Shabbat 97a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara raises an objection: how did Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira say to Rabbi Akiva that he reveals what the Torah concealed

But rather, he learned

Rabbi Akiva

a gezerah shavah [

for by means of a gezerah shavah Rabbi Akiva learned this; and if so, it is not concealed, but is as though explicit]!?

And we answer: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira

this gezerah shavah

this one

did not learn [

he did not receive it from his teacher], and a person does not derive a gezerah shavah on his own.

The Gemara asks according to Rabbi Yehuda:

But rather,

Zelophehad himself, concerning whom his daughters said, “For he died through his sin,”

from where was he [

from where was he]? That is, what was his sin!?

And we answer: Zelophehad was

among

those about whom it is said [Numbers 14:44]

“They acted presumptuously

to ascend to the top of the mountain. And they were struck and beaten down as far as Hormah,”

he was.

The beraita adds:

Similarly,

like that rebuke which Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said to Rabbi Akiva,

you say:

It is written concerning Miriam and Aaron, who spoke evil speech about Moses regarding the Cushite woman whom he had taken:

“The anger of the Lord burned

against them, and He went away,”

this teaches

that Scripture included Aaron as well with Miriam, who was afflicted with tzaraat, in the anger of the Lord,

that Aaron too was afflicted with tzaraat

because of that evil speech which they spoke about Moses,

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said to Rabbi Akiva

:

Akiva! In either case [

whether it is indeed as you say, or whether it is not so],

you are destined to give an accounting:

For

if it is as you say,

then

the Torah concealed him

from Aaron,

and you reveal him. And if not, you cast

aspersions upon that righteous man [

Aaron].

And

we challenge:

But is it not written, “against them,”

implying that His anger also burned against Aaron, and he too was afflicted with tzaraat?

And we answer:

That

anger

was merely a reprimand

.

It was taught in accordance with the one who says [

Rabbi Akiva], that

Aaron too was afflicted with tzaraat.

For it is written

in that passage:

“Aaron turned toward Miriam, and behold, she was afflicted with tzaraat,”

and

the tannai

taught in the beraita: What is the meaning of “turned”?

That Aaron turned away

from his

affliction with tzaraat [

he was healed from it].

Reish Lakish said: One who suspects the worthy is stricken in his body.

For it is written

at the time when the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded Moses to go to redeem the Children of Israel from Egypt, when Moses said:

“But behold, they will not believe me

and will not heed my voice, for they will say, ‘The Lord did not appear to you.’”

And it was revealed before the Holy One, blessed be He, that Israel were believers [

it was revealed and known before Him, blessed is He, that Israel would believe]. Therefore,

He said to him

the Holy One, blessed be He, to Moses:

“Indeed,

the Children of Israel

are believers, the children of believers,

they are,

but

you,

you will ultimately not believe.

And Reish Lakish explains:

“They are believers,” for it is written

when Moses came to the Children of Israel in Egypt:

“And the people believed.”

“The children of believers,”

for it is written concerning Abraham at the Covenant between the Pieces:

“And he believed in the Lord.”

But

“you will ultimately not believe,” as it is said

to Moses and Aaron concerning the waters of dispute:

“Because you did not believe in Me.”

And from where is it that he was stricken

because he suspected Israel that they would not believe!? Because

it is written

in that passage: “And the Lord said to him further:

‘Please bring your hand into your bosom,’

and he brought his hand into his bosom, and he took it out, and behold, his hand was afflicted with tzaraat, like snow.”

Rava said—and some say Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina [

and some say Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina was the one who said]:

A measure of goodness hastens to come more than a measure of punishment.

For whereas with a measure of punishment,

when Moses was stricken with tzaraat,

it is written, “And he took it out, and behold, his hand was afflicted with tzaraat, like snow,”

implying: when he took it out, his hand became afflicted with tzaraat, but when it was in his bosom it had not yet been afflicted.

But with a measure of goodness,

when Moses was healed,

it is written, “And he took it out of his bosom, and behold, it had returned like his flesh,”

implying that already

from his bosom it had returned like his flesh.

