Shabbat 97b — the Talmud in English

And behold, the labor of carrying out is an av, whereas the labor of carrying in is not an av in its own right, but is a derivative of carrying out, and

does this mean that Rabbi holds one liable for a derivative in the place of an av?

And does Rabbi hold one liable for a derivative when he performed it together with the av in one unwitting lapse?

And

it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi says:

It is written [Exodus 35:1]: “These are the words that the Lord commanded, to perform them. Six days shall work be done, and on the seventh day it shall be holy for you.” From the implication of his saying

“words,”

and the minority of a plural is two, we have learned two. And since the verse added and said

“the words,”

we have learned one more. And since the verse added to say

“these are the words”,

we have learned thirty-six more, for “these” has the numerical value of thirty-six:

These are thirty-nine

avs of

labors

of Shabbat

that were said to Moses at Sinai,

and therefore we need to know the number, in order to teach us: A person is not liable for more than thirty-nine sin-offerings if he performed them in one unwitting lapse.

We have thus learned that a person is not liable for the derivatives when he performed them in one unwitting lapse together with the avs, for if so, you would find many more than thirty-nine sin-offerings. And this is difficult for Shmuel, who explained Rabbi’s view: He is liable for a derivative in the place of an av!?

Rav Yosef said

to Rav Hisda, who had raised this difficulty against his statement, in which he had said in the name of Shmuel:

You teach this

the words of Shmuel [you teach Shmuel’s words regarding Rabbi],

and

because of this

it is difficult for him

Rabbi against Rabbi.

But

we teach it regarding Rabbi Yehuda

the statement of Shmuel [we teach Shmuel’s words regarding Rabbi Yehuda],

and

for us

it is not difficult

your difficulty. And this is how I teach Shmuel’s words:

For it was taught in a beraita:

If one threw

from a private domain into a public domain, and

the object did not come to rest immediately upon entering the public domain, but

passed four cubits

more

in the public domain

and afterward came to rest:

Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable,

as it explains and proceeds.

And the Sages exempt,

as it explains and proceeds.

And regarding this beraita we teach:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Rabbi Yehuda would hold him liable for two:

One on account of carrying out

from a private domain into a public domain,

and one

additional

on account of transferring

four cubits in the public domain, which is a derivative of carrying out. And this is because he holds: “That which is caught [in the air] is considered as though it came to rest,” and immediately when the object entered the airspace of the public domain, we consider it as though it came to rest; then he again lifted it and caused it to come to rest after four cubits. And nothing can be raised against this statement, for we have not found that Rabbi Yehuda exempts one for a derivative in the place of an av.

And the proof that Rabbi Yehuda would hold him liable for two is:

If it enters your mind that one

alone

is what he holds him liable for,

Rabbi Yehuda, and he never holds one liable for a derivative in the place of an av,

it follows [

if so, necessarily],

that the Rabbis exempt entirely,

and do not hold him liable even for one; for if not, over what did they disagree? And it is impossible to say that

he did carry it out [

he carried it out]

from a private domain into a public domain,

for even according to the Sages, who do not hold that “that which is caught [in the air] is considered as though it came to rest,” he should at least be held liable for one on account of carrying out.

Rather, certainly their disagreement is concerning the labor of transferring, for which Rabbi Yehuda added liability, because “that which is caught [in the air] is considered as though it came to rest,” and it is as though it came to rest and was again lifted; whereas the Sages exempt, because in their view “that which is caught [in the air] is not considered as though it came to rest.” And we raise an objection to this:

From where

what necessity is there here that Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable for two, and that it can be learned from here that Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable for a derivative in the place of an av!? But

perhaps I will always say to you: Rabbi Yehuda, one

alone

is what he holds him liable for,

namely, for the carrying out, which is an av alone,

and the Rabbis

indeed

exempt entirely.

.

And regarding what is difficult for you: How is it possible that he would not be liable at all? Say to you:

And how do you find

that he would not be liable at all?

For example, where he said

at the time he threw:

“Until it comes out into the public domain”—

“let it come to rest” [

when it comes out into the public domain, let it immediately come to rest].

