Shevuot 20b — the Talmud in English

But according to Rava,

who says: one who makes a shevu'a by association has not made a shevu'a,

it is difficult.

For here it is stated explicitly that associating with a vow produces a valid vow, and the same applies to one who associates with a shevu'a: it produces a valid shevu'a?

And we answer:

Rava could say to you:

Actually, this beraita is not speaking at all of association with a vow, but of the essential wording of the vow. The beraita comes to teach us that the vow takes effect only if he explicitly forbids the matter to himself, and in addition he linked the vow to another matter that had already been forbidden to him by a vow. And this is not called association, unless he did not specify the prohibition at all: he did not say, “It is upon me not to eat meat and not to drink wine,” but only said, “It is upon me that this day shall be like the day on which my father died.” Such association indeed is not included within the category of a vow. Accordingly, they explained the Gemara’s objection to Rava from the beraita of “Which is the isur stated in the Torah?”: it is apparent from the beraita that the isur stated in the Torah refers to association. And according to Abaye, this is understandable: although the beraita is speaking of association with a vow, the same applies to association with a shevu'a, since the primary instance of association is stated with regard to a shevu'a, as it says, “or she places an isur upon herself by a shevu'a.” And the tanna mentioned a vow to teach a novelty: that even with regard to a vow there is association, and all the more so with regard to a shevu'a. But according to Rava, there are two difficulties. He says that the isur in the Torah is not association, whereas here in the beraita it is stated that isur means association. And further, if isur means association, then certainly association with a shevu'a also produces association, since the primary isur is stated with regard to a shevu'a. Rava answers that the beraita is not speaking of the isur in the Torah, whose meaning is indeed the wording of the vow and shevu'a themselves. Rather, it is speaking of the very prohibition of a vow, and it comes to teach us that there is another prohibition among vows that is like a vow but is not an actual vow: association with a vow. This is learned from the verse, “When a person vows a vow,” and we expound: until he vows with regard to a matter subject to a vow. This indicates that it is possible to associate with a vow, provided that he associates with a matter subject to a vow and not with a forbidden matter. And Rava derives from this that the verse also comes to exclude one who associates with a shevu'a: association is possible specifically with a matter subject to a vow, but not with a matter subject to an oath. Ran objected to this approach: why should association with a shevu'a not be effective for Rava, as it is with a vow? Although the law of association is stated in the Torah with regard to a vow—“When a person vows a vow”—let us derive a shevu'a from a vow, just as the law of incomplete expressions in a shevu'a was derived from a vow, since they were equated with one another in the verse, “When a person vows a vow or swears a shevu'a.” And if it is because of the exclusion, “until he vows with regard to a matter subject to a vow,” this can exclude only that one cannot associate a vow with a vow rather than a vow with a shevu'a. But from where do we know that one cannot associate a shevu'a with a shevu'a? Nor can it be said that Rava’s reason is that association applies only to vows, which are a prohibition affecting the object. Since the prohibition rests upon the object that is subject to the vow, it is therefore possible to associate another matter with it. This is not so with a shevu'a, which is a prohibition affecting the person: association does not apply to it, since one who swore not to eat this loaf and then said of another loaf that it should be like it has said nothing, for the prohibition is not located at all upon the first loaf, but only upon the person. For it would still be difficult: indeed, when he associates one object with the object of the shevu'a, it is right that this should not be effective. But when he associates one person with another person—for example, a person heard someone swear not to eat meat and said that he too should be like him—why should it not be effective? Yet the Rif says that even in such a case association with a shevu'a is ineffective. Ran answered that association applies only to a prohibition affecting the object, because a legal status of prohibition or sanctity takes effect upon the very object. But with a shevu'a it is not appropriate to say that he associates himself with the person, since no legal status takes effect upon the person who swore, so that one could associate himself with him. Ran further wrote that a vow and a shevu'a differ in their essence, and it is impossible to derive one from the other. For the entire essence of a vow is association: the primary vow stated in the Torah is that one associates a permitted object with a vow of consecration. Without this, a person cannot forbid a permitted matter to himself. Rather, because consecration effects exchange [so that the sanctity can be transferred onto another matter], it is also possible to associate the prohibition of consecration with another permitted matter. [And it is again possible to associate with this matter that was made subject to a vow, but the beginning of the vow is association with a vow of consecration.] And although the vow takes effect even without association, this is by means of an incomplete expression: when he says, “This matter is forbidden to me,” we complete his words, understanding that it shall be forbidden like a sacrifice. But the essence of the vow is only through association, as they said, “until he vows with regard to a matter subject to a vow.” Therefore it is not appropriate to derive a shevu'a from a vow, so that association should be effective with a shevu'a as well. A vow is different, for its defining feature is that the prohibition of sanctity is extended and associated with another matter, and not merely the prohibition itself. This is not so with a shevu'a, which contains no sanctity, but only prohibition; association therefore does not apply to it. Thus the Rif wrote that even if he associates one person with another person, the association does not take effect with a shevu'a. But Ran wrote that he is still inclined to rule stringently that when one person is associated with another person, it is effective with