It is written: “And the Lord said to Moses and to Aaron, saying: When Pharaoh speaks to you, saying, ‘Give a wonder for yourselves,’ then you shall say to Aaron, ‘Take your staff and cast it before Pharaoh; it shall become a serpent.’ And Moses and Aaron came to Pharaoh, and they did so. And Pharaoh also called for the wise men and for the sorcerers, and they too did so. And each man cast down his staff, and they became serpents,”

“and Aaron’s staff swallowed their staffs.”

Rabbi Elazar said: It was a miracle within a miracle.

It was so. That is, it was not that, when it was a serpent, it ate their serpents; rather, when it returned and became a staff, an additional miracle occurred, that Aaron’s staff ate their staffs.

We learned in the Mishna:

From a private domain to a private domain

through a public domain, with the public domain in the middle: Rabbi Akiva deems him liable, and the Sages exempt him:

A. The public domain does not take effect in height except for the air up to ten handbreadths. But the air above ten handbreadths is a “place of exemption.”

B. One who extends [an object] from a private domain to a private domain through a public domain is liable even when he carried it above ten handbreadths, despite the fact that this air is a “place of exemption.”

Rava raised a question:

Is it specifically when he threw through the air of the public domain

below

the height of

ten

handbreadths, which is the air of the public domain, that

Rabbi Akiva and the Sages disagree

,

and this is the matter over which they disagree: One master,

Rabbi Akiva,

holds, “That which is caught

in the air of the public domain

is considered as though it had come to rest,”

and he became liable as one who throws from a private domain to a public domain.

And the other master,

the Rabbis,

holds [

that]

we do not say that which is caught is considered as though it had come to rest

.

But

if he threw through

above ten

handbreadths, in the air of the public domain, where it was not caught in the air of the public domain, and it is impossible to make him liable as one who throws from a private domain to a public domain, even if “that which is caught is considered as though it had come to rest,”

according to everyone

and even according to Rabbi Akiva he is

exempt.

And

according to everyone, both Rabbi Akiva and the Sages,

we do not derive

liability for

one who throws

from a private domain to a private domain through a public domain above ten handbreadths

from one who extends.

For the work of the Levites in the Tabernacle was by extending and not by throwing, as explained in the Mishna. Therefore they do not deem him liable above ten handbreadths.

Or perhaps,

it is specifically when he threw at a height

above ten

handbreadths, at the height of the public domain, that

the Sages and Rabbi Akiva disagree

, whereas according to the Sages he is not liable.

And this is the matter over which they disagree: Rabbi Akiva holds that we derive throwing from extending,

and because of the law of “extending” he holds him liable.

And the Rabbis hold that we do not derive throwing from extending

to hold him liable for throwing from a private domain to a private domain through the air of the public domain above ten handbreadths, from “extending.”

But

if he threw

below ten, everyone agrees that he is liable

by the law of “one who carries out from a private domain to a public domain.”

What is the reason?

We say, “That which is caught is considered as though it had come to rest,”

even according to the Sages.

And Rav Yosef said: Rava also raised this matter as a question

as well

for Rav Hisda. And Rav Hamnuna resolved it for him from this [

this uncertainty was also raised for Rav Hisda, and Rav Hamnuna resolved it for him from the beraita], for it was taught:

From a private domain to a private domain, and he passes through the public domain itself [

and the Gemara will immediately explain],

Rabbi Akiva deems him liable, and the Sages exempt him.

And

since it says, “through the public domain itself,”

then

it is obvious

that in this beraita

below ten

in the public domain

they disagree,

and this is “through the public domain itself.”

And in what case,

in what manner did they disagree?

If you say

that it concerns one who carries

through the public domain as he walks, and it is another dispute concerning the law “Is one who walks considered as one who is standing?”; therefore they disagreed only when he carried his burden through the public domain itself, then this cannot be said. Since, is it only

below ten that he is liable

when a person carries a burden into the public domain, whereas

above ten he is not liable,

as is explained in the beraita, “through the public domain itself”!?

But Rabbi Elazar said [

above, page 92a]:

One who carries a burden,

even

above ten handbreadths,

he is

liable, since

the

burden of the sons of Kehat

was carried above ten when they carried the sacred vessels upon their shoulders.

Rather, is it not that it concerns one who throws

from a private domain to a private domain through a public domain, and they disagreed in this beraita?

