Shevuot 18b (יח:) — the Talmud in English

And

if it were

we, in the Temple

that

we learned: “the longer way and the shorter way,” but not concerning a niddah—!?

This means: Since in both cases he transgresses, and the reason he is obligated to withdraw with a flaccid organ rather than with an erect organ is that this prohibition is more severe, this should be comparable to one who became impure in the Temple courtyard, who must choose to transgress by taking the shorter route, which is less severe, rather than by leaving by the longer route, which is more severe. If so, the tanna should have taught identical wording in both cases, saying: “If he withdrew by the longer route”—meaning that he waited until the organ became flaccid—he is exempt; “if he withdrew by the shorter route”—meaning that he withdrew immediately—he is liable!?

Necessarily, if he waits until the organ becomes flaccid, he does not transgress at all. Therefore, it is no longer appropriate to teach here the terms “longer route” and “shorter route,” as in the Temple courtyard. In the Temple courtyard, both routes involve a prohibition, and he chooses one of them because it is less severe. Here, however, we require him not to transgress at all; this is not a “shorter route,” but no route at all.

And we answer:

Rather

one may always say that even when he withdraws with a flaccid organ, he transgresses; he must merely choose the less severe prohibition rather than the more severe one. The reason the Mishna did not use the expression “longer and shorter” concerning a niddah, as it did concerning one who became impure in the Temple courtyard, is

because it is not comparable

to one who became impure in the Temple courtyard. For in the Temple courtyard, when he leaves by the “longer route,” he is liable, whereas by the “shorter route” he is exempt. Here, by contrast, on the “longer route”—when he waits until the organ becomes flaccid—he is exempt, while on the “shorter route”—when he withdraws immediately—he is liable.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, raised an objection

to Abaye’s statement:

And did Abaye say that he is coerced

with regard to his withdrawal with a flaccid organ? This is because he should not have anticipated that she would become impure

; apparently, we are speaking when it is not near her expected menstrual period

—when in fact he should not have anticipated that she would become impure—

we are speaking [that is, this is the case addressed by our Mishna]—

But Abaye

is the one who

said

concerning our Mishna that he is

liable for

two

offerings, both for entering and for withdrawing

; apparently, our Mishna is speaking when it is near her expected menstrual period

as explained above: because it is near her expected menstrual period, he is liable for two offerings.

And we answer:

When Abaye’s statement was made—that he is liable for two offerings—he did not say it concerning our Mishna. Our Mishna deals with one who is coerced and is not liable for entering, but only for withdrawing once he knows that she has become impure, and he should have withdrawn with lesser benefit. Rather,

it was stated generally,

meaning: It was an independent statement that Abaye made, that in a case where he is not coerced, he is liable for two offerings, for entering and for withdrawing.

Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosei ben Lakonya asked Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya:

From where in the Torah is there a warning against one who engages in intercourse with a niddah?

Rabbi Shimon took

a clod of earth and

threw it at

Rabbi Yonatan [he took a clod of earth and threw it at him], and said:

A warning against one who engages in intercourse with a niddah!?

Are you asking me from where there is a warning against one who engages in intercourse with a niddah? Is it not an explicit verse: “

And to a woman during the impurity of her menstruation you shall not draw near”!?

Rather,

this is the question:

What is the source of a warning to one who is engaging in intercourse with a pure woman and she tells him, ‘I have become impure,’ that he should not withdraw immediately

with an erect organ, but should wait until the organ becomes flaccid and then withdraw

? From where do we derive this?

He said

that

Hezekiah

explained: Because

the verse says [Leviticus 15:24]: “And if a man shall surely lie with her,

and her menstrual impurity shall be upon him

, and he shall be impure for seven days.” And we learn from this that

even

if

he had intercourse with her

during her menstrual period,

when she was pure at the time he had intercourse with her, but became impure while beneath him,

it shall be upon him

as the prohibition of a niddah: He is obligated to wait until the organ becomes flaccid, and if he withdraws immediately, he has transgressed the prohibition of failing to perform the positive mitzva: “And her menstrual impurity shall be upon him.”

The Gemara discusses this:

We find

the prohibition of a

positive mitzva,

but

the prohibition of a negative mitzva

for one who withdraws with an erect organ

from where do we derive it?