a shevu'a. The dispute between Abaye and Rava applies only to the case where he swore not to eat this meat, and afterward said about a loaf, “This is upon me like this meat.” Abaye holds that even in such a case the association takes effect, for he learns the law of association from the verse, “or she places an isur upon herself by a shevu'a.” This indicates that he forbids a particular matter to himself with the expression “upon me” [which is the language of a vow], and associates it with another matter regarding which he had already sworn. This is the meaning of Abaye’s statement that one who associates with a shevu'a is considered like one who utters a shevu'a with his mouth: in every circumstance in which he associates with a shevu'a, he is like one who utters a shevu'a with his mouth. And Rava says that one who associates with a shevu'a is not considered like one who utters a shevu'a with his mouth. That is, he is not like one who utters a shevu'a with his mouth in every circumstance. Rather, there is a circumstance in which association is effective, such as when he associates one person with another person, and there is a circumstance in which association is ineffective, such as when he associates one object with the object of a shevu'a. Accordingly, Rava’s wording is precise: he did not say, “One who associates with a shevu'a is nothing,” but rather, “is not considered like one who utters a shevu'a with his mouth,” because association with a shevu'a is in fact sometimes effective. And the early authorities brought that Rabbi Yosef Migash deduces from Rava’s wording, “is not considered like one who utters a shevu'a with his mouth,” that even Rava agrees that with regard to the prohibition, association with a shevu'a is effective. It is only with regard to a sacrifice that the association is not like a shevu'a. And they brought that Raavad wrote that also with regard to a shevu'a we expound, “or swear a shevu'a”—until he swears with regard to a matter subject to a shevu'a, which refers to one who associates with a shevu'a. But Rava holds that this applies only with regard to “he shall not profane,” stated in that passage, and not with regard to a sacrifice. Ran explained this view according to his own approach: since Rava agrees that when one person is associated with another person the association takes effect, it is possible that even when one object is associated with another object, it is forbidden by rabbinic law, as a safeguard because of association of one person with another person. However, the early authorities wrote that it follows from the words of the Rif that according to Rava there is no prohibition at all in association with a shevu'a. Since Abaye stated in his words, “One who associates with a shevu'a is considered like one who utters a shevu'a with his mouth,” Rava likewise stated, “One who associates with a shevu'a is not considered like one who utters a shevu'a with his mouth.” In fact, it contains not even a prohibition. In Kehillot Yaakov [14], it is brought that Rambam, in the Laws of Shevu'ot [2:8], ruled like his teacher Rabbi Yosef Migash: one who associates with a shevu'a is exempt only from a sacrifice and lashes, but he is forbidden to eat from the bread with which he associated through the shevu'a. And Kehillot Yaakov wrote that according to Rambam’s view it is impossible to say, in accordance with Ran’s reasoning, that this is because of a safeguard because of association of one person with another person. For Rambam ruled like the Rif, that even association of one person with another person is ineffective with a shevu'a. If so, explanation is required: what is the source of the prohibition? Since one who associates with a shevu'a is not considered like one who utters a shevu'a with his mouth, apparently there is no shevu'a here at all; why then should it be forbidden? He explained that Rambam follows his own method, for he ruled [there, 2] that a shevu'a requires mention of the Divine Name. If he did not mention the Name in his shevu'a, he is liable neither for a sacrifice nor for lashes, and there is only a prohibition in this. See there, in Kesef Mishneh, the reason for this. Now the explanation of the dispute between Abaye and Rava concerning one who associates with a shevu'a appears to be as follows. Abaye holds that although every association in which one says, “This is like that,” means that he associates the object, placing upon the second matter the prohibition that was upon the first, nevertheless it also contains the meaning of associating with the wording of the one who swore. It is as though he says, “I am doing to the second what was done to the first,” and through this he is as though he actually swore. As we find with regard to testimony, when the second witness says of the first, “I too am like him,” it is as though he stated all the testimony that the first had given, since the wording “I too am like him” includes the entire testimony. So here as well, when he says, “I am doing as he did,” it is as though he stated the entire wording of the first person’s shevu'a, including the mention of the Name that was present in the first person’s shevu'a. Therefore, the law of one who associates with a shevu'a is that he is considered like one who utters a shevu'a with his mouth in every respect. Rava holds that the entire meaning of association concerns only the object: the prohibition that came into being through the first person’s vow or shevu'a is associated with the second object. And even when one person is associated with another person, its meaning is not that he himself performs the act of the shevu'a, but that he wants the prohibition that came into being through his fellow’s shevu'a to take effect upon him as well. Therefore, although there is a legal concept of association with a shevu'a, insofar as the prohibition that is present in the first matter is associated with the second, nevertheless there is no mention of the Name on the part of the one who associates. His law is like that of one who swore without mentioning the Name: there is only a prohibition in this, but no liability for a sacrifice or lashes. This is Rava’s intention: one who associates with a shevu'a can indeed forbid the matter through his association, but he is not considered like one who utters a shevu'a with his mouth, so that liability for a sacrifice and lashes should also take effect upon him as though he had mentioned the Name. Rambam’s view is thus explained: because he ruled like Rava, he wrote that one who associates with a shevu'a is exempt only from a sacrifice and lashes, but there is a prohibition in this.