And

since it is taught in the beraita, “through the public domain itself,” it is proven that only

below ten is he liable

according to Rabbi Akiva, but

above ten he is not liable.

Conclude from this that they disagree concerning “that which is caught is considered as though it had come to rest.”

For if Rabbi Akiva held that we derive throwing from extending, he should have been liable even above ten.

And we conclude: Indeed,

conclude from this

from this beraita that they disagreed concerning “that which is caught is considered as though it had come to rest.”

And it disagrees

with this statement of Rav Hamnuna, who explained their dispute in the beraita as being only “through the public domain itself,” and that they disagreed concerning “that which is caught is considered as though it had come to rest,”

with [the opinion of] Rabbi Elazar.

for Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Akiva would have held him liable even

when he threw

above ten

handbreadths, and because, in his opinion, “we derive throwing from carrying.”

And the reason it teaches

in the beraita

“the public domain itself,”

which proves from it, as Rav Hamnuna learned, that even according to Rabbi Akiva he is not liable above ten, and because even according to his opinion “we do not derive throwing from carrying,” is not because Rabbi Akiva does not hold him liable above ten, but rather

to inform you of the power of the Rabbis,

that even if he threw below ten, he is not liable.

And it disagrees with

Rabbi Elazar, who explains that the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis applies even above ten,

with the statement of Rav Helkiah bar Tovi.

For Rav Helkiah bar Tovi said

to explain the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis:

a. If he threw from one private domain to another private domain through the public domain

within three

handbreadths of the ground of the public domain,

everyone agrees,

and even according to the Rabbis he is

liable.

For although they do not hold that “caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest,” nevertheless, within three handbreadths, even though it did not come to rest on the ground, the Sages agree that it is considered as though it had come to rest on the ground.

b. If he threw

above ten

handbreadths,

everyone agrees that he is exempt.

For even Rabbi Akiva agrees that we do not derive throwing from carrying, and his liability is because of “caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest”; and since he threw it above ten handbreadths, where it was not caught in the air of the public domain, he is exempt even according to Rabbi Akiva.

c. If he threw

from three

handbreadths

to ten

handbreadths,

we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis:

Rabbi Akiva holds him liable, because “caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest,” while the Sages disagree with this and exempt him.

It was taught likewise

in a beraita, in accordance with the words of Rav Helkiah bar Tovi. For it was taught: if he threw from one private domain to another private domain through the public domain

within three

handbreadths of the ground of the public domain,

everyone agrees that he is liable.

And if he threw

above ten

handbreadths, he

is not

prohibited

except on account of a rabbinic prohibition,

even according to Rabbi Akiva. For here there is no prohibition except on account of the enactment of “eruv of courtyards,” by which the Sages prohibited taking something out from one person’s domain to another person’s domain.

And

therefore,

if they were

the two private domains on the two sides of the public domain

his domains,

and here there is no taking out from his courtyard to his fellow’s courtyard, it is

permitted.

And if he threw at a height

from three to ten, Rabbi Akiva holds him liable

because “caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest,”

and the Sages exempt.

»,

The master said: If they were

the two private domains from which he threw from one to the other through the public domain above ten handbreadths,

his domains,

it is

permitted.

And we raise an objection:

shall we say,

this beraita, which permits throwing through the public domain and is not concerned on account of taking out from the courtyard of an individual to the courtyard of many,

is a refutation of Rav.

For it was stated: Two houses on the two sides of the public domain—

Rabba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: It is prohibited to throw from one to the other,

even if the two houses belong to one person, because the object passes through the air of the public domain, and this is like taking something out from his courtyard to the courtyard of many, which the Sages prohibited without “eruv of courtyards.”

And Shmuel said: It is permitted to throw from one to the other,

because the air of the public domain does not prohibit taking something out into it, since the members of the public domain do not make use of the air.

And we answer:

But did we not establish that passage

[and did we not already explain, in the Gemara of Eruvin 85b], that even Rav agrees that the air of the public domain does not prohibit? And what Rav prohibited, throwing from one to the other, applies specifically

when one is elevated and one is lowered

[one house is higher than the other]; and since he must train his hand to throw from the high one to the low one or from the low one to the high one, he is distracted by this, and the Sages were concerned

that sometimes it falls and he may come to bring it

[sometimes the thrown object falls into the public domain, and there is concern that perhaps he will return and bring it to himself]. If so, there is no difficulty from the beraita against Rav, because the beraita deals with a case in which the two domains stand at the same height.