And in this they disagree:

For Rabbi Yehuda holds: “That which is caught

is considered as though it came to rest,”

and it follows that

his intention was accomplished [his intention was carried out],

for it came to rest immediately upon its exit; and because of this he is liable for the carrying out, whereas for the transferring he is exempt, because one is not liable for a derivative in the place of an av.

And the Rabbis hold: We do not say, “That which is caught is considered as though it came to rest,” and his intention was not accomplished,

and therefore he is not liable even for the carrying out.

But for a derivative in the place of an av

indeed

Rabbi Yehuda does not hold him liable,

and from where does Shmuel derive that Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable for two, and holds one liable for a derivative in the place of an av!? And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

to say that Rabbi Yehuda does not hold one liable for a derivative in the place of an av—

For

behold,

it was taught

in a beraita concerning what we learned above [73a], “The primary categories of labor are forty less one,” and the intention of the tanna in listing them is to say that if one performed all of them in a single lapse of awareness, he is liable for each and every one, as Rabbi Yohanan said above [96b].

And concerning this it was taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Yehuda adds: Also

the

one who beats the woof and

the

one who makes precise adjustments,

and it explains and proceeds concerning what Rabbi Yehuda adds.

The Sages said to him:

The Sages:

The one who beats the woof is included in the one who stretches the warp,

which was counted among the thirty-nine labors;

the one who makes precise adjustments is included in the one who weaves,

which was counted among the thirty-nine labors.

Is it not that he performed [

both of them] [

all of them, Rashi]

[Rashi: all of them]

together,

and is it not Rabbi Yehuda’s intention to say that if he performed these labors together with the rest of the avs of labors in one unwitting lapse, he is liable for two additional sin-offerings for these labors,

and

if so,

learn from it:

Rabbi Yehuda would hold one liable for a derivative in the place of an av,

for the one who beats the woof and the one who makes precise adjustments are derivatives of the one who stretches the warp and the one who weaves, yet Rabbi Yehuda would nevertheless hold him liable even for these derivatives when he performed them together with their avs.

And we reject this:

In truth

I can say to you: Rabbi Yehuda does not hold one liable for a derivative in the place of an av;.

.

And in this they disagree,

Rabbi Yehuda, who holds him liable for these when he performed them together with the other thirty-nine labors in one unwitting lapse, and the Sages, who do not hold him liable:

For Rabbi Yehuda holds: These,

the one who beats the woof and the one who makes precise adjustments,

are avs,

and therefore he is liable for them as well.

And the Rabbis hold: These,

the one who beats the woof and the one who makes precise adjustments,

are derivatives,

and therefore he is not liable for them, for one is not liable for a derivative in the place of an av.

Know

that the explanation is as the Gemara explained:

For it teaches

in the beraita

“Rabbi Yehuda adds.”

Granted, if you say that they are avs,

according to Rabbi Yehuda, if so,

what does “he adds” mean?

He adds avs.

But if you say that they are derivatives,

then

what does “he adds” mean?

That is, what addition is there in this over those enumerated in the Mishna? The Mishna enumerated only avs, whereas these are derivatives, and there is no addition here.

And since they are avs, if so there is no proof from this beraita that Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable for a derivative in the place of an av. And the beraita in which Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages disagreed regarding carrying out and transferring can also be explained in a manner in which Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable for only one, as was explained, and not like Shmuel, who explained Rabbi Yehuda’s view there as holding him liable for two.

The Gemara supports the questioner’s difficulty against Shmuel:

It was also stated

not according to Shmuel’s explanation of the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages concerning one who transfers, but according to the questioner’s difficulty:

Rabba and Rav Yosef both said: Rabbi Yehuda held him liable for only one.

And so the questioner explained their disagreement.

And we challenge this:

And according to what we initially thought, that Rabbi Yehuda would hold him liable for two,

when he threw from a private domain into a public domain and it passed four cubits in the public domain, it is difficult: How is it possible to hold him liable for the transferring? For in either event:

If he intended it for here [

at the end of four cubits]

he intended it,

if his intention was that it should come to rest in the place where it in fact came to rest, at the end of the four cubits, then

he did not intend it for here [

he did not want it to come to rest at the beginning of the four cubits], and he is not liable for the transferring.