And

reconcile it and say so

in the beraita:

Which is the isur [A0016]that is, prohibition

that is, the prohibition

of a vow stated in the Torah? [A0018]And it is not speaking at all of the wording “isur,” but of the very prohibition of a vow—

The beraita is not discussing the wording “issar” at all, but the very prohibition of a vow—

One who says: “It is upon me not to eat meat and not to drink wine like the day on which his father died,”

or

like the day on which so-and-so was killed,

for he explicitly forbade it to himself and also linked it to a matter that had already been forbidden to him by a vow.

And Shmuel said: And this is when he had been under a vow and came from that day.

For, as stated, the vow takes effect only if he linked it to a matter subject to a vow.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that the vow must be linked to a matter subject to a vow, and it is not sufficient for him merely to forbid the matter to himself by a vow?

The verse says [A0029]there, verse 3: “

[Leviticus 27:2]: “

When a person makes a vow to the Lord.”

And we expound:

until he vows with regard to a matter subject to a vow

from before! And we challenge: Since the reason for the beraita is as Shmuel explains, that he had been under a vow from that day, then what is the significance of

“like the day on which his father died”

that the beraita mentioned? For

it is obvious

that the vow takes effect, since that day had been forbidden to him by a vow; would it become diminished merely because his father died on that day? And we answer:

“like the day on which Gedaliah son of Ahikam was killed,”

Like the day on which Gedaliah ben Ahikam was killed”;

it was necessary for it

to teach us that

it might enter your mind to say: since when he did not vow

not to eat on that day,

he is also forbidden

to eat, since it is a fast day, then

when he vowed

not to eat on that day,

there is also no prohibition upon him,

the vow does not take effect at all, and it follows that

this is not association with a vow,

for association must be with a matter subject to a vow and not with a forbidden matter.

