Shevuot 17b (יז:) — the Talmud in English

But if you say “

a short route”

was specifically taught—and anyone who exited by the short route, even if he ran along it and did not remain inside for the time required to exit by the short route, is liable—

how can you find a case in which he performs the service and is not liable to karet for entering the Temple?

How can you find such a case?

in which he performs the Temple service but is not liable to excision for entering the Temple while impure?!

He said:

Abaye

explained:

Why,

what difficulty is there?!

For one can

find a case in which he is liable to death at the hands of Heaven but not to karet,

for example, if he became impure in the Temple courtyard and

then

entered by the short route before he remained there for the time required for prostration,

and turned

while exiting

with the fork

in his hand,

during his exit

—[he turned the limbs over on the altar with the fork in his hand so that they would be consumed]

as in the statement of Rav Huna!

For Rav Huna said: A non-priest who turned the limbs with the fork is liable to death;

and the same law applies to an impure person who turned the limbs with the fork: he is liable to death.

The substance of the matter: Rav Huna said: A non-priest who turned the limbs with the fork is liable to death.

And we raise an objection to this:

What are the circumstances?!

For:

If, had he not turned them, they would not have been consumed

—[if the limbs would not have been consumed without his turning them]—then

it is obvious

that he is liable for turning them, since through his actions the limbs were consumed; Rav Huna would not have needed to teach us this law.

And if

Rav Huna is dealing with a case in which

even

Rav Huna is dealing with a case in which

if he had not turned them, they too would have been consumed,

then

what did he do [what action did he perform]? He should not be liable to death for this

!

And we answer:

It is necessary

for Rav Huna to teach us that he is liable, but only in a case

where, had he not

have

turned them, they

would have

been consumed after two hours, whereas now they are consumed in one hour—[for example, without his turning them they would have been consumed in two hours, but through his turning them their consumption is accelerated and takes one hour]—

[that is, without turning them over they would have been consumed in two hours, but turning them over hastens their consumption so that they are consumed in one hour].

And Rav Huna teaches us this:

that

every preparation of the service

is itself service.

Rabbi Oshaya said: I wish to state a matter, but I fear my colleagues

[I wish to state a novel ruling, but I am afraid of my colleagues]:

One who enters a house afflicted with leprosy

with tzara’at

from the rear, and even

if he enters in this manner

with his entire body except for his nose

which remains outside, is

pure—

because

it is written [Leviticus 14:46, in the passage concerning afflictions of houses]:

“

And he who enters the house

during all the days that he has confined it shall be impure until evening.” And we learn from this:

The Torah prohibited

[rendered impure]

the manner of entering,

but not entering from the rear.

And I fear my colleagues,

because they can raise an objection to my statement:

If so,

even if he enters

entirely

not in the manner of entering,

also

he should not become impure

!

He said—

Rava

explained:

If he enters

entirely,

then

the person who enters

is no less liable than

vessels that

were already

in the house

before the house was confined, which become impure even though they did not enter the afflicted house at all.

For it is written [ibid., verse 35]: “And he to whom the house belongs shall come and tell the priest, saying: It seems to me that there is an affliction in the house. And the priest shall command that they clear the house before the priest comes to see the affliction,

so that everything that is in the house shall not become impure.”

This shows that the vessels already found in the house also become impure. Therefore, one who enters entirely without entering in the manner of entering is likewise impure, just like vessels that are found there and did not enter at all.

Thus, the vessels already located in the house also become impure. Therefore, one who enters entirely without entering in the ordinary manner becomes impure, like vessels that were already there and did not enter at all.

A beraita also teaches accordingly, in accordance with Rabbi Oshaya’s statement that “entering” in a manner other than the normal manner of entering is not considered entering:

These roofs

—those of the Sanctuary and the courtyard—

are not used for eating Most Holy sacrificial meat, and one may not slaughter there sacrificial animals of lesser sanctity.

—of the Sanctuary and the courtyard—

may not be used to eat there the most sacred offerings, and one may not slaughter there offerings of lesser sanctity.

