Shevuot 18a (יח.) — the Talmud in English

And if we are dealing with an ignoramus

—that is, one who does not know about the prohibition against withdrawing once she has become impure, and therefore is not intentional regarding withdrawal, but says that it is permitted and is liable to bring a sin-offering for it—then this is difficult: Since he is an ignoramus, it follows that he also does not know what the Sages will state below, on page 18b, that a man must separate from his wife during the time—day or night—in which she is expected to see blood. If so, even when he learns that she has become impure, he will think that he is not liable to a sin-offering for the initial act of intercourse, since he considers himself compelled and believes that he could not have anticipated that she would become impure. If so:

Both this and that

—the initial act of intercourse and the withdrawal—are like one who

ate two olive-bulk portions of forbidden fat in one lapse of awareness!

For whenever he did not learn that he had become liable for the first act , between one transgression and the other, he is not liable to bring two sin-offerings. Here, too, he did not learn that he had become liable for the initial act, since the ignoramus believes that he was compelled regarding it.

Rather,

for example, he had intercourse with her

when it was not near the time of her expected period—

And with whom?

If you say it was with a Torah scholar,

this cannot be said, for:

He is liable for neither one,

meaning that he is not liable even for one of them, because:

For the initial act

he is not liable, since he was

compelled,

as he did not know and had no reason to consider that she might see blood—

And likewise,

for the withdrawal

he is not liable, since he was

intentional, for he is a Torah scholar and knows that it is prohibited to withdraw while the organ is still erect.

as he is a Torah scholar and knows that it is forbidden to withdraw while the organ is still erect.

If we are dealing with an ignoramus,

who does not know of the prohibition against withdrawing while the organ is still erect, this too cannot be said, for:

Nevertheless,

one

alone

is what he is liable for, namely,

namely

the withdrawal.

But he is not liable for the initial act, since he was compelled. If so, under what circumstances did they say that he is liable for two!?

Rava then said: In fact,

for example, he had intercourse with her

near the time of her expected period, and he was a Torah scholar,

who knows what the Sages stated, that a man must separate from his wife near the time of her expected period, and who knows, once she becomes impure, that he is liable to a sin-offering. He is therefore not compelled, and he has awareness between one transgression and the other. And as for the difficulty that if so he should not be liable for the withdrawal, since he knows the prohibition against withdrawing while the organ is erect and is intentional—

Do not raise this difficulty:

and

he is

a Torah scholar with regard to this,

the obligation to separate near the time of her expected period,

but he is not a Torah scholar with regard to this,

the prohibition against withdrawing while the organ is erect.

Rava said: And both of them

—these two liabilities to bring sin-offerings—

were taught

by the Sages:

The initial act was taught,

and

the withdrawal

also

was taught.

The withdrawal was taught, as it is taught

in our Mishna:

If he was having intercourse with a pure woman and she said to him, “

I have become impure,”

and he withdrew immediately, he is liable

to a sin-offering, since he did not know of the prohibition against withdrawing while the organ is flaccid.

The initial act was taught

in the Mishna in tractate Niddah, on page 14a, as we learned: The practice of Jewish women is to engage in intercourse while using two cloths for examination, one for him and one for her [to wipe with after intercourse]—

If

blood

is found on

the cloth

belonging to him,

with which he wiped the organ,

both are impure—

she because of her status as a menstruating woman, and he because he had intercourse with a menstruating woman—

and they are liable to bring an offering.

It is thus apparent that he is liable to bring an offering if she became impure during intercourse.

Is it not

for example, that he had intercourse with her

near the time of her expected period,

when he is not compelled,

and it is for the initial act

that they become liable to bring an offering? Thus, the initial act was taught.

Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: I will nevertheless say to you that

the Mishna in Niddah is discussing even

a case

in which he had intercourse with her

not near the time of her expected period.

And

it is not for the initial act that he becomes liable, since he was compelled; rather,

it is for the withdrawal

that he becomes liable, because he withdrew while the organ was erect, as, for example, she said to him, “I have become impure,” and he was an ignoramus who did not know of the prohibition against withdrawal. The initial act near the time of her expected period has still not been taught.

And if you would say

that if the Mishna makes him liable for withdrawal,

why do I need the teaching about withdrawal

of Rabbi, the compiler of the Mishnayot, to teach us that he is liable to bring an offering?

This

has already

taught it

with regard to withdrawal in our Mishna, where it states that he is liable.

One can say:

This

—the latter clause of that Mishna—

was necessary to teach us,

as it states there:

If [blood] is found on her [cloth] “immediately” [when she examined herself directly after intercourse], both are impure [she because she is a menstruating woman, and he because he had intercourse with a menstruating woman], and they are liable to bring an offering—

If

[blood]

is found on hers

after some time [because she did not examine herself immediately], they are

impure by uncertainty,

since it is not known whether he had intercourse with a menstruating woman, as perhaps she saw blood only after intercourse,

and they are exempt from bringing an offering.

And since the tanna needed to teach

—because the tanna taught—“

If it is found on hers,”

to distinguish between immediately and after some time,

he also taught

“

If it is found on his,” even though we had already learned this law from our Mishna.

