Shevuot 19b — the Talmud in English

And even in the first one

and even in the first manner; and as for the first manner, in which he did not become pure from the first going until he also went the second time,

in any event

he is impure:

and his impurity was known to him before he entered; so why should he be exempt!?

Rava said:

he answered:

Rava:

Actually, it is the first manner in the words of the first tanna. Rabbi Shimon did not disagree, even according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, for he certainly knows that he is impure—

Rather,

with what are we dealing here?

That is to say: the manner in which the first tanna according to Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda according to Rabbi Shimon, disagreed is another manner:

For example, he went the first time

and did not enter,

and

went the second time and entered, and

when he went the second time, he forgot that he had gone the first time.

In this manner, the first tanna according to Rabbi Shimon holds that he is liable. And although according to Rabbi Shimon we should exempt him, as in the case of one who sprinkled and repeated, since before the entry that creates liability he did not have certain knowledge, but only knowledge of uncertain impurity—for he does not remember the first going—and because

he has “

partial knowledge”

and not “knowledge of uncertainty”: for in the case of one who sprinkled and repeated, although he knows all the facts, his impurity is uncertain at every entry; but here, had he remembered all the facts that had previously been known to him, he would have had certain knowledge, and because of the forgetting he does not know with certainty. This is not knowledge of uncertainty, but “partial knowledge.”

And in this they disagree:

the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda:

The first tanna

according to Rabbi Shimon

holds: We say: “

partial knowledge”

is like complete knowledge.

And Rabbi Shimon holds: We do not say: “

partial

knowledge”

is like complete knowledge.

Here the Gemara returns to the beginning of the beraita, where we learned:

If he went the first time and entered, sprinkled and repeated and immersed, then went back and went the second time and entered, he is liable.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts him.

And we raise an objection against the first tanna:

And why is he liable!?

For

it is knowledge of uncertainty,

since he is in truth uncertainly impure before every entry, and there is no knowledge here to make him liable!?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

he answered:

Here they treated knowledge of uncertainty as knowledge.

And Reish Lakish said: Whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi Yishmael’s, for he says: We do not require knowledge at the beginning;

and since today he knows that he certainly entered the Temple in impurity, this is sufficient to make him liable for the ascending-and-descending offering, as with the other sin-offerings, for with them knowledge at the end is sufficient to make him liable.

a. One who eats forbidden fat unintentionally, not knowing at the time of eating that he ate forbidden fat, and afterward it became known to him that it was forbidden fat, is liable for a sin-offering.

b. One who eats two olive-bulks of forbidden fat one after the other is liable for only one sin-offering; but if it became known to him between one eating and the other that he had eaten forbidden fat, the “knowledges divide,” and he is liable for a sin-offering for each eating.

c. One who eats forbidden fat, thinking that it is ordinary fat, and afterward becomes uncertain to him whether it is forbidden fat or ordinary fat, is liable for a provisional guilt-offering.

And they raise a contradiction between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yoḥanan, and between Reish Lakish and Reish Lakish:

For it was taught: He ate uncertain forbidden fat and it became known,

that is to say: one who eats forbidden fat, thinking that it is ordinary fat, and afterward it became known to him that it is uncertain whether it is forbidden fat or ordinary fat, and he ate another

uncertain forbidden fat

afterward

and it became known

to him:

Rabbi says: Just as he brings a sin-offering for each

and every one,

as the meaning of his statement will be explained below,

so he brings a provisional guilt-offering for each and every one,

because the knowledge of uncertainty in between divides the guilt-offerings.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon said in the name of Rabbi Shimon:

He brings only one provisional guilt-offering,

and the knowledge in between does not divide,

as it is stated

in the passage concerning a provisional guilt-offering [Leviticus 5:17]: “And if a person sins, and does one of all the commandments of the Lord that may not be done, and he did not know, and he bears guilt, and he shall bring an unblemished ram from the flock according to your valuation as a guilt-offering to the priest, and the priest shall atone for him

for his unintentional act in which he acted unintentionally”

this implies several unintentional acts;

the Torah included many unintentional acts, but one provisional guilt-offering.

