Shabbat 96b (צו:) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who throws from a private domain into a public domain, or from a public domain into a private domain, is liable:

The Gemara discusses this:

Now,

the

throwing

from a private domain into a public domain

is a derivative of

the labor of

carrying out

[which was taught above, on page 73a, among the primary categories of labor]

itself.

Now the matter must be examined: The labor of

carrying out itself, where is it written—

where is it stated in the Torah?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For the verse states: “And Moses commanded, and they spread a proclamation throughout the camp

saying: ‘Let neither man nor woman perform any more labor for the offering of the Sanctuary.’” That is, they should no longer bring donations to him for the work of the Tabernacle. The Gemara assumes that Moses’ command not to bring donations to him was issued on Shabbat, because of the prohibition against carrying out.

But

where did Moses sit

[where was his place of residence]? —

In the camp of the Levites

he sat.

And was the camp of the Levites a public domain?

For all Israel were present there with Moses our teacher.

And he said to them,

Moses,

“Do not take out and bring from your private domain into the public domain

[do not carry out and bring from your tents, which are private domains, to me, since I am in the public domain].”

But the Gemara asks:

And from where do we know that he was speaking about Shabbat

[that Moses was warning them concerning the labor of carrying out on Shabbat]?

Perhaps he was speaking on a weekday, because the work had been completed,

[perhaps Moses told them not to bring him any more donations because he had enough donations, which they had already brought in order to complete the work of the Tabernacle],

as it is written

in that passage: “And Moses commanded, and they spread a proclamation throughout the camp, saying: ‘Let neither man nor woman perform any more labor for the offering of the Sanctuary.’ And the people ceased from bringing.”

“And the work was sufficient

for them to perform all the work, and there was extra.”

And we answer:

He derives “transferring” from “transferring” with regard to Yom Kippur

of the Jubilee year.

Here it is written, “And they spread a proclamation throughout the camp,” and there it is written,

regarding Yom Kippur of the Jubilee year,

“And you shall transfer a blast of the shofar.”

Just as,

the sounding of the shofar written

there,

on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee year,

is on a day when

labor is prohibited,

so too,

the proclamation written

here

is

on a day when

labor is prohibited, namely, Shabbat, on which Moses commanded them not to carry out.

But the matter must still be examined:

We have found,

indeed, a proof concerning

carrying out

from a private domain into a public domain, whose prohibition is explicitly written in the Torah. But

bringing in

from a public domain into a private domain, which is not explicitly written in the Torah,

from where do we know

that it is prohibited?

It is a logical inference,

that bringing in should be prohibited because it is a derivative of carrying out. For

now,

every act of carrying out

is from one domain to another

when he carries it out. Therefore,

what difference is there between taking out and bringing in

[what difference is there between carrying from one domain to another and carrying into another domain]?

However, carrying out

is a primary

category of labor, whereas

bringing in

is a derivative

of it.

The Gemara discusses further:

Now,

for

this one he is liable and for that one he is liable

[he is liable both for carrying out and for bringing in], so

why is this one called

the

“primary,” and why is that one called

the

“derivative”?

What practical difference is there?

And we explain:

The practical difference

in all the primary categories of labor on Shabbat is that

if he performs two primary categories together

[if he unwittingly performed two primary categories of labor, without becoming aware of the prohibition between one labor and the other],

alternatively,

if he performed

two derivatives together, he is liable for two

[he incurs liability for two sin-offerings].

But

if

he performs a primary category and its derivative, he is liable for only one

[if he performs the primary category and its derivative during one lapse of awareness, he is liable for only one sin-offering for both]. This is the practical difference in calling carrying out a “primary category” and bringing in a “derivative.”

The Gemara continues its discussion:

And according to Rabbi Eliezer

[in Keritot 16b], who

holds one liable

for a separate sin-offering

for a derivative performed alongside its primary category

[even when he performed the derivative together with the primary category during one lapse of awareness],

why did they call

carrying out

a primary category, and why did they call

bringing in

a derivative?

