Shevuot 19a — the Talmud in English

Because

since ![](pamud.bmp "

exact location of the folio")

he needed to write

the carcass of an

animal and

the carcass of a

wild animal ["

or the carcass of an impure wild animal or the carcass of an impure animal"]

in accordance with Rabbi

in the beraita above (7a), “Rabbi says: I can read ‘wild animal’; why was ‘animal’ stated?” —

Therefore

it is also written: “

or in the carcass of an

impure creeping creature

impure.”

And

as the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught: Every passage that was stated and repeated was not repeated

in its entirety

except because of one matter

one

that was newly introduced in it.

That is to say: at times, matters in which there is no novelty are written together with a novelty.

The Gemara asks further:

And Rabbi Eliezer, this “

in it” \-

from which Rabbi Akiva expounded that one must know in which transgression he sinned —

what does he do with it?

To teach:

to exclude one who is engaged

in a permitted matter and a prohibited matter came to him, and he did not intend for the substance of this one, that he is exempt from the offering; for example, he intended to cut the detached vegetable before him, and he cut the attached vegetable that was also before him; or, for example, he intended [to have intercourse] with his wife, and his sister was also with him in the bed, and his wife slipped away and his sister came beneath her; and who is liable? One who intended to cut, and thought it was detached, but it turned out to be attached; or one who thought that this labor was permitted—for in any event, he intended from the outset for the one that he indeed performed; and likewise, one who had intercourse with his sister and intended for this body, for he thought that she was his wife. Here the Gemara returns to explain what the difference is between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, and it brings another approach in explaining their words:

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

Indeed, there is no legal disagreement between them; rather,

the significance of the expositions

alone is what

is between them.

That is to say, they expound one law, this one from this verse and that one from another verse.

And likewise Rav Sheshet said: The significance of the expositions is what is between them,

for we find

that Rav Sheshet exchanges Rabbi Eliezer for Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Akiva for Rabbi Eliezer

—at times he would recite Rabbi Eliezer’s words in the Mishna in the name of Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Akiva’s words in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, and he was not particular about the matter, because there is no difference between them concerning liability and exemption.

Rava asked Rav Nahman

according to the opinion of those who exempt in a case where the Temple was forgotten:

If

this forgetting

[of impurity] and

this

[of the Temple]

are in his hand,

that is to say: if when he entered the Temple, both the impurity, for forgetting which he is liable, and the Temple, for forgetting which he is not liable, were forgotten from him,

what

is the law—will he be liable to bring a graduated offering?

He said to him

Rav Nahman to Rava:

Behold, the forgetting of impurity is in his hand, and he is liable!

He has unawareness of ritual impurity in his possession, and he is liable!

And we object:

On the contrary,

let us say:

Behold, the forgetting of the Temple

is in his hand, and he is exempt.

Rav Ashi said: We see

let us examine:

if he desists because of the impurity,

if, when they informed him of the impurity, he regrets having entered,

behold, the forgetting of impurity is in his hand,

that is to say, it became clear that he entered the Temple because he had forgotten his impurity, and

he is liable.

And

if he desists because of the Temple,

if, when they informed him that it was the Temple, without reminding him that he was impure, he regrets having entered,

behold, the forgetting of the Temple is in his hand,

and therefore it became clear that he entered because he had forgotten his knowledge of the Temple,

and he is exempt.

Said

He objected

Ravina to Rav Ashi:

How can we say that if he desists because of the Temple he is exempt?

Did he desist because of the Temple at all, except because of the impurity

? That is to say: surely he does not regret his earlier action merely because he knows that it is the Temple, for what difference does it make that it is the Temple, since he does not know that he is impure? And if he does regret it, it is surely because, through this, he paid attention and remembered that he had been impure, and therefore his regret is also because of the impurity —

And how can we say that if he desists because of the impurity he is liable?

For:

Did he desist because of the impurity at all, except because of the Temple

? For the fact that he is impure is not a reason for regret except because he paid attention and remembered that it was the Temple, and therefore he regrets it because of both of them —

Rather, it makes no difference,

and in every case he is exempt.

The Sages taught:

If there were before him

two paths,

one of

them impure

—that is to say, there is a corpse in it, lying in such a manner that anyone who walks on the path certainly becomes impure—

and one pure

—there is no corpse in it at all, but it is not known which of them is the pure one and which is the impure one—

And he walked

a person

on

the

first path and did not enter

the Temple afterward, and he walked further

on the second,

with the result that he certainly knows that he is impure, whether because of the first or because of the second,

and entered

the Temple afterward, he is

liable,

for he entered the Temple in impurity, since he is impure whether because of the first or because of the second.

And even if

he walked on

the

first path

and it is doubtful to him whether he is impure, because he does not know whether the path on which he walked was the impure path,

and entered

the Temple, and upon emerging

sprinkled and repeated the sprinkling [

he sprinkled the water of purification on the third and seventh days]

and immersed, and

only

afterward walked on

the

second path and entered,

he is

liable,

for it is certain that he entered the Temple in impurity, whether because of the first entry or because of the second entry.

Rabbi Shimon exempts

when he sprinkled, repeated the sprinkling, and immersed between the first entry and the second. For although it is certain that he entered the Temple in impurity, whether because of his first walking and the entry that followed it, or because of the second walking and the entry that followed it, nevertheless no certain knowledge that he was impure preceded any entry, since it was doubtful to him whether he was impure. And although he walked on both paths and certainly became impure, he became pure from the first walking, and it still remained doubtful to him.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda exempts in all of them.

That is to say, even in the first case,

in the name of Rabbi Shimon;

unlike the first tanna of the beraita, who holds that Rabbi Shimon exempted only in the second case.

And we object: Does Rabbi Shimon indeed exempt

in all of them

according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda!?