.”

The Sages added two further oaths of utterance, which they derived from an amplification in the verse, and together there are four.

The oaths that are not explicit in the Torah but are derived through an amplification are oaths concerning the past, such as one who swore

“I ate,” and

one who swore

“I did not eat.”

One who says,

“I swear that I will not eat,” and eats

even

any amount is liable

to lashes if he acted intentionally, and to a sacrifice if he acted inadvertently, although for the other prohibitions of the Torah one is liable only for eating an olive-bulk,

the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

The Sages said

to

Rabbi Akiva: Where do we find

anywhere in the Torah

that one who eats any amount is liable?

And if so, why do you say

that this person

who swore and ate any amount

is liable?

Rabbi Akiva said to them: And where do we find one who speaks and brings a sacrifice

—that a person should be liable for a sacrifice because he failed to fulfill his statement? According to your words, how can it be that

this person

who swore

speaks and brings a sacrifice

for failing to fulfill his statement? Rather, you must necessarily say that the Torah introduced, in the section concerning oaths of utterance, the obligation of a sacrifice for merely failing to fulfill one’s statement. If so, even if he ate only any amount, he has failed to fulfill his statement, since anyone who says, “I will not eat,” intends to prohibit himself even from eating any amount.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who says, “I swear that I will eat,” and does not eat is liable.

And we raise a question about this:

Does this mean

that it should be said

that

one who says, “I swear

that I will eat”—

does it mean, ‘I will eat’?

That is, does he intend to swear that he obligates himself to eat?

And we raise a contradiction

from a Mishna in tractate Nedarim: One who says to another one of the following three expressions is forbidden to eat from the other’s food—

1.

“I swear: I will not eat from you,”

meaning: I take an oath upon myself that I will not eat from what is yours.

2.

“I swear: what I eat from you,”

meaning: Whatever I eat from what is yours will be subject to the prohibition of an oath upon me.

3.

“Not an oath that I will not eat from you,”

meaning: Only what I do not eat from what is yours will not be subject to the prohibition of an oath upon me; but what I eat from what is yours will be subject to the prohibition of an oath upon me.

In all these cases

it is forbidden

for the one who swore to eat from his fellow’s food.

This proves that the expression “that I will eat from you” means that the person wishes to prohibit the eating to himself, and not to obligate himself to eat, as it appears to mean in our Mishna?

And we answer:

Abaye said: Actually,

the meaning of “that I will eat” is

“I will eat,”

and nevertheless

there is no difficulty,

because

here it is a case where they are importuning him to eat,

they urge ]

and here it is a case where they are not

importuning him to eat.

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not importuning him to eat.