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagreed concerning the explanation of what Rabbi said, “Just as he brings a sin-offering for each and every one”:

And Reish Lakish said: Here Rabbi taught that knowledge of uncertainties is divided for sin-offerings,

that is to say: Rabbi intends to say that just as, had he had knowledge of uncertainty between one eating and another, and ultimately it had become known to him with certainty that he had eaten forbidden fat, the knowledge of uncertainty in between would have been effective to make him liable for two sin-offerings—“knowledges of uncertainty are divided for sin-offerings”—so knowledge of uncertainty is effective to divide them with regard to a provisional guilt-offering.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Rabbi did not intend to say that knowledge of uncertainty would be effective to make him liable for two sin-offerings, for with regard to a sin-offering, which requires certain knowledge, only certain knowledge is effective to divide; rather, this is what Rabbi said:

Just as certain knowledges ordinarily divide for sin-offerings,

that is to say: just as, with regard to a sin-offering, had certain knowledge become known to him between the two acts of eating, this knowledge would have been effective to make him liable for two sin-offerings,

so knowledges of uncertainty divide for guilt-offerings,

for their liability is through knowledge of uncertainty.

And it is clear that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagreed concerning the law of “knowledge of uncertainty”: whether it is knowledge that divides. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, “knowledge of uncertainty is not like knowledge,” whereas according to Reish Lakish, “knowledge of uncertainty is like knowledge.” This is the reverse of their positions above: according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, “knowledge of uncertainty is like knowledge,” while according to Reish Lakish it is not like knowledge!?

The Gemara continues to explain its difficulty:

Granted, concerning Rabbi Yoḥanan, it is not difficult,

for even in his statement above Rabbi Yoḥanan said

“Here”—

with regard to knowledge at the beginning concerning entry into the Temple—

“they treated

knowledge of uncertainty as knowledge,” and it implies:

“But throughout the entire Torah they did not treat it so;”

and the reason for the distinction is:

Here—

with regard to the law of knowledge at the beginning concerning entry into the Temple—

it

is that knowledge of uncertainty is knowledge, because

knowledge is not written explicitly

in the Torah, but rather it comes

from

the implication of the wording

“and it was concealed”:

it is what is being derived

that is, “now it was concealed, but at the beginning he knew.”

But throughout the entire Torah—

that is, with regard to knowledge at the end concerning a sin-offering—

they did

not treat knowledge of uncertainty as knowledge, because

it is written

[Leviticus 4, concerning the sin-offering of a leader]:

“Or it becomes known to him

his sin that he committed, and he shall bring his offering,” explicitly, and it implies:

we require proper knowledge.

But concerning Reish Lakish,

it is difficult, for

rather than establishing it

by making the first tanna of our Mishna stand

according to Rabbi Yishmael,

who does not require knowledge at the beginning,

let us establish it according to Rabbi,

who said, “Knowledge of uncertainty is knowledge”!?

And we answer: Actually, Reish Lakish could have explained the words of the first tanna according to Rabbi, but

this he teaches us

Reish Lakish through his answer:

Rabbi Yishmael does not require knowledge at the beginning,

and therefore he explained it according to Rabbi Yishmael.

And we object to this: But

it is obvious that he does not require

knowledge at the beginning,

since the verses “and it was concealed” are not superfluous to him,

“and it was concealed,”

for

that

Rabbi Yishmael is liable

for

the concealment of the Temple.

That is to say: the source of the law of knowledge at the beginning is the doubled wording “and it was concealed.” Consequently, since Rabbi Yishmael expounds the doubled wording “and it was concealed” to make one liable even for concealment of the Temple, which is not stated explicitly in the Torah, it necessarily follows that he does not require knowledge at the beginning, for there is no superfluous doubling here to teach this!?

