Shabbat 96b — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who throws from a private domain into a public domain, or from a public domain into a private domain, is liable:

And the Gemara asks:

Now,

behold,

throwing

from a private domain into a public domain

is a derivative of

the labor of

carrying out [

which was taught above, 73a, among the primary labors]

itself.

And from now we must ask: The labor of

carrying out itself, where is it written,

where is it stated in the Torah?

Rabbi Yohanan said: For the verse says, “And Moses commanded, and they caused a proclamation to pass throughout the camp

saying, ‘Let no man or woman make any more labor for the contribution of the holy place.’” That is, they should no longer bring to him donations for the labor of the Tabernacle. And the Gemara assumed that Moses’ command that they should no longer bring donations to him was on Shabbat, because of the prohibition of carrying out.

But

where did Moses sit [

where was the place of his residence]? —

In the camp of the Levites

he sat.

And the camp of the Levites was a public domain.

For all Israel were present there with Moses our teacher.

And he said to them

Moses,

to Israel: Do not carry out and bring from your private domain into the public domain [

do not carry out and bring from your tents, which are a private domain, to me, since I am found in a public domain].

But the Gemara asks:

And from where do we know that he was speaking about Shabbat [

how do we know that Moses was warning them about the labor of carrying out on Shabbat]!?

Perhaps he was speaking on a weekday, and because the work had been completed, [

perhaps Moses told them not to bring him any more donations because he already had enough donations, which they had brought to complete the work of the Tabernacle],

as it is written

in that section: “And Moses commanded, and they caused a proclamation to pass throughout the camp, saying: Let neither man nor woman do any more work for the contribution of the holy place. So the people were restrained from bringing,

for the work was sufficient

for all the work to make it, and there was excess.”

And we answer:

We derive “causing to pass” from “causing to pass,” from Yom Kippur

of the Jubilee year.

It is written here, “And they caused a proclamation to pass throughout the camp,” and it is written there,

on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee year,

“And you shall cause the sound of the shofar of a blast to pass” —

Just as

the causing of the shofar to pass that is written

there,

on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee year,

is on a day prohibited

from labor,

so too

the causing to pass that is written

here

is

on a day prohibited

from labor, which is the day of Shabbat, on which Moses commanded that they should not carry out.

But it still requires discussion:

We have found,

indeed we have found proof concerning

carrying out

from a private domain into a public domain, whose prohibition is explicitly written in the Torah. But

bringing in

from a public domain into a private domain, which is not explicitly written in the Torah,

from where do we know

that it is prohibited?

It is a logical inference,

that bringing in should be prohibited because it is a derivative of carrying out. For

now,

behold, every carrying out

is from one domain to another

he carries out. And if so,

what difference is there whether he takes out or whether he brings in [

what difference is there between carrying out from one domain to another and bringing in from one domain to another]?

However, carrying out — it is a

primary

labor. Whereas

bringing in — it is a

derivative

of it.

And the Gemara asks:

Now,

behold,

for this one he is liable and for this one he is liable [

for both carrying out and bringing in he is liable], and if so,

why is it called

the

“primary,” and why is it called

the

“derivative”?

What practical difference is there in this?

And we explain:

The practical difference

is that with all the primary labors of Shabbat,

if he performed two primary labors together [

if he inadvertently performed two primary labors, and the prohibition was not made known to him between one labor and the other],

alternatively,

if he performed

two derivatives together, he is liable for two [

he becomes liable for two sin-offerings].

And

if

he performed a primary labor and its derivative, he is liable for only one [

if he performs the primary labor and its derivative in one period of unawareness, he is liable for only one sin-offering for both of them]. And this is the practical difference in what we call carrying out a “primary labor” and bringing in a “derivative.”

The Gemara continues to discuss:

And according to Rabbi Eliezer [

in Keritot 16b],

who holds liable

for a separate sin-offering

a derivative in the place of the primary labor [

even when he performed the derivative together with the primary labor in one period of unawareness],

why did they call

carrying out

a primary labor, and why did they call

bringing in

a derivative?

And we answer: Indeed, according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no practical legal difference whether it is a primary labor or a derivative. Rather,

this,

the labor of carrying out,

which was important in the Tabernacle [

which was an important labor in the Tabernacle],

is called a primary labor.

And

if

this,

the labor of bringing in,

which was not important in the Tabernacle [

which was not an important labor in the Tabernacle],

is not called a primary labor.