That is, you are holding him liable for transferring in the public domain, for which he is liable only if he lifted it in the public domain at the beginning of four cubits and placed it at the end of four cubits. This is because, by virtue of “that which is caught [in the air] is considered as though it came to rest,” we consider it as though the object came to rest when it reached the public domain, and then was lifted again and came to rest at the end of four cubits. But since his desire was that it come to rest at the end of four cubits, he did not desire that it come to rest at the beginning of four cubits, and it is impossible to hold him liable for transferring in the public domain.

And if he intended it for here [

at the beginning of four cubits]

he intended it

to come to rest, then

for here [

at the end of four cubits]

he did not intend it, and how can we hold him liable for a transferring that he did not desire at all—not for the lifting, not for the transferring, and not for the placing?

to come to rest. How, then, can you impose liability on him for carrying, which he did not want at all—not its uprooting, not its carrying, and not its placing?

He said to him

Rav Ashi to Ravina: What are we dealing with here?

With one who says, “Let it come to rest wherever you wish”,

and since it does not matter to him where it comes to rest, his intention was fulfilled both by the placing at the beginning of the four cubits and by the transferring and placing afterward.

The Gemara says: This law is certainly

obvious:

if

he intended to throw eight

cubits in the public domain

and threw

only

four

cubits, he is liable on account of transferring four cubits in the public domain, because

behold

he is like one who

wrote “Shem” [

Shem]

from Shimon, that is, behold, he resembles one who wanted to write “Shimon,” which is a major labor, but wrote only “Shem,” which is a minor labor—that he is liable.

But there is room for doubt:

if

he intended to throw four

cubits בלבד,

and threw eight

cubits,

what is [the law]?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Do we say: He has indeed taken it out [behold, he took it out beyond four cubits] according to his intention, and although he took it out farther, there is no deficiency in this?

as he intended, and the fact that he carried it farther does not detract from this.

Or perhaps: Where he requires it

to rest,

it did not rest

there, because he intended that the object rest at the end of four, whereas it rested at the end of eight.

The Gemara rejects the obviousness, and resolves the doubt:

And

is this not what

was said [

that he asked]

by Ravina to Rav Ashi above: Why does he become liable when he threw from a private domain to a private domain and passed four cubits in the public domain, for carrying out and transferring, when whether he intended that it rest at the end of the four cubits, or whether he intended that it rest at their beginning, it is impossible to make him liable?

earlier: Why is one liable when he throws an object from one private domain to another private domain, passing through the public domain for four cubits, for both carrying out and carrying four cubits? In either case—whether he intended it to come to rest at the end of the four cubits or whether he intended it to come to rest at their beginning—it should be impossible to hold him liable.

And he said to him,

and Rav Ashi was forced to say to Ravina:

“In one who says, ‘Wherever you want it to rest,”

but without this he indeed is not liable. And from here it is learned to exempt both when he intended to throw eight and threw four, and when he intended to throw four and threw eight: for he intended to throw eight and threw four resembles intending that it rest at the end of four, and intending to throw four and throwing eight resembles intending that it rest at the beginning of four, and both are exempt.

The Gemara adds to explain:

And as for what you said

concerning one who intended to throw eight and threw four, that he should be made liable, because

behold, he wrote “Shem” from Shimon—

is it comparable!? [

And is the case under discussion comparable to the proof]!? For behold,

there,

concerning “Shem” from Shimon,

as long as he has not written “Shem,

he cannot write “Shimon” [

if he does not first write “Shem,” he will not write “Shimon”]. That is, he intended to write “Shem” as part of what he intended to write, “Shimon,” which includes the letters “Shem.” It follows that he intended what we make him liable for, except that he also intended to add to it.

But this is not so

here,

concerning one who intended to throw eight and threw four, for

as long as he does not throw four

and rest at their end, is it the case that

he cannot throw eight!?

That is, does throwing eight require throwing four and resting at the end of four? Behold, his intention was not for throwing four with resting in between; rather, he intended to throw to a distance of eight cubits without resting in between, and it is impossible to make him liable for the resting that occurred in between contrary to his intention.

The Sages taught: One who throws from the public domain to the public domain, with a private domain in the middle:

If he transferred

four cubits

in the public domain, even by joining the two public domains together, he is

liable.