He said

—he challenged

Ravina to Rav Adda

bar Mattana:

Can you really establish that Mishna

of tractate Niddah

as referring to intercourse not near the time of her expected period, and

the liability to bring an offering is

for the withdrawal, because she told him, “I have become impure,” before he withdrew!?

because she told him, “I have become impure,” before he withdrew?

But “

If it is found

on his, both are impure and liable to bring an offering,”

it teaches

there,

and “

If it is found,”

afterward

[after intercourse]

implies,

that he wiped himself after intercourse and blood was found on the cloth, and from this they know that she became impure—

And if it is for the withdrawal

that he is liable, because she told him, “I have become impure,” then

from the outset, when he withdrew from her

[at the beginning, when she explained to him, “I have become impure”],

from the outset, he had awareness;

whereas the Mishna implies that he learned of her menstruation only after intercourse!?

Rava said

to Rav Adda bar Mattana:

Obey what your teacher says

[listen attentively to the words of your teacher Ravina, who challenged your words]!

He said to him

Rav Adda bar Mattana to Rava:

How can you

interpret it as referring to the initial act, specifically when he had intercourse with her near the time of her expected period,

for

this

is taught concerning

that Mishna in Niddah:

This is the positive mitzva concerning a menstruating woman, for which

the court

is liable—

And if it is so,

that the intention of the Mishna is to make him liable for the initial act, then

it is a negative mitzva

not to have intercourse with a menstruating woman, and there is no positive mitzva involved; necessarily, the Mishna comes to make him liable for the withdrawal, which is a positive mitzva, as we learned in our Mishna!?

He said

—he answered

him,

Rava to Rav Adda bar Mattana:

If you teach

[if you recite the beraita as you brought it],

it is missing

that clause,

and teach it this way

[as in the other instances of “a clause is missing, and this is what it teaches”]:

This

—the case taught in our Mishna, in which he is liable when the blood is found on his cloth—

is the negative mitzva

concerning a menstruating woman, for which

the court

is liable.

And if he was having intercourse with a pure woman and she said to him, “

he was having relations with a woman who was pure and she said to him, “

I have become impure,”

and he withdrew immediately, this is the positive mitzva concerning a menstruating woman, for which

the court

is liable.

The Master said

in our Mishna: He was having intercourse with a pure woman and she said to him, “I have become impure,” and

he withdrew immediately, he is liable:

The Gemara asks:

What should he do

[how should he act]?

Rav Huna said in the name of Rava: He should press all ten fingernails into the ground,

meaning that he should hold himself still, without thrusting with the organ, until it becomes flaccid—

And praiseworthy is he

[and fortunate is he] if he does so.

Rava said:

Our Mishna, which teaches: “He withdrew immediately, he is liable,” implying that one who withdraws while the organ is flaccid is exempt—

that is to say

that

one who engages in intercourse

with a flaccid

organ in forbidden sexual relations

is

exempt—

For if it enters your mind

that in all cases one who engages in intercourse with a flaccid organ

is liable,

and that even when he waits until the organ becomes flaccid he transgresses a prohibition, then necessarily,

here,

when he withdraws with a flaccid organ,

for what reason

is he

exempt

from a sin-offering?

Because

the case is one in which it was not near the time of her expected period,

and he was compelled,

since he had no reason to anticipate that she would become impure— but

if he was compelled,

because he had intercourse with her not near the time of her expected period, and this is the reason for his exemption when he withdrew with a flaccid organ, even though it is prohibited,

then when he withdrew with an erect organ, too, he should be exempt

from a sin-offering, for the very same reason, since

he was compelled.

What difference is there whether, under compulsion, he performed this prohibited act or performed another prohibited act under compulsion!?

Rather, he is certainly not compelled, since he had intercourse with her near the time of her expected period. The reason for his exemption when the organ is flaccid is that this is not intercourse at all; therefore, when he withdraws while the organ is erect, he is liable. From here it follows that anyone who engages in intercourse with a flaccid organ is not liable.

Abaye said to Rava,

rejecting his proof from the Mishna that one who engages in intercourse with a flaccid organ in forbidden sexual relations is exempt:

I will nevertheless say to you: One who engages in intercourse with a flaccid organ in forbidden sexual relations is liable; and here,

when he withdrew while the organ was flaccid,

for what reason is he exempt

from a sin-offering?

Because he was compelled. And as for what you said,

to prove otherwise, based on the difficulty:

When he withdrew immediately, why is he liable

since he was compelled? I will say to you:

He is liable because

he should have withdrawn with minimal pleasure

while the organ was flaccid,

but he withdrew with greater pleasure

while it was still erect.

Rabba bar Hanan said to Abaye: If so,

according to your words, that withdrawal with a flaccid organ is also intercourse and he necessarily must transgress a prohibition, except that he must withdraw with a flaccid organ because this involves minimal pleasure and a less severe prohibition, rather than withdraw with an erect organ because this involves greater pleasure and a more severe prohibition—then

we find

a distinction between the

longer

“path” and the

shorter

“path”

in the case of a menstruating woman, just as we find with one who became impure in the Temple courtyard—