Shevuot 18b — the Talmud in English

And

if we say

in the Temple

it is that

we learned:

“the long way and the short way,” and not concerning a menstruating woman!?

That is to say: since in both this case and that case he transgresses, and the fact that he is obligated to withdraw with a dead organ and not with a living organ is because this prohibition is more severe; if so, this is comparable to one who became impure in the Temple courtyard, who must choose to transgress by the shorter way, which is lighter, rather than to leave by the longer way, which is more severe. And if so, the tannaitic text should have used identical language in both cases, and said: “He withdrew by the long way,” meaning that he waited until the organ died—he is exempt. “He withdrew by the short way,” meaning that he withdrew immediately—he is liable!?

And necessarily, if he waits until the organ dies, he does not transgress at all, and it is therefore no longer appropriate to use here the language “long way” and “short way,” as in the Temple courtyard. For in the Temple courtyard, both ways are prohibited, and he chooses one of them because it is lighter. But here we obligate him not to transgress at all, and this is not a “short way”; rather, it is no way at all.

And we answer:

Rather

one must say that even when he withdraws with a dead organ, he transgresses; it is only that he must choose the lighter prohibition and not the more severe prohibition. And the reason that the Mishna did not state the language “long and short” concerning a menstruating woman, as it stated concerning one who became impure in the Temple courtyard, is

because it is not comparable

to one who became impure in the Temple courtyard. For in the Temple courtyard, when he transgresses by the “long way,” he is liable, whereas by the “short way” he is exempt; but here, by the “long way”—when he waits until the organ dies—he is exempt, and by the “short way”—when he withdraws immediately—he is liable.

Rav Huna son of Rav Natan raised an objection

to Abaye’s statement:

And did Abaye say that he is compelled

concerning his withdrawal with a dead organ? That is because he should not have anticipated that she would become impure,

therefore, evidently, it is when she is not near her menstrual period

—when in truth he should not have anticipated that she would become impure—

that we are speaking [

our Mishna is dealing with ]—

But Abaye

is the one who

said

concerning our Mishna that he is

liable for two

—both for the entry and for the withdrawal—

evidently, we are dealing with the time near her menstrual period

in our Mishna, as explained above: because it is near her menstrual period, he is liable for two.

And we answer:

When Abaye’s statement was said

—that he is liable for two—it was not said concerning our Mishna, for our Mishna deals with one who is compelled and is not liable for the entry, but only for the withdrawal, once he knows that she has become impure, and he should have withdrawn with lesser benefit; rather,

it was said generally

that is to say: it is a statement in its own right that Abaye said, namely, that in a situation where he is not compelled, he is liable for two, for the entry and for the withdrawal.

Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosei ben Lakonia asked Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonia:

The warning concerning one who has intercourse with a menstruating woman—from where is it derived from the Torah?

Rabbi Shimon took

Rabbi Shimon

a clod and threw it at him

at Rabbi Yonatan [he took a piece of earth and threw it at him] and said:

The warning concerning one who has intercourse with a menstruating woman!?

Are you asking me, “The warning concerning one who has intercourse with a menstruating woman—from where is it derived?” Is it not an explicit verse:

“And to a woman in the impurity of her menstruation you shall not draw near”!?

Rather,

this is the question:

The warning concerning one who is having intercourse with a pure woman, and she says to him, ‘I have become impure,’ that he should not withdraw immediately

with a living organ, but should wait until the organ dies, and then withdraw—

from where do we know this?

He said

Rabbi

Hezekiah:

because

the verse says [Leviticus 15:24]:

“and if a man shall surely lie with her,”

“and her menstruation shall be upon him,”

“and he shall be impure for seven days”; and we learned

even

if he had intercourse with her

at the time of her menstruation,

when she was pure at the time he had intercourse with her, but became impure beneath him,

it shall be upon him

as the prohibition of a menstruating woman: he is obligated to wait until the organ dies, and if he withdraws immediately, he has transgressed the prohibition of a positive commandment, “and her menstruation shall be upon him.”

And the Gemara asks:

We find

the prohibition of a

positive commandment,

but the

negative commandment

for one who withdrew with a living organ—

from where do we know it?