And we answer: Indeed, according to Rabbi Eliezer, there is no practical legal difference whether it is a primary category or a derivative. Rather,

this,

the labor of carrying out,

which was important in the Tabernacle

[which was an important labor in the Tabernacle],

is called a “primary category.”

But

if

this,

the labor of bringing in,

was not important in the Tabernacle

[it was not an important labor in the Tabernacle],

it is not called a primary category.

Alternatively, this,

carrying out,

which is written

in the verse, as explained above,

is called a primary category, whereas this,

the labor of bringing in,

which is not written, is called

a

derivative.

The Gemara further explains the source of another derivative of carrying out:

And concerning that which we learned

below:

One who throws

a moist fig or something similar

four cubits

in a public domain, and the fig came to rest in a way that it adhered

to a wall

whose face is toward the public domain: If the fig adhered to the wall

above ten handbreadths,

where it is not considered airspace of the public domain, since a public domain extends only to a height of ten handbreadths, he is

like one who throws

and places an object

in the air,

and he is exempt. But if it adhered

below ten handbreadths,

which is airspace of the public domain, he is

like one who throws onto the ground,

and he is liable.

And one who throws four cubits on the ground,

he is

liable.

We have therefore learned that the labor of transferring an object four cubits in a public domain is a labor.

If he threw

or carried

four cubits in a public domain, from where do we know that he is liable?

Rabbi Yashya said:

The reason one who throws an object four cubits in a public domain is liable is

because the weavers

of the

curtains

for covering the Tabernacle

would throw

their

needles to one another.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

“Weavers—why do they need needles?!”

After all, the weaving of the curtains was not performed with needles

Rather

this is what it should say:

“As the curtain-makers”

who were in the Tabernacle

would throw their needles to one another.

But the Gemara still raises an objection: How do we know this?

Perhaps they sat beside one another [

perhaps they sat next to each other within one cubit, and therefore they needed only to hand the needles to one another rather than throw them]?!

And we answer: It is impossible that they sat beside one another, because

they would strike one another with the needles [

they might injure one another with their needles] when they stretched the thread with the needle attached to its end.

And we still raise an objection:

Perhaps

although they did not sit immediately beside one another, perhaps they sat

within four

cubits

of one another [

perhaps they sat within four cubits of one another], and there was therefore no throwing across a distance of four cubits?!

Rather, Rav Hisda said: As the weavers of

curtains would throw the shuttle [

a tool into which the woof thread was inserted, which they threw between the two walls of warp threads of the curtain]

across the curtain,

which itself was four cubits wide, and when they threw it from one side of the curtain to the other, they thereby transferred an object four cubits.

And we raise an objection:

But it was bound to his hand?!

That is, when he threw the shuttle a distance of four cubits, he himself was standing at the beginning of those four cubits, and there he held in his hand the woof thread, which was not detached from the shuttle; therefore this was not a transfer across four cubits?!

And we answer: In any event, we find a case in which throwing the shuttle constitutes a transfer across four cubits without his holding in his hand a thread attached to the shuttle; this is

with the final thread [

in weaving the last woof thread in the curtain], because at that point the rod slips away from the thread and the shuttle falls at the end of the four cubits.

And we still raise an objection:

But it travels through a “place exempt”,

for the transfer of the shuttle through the walls of the curtain is not considered a transfer in the public domain, because between the walls of the curtain there is not a public domain but rather a “place exempt”?!

Rather, as the weavers of the curtains would throw the shuttle to those who asked them for it,

when one of them had two shuttles and one of the curtain-weavers needed to borrow one from him, he would throw it to him.

And we raise an objection:

Perhaps they sat beside one another [

perhaps they sat next to each other]?!

And we answer: It is impossible that they sat immediately beside one another, because

they would strike

one

another at the edge [

at the edge of the curtain]. That is, if they had sat beside one another, one’s hand would reach the other’s at the edge of the curtain when they stretched the woof thread.

