Shabbat 97b (צז:) — the Talmud in English

But the labor of carrying out is an av melakha, whereas the labor of bringing in is not an av melakha in its own right, but a derivative of carrying out.

Does this mean that Rabbi holds one liable for a derivative performed together with its av?

And does Rabbi hold one liable for a derivative when he performed it together with the av in a single lapse of awareness?

And

was it not taught in a beraita: Rabbi says:

It is written [Exodus 35:1]: “These are the words that the Lord commanded, to perform them. Six days work shall be done, and the seventh day shall be sacred.” From the fact that it says

“words,”

and the minimum of a plural expression is two, we learn two. And since the verse adds and says

“the words,”

we learn one more. And since the verse further says

“These are the words,”

we learn another thirty-six, because the numerical value of “these” is thirty-six:

These are the thirty-nine

avot

melakhot

of Shabbat

that were told to Moses at Sinai;

and therefore we need to know the count, in order to teach us that a person is never liable for more than thirty-nine sin-offerings if he performed them all in a single lapse of awareness.

We have therefore learned that a person is not liable for derivatives when he performed them in a single lapse of awareness together with the avot, since otherwise he would be liable for many more than thirty-nine sin-offerings. This is difficult for Shmuel, who explained Rabbi’s opinion as follows: He is liable for a derivative performed together with its av!?

Rav Yosef said

to Rav Hisda, who had raised this difficulty against his statement in the name of Shmuel:

You teach it

according to Shmuel’s statement [you apply Shmuel’s statement to Rabbi’s opinion],

and

therefore

it is difficult for you

to reconcile Rabbi with Rabbi.

But

we teach it as referring to Rabbi Yehuda

[we apply Shmuel’s statement to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion],

and

for us

there is no difficulty

with your question. This is how I teach Shmuel’s statement:

As it was taught in a beraita:

One threw

from a private domain into a public domain, and

the object did not come to rest immediately upon entering the public domain; rather, it

traversed four cubits

additional

in the public domain

and then came to rest:

Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable,

as the Gemara will explain.

And the Sages exempt him,

as the Gemara will explain.

It is with regard to this beraita that we teach:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Yehuda would hold him liable for two:

One, for carrying out

from a private domain into a public domain,

and one

additional

for carrying

four cubits in the public domain, which is a derivative of carrying out. This is because he holds that “an object caught in the air is considered as though it came to rest,” and as soon as the object entered the airspace of the public domain, we consider it as though it came to rest; then he lifted it again and set it down after four cubits. Nothing can be raised against this statement, since we do not find that Rabbi Yehuda exempts one for a derivative performed together with its av.

The proof that Rabbi Yehuda would hold him liable for two is as follows:

If it enters your mind that only one

alone

is what Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable for,

and that he never holds one liable for a derivative performed together with its av,

it follows [

that is necessarily the case]

that the Sages exempt him entirely,

and do not hold him liable even for one. For if not, in what would they disagree? Yet it is impossible to say that

he carried it out [

he carried it out]

from a private domain into a public domain,

since even according to the Sages, who do not hold that “an object caught in the air is considered as though it came to rest,” he should at least be liable once for carrying out.

Rather, it is certain that their dispute concerns the labor of carrying, for which Rabbi Yehuda added liability because “an object caught in the air is considered as though it came to rest,” as though it came to rest and was then lifted again; and the Sages exempt him because in their view “an object caught in the air is not considered as though it came to rest.” And we raise an objection to this:

From where

is it established from here that Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable for two, and that Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable for a derivative performed together with its av?

Perhaps I can always tell you: Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable for only one

alone,

and that is what he holds him liable for,

namely, for carrying out, which is an av alone,

and the Sages

indeed

exempt him entirely.

.

And regarding your difficulty—how is it possible that he would not be liable at all—we can say:

And how do you find

a case in which he would not be liable at all?

For example, when he said

at the time he threw:

“Until it emerges into the public domain”—

“let it come to rest” [

as soon as it emerges into the public domain, let it come to rest].