Any place in the public domain that is not three handbreadths high has the status of the public domain. And if it is three handbreadths high but does not have a width of four by four, it is a “place exempt” according to Torah law. And if it is three handbreadths high and four by four wide, it is a “karmelit,” by rabbinic enactment.

Rav Hisda said to Rav Hamnuna.

And some say, Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Hisda

[there are those who say that Rav Hamnuna was the one who said the following words to Rav Hisda]:

From where is this matter that the Sages said, every

thing that is higher

than three

handbreadths and stands in the public domain

is considered lavud.

That is, as though the place had become level with the public domain?

He said to him:

It is a logical consideration, and not because of “lavud,” but rather

because it is impossible for the public domain to be gathered with a scraper and a smoothing plane

[types of tools with which planks are smoothed]. That is, it is impossible to say that the Torah made one liable for transferring in the public domain only in a public domain that had been smoothed of bumps with tools such as these.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

since it is a logical consideration, even a place that is

three

handbreadths

also

should be the public domain, by that same logical consideration!?

And furthermore,

it is difficult: if this is the logical consideration for imposing liability in the public domain, and no law of “lavud” was stated at all, then

that which we learned

with regard to the walls of a sukka:

if one lowers the walls from above downward,

that is, he began weaving the walls from the roofing downward but did not finish weaving them to the bottom of the sukka,

if they are three handbreadths above the ground,

the sukka is

invalid

[even if the wall has a measure of ten handbreadths].

And it implies:

this

if the walls of the sukka are high above the ground

less than three

handbreadths, the sukka is

valid.

And if there is no law of “lavud,” and the entire reason in the public domain is only that it is impossible for the public domain to be smooth, if so,

what is there to say,

why should the walls of the sukka not have to reach the actual ground? For what is the difference between when the walls are more than three handbreadths above the ground, in which case it is invalid, and when they are less than three handbreadths above it, in which case it is valid!?

And we answer:

There,

with regard to the sukka,

this is the reason

that if the wall was more than three handbreadths above the ground, the sukka is invalid: it is

because it becomes

the wall of the sukka when it is three handbreadths above the ground

“a partition through which young goats pass”

[beneath it], and they nullify the wall from serving as a partition. But when the suspension is less than three handbreadths from the ground, young goats do not pass beneath it, and therefore the sukka is valid; yet there is no need to invoke the law of “lavud.”

And we raise an objection to this:

That is satisfactory

as to what the Mishna distinguishes between three and less than three with regard to

below.

But the distinction between three handbreadths and less than three

above,

such as when he distanced the walls from the roofing, where a distance of less than three handbreadths makes it valid and more than three makes it invalid,

what is there to say,

if the law of “lavud” is not stated!?

Rather,

necessarily,

anything less than three handbreadths is considered lavud; it is a halakha received by tradition

[it is a halakha given to Moses at Sinai].

The Sages taught:

One who throws

from the public domain to the public domain, with a private domain in the middle:

Rabbi holds him liable,

and he proceeds to explain the reason.

And the Sages exempt,

for it did not come to rest in the public domain, and caught in the air is not considered as though it had come to rest.

Rav and Shmuel both said

in explanation of the reason of Rabbi, who holds him liable:

Rabbi held him liable only when the private domain is roofed, for we say, “the house is considered as though it were filled

” [as though the entire house were filled with objects up to its roof, so that the air is not considered air]; therefore, anything thrown into it is considered as though it had come to rest.

But

in a private domain

that is not roofed, not

does Rabbi hold him liable.

Rav Hisd

a

said that Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Rabbi would hold him liable for two, one on account of taking out

from a private domain to the public domain. Since it is considered as though it had come to rest in the public domain, he becomes liable for taking it out; and when the object continued moving to the private domain, it is as though he uprooted it again and placed it in the private domain,

and

he becomes liable for an additional

one on account of bringing in

from the public domain to the private domain.

Rav Hisda sat and was having difficulty with it

regarding what he had said in the name of Shmuel: