Shevuot 20b (כ:) — the Talmud in English

But according to Rava,

who says that one who associates a second object with a shevu’a has not uttered a shevu’a,

it is difficult.

For here it is stated explicitly that associating with a neder constitutes a neder, and the same should apply to one who associates with a shevu’a, that it constitutes a shevu’a?

We answer:

Rava could say to you:

In fact, this beraita is not speaking at all about associating with a neder, but about the principal formulation of a neder. The beraita comes to teach us that a neder takes effect only if one explicitly prohibits the object to himself, and in addition links the neder to another thing that is already prohibited to him by a neder, and this is not called association, unless he did not specify the prohibition at all: He did not say, “This is forbidden to me if I eat meat or drink wine,” but only said, “This day is upon me like the day on which my father died.” Such association indeed is not included in the category of neder.

And

resolve it and say this

with regard to the beraita:

Which is the issar

that is, prohibition

of a neder mentioned in the Torah?

The beraita is not speaking at all of the formulation “issar,” but of the very prohibition of a neder—

One who says: “This is upon me: I shall not eat meat and I shall not drink wine, like the day on which his father died,”

or

“like the day on which so-and-so was killed,”

who explicitly prohibited the object to himself and also linked it to something that had already been prohibited to him by a neder.

And Shmuel said: This is so when he had already taken a neder and continued in that state from that day.

As stated, the neder takes effect only if he linked it to an object that is the subject of a neder.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that the neder must be linked to an object that is the subject of a neder, and it is not sufficient for him merely to prohibit the object to himself by means of a neder?

The verse says

[there, 3]: “

When a man takes a neder to the Lord.”

And we expound:

Until he takes a neder with regard to an object that is the subject of a neder

already! And we challenge this: Since the reason for the beraita is as Shmuel explains—that he had taken a neder from that day—then what is the significance of the phrase

“like the day on which his father died”

that the beraita mentioned? After all,

it is obvious

that the neder takes effect, since that day was already prohibited to him by a neder. Would it become less effective merely because his father died on that day? And we answer: “

Like the day on which Gedaliah ben Ahikam was killed”;

Like the day on which Gedaliah ben Ahikam was killed”;

it was necessary for him

to teach us that

it might enter your mind to say: Since when he did not take a neder

not to eat on that day,

it is also prohibited

for him to eat, since it is a fast day, therefore

when he takes a neder

not to eat on that day,

the prohibition does not also take effect upon him,

the neder does not take effect at all, and it follows that

this is not association with a neder,

since association must be with an object that is the subject of a neder, and not with something that is inherently prohibited.

It teaches us

that nevertheless the neder takes effect, and one who associates with that day is considered to have associated with an object that is the subject of a neder.

And Rabbi Yohanan also agreed with this position of Rava,

who said that “issar” is the formulation of the shevu’a itself and not association with a shevu’a [provided that they state it in the language of a shevu’a].

When Ravin came, he said that Rabbi Yohanan:

One who says,

“Mivt’a: I will not eat from you,”

or who says,

“Issar: I will not eat from you,”

this is the formulation of a

shevu’a.

When Rav Dimi came, he said that Rabbi Yohanan:

One who swears concerning the future, “I

will eat,”

and

likewise one who swears,

“I will not eat,”

and does not fulfill his shevu’a, this is a shevu’a of

falsehood.

And its warning

for a shevu’a of falsehood is

from here,

as it is written [Leviticus 19:12]: “

You shall not swear falsely by My Name,”

meaning: You shall not swear by My Name in order to lie afterward through your shevu’a and violate it. And when one administers a warning to such a person, he must mention this prohibition to him.

But one who swears concerning the past,

“I ate,”

or

“I did not eat,”

and his statement is untrue, this is a shevu’a of

vain oath.

And its warning

for a shevu’a of vain oath is

from here,

as it is written [Exodus 20:7]: “

You shall not take the Name of the Lord your God in vain,”

for the term “vain” means that it is of no substance, as in: “I struck your children for no reason.” This person’s shevu’a, too, emerged from his mouth in vain, since he swore concerning something that was not true. One who administers a warning to such a person must warn him with this prohibition.

And one who violates

konamot,

having eaten something prohibited to him by a neder,

violates

[Numbers 30:3]

the prohibition of “

He shall not profane his word.” This too refers to the future. Since with regard to a future-oriented shevu’a we have already learned from “You shall not swear by My Name falsely,” this verse, “He shall not profane his word,” is available to refer to konamot, teaching that he may not profane his word by which he prohibited the object to himself through a konam.

For this too refers to the future. And since with regard to a future shevu'a we have already learned from “You shall not swear falsely by My Name,” this verse of “He shall not profane” is available with regard to konamot, to say that he shall not profane his word that he forbade to himself through a konam.