And this is the point of their dispute:

For Rabbi Yehuda holds: “An object caught

in the air is considered as though it came to rest,”

and it follows that

his intention was fulfilled [his intention was accomplished],

for it came to rest immediately upon its emergence. Therefore he is liable for carrying out, whereas he is exempt for carrying, because one is not liable for a derivative performed together with its av.

And the Sages hold: We do not say that “an object caught in the air is considered as though it came to rest,” and his intention was not fulfilled,

and therefore he is not liable even for carrying out.

But for a derivative performed together with its av,

in truth,

Rabbi Yehuda does not hold him liable. So from where did Shmuel derive that Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable for two, and holds one liable for a derivative performed together with its av? And we resolve:

. From where, then, did Shmuel derive his explanation that Rabbi Yehuda imposes two liabilities and imposes liability for a derivative labor together with its primary category? And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

to say that Rabbi Yehuda does not hold one liable for a derivative performed together with its av—

For

there is

a beraita

concerning what we learned above [73a], “The avot melakhot are forty less one,” and the tanna’s intention in counting them is to say that if one performed all of them in a single lapse of awareness, he is liable for each and every one, as Rabbi Yohanan said above [96b].

And concerning this, it was taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Yehuda adds: Also

the

beating of the threads and

the

precision finishing,

and the Gemara proceeds to explain with regard to what Rabbi Yehuda adds them.

The Sages said to him:

The

beating of the threads is included in warping,

which is counted among the thirty-nine melakhot;

precision finishing is included in weaving,

which is counted among the thirty-nine melakhot.

Is it not that he performed [

both of them] [

all of them, Rashi]

[Rashi: all of them]

together,

and is Rabbi Yehuda not saying that if he performed these melakhot together with the other avot melakhot in a single lapse of awareness, he is liable for two additional sin-offerings for these melakhot,

and

if so,

derive from this:

Rabbi Yehuda would hold one liable for a derivative performed together with its av,

since the beating of the threads and precision finishing are derivatives of warping and weaving, respectively, and nevertheless Rabbi Yehuda would hold one liable for these derivatives as well when he performed them together with their avot.

And we reject this:

Ultimately,

I can tell you: Rabbi Yehuda does not hold one liable for a derivative performed together with its av.

.

And this is the point of their dispute,

between Rabbi Yehuda, who holds him liable for these when he performed them together with the other thirty-nine melakhot in a single lapse of awareness, and the Sages, who do not hold him liable:

For Rabbi Yehuda holds: These,

the beating of the threads and precision finishing,

are avot,

and therefore he is liable for them as well.

And the Sages hold: These,

the beating of the threads and precision finishing,

are derivatives,

and therefore he is not liable for them, because one is not liable for a derivative performed together with its av.

Know

that the explanation is as the Gemara explained:

For it teaches

in the beraita,

“Rabbi Yehuda adds.”

Granted, if you say that they are avot,

according to Rabbi Yehuda, then

what is the meaning of “adds”?—

He adds avot.

But if you say that they are derivatives,

then

what is the meaning of “adds”?

That is, what addition is there here to those enumerated in the Mishna? The Mishna enumerated only avot, whereas these are derivatives, so there is no addition here.

And since they are avot, there is no proof from this beraita that Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable for a derivative performed together with its av. Even the beraita in which Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages disagree concerning carrying out and carrying can be explained in a manner in which Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable for only one, as explained, and not in accordance with Shmuel, who explained Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion there as holding him liable for two.

The Gemara supports the questioner’s difficulty against Shmuel:

It was also stated

not in accordance with Shmuel’s explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages concerning one who carries, but in accordance with the questioner’s difficulty:

Rabba and Rav Yosef both said: Rabbi Yehuda held him liable for only one.

And this is as the questioner explained their dispute.

And we challenge this:

But according to the initial assumption that Rabbi Yehuda would hold him liable for two,

when one threw from a private domain into a public domain and the object traversed four cubits in the public domain, this is difficult: How can he be held liable for carrying? In either case:

If he wanted it here, [

at the end of the four cubits]

he wanted it to rest,

if his intention was that it should come to rest where it actually came to rest, at the end of the four cubits, then

he did not want it here [

at the beginning of the four cubits, he did not want it to come to rest], and he is not liable for carrying.