It comes to teach us

that nevertheless the vow takes effect, and one who associates with that day is like one who associates with a matter subject to a vow.

And Rabbi Yohanan too held this view of Rava,

who said that “isur” is the wording of the shevu'a itself and not association with a shevu'a [provided that they say it in the wording of a shevu'a]. They further wrote that what the beraita says—that a vow takes effect with regard to a matter of a mitzva—refers to annulling a mitzva, such as when he says, “Konam, I will not take a lulav,” or, “I will not don tefillin. But if he vowed to fulfill a prohibition-mitzva, such as when he said, “Konam, I will not eat on Yom Kippur,” or, “I will not eat carrion or improperly slaughtered animals,” the vow does not take effect, because one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition. Ran wrote that the reason for distinguishing between fulfilling a mitzva and annulling a mitzva is that one who vows to annul the mitzva has created a new prohibition upon himself through his vow. At first, that mitzva was imposed upon him to fulfill, and now it is forbidden to him. But one who vows to fulfill a prohibition-mitzva has not created any new prohibition through his vow, since he was forbidden in any event; therefore it does not take effect.

When Ravin came, he said that Rabbi Yohanan

said: One who says,

“An utterance: I will not eat yours,”

or who says,

“An isur: I will not eat yours,”

this is the wording of a

shevu'a.

When Rav Dimi came, he said that Rabbi Yohanan

said: One who swears concerning the future, “that I

will eat,”

and

likewise one who swears

“I will not eat,”

but did not fulfill his shevu'a, this is a shevu'a of

falsehood.

And its warning

for a shevu'a of falsehood is

from here,

as it is written [Leviticus 19:12]:

“You shall not swear falsely by My Name,”

whose explanation is: You shall not swear by My Name in order afterward to lie through your shevu'a and violate it. And when one administers a warning to this person, he must mention this prohibition to him.

But one who swears concerning the past,

“I ate,”

or

“I did not eat,”

and his words are not true, this is a shevu'a of

vanity.

And its warning

for a shevu'a of vanity is

from here,

as it is written [Exodus 20:7]:

“You shall not bear the Name of the Lord your God in vain,”

for the term “vanity” means that it is nothing, [as in, “For vanity I struck your children”]. This person too has uttered a shevu'a from his mouth for no purpose, since he swore concerning a matter that is not true. And one who administers a warning to this person must warn him with this prohibition.

And one who violates

konamot,

having eaten a matter forbidden to him by a vow,

violates [A0094]Numbers 30:3

[Numbers 30:3]

the

“He shall not profane his word.”

For this too refers to the future. And since with regard to a future shevu'a we have already learned from “You shall not swear falsely by My Name,” this verse of “He shall not profane” is available with regard to konamot, to say that he shall not profane his word that he forbade to himself through a konam.

He raises an objection

from that which was taught in a beraita: A shevu'a of

vanity and a

shevu'a of

falsehood are one!

Does it not mean

that the intention of the beraita is to say that they are similar in this respect:

that from

a shevu'a of

vanity,

in which he swore concerning a matter that cannot be, which everyone knows makes this shevu'a nothing, and it is therefore called “vanity,” it is

concerning the past,

since at the very moment of the shevu'a he violates a shevu'a of vanity,

also

a shevu'a of

falsehood is likewise concerning the past.