Rav Pappa

explained: Because

the verse says [Leviticus 18:19]: “And to a woman during the impurity of her menstruation

you shall not draw near

.” The expression

“you shall not draw near”

with regard to a niddah

also means,

you shall not withdraw

from a niddah

either

; rather, remain there until the organ becomes flaccid.

As it is written

[Isaiah 65]: “I spread out My hands all day to a rebellious people, who walk in a way that is not good, after their thoughts; the people who provoke Me continually to My face…

who say

[to the prophet],

‘Draw near to yourself

[remain by yourself],

do not approach me, for I have sanctified you

[do not touch me, for through this contact you will become impure, since I am impure and you are holy].” They would say this mockingly. Thus, the expression “you shall not draw near” is interpreted as: remain by yourself.

The Sages taught:

It is written: “

And you shall separate

[and you shall set apart]

the Children of Israel from their impurity

,” and immediately afterward, in the same context: “And the menstruating woman in her impurity”—

Rabbi Josiah said: From here there is a warning to the Children of Israel that they must separate from their wives near the time of their expected menstrual period—

And how much

is the measure of “near the time of their expected menstrual period”?

Rava said: One period of time,

meaning: during the period of time [day or night] in which she is expected to see menstrual blood, he must separate from her from its beginning.

Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: Anyone who does not separate from his wife near the time of her expected menstrual period, even if he has sons like the sons of Aaron

the

Kohen, they will

die.

As it is written

at the end of the passage concerning the one afflicted with scale disease [Leviticus 15:31]: “

And you shall separate the Children of Israel from their impurity

,” and immediately afterward: “

And the menstruating woman in her impurity

.” From here we learn that one must separate due to concern for menstruation near the time of her expected period.

And immediately afterward

in the following passage,

“After the death

of the two sons of Aaron,” teaching us that anyone who does not separate—even if his sons are like the sons of Aaron—they will die.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

Anyone who separates from his wife near the time of her expected menstrual period will have male children, as it is written

at the end of the passage concerning the creeping animals [Leviticus 11:47]: “

To distinguish between the impure and the pure

,”

and immediately afterward

in the following passage: “

When a woman conceives and gives birth to a male.” We have therefore learned that one who distinguishes between impurity and purity by separating from his wife near the time of her expected menstrual period will merit the birth of a male.

Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said: Anyone who separates from his wife near the time of her expected menstrual period will have sons fit to issue halakhic rulings, as it is written [Leviticus 10:10, in the passage concerning those who drink wine]: “And

to distinguish and to teach” [“to distinguish between the sacred and the profane, and between the impure and the pure, and to teach the Children of Israel”]. We have therefore learned that one who distinguishes between the impure and the pure will have sons fit to issue halakhic rulings.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Anyone who recites the blessing over wine in havdala at the conclusion of Shabbat will have male children, as it is written

in the passage concerning those who drink wine,

“

to distinguish between the sacred and the profane

,”

and it is written there

at the end of the passage concerning the creeping animals,

“

to distinguish between the impure and the pure.”

We have thus learned that distinguishing between the sacred and the profane is comparable to distinguishing between impurity and purity,

and immediately afterward

the distinction between impurity and purity appears:

“When a woman conceives

and gives birth to a male.” We learn that one who distinguishes between the sacred and the profane will likewise have male children, like one who distinguishes between impurity and purity.

Rabbi Joshua ben Levi,

in accordance with

his own approach,

said: Anyone who recites the blessing over wine in havdala at the conclusion of Shabbat

will have sons fit to issue halakhic rulings, as it is written

“

to distinguish and to teach,”

and from there we have learned: One who distinguishes between impurity and purity will have sons fit to issue halakhic rulings, and one who distinguishes between the sacred and the profane will likewise have such sons, since “to distinguish” is stated in both cases.

Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet said that Rabbi Elazar:

Anyone who sanctifies himself at the time of intercourse

and conducts himself modestly

will have male children, as it is stated

at the end of the passage concerning the creeping animals [Leviticus 11:44]: “

And you shall sanctify yourselves and be holy,”

and immediately afterward

in the following passage:

“When a woman conceives

and gives birth to a male.”