In other words, you seek to hold him liable for carrying in the public domain, for which one is liable only if he lifted the object in the public domain at the beginning of the four cubits and set it down at the end of the four cubits, because by virtue of the principle that “an object caught in the air is considered as though it came to rest,” we consider the object as though it came to rest upon reaching the public domain and was then lifted again and set down at the end of the four cubits. But since his desire was for it to come to rest at the end of the four cubits, he did not desire it to come to rest at the beginning of the four cubits, and it is impossible to hold him liable for carrying in the public domain.

And if he wanted it here, [

at the beginning of the four cubits]

he wanted it to come to rest,

then

here, [

at the end of the four cubits]

he did not want it to rest,

so how can we hold him liable for carrying, which he did not want at all—not the lifting, not the carrying, and not the placing?

He said to him,

Rav Ashi said to Ravina: What are we dealing with here?

With one who says, “Let it come to rest wherever you wish,”

and since he does not care where it comes to rest, his intention was fulfilled both by its resting at the beginning of the four cubits and by the carrying and placing that followed.

The Gemara says: This ruling is certainly obvious:

Obviously

: If

he intended to throw eight

cubits in the public domain

and threw

only

four

cubits, he is liable for carrying four cubits in the public domain, because

it is

like one who

wrote the name [

Sh

from Shimon

, meaning, it is comparable to one who wished to write “Shimon,” which is a major labor, but wrote only “Sh,” which is a minor labor—he is liable.

But the following question remains: If

he intended to throw four

cubits only,

and threw eight

cubits,

what is

the ruling?

We say: He has indeed taken it out [that is, he took it beyond four cubits] as he intended, and although he took it farther, this is not a deficiency.

as he intended, and the fact that he carried it farther does not detract from this.

Or perhaps: Where he wants it to

come to rest,

it did not come to rest

there, because he intended the object to come to rest after four cubits, whereas it came to rest after eight cubits.

The Gemara rejects the obvious conclusion, and resolves the question:

And

is

this not what

Ravina

raised as an objection to Rav Ashi

earlier: Why is one liable when he throws from one private domain to another private domain and the object passes four cubits through the public domain, for both carrying out and transferring, since whether he intended it to come to rest at the end of the four cubits or intended it to come to rest at their beginning, it is impossible to hold him liable?

And he said to him

, and Rav Ashi was forced to say to Ravina:

When he says, “At any place you wish it to come to rest

,” but without this statement he is indeed not liable. From here we learn that one is exempt both when he intended to throw eight and threw four, and when he intended to throw four and threw eight. For one who intended to throw eight and threw four is comparable to one who intended the object to come to rest at the end of four, while one who intended to throw four and threw eight is comparable to one who intended it to come to rest at the beginning of the four; and both are exempt.

The Gemara proceeds to explain:

And as for what you said

regarding one who intended to throw eight and threw four, that he should be liable, because

he wrote “Sh” from “Shimon”—

Are the cases comparable!? [that is, is the case under discussion comparable to the proof]!?

For there is a distinction:

There

, in the case of “Sh” from “Shimon,”

as long as he has not written “Sh

,” he cannot write “Shimon” [if he does not first write “Sh,” he cannot write “Shimon”]. In other words, his intention to write “Sh” was included within his intention to write “Shimon,” which includes the letters “Sh.” It follows that he intended the very act for which we hold him liable; he merely intended to add to it.

[if he does not first write “Shem,” he cannot write “Shimon.”] In other words, his intention to write “Shem” was included within his intention to write “Shimon,” which includes the letters “Shem.” It follows that he intended the very act for which we hold him liable; he merely intended to add more to it.

By contrast,

here

, in the case of one who intended to throw eight and threw four, since

if he does not throw four

and have the object come to rest at their end,

could he throw eight!?

That is, does throwing eight require throwing four and having the object come to rest at the end of those four? His intention was not to throw four with an intermediate act of placing down; rather, he intended to throw the object a distance of eight cubits without its coming to rest in between. Therefore, he cannot be held liable for the placing down that occurred in between contrary to his intention.

The Sages taught: One who throws from the public domain to the public domain, with a private domain in between:

If he transferred

four cubits

within the public domain, even by combining distances from the two public domains, he is

liable.