Shevuot 19a (יט.) — the Talmud in English

Because

since

it was necessary to write

the carcass of a

domestic animal and

the carcass of a

wild animal ["

or the carcass of an impure wild animal or the carcass of an impure domestic animal"]

in accordance with Rabbi

[in the beraita above, 7a], “Rabbi says: I read ‘wild animal’; why was ‘domestic animal’ stated?”—

Therefore

it also says: “

or with the carcass of an

impure creeping creature

impure.”

And

as the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Every passage that was stated and repeated was not repeated

in its entirety

except on account of one matter

one

that was newly introduced in it.

That is to say, at times statements containing no novel element are written together with a novel element.

The Gemara asks further:

And what does Rabbi Eliezer do with this “

in it” —

from which Rabbi Akiva derived that one must know through which transgression he sinned—

what does he do with it?

It serves to teach:

to exclude one who is merely occupied

with a permitted act, and a prohibition happened to come about through him, when he did not intend for the actual object of this act, in which case he is exempt from a sacrifice. For example, he intended to cut the detached vegetable before him, but cut the attached vegetable that was also before him; or, for example, he intended to be with his wife, and his sister was also with him in the bed, and his wife slipped away and his sister came in her place, and what is the case in which he is liable? He intended to cut, but thought that the object was detached and it turned out to be attached; or he thought that this labor was permitted—for in any event, he intended from the outset for the act that he actually performed. Similarly, if he was intimate with his sister, he intended for this body, which he thought was his wife.

Here the Gemara returns to explain what the practical difference is between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, and it presents another approach to explaining their statements:

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

Indeed, there is no legal disagreement between them; rather,

the significance of their respective expositions

is the only matter in which

they differ.

That is, they derive one law, but one derives it from this verse and the other from a different verse.

And Rav Sheshet likewise said: The significance of their respective expositions is the only matter in which they differ,

as we find

that Rav Sheshet interchanges Rabbi Eliezer with Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Akiva with Rabbi Eliezer:

At times he would recite Rabbi Eliezer’s statement in the Mishna in the name of Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Akiva’s statement in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, and he was not particular about this, because there is no difference between them concerning liability and exemption.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman

according to the view of those who exempt one who was unaware of the Temple:

If

this unawareness [of

impurity]

and this [of

the Temple]

are in his possession,

that is, when he entered the Temple, he was unaware both of the impurity for which he is liable when unaware of it and of the Temple, for which he is not liable when unaware of it,

what

is the law regarding whether he must bring a sliding-scale offering?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said to Rava:

Behold, unawareness of impurity is in his possession, and he is liable!

And we raise an objection:

On the contrary,

let us say:

Behold, unawareness of the Temple

is in his possession, and he is exempt.

Rav Ashi said: We examine

and ascertain:

If he withdraws because of the impurity

if, when they informed him of the impurity, he regrets having entered,

behold, unawareness of impurity is in his possession;

that is, it became clear that he entered the Temple because he was unaware of his impurity, and

he is liable.

But

if he withdraws because of the Temple,

if, when they informed him that it was the Temple but did not mention that he was impure, he regrets having entered,

behold, unawareness of the Temple is in his possession;

if so, it became clear that he entered because he was unaware of the Temple,

and he is exempt.

Rabina said

in astonishment

to Rav Ashi:

How can we say that if he desists because of the Temple he is exempt?

How can we say that if he withdraws because of the Temple he is exempt?

Does he withdraw because of the Temple except on account of the impurity?

That is, surely he does not regret his earlier act merely because he now knows that it was the Temple, for what difference does it make that it was the Temple, since he does not know that he was impure? If he regrets it, it must be because this caused him to realize and remember that he had been impure, and therefore his regret is also on account of the impurity—

and how can we say that if he withdraws because of the impurity he is liable? For

does he withdraw because of the impurity except on account of the Temple?

His being impure is not in itself a reason for regret; it is a reason only because it caused him to realize and remember that it was the Temple. Thus, his regret is because of both factors—

Rather, it makes no difference,

and in every case he is exempt.

The Sages taught: If there were before a person

two

paths,

one

impure—

that is, it contains a corpse, lying in such a manner that anyone who walks along the path certainly becomes impure—

and one pure,

which contains no corpse at all, but it is not known which is the pure path and which is the impure one—

And he walked

a person

along

the

first path and did not enter

the Temple afterward, and then walked

along the second,

so that he certainly knows that he became impure, whether because of the first path or because of the second,

and entered

the Temple afterward, he is

liable,

since he entered the Temple while impure: he is impure either because of the first path or because of the second.

And even if he

walked along

the

first

path and is uncertain whether he is impure, since he does not know whether the path along which he walked was the impure path,

and entered

the Temple, and after leaving

was sprinkled and repeated the sprinkling

[the water of purification was sprinkled upon him on the third and seventh days]

and immersed, and

only

afterward walked along

the

second path and entered,

he is

liable,

for it is certain that he entered the Temple while impure, whether because of the first entry or because of the second.

Rabbi Shimon exempts

him when he was sprinkled, had the sprinkling repeated, and immersed between the first entry and the second. For although he certainly entered the Temple while impure—either because of his first walking and the entry that followed it, or because of the second walking and the entry that followed it—nevertheless, neither entry was preceded by certain knowledge that he was impure, since he was uncertain whether he was impure. Although he walked along both paths and certainly became impure, he became pure from the first walking, and he still remained uncertain

. And Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda exempts in all of them,

that is, even in the first case,

in the name of Rabbi Shimon;

unlike the first tanna of the beraita, who maintains that Rabbi Shimon exempted him only in the second case.

And we raise an objection: Does Rabbi Shimon indeed

exempt in all of them,

according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda!?