And we still raise an objection:

Perhaps they were staggered in their positions.

That is, perhaps they indeed sat beside one another, but one was positioned farther back and the other farther forward, so that they did not have to fear striking one another?!

Furthermore,

there is another difficulty:

Did they borrow from one another? [

Did they borrow tools of their craft from one another?!

But it was taught

by Luda [

the name of a Sage]:

“Each man from his work, which they were doing”—he performed his own work, and he did not perform the work of his fellow, for they were all equipped with their own tools of craftsmanship and had no need to borrow.

Furthermore,

there is another difficulty: Indeed, we have found throwing across four cubits in the Tabernacle, and for that reason one is liable. But

with regard to one who transfers an object four cubits in the public domain, from where do we know that he is liable [

from where do we know that he is liable], when in the Tabernacle they transferred objects only by throwing them?!

Rather, for every transfer of four cubits in the public domain, the matter is received by tradition

as a tradition [

it is a tradition transmitted to us].

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

It is written [Numbers 15:32–36]: “The children of Israel were in the wilderness, and they found a man gathering wood on the day of Shabbat. And the Lord said to Moses: The man shall surely be put to death; the entire assembly shall stone him with stones outside the camp.” Shmuel explains what labor that man performed for which he became liable to stoning:

The gatherer

did not detach the wood and did not gather it; rather, he

was transferring

the wood

four cubits in the public domain.

In a baraita it was taught [

we learned in a baraita]:

The gatherer was detaching

the wood, and for this he became liable.

Rav Aha bar Yaakov said:

The wood had already been detached and was scattered, and that man

was gathering [

collecting]

it,

and for this he became liable.

The Gemara asks:

What practical difference does it make

for us to know what sin the gatherer committed? What happened has happened?!

And it explains:

It is relevant to the statement of Rav, for Rav said: I found a hidden scroll

in the study hall of Rabbi Hiyya, and it was written in it:

“The primary labors are forty less one, and one is liable for only one of them,” The Gemara initially thought that this meant that if one performed all of them during a single lapse of awareness—having forgotten the prohibition of all the labors of Shabbat and performing them all without becoming aware of his transgression in the interim—he is liable to only one sin-offering [

but ultimately the Gemara explains this differently, and the meaning of the Gemara’s statement, “It is relevant to the statement of Rav,” is clarified].

And we challenge this: Is it only

one

sin-offering for which he is liable,

and no more?!

But we learned

later, in the chapter “The General Principle”:

The primary labors are forty less one.

The Mishna there enumerates all of them—

And we considered it: Why do I need the number [

what is the purpose of mentioning the general number at the beginning of the Mishna]?!

And

Rabbi Yoḥanan

said:

The tanna stated the general number in order to teach

that if one performed all of them during a single lapse of awareness, he is liable

to a sin-offering

for each and every one.

The tanna teaches us that the total number of sin-offerings to which a person can become liable during a single lapse of awareness is forty-nine. But if he performed primary labors and their derivatives during a single lapse of awareness, he does not add a sin-offering for the derivatives.

And just as this law can be inferred from the wording of the Mishna, it can likewise be inferred from the words of Isi ben Yehuda himself, who said: “The primary labors are forty less one.” We have thereby learned that he is liable for each and every one. How, then, did he say: “And he is liable for only one”?!

Rather, say

that this is the meaning of Isi ben Yehuda:

He is not liable for one of them.

There is one of the labors for which he is not liable to stoning, but we do not know which labor it is. The practical significance of this is to know what the gatherer did, for which the Torah made him liable to stoning:

Rav Yehuda—

it is obvious to him,

on the basis of his interpretation of the incident of the gatherer,

that transferring

four cubits

makes one liable

to stoning, because it is not among the labors regarding which there is uncertainty whether one is liable to stoning for performing them.

And the baraita—