And we answer: Nevertheless, Reish Lakish needed to teach us that according to Rabbi Yishmael knowledge at the beginning is not required, because

it might enter your mind to say: When Rabbi Yishmael does not have

knowledge at the beginning

from Scripture,

that is to say: indeed, it is certain that according to Rabbi Yishmael there is no source in the

written text from which to learn knowledge at the beginning,

but

perhaps

from tradition

[from a law transmitted to Moses at Sinai],

he does have

knowledge at the beginning—

and

this he teaches us

Reish Lakish: according to Rabbi Yishmael, knowledge at the beginning is not required at all.

We have returned to you, chapter on the knowledges of impurity

Mishna:

The Mishna now explains what we learned at the beginning of the tractate

“Two oaths that are four” —

One who says:

“An oath that I shall eat today”

something,

and

so too one who says: an oath

“that I shall not eat”

today.

These two oaths of expression, which concern the future, are explicit in the Torah, as it is stated [Leviticus 5:4]: “Or a person who swears, expressing with the lips, to do harm or to do good,” that is, he swore concerning the future:

“that I shall not eat,” whereby he afflicts himself. “To do good”

—that I shall eat. And below, in the Mishna [25a], we expound from the verse that even things that contain neither harm nor benefit to a person are included in this, whenever one swears: I shall do a certain thing, or I shall not do it].

And the Sages added to them: they expounded from the amplification of the verse two further oaths of expression, and together they are four.

The oaths that are not explicit in the Torah and are learned from an amplification are oaths concerning the past, such as one who swore

“that I ate,” and

one who swore

“that I did not eat.”

One who says

“An oath that I shall not eat,” and ate

even

any amount is liable

to lashes if he acted intentionally, and to an offering if he acted unintentionally, although concerning the other prohibitions of the Torah one is liable only for eating an olive-bulk,

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

The Sages said to him

the Sages

to Rabbi Akiva: “Where do we find

throughout the Torah

that one who eats any amount is liable?”

And if so, why do you say

that this one

who swore and ate any amount

is liable?

Rabbi Akiva said to them: “And where do we find one who speaks and brings an offering

that a person should be liable for an offering because he nullified his speech? And according to your words, it is difficult: how can it be

that this one

who swore

speaks and brings an offering

for nullifying his speech? Rather, necessarily you must say that the Torah innovated in the section of oaths of expression that there is liability for an offering for the mere nullification of his speech. And if so, even if he ate only any amount, he nullified his speech, for anyone who says ‘I shall not eat’ intends to prohibit himself even from any amount.”

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: one who says, “An oath that I shall eat,” and did not eat, is liable.

And we raise it:

does this mean

that we should say

that

one who says, “An oath

that I shall eat” —

does it mean ‘I shall eat!’

that his intention is to swear that he undertakes to eat?

And we raise an objection

from a contradiction to this from a Mishna in Nedarim: one who says to his fellow one of the following three expressions is forbidden to eat of his food —

a.

“An oath: I shall not eat yours,”

whose meaning is: an oath upon me that I shall not eat of yours.

b.

“An oath: that I shall eat yours,”

whose meaning is: whatever I eat of yours shall be upon me under the prohibition of an oath.

c.

“Not an oath that I shall not eat yours,”

whose meaning is: only what I do not eat of yours shall not be upon me under the prohibition of an oath, but what I eat of yours shall be upon me under the prohibition of an oath.

In all these cases

it is forbidden

for the one who swore to eat of his fellow’s food.

And it follows that the expression “that I shall eat yours” means that the person wishes to prohibit the eating upon himself, and not to obligate himself to eat, as it appears from our Mishna?

And we answer:

Abיי said: “Actually,

the meaning of “that I shall eat” is

‘I shall eat,’

and nevertheless

there is no difficulty,

for

here it is when they press [

they urge ]

him to eat,

and

here when they do not ![](pamud.bmp "

")

press him to eat.