Meytivi

from that which was taught in a beraita: A shevu’a of

vain oath and a

shevu’a of

falsehood are one!

Is it not

the intent of the beraita to say that they are similar in the following respect:

Since

a shevu’a of

vain oath,

in which one swears concerning something that cannot be true, so that everyone knows that this shevu’a is nothing and it is therefore called “vain,” is

concerning the past,

since at the very moment of the shevu’a he violates a shevu’a of vain oath,

so too

a shevu’a of

falsehood is concerning the past.

For one swears, “I ate” or “I did not eat” [and this is not called “vain,” since not everyone knows whether it is true or false]. For “You shall not swear by My Name falsely” means: Do not utter a false shevu’a from your mouth, since at the very moment of the shevu’a he is lying. If so, a future-oriented shevu’a is not included in this prohibition, since he is not lying at the moment of the shevu’a; rather, he fails to uphold his statement afterward. Instead, it is derived from “He shall not profane his word.”

Apparently, "

I ate" and "

I ate" and "I did not eat" is a

oath of

falsehood;

it is.

But this is difficult for Rav Dimi, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan that “I ate and I did not eat” is an oath taken in vain?

And we answer:

That does not necessarily follow!

For is it imperative to say that both of them refer to the past?

I could actually say that

this

oath of falsehood is

as it is stated,

in the future,

while

this oath taken in vain is

as it is stated,

in the past.

And

what the beraita said,

“They are one matter,”

means

that they were uttered in a single utterance: the two prohibitions of an oath of falsehood and an oath taken in vain were spoken by the Holy One, blessed be He.

As it is taught:

the statement,

“Remember

the day of Shabbat,” which is the wording of the first version of the commandments,

and

the statement,

“Observe

the day of Shabbat,” which is the wording of the second version of the commandments,

were uttered in a single utterance. That which the mouth cannot utter and that which the ear cannot hear

—two utterances simultaneously—except that it occurred through a miracle.

The Gemara asks about this:

Granted, there,

there is a practical consequence to the fact that

they were uttered in a single utterance: to juxtapose “Remember” with “Observe,” and to teach us that women too are obligated in the mitzva of Kiddush of Shabbat, despite the fact that it is a time-bound positive mitzva.

In accordance with Rav Adda bar Ahava.

For Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Women are obligated in the Kiddush of the day

of Shabbat

by Torah law,

by force of Torah law.

For the verse says,

in a single utterance,

“Remember and Observe”;

the verse juxtaposed “Remember” with “Observe” to teach us:

Anyone included in observing

Shabbat

is included in remembering

Shabbat.

And these women, since they are included in observing,

for they are commanded regarding observance of the prohibition, “You shall not perform any labor,” since women are obligated to observe all prohibitions of the Torah, even time-bound prohibitions,

are also included in remembering.

They are likewise commanded regarding the mitzva of Kiddush of Shabbat, as it is derived from “Remember the day of Shabbat”: remember it over wine.

But here,

with regard to an oath of falsehood and an oath taken in vain,

for what halakhic purpose is this needed?

For what law were they uttered in a single utterance?

And we answer:

Rather,

what the beraita said—that an oath taken in vain and an oath of falsehood are one—is to teach you:

Just as one is flogged for

an oath

taken in vain, so too one is flogged for

an oath of

falsehood!

And we challenge this:

To which direction are you turning? [That is, toward where are you turning? You are turning in the opposite direction!] For it is more straightforward to obligate one to receive lashes for an oath of falsehood than for an oath taken in vain. In the case of an oath of falsehood, which concerns the future, it is possible for one to violate it through an action—for example, he swore that he would not eat, and then ate. Whereas an oath taken in vain, which concerns the past—“I ate” and “I did not eat”—never involves an action. If so, how can you make the law of lashes for an oath of falsehood, which involves an action, dependent on lashes for an oath taken in vain, which does not involve an action?

And we answer:

Rather, say

the opposite:

Just as one is flogged for

an oath of

falsehood

in a case in which it involves an action,

so too one is flogged for

an oath taken in

vain,

despite the fact that it does not involve an action, because this is derived below from “God will not hold him guiltless who takes His name in vain”: only God does not hold him guiltless, but an earthly court flogs him and thereby cleanses him of the transgression.

And we challenge this: If so,

it is obvious

that one is flogged for an oath taken in vain just as one is flogged for an oath of falsehood, for

this is one prohibition and that is one prohibition.

The fact that an oath taken in vain does not involve an action is irrelevant, since the Torah included it among those liable to lashes through the verse, “God will not hold him guiltless” [for taking His name in vain]?

And we answer:

Lest you say

that one should not be flogged for an oath taken in vain,

as Rav Pappa said to Abaye

below, as we shall explain:

“God will not hold him guiltless”—

at all,

not even an earthly court?