And an impure person who enters the Sanctuary through the roofs,

is

exempt,

because

it is stated [Leviticus 12:4, with regard to a woman after childbirth]:

“

And she shall not enter the Sanctuary.” And we learn from this:

The

manner of entering—

that is, through the entrances—

is prohibited by the Torah.

—that is, through the doorways.

We learned in the Mishna:

This is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple for which one is not liable,

and what is the positive mitzva concerning a menstruating woman for which one is liable? If he was engaging in intercourse with a woman who was pure and she said to him, “I have become impure,” and he withdrew immediately, he is liable, because his exiting is pleasurable for him just as his entering was pleasurable.

The Gemara asks:

With reference to what does he say

“This is”,

when our Mishna says, “This is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple”?

And we explain:

There,

with reference to the statement of the Mishna in tractate Horayot, it

refers, for we learned there:

This is”?

A court is not liable

when it issued an erroneous ruling

for

a positive or a negative commandment concerning the Temple,

because its liability is a sliding-scale offering and not a fixed sin-offering.

And individuals do not bring

a

suspended guilt-offering

when they are uncertain whether they entered the Temple while impure, as do those liable to fixed sin-offerings, who bring a suspended guilt-offering when they are uncertain

for a positive or a negative commandment concerning the Temple;

because a suspended guilt-offering is brought only for a matter that, when one becomes certain that he committed it, renders him liable to a fixed sin-offering—

But a court is liable

for its ruling

for a positive and a negative commandment concerning a menstruating woman, and

individuals

bring a suspended guilt-offering for a positive or a negative commandment concerning a menstruating woman—

And

this is what he

says

in our Mishna:

This—

impurity in the courtyard—

is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple,

for one who became impure in the courtyard and remained there, or exited by the long route, violates the positive commandment “They shall send out from the camp,” which indicates that one who became impure in the camp must leave outside the camp. Concerning this commandment we learned

that

a court is

not liable,

and if it erroneously ruled that one who became impure in the courtyard need not leave by the short route, it is not liable to bring a bull for an erroneous ruling of the community.

Our Mishna further explains the continuation of the Mishna there:

And what is the positive mitzva concerning a menstruating woman for which a court is liable? If he was engaging in intercourse with a woman who was pure and she said to him

“

I have become impure,” and he

withdrew immediately with a living organ and did not wait until it became flaccid, he is

liable

for a sin-offering,

because his exiting is pleasurable for him just as his entering was;

and if the court issued an erroneous ruling concerning this positive commandment, it is liable to bring a bull.

It was stated: Abaye said in the name of Rabbi Hiyya bar Rav: He is liable—

a man who was having intercourse with a woman and she said to him, “I have now become impure,” and he withdrew from her—

two [two sin-offerings];

the Gemara continues to explain this.

And Rava likewise said in the name of Rav Shmuel bar Sheva in the name of Rav Huna: He is liable to two.

And we explain this:

One

sin-offering he is liable to bring

for entering,

since she was a menstruating woman and he did not know;

and one

sin-offering he is liable to bring

for withdrawal, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

And we explain it:

Rava examined the matter: In what

circumstances are we dealing with this

?

If we say

that he had intercourse with her

close to

the time of her expected menstrual period

—and he should have considered the possibility that she would see menstrual blood during intercourse, and therefore he is liable for entering because he is not considered compelled—

then who

[is the man having intercourse with her]?

If we say it is a Torah scholar,

who knows that if she says to him, “I have become impure,” he must withdraw with a lifeless organ, then the following difficulty arises:

Granted, for entering he should be liable

for a sin-offering, because although it was close to the time of her expected menstrual period, he is not considered intentional, since

he assumed—

the man having intercourse with her—

“I can have intercourse

and withdraw before she becomes impure”

— Rather, with regard to withdrawal, why should he be liable for a sin-offering?

For since he is a Torah scholar and knows that withdrawal is prohibited,

he is deliberate.