Rabbi

Rabbi

Rav Pappa:

because

the verse says [Leviticus 18:19]: “And to a woman in the impurity of her menstruation”

you shall

not draw near.”

And the expression

“you shall not draw near”

to a menstruating woman

also means, you shall not withdraw

from a menstruating woman

is

rather, stand there until the organ dies.

As it is written [Isaiah 65]: “I spread out my hands all day to a rebellious people, who walk in a way that is not good, after their thoughts; the people who anger Me constantly to My face …

[to the prophet],

saying

[to the prophet]

‘Draw near to yourself’

[stand by yourself],

‘Do not approach me, for I have sanctified you’

[do not touch me, for through this touch you will become impure, since I am impure and you are holy. And they said this in a mocking expression]. Thus, the expression “you shall not draw near” is interpreted: stand by yourself.

The Sages taught:

It is written:

“And you shall separate”

[and separate]

“the children of Israel from their impurity,”

and adjacent to it, in the same subject, “and the menstruating woman in her impurity”—

Rabbi Yoshiyah said: From here, a warning to the children of Israel that they should separate from their wives near their menstrual periods—

And how much

is the measure of “near their menstrual periods”?

Rava said: One period,

that is to say: that period [day or night] in which she is expected to see [blood], he separates from her from its beginning.

Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: Anyone who does not separate from his wife near her menstrual period—even if he has sons like the sons of Aaron

the

priest, they are

dead.

As it is written

“And you shall separate the children of Israel from their impurity,”

and adjacent to it is

“and the menstruating woman in her impurity,”

and from here we learned to separate because of the concern of menstruation near her menstrual period,

and adjacent to it

in the adjacent portion

“After the death of

the two sons of Aaron,” teaching us that anyone who does not separate—even if his sons were like the sons of Aaron—they are dead.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

Anyone who separates from his wife near her menstrual period will have male children, as it is written

at the end of the portion of Shemini [Leviticus 11:47]:

“To distinguish between the impure and the pure,”

and adjacent to it

in the adjacent portion

“When a woman conceives and gives birth to a male.”

Thus we learned that one who distinguishes between impurity and purity by separating from his wife near her menstrual period will merit the birth of a male.

Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said: Anyone who separates from his wife near her menstrual period will have sons fit for issuing rulings, as it is written [Leviticus 10:10, in the portion of those who drink wine]: “And

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Anyone who recites the blessing over wine in havdala at the conclusion of Shabbat will have male children, as it is written

to distinguish and to teach” [“to distinguish between the sacred and the profane and between the impure and the pure, and to teach the children of Israel”]. Thus we learned that one who distinguishes between the impure and the pure will have sons fit for issuing rulings.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Anyone who makes the distinction over wine at the conclusion of Shabbat will have male children, as it is written

in the portion of those who drink wine

“

to distinguish between the sacred and the profane,”

and it is written there

at the end of the portion of Shemini

“to distinguish between the impure and the pure.”

Thus we learned to compare distinguishing between the sacred and the profane with distinguishing between impurity and purity,

and adjacent to it

to distinguishing between impurity and purity is:

“When a woman conceives

and gives birth to a male”; and we learned that one who distinguishes between the sacred and the profane will likewise have male children, like one who distinguishes between impurity and purity.

Rabbi Joshua ben Levi,

according to his own method,

said:

Anyone who makes the distinction over wine at the conclusion of Shabbat,

will have sons fit for issuing rulings, as it is written

“to distinguish and to teach,”

and from there we learned:

One who distinguishes between impurity and purity will have sons fit for issuing rulings, and one who distinguishes between the sacred and the profane will likewise have this, for “to distinguish” and “to distinguish” are stated.

Rabbi Benjamin bar Yefet said in the name of Rabbi Eleazar:

Anyone who sanctifies himself at the time of intercourse

and conducts himself in a modest manner,

will have male children, as it is stated

at the end of the portion of Shemini [Leviticus 10:44]:

“And you shall sanctify yourselves and you shall be holy,”

and adjacent to it

in the following portion

“When a woman conceives

and gives birth to a male.”