For he swore, “I ate,” or, “I did not eat” [and this is not “vanity,” because not everyone knows whether it is true or false]. For “You shall not swear falsely by My Name” means: do not utter from your mouths a shevu'a falsely, for at the very moment of the shevu'a he is lying. If so, a future shevu'a is not included within this prohibition, since he is not lying at the moment of the shevu'a, but afterward does not stand by his word. Rather, it is learned from “He shall not profane his word.”

Thus, "

I ate" and "

I did not eat" is a

oath of

falsehood

it is.

And this is difficult for Rav Dimi, who said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that “I ate” and “I did not eat” is an oath of futility?

And we answer:

Does it necessarily follow!?

For is it necessary to say that both of them refer to the past?

I can always say to you that

this one

is an oath of falsehood

as it is stated,

in the future,

and this one

is an oath of futility

as it is stated,

in the past.

And what is it

that the beraita said,

“They are one matter,”

to say?

That they were said in one utterance

the two prohibitions of an oath of falsehood and an oath of futility, from the mouth of the Holy One, blessed is He.

As it is taught:

the utterance

“Remember

the day of Shabbat,” which is the wording of the First Utterances,

and

the utterance

“Keep

the day of Shabbat,” which is the wording in the Second Utterances,

were said in one utterance. That which the mouth cannot speak and that which the ear cannot hear

two utterances at once, but it was a miracle.

And we examine this:

Granted, there

there is a practical consequence from this, that they

were said in one utterance

—to equate “Remember” with “Keep,” and to teach us that women too are obligated in the mitzva of kiddush of Shabbat, even though it is a positive mitzva whose time causes it.

In accordance with Rav Adda bar Ahava.

For Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Women are obligated in the kiddush of the day

of Shabbat

by Torah law

by force of Torah law.

For the verse says

in one utterance

“Remember and Keep”;

the text equated “Remember” with “Keep” to teach us:

Everyone who is included in keeping

of Shabbat

is included in remembering

of Shabbat.

And these women, since they are included in keeping,

for they are commanded concerning the observance of the prohibition of “You shall not perform any labor,” since women are obligated in the observance of all prohibitions in the Torah, even in prohibitions whose time causes them,

are also included in remembering.

They too are commanded concerning the mitzva of kiddush of Shabbat, which is learned from “Remember the day of Shabbat”—remember it over wine.

Rather, here,

with regard to an oath of falsehood and an oath of futility,

for what halakhic purpose is it needed?

With regard to what law were they said in one utterance?

And we answer:

Rather,

what the beraita said, that an oath of futility and an oath of falsehood are one, is to tell you:

Just as one is flogged for

an oath of

futility, so too one is flogged for

an oath of

falsehood!

And we object:

To which direction is this turned? [To where are you turning? For you are turning in the opposite direction!] For it is more straightforward to obligate one to lashes for an oath of falsehood than for an oath of futility. For in an oath of falsehood, which concerns the future, it is possible for him to violate it through an act, such as when he swore that he would not eat, and he ate. Whereas an oath of futility, which concerns the past—“I ate” and “I did not eat”—never involves an act. If so, how do you make the law of lashes for an oath of falsehood, which involves an act, dependent on lashes for an oath of futility, which does not involve an act? And we answer:

And we answer:

Rather, say

the reverse:

Just as one is flogged for

an oath of

falsehood

in a manner in which it involves an act,

so too one is flogged for

an oath of

futility,

even though it does not involve an act, because we derive it below from “Hashem will not hold guiltless the one who bears His Name in futility”: only Hashem will not hold him guiltless, but the earthly court flogs him and thereby clears him.

And we object: If so,

it is obvious

that one is flogged for an oath of futility just as one is flogged for an oath of falsehood, for

this is one prohibition and that is one prohibition,

and the fact that an oath of futility does not involve an act does not matter to us, for the Torah expanded it to lashes from “Hashem will not hold guiltless the one who bears His Name in futility”?

And we answer:

Lest you say

that one should not be flogged for an oath of futility

as Rav Pappa said to Abaye

below, as we shall explain: "

He will not hold guiltless"—

at all,

even not in an earthly court?