Alternatively, this,

carrying out,

which is written

in a verse, as explained above,

is called a primary labor, and this,

the labor of bringing in,

which is not written, is called

it

a derivative.

The Gemara further explains the source of another derivative of carrying out:

And as for that which we learned

below:

One who throws

a juicy fig or something similar

four cubits

in a public domain, and the fig came to rest in such a way that it stuck

to a wall

whose face is in the public domain—if the fig stuck to the wall

above ten handbreadths,

where it is not considered the air of a public domain, since a public domain extends only to a height of ten handbreadths, then he is

like one who throws

and places

in the air,

and he is exempt. But if it stuck

below ten handbreadths,

which is the air of a public domain, then he is

like one who throws on the ground,

and he is liable.

And one who throws on the ground four cubits,

he is

liable.

We have thus learned that the labor of carrying four cubits in a public domain is a labor.

If he threw

or carried

four cubits in a public domain, from where do we know that he is liable?

Rabbi Yashya said:

For this reason one who throws four cubits in a public domain is liable:

for such was the practice of the weavers of

the

curtains

for covering the Tabernacle:

they would throw

their

needles to one another.

And the Gemara asks:

“Weavers—why do they need needles!?”

For there is no manner of weaving the curtains with needles!?

Rather,

this is what one must say:

for the curtain-sewers

who were in the Tabernacle

would throw their needles to one another.

But the Gemara still asks: From where do we know this?

And perhaps they were sitting beside one another [

perhaps they were sitting one next to the other within one cubit, and there was no need to throw, but only to hand over]!?

And we answer: This was explained according to Rashi. And we answer: It is impossible that they sat beside one another, because

they would injure one another with needles [

they were liable to injure one another with their needles] when they stretched the thread at whose end was the needle.

And we still ask:

And perhaps,

although they were not actually sitting close to one another, perhaps

within four

cubits

they were sitting [

perhaps they were sitting within four cubits], and there is no throwing four cubits!?

Rather, Rav Hisda said: for the weavers of

curtains would throw a buchyar [

a tool into which the rod of the woof was placed, which they would throw between the two walls of the warp threads of the curtain]

in the curtain,

which itself was four cubits wide, and when he threw it from one side of the curtain to its other side, he had carried four cubits.

And we ask:

But it was bound to his hand!?

That is, when he threw the buchyar a distance of four cubits, he himself was standing at the beginning of the four cubits, and there he held in his hand the woof thread, which was not detached from the buchyar, and this is not carrying four cubits!?

And we answer: In any event, we find carrying four cubits through throwing the buchyar without his holding in his hand a thread tied to the buchyar, and that is

with the final niska [

in the weaving of] the last woof thread in the curtain], because then the rod slips away from the thread and the buchyar falls at the end of the four cubits.

And we still ask:

But they go through a “place exempt”,

for the carrying of the buchyar through the walls of the curtain is not considered carrying in the public domain, because between the walls of the curtain this is not a public domain, but a “place exempt”!

Rather, for the weavers of curtains would throw a buchyar to those who asked them,

when one of them had two [buchyarim] and one of the weavers of the curtains needed to ask him for his, he would throw it to him.

And we ask:

And perhaps they were sitting beside one another [

perhaps they were sitting one next to the other]!?

And we answer: It is impossible that they sat close beside one another, because

they would injure

one

another at the hem [

at the edge of the curtain], that is, if they had been sitting one next to the other, one’s hand would reach into the other’s space at the edge of the curtain when they stretched the woof thread.

And we still ask:

And perhaps they were shifted past one another.

That is, perhaps they indeed sat one next to the other, but one was drawn backward and the other forward, so that they had no need to fear injuring one another!?

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty:

Did they ask from one another [

and would they ask one another for work tools]!?

But it was taught

by Luda [

the name of a sage]:

“Every man from his work that they were doing”: he performs from his work, and he does not perform from his fellow’s work,

for all were prepared with their craft tools, and they did not need to ask.

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty: Indeed, we find throwing four cubits in the Tabernacle, and for this reason he is liable. But

from where do we know that one who carries four cubits in the public domain is liable [

from where is he liable], for in the Tabernacle they carried only by throwing!?

Rather, every four cubits in the public domain is a tradition,

it is learned as a tradition [

it is a received tradition].