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says:

“And the creeping creature, and it was concealed from him,”

for being unaware of the creeping creature he is liable, but he is not liable for being unaware of the Temple; Rabbi Akiva says: “And it was concealed from him, and he is impure”—for being unaware of the impurity he is liable, but he is not liable for being unaware of the Temple:

The Gemara asks:

What is the difference between them?

In what did Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree? For according to both the one and the other, he is not liable for being unaware of the Temple, unlike the first tanna, who obligates even one from whom the Temple was concealed while he remembers the impurity?

Rabbi

Rabbi

Hezekiah said: A creeping creature and an animal carcass are the difference between them.

That is to say: in any event, concerning being unaware of the Temple there is no practical difference between them; rather, they disagreed concerning being unaware of impurity, which requires knowledge at the outset: with what knowledge is he liable? And he proceeds to explain.

Rabbi Eliezer holds: We require that he know

at the outset, before he entered the Temple,

whether he became impure through a creeping creature or whether he became impure through an animal carcass

[by what he became impure]. And then he is liable when the impurity was completely concealed from him. But if at the outset he knew that he had become impure, only he did not know through what he had become impure, then he is not liable when the impurity was completely concealed from him.

And Rabbi Akiva holds: We do not require that he know

at the outset what his impurity was. For it is written, “And it was concealed from him, and he is impure,”

since once he knew that he had become impure in some way, he does not need

to know

whether he became impure through a creeping creature or whether he became impure through an animal carcass.

And Ulla likewise said: A creeping creature and an animal carcass are the difference between them!

And the proof that Ulla too said so:

For Ulla raised

a contradiction

between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Eliezer, and resolved it,

and explained that here Rabbi Eliezer learned from the verse that one must know at the outset through what he became impure.

And this is how Ulla raised the contradiction:

Did Rabbi Eliezer say, “We require that he know whether he became impure through a creeping creature or whether he became impure through an animal carcass”?

And he raises a contradiction

to this from what we learned [Keritot 19a]: One who had forbidden fat and notar before him, and concerning both of them there is the prohibition of karet when intentional and a sin-offering when unwitting, and he ate one of them unwittingly, but does not know which of them; or it was Shabbat and Yom Kippur, and he was unwitting and performed labor on one of them, but does not know on which of them; or his menstruating wife and his sister were with him in the house, and he had intercourse with one of them unwittingly, but does not know with which of them—Rabbi Joshua exempts, and Rabbi Eliezer obligates him to bring an offering.

Rabbi Eliezer said: Whichever way you look at it,

he is liable for a sin-offering, whether

he ate forbidden fat,

he is

liable, or whether

he ate notar,

he is liable.

And likewise, if

he desecrated Shabbat, he is liable,

and if

he desecrated Yom Kippur, he is liable.

And likewise, if

he had intercourse with his menstruating wife, he is liable,

and if

he had intercourse with his sister, he is liable!

Rabbi Joshua said to him: It says

“Or he informs him of his sin that he committed,” and we expound from the fact that it is written “it” that he is not liable to bring an offering

until it becomes known to you through what he sinned!?

And Ulla proves that Rabbi Eliezer is the one who holds that it is not necessary to know even which sin he committed. If so, why, concerning impurity of the Temple, did he require that he know at the outset through what he became impure, whether through a creeping creature or through an animal carcass?

And he answers,

and Ulla answered:

There,

concerning liability to a sin-offering for an ordinary sin,

“

that he sinned—

and he shall bring,”

the Merciful One said.

And it implies: for

any sin whatsoever,

even if he does not know what it is, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

But

here,

concerning impurity of the Temple,

since

it is written [Leviticus 5]: “Or a person who touches

any impure thing,”

which includes all impure things, if so, this that the verse added and said,

“or the carcass of a creeping creature,”

“impure,”

why do I need it?

Conclude from it

that the verse came to say that concerning impurity of the Temple

we require that he know

at the outset

whether he became impure through a creeping creature or whether he became impure through an animal carcass.

And Rabbi Akiva,

who disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer, holds that no proof is to be brought from here.

at the outset

whether he became impure through a creeping animal or whether he became impure through an unslaughtered carcass.

And Rabbi Akiva,

who disputes Rabbi Eliezer, holds that no proof can be brought from here.