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says: “

And the creeping animal was concealed from him,”

meaning that one is liable for failing to realize that he had touched a creeping animal, but is not liable for failing to realize that he had entered the Temple; Rabbi Akiva says: “And it was concealed from him, and he was impure,” meaning that one is liable for failing to realize his impurity, but is not liable for failing to realize that he had entered the Temple:

The Gemara asks:

What is the difference between them?

What is the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva? According to both the one and the other, he is not liable for failing to realize that he had entered the Temple, unlike the first tanna, who holds him liable even when he failed to realize that he had entered the Temple while remembering his impurity?

He said

that

Hezekiah explained: A creeping animal and an unslaughtered carcass are the difference between them.

That is: In terms of failing to realize that he had entered the Temple, there is indeed no practical difference between them. Rather, they disagree with regard to failing to realize his impurity, which requires awareness at the outset: what kind of awareness renders him liable, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

Rabbi Eliezer holds: We require that he know

at the outset, before he enters the Temple,

whether he became impure through a creeping animal or whether he became impure through an unslaughtered carcass [what rendered him impure]. He is then liable when his impurity is subsequently entirely forgotten. But if at the outset he knew that he had become impure, but did not know through what he had become impure, he is not liable when his impurity is subsequently entirely forgotten.

And Rabbi Akiva holds: We do not require that he know

at the outset what his impurity was. For it is written: “And it was concealed from him, and he was impure

”; since he knew that he had become impure in some manner, he need not

know

whether he became impure through a creeping animal or whether he became impure through an unslaughtered carcass.

And Ulla likewise said: A creeping animal and an unslaughtered carcass are the difference between them!

The proof that Ulla said this as well is as follows:

For Ulla raises

a contradiction

between one statement of Rabbi Eliezer and another statement of Rabbi Eliezer, and resolves it,

explaining that here Rabbi Eliezer derives from the verse that one must know at the outset through what he became impure.

And this is how Ulla raises the contradiction:

Did Rabbi Eliezer say that we require that he know whether he became impure through a creeping animal or whether he became impure through an unslaughtered carcass?

And we raise a contradiction

from what we learned [Keretot 19a]: If one had forbidden fat and notar before him, and there was a prohibition of karet for intentional consumption and a sin-offering for unwitting consumption in the case of each, and he unwittingly ate one of them but did not know which one; or if it was Shabbat and Yom Kippur, and he unwittingly performed labor on one of them but did not know on which one; or if his wife, who was a niddah, and his sister were with him in the house, and he unwittingly had intercourse with one of them but did not know with which one—Rabbi Joshua exempts him, and Rabbi Eliezer obligates him to bring an offering.

Rabbi Eliezer said: Whichever way you look at it,

he is liable to bring a sin-offering: Whether

he ate forbidden fat,

he is

liable, or whether

he ate notar

, he is

liable. Likewise, if

he desecrated Shabbat, he is liable,

and if

he desecrated Yom Kippur, he is liable. Likewise, if

he had intercourse with his wife, who was a niddah, he is liable,

and if

he had intercourse with his sister, he is liable!

Rabbi Joshua said to him: It says

“

Or it becomes known to him that he sinned in it,”

and we derive from the fact that the word “in it” is written: He is not liable to bring an offering

until it becomes known to you in what he sinned!?

Ulla proves that Rabbi Eliezer is the one who holds that one need not know even which sin he committed. If so, why, with regard to impurity involving the Temple, did he require that he know at the outset whether he became impure through a creeping animal or through an unslaughtered carcass?

And he resolves

it, and Ulla answers:

There,

with regard to liability for a sin-offering for an ordinary sin,

“

that he sinned

—

and he shall bring,”

the Merciful One said.

This implies that for

any sin,

even if he does not know what it was, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

But

here,

with regard to impurity involving the Temple,

since

it is

written

[Leviticus 5]: “Or a person who touches

any impure thing,”

which includes all impure things, if so, why did the verse add and state: “

Or an unslaughtered carcass of a creeping animal

that is impure”?

Why do I need this?

Conclude from it

that with regard to impurity involving the Temple,

we require that he know

at the outset

whether he became impure through a creeping animal or whether he became impure through an unslaughtered carcass.

And Rabbi Akiva,

who disputes Rabbi Eliezer, holds that no proof can be brought from here.