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

It is written [Numbers 15:32–36]: “And the Children of Israel were in the wilderness, and they found a man gathering wood on the day of Shabbat. And the Lord said to Moses: The man shall surely be put to death; the entire assembly shall stone him with stones outside the camp.” And Shmuel explains what the labor was that this man performed, for which he became liable for stoning:

“Gathering”

does not mean that he plucked the wood or gathered it, but rather

carrying

the wood

four cubits in the public domain, he was.

In a metanita it was taught [

in a beraita we learned]:

he was plucking

the gatherer; and for this he became liable.

Rav Aha bar Yaakov said:

The wood was detached and scattered, and that man

was gathering [

collecting]

—he was,

and for this he became liable.

The Gemara asks:

What practical difference is there

for us in knowing what the sin of the gatherer was, when what happened has happened!?

And it explains:

For the matter of Rav! For Rav said: I found a scroll of secrets

in the academy of Rabbi Hiyya, and it was written in it:

Issi ben Yehuda says: The primary labors are forty minus one, and one is liable for only one;

and the Gemara thought to explain that if he performed all of them in one lapse of awareness—he forgot the prohibitions of all the labors of Shabbat and performed all of them without becoming aware of them in the interim—he is liable for only one sin-offering [ and ultimately the Gemara explains it in another manner, and the intent of the Gemara’s saying “for the matter of Rav” is clarified].

And we ask about it: Is it

one

sin-offering alone for which he is liable,

and no more!?

But we learned

later, in the chapter “The Great Principle”:

The primary labors are forty minus one.

And the Mishna enumerates all of them there—

And we considered it: Why do I need the enumeration [

for what purpose is the general enumeration mentioned at the beginning of the Mishna]!?

And he said

he answered,

Rabbi Yohanan:

For this reason the tannai taught the general enumeration: to teach

that if he performed all of them in one lapse of awareness, he is liable

for a sin-offering

for each and every one.

And the tannai teaches us that the total number of sin-offerings for which a person can become liable in one lapse of awareness is forty-nine sin-offerings. But if he performed primary categories and derivatives in one lapse of awareness, he does not add a sin-offering for the derivatives.

And just as this law must be inferred from the wording of the Mishna, so too this law must be inferred from the words of Issi ben Yehuda himself, who said, “The primary labors are forty minus one.” Behold, we have learned that he is liable for each and every one. And how did he say, “and he is liable for only one”!?

Rather, say,

this is the intent of Issi ben Yehuda:

he is not liable for one of them.

There is one of the labors for which he is not liable for stoning, and we do not know which labor it is. And for this there is a practical difference in knowing what the gatherer did, for which the Torah made him liable for stoning:

Rav Yehuda—

it was obvious to him,

on the basis of his interpretation of the act of the gatherer,

that carrying

four cubits

is liable

for stoning, because it is not among the labors regarding which it is uncertain whether one is liable for stoning for them.

And the metanita—

it was obvious to him

on the basis of its interpretation of the act of the gatherer,

that plucking is liable

for stoning.

And Rav Aha bar Yaakov—

it was obvious to him that gathering is liable.

One master,

one of the three,

held: this,

that labor for which, in his opinion, the gatherer became liable,

at any rate is not uncertain,

there is no uncertainty concerning it, but one is certainly liable for stoning for it.

And one master,

the second of the three,

held: this at any rate is not uncertain.

And likewise the third.

The Sages taught: The gatherer

who was stoned in the wilderness

was Zelophehad. And so it says [

and from here it is learned]:

“And the Children of Israel were in the wilderness, and they found a man

gathering wood on the day of Shabbat.”

And below,

concerning the daughters of Zelophehad when they spoke before Moses about the inheritance of their father,

it says, “Our father died in the wilderness [

and he was not among the congregation of Korah, for he died because of his sin].”

Just as below,

with regard to the “in the wilderness” mentioned there,

Zelophehad,

so too here,

with regard to the “in the wilderness” mentioned concerning the gatherer,

Zelophehad, the words of Rabbi Akiva;

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said to him: Akiva! In either case,

whether your words are correct or whether they are not,

you will ultimately be called to account!

For

if

indeed

it is as you say, he will ultimately call you to account for

what

the Torah concealed him,

Zelophehad, and did not say that he was the gatherer,

and

if

you reveal him.

And if not,

according to your words, you will also ultimately be called to account, for

you bring slander upon that righteous man [

Zelophehad], saying that he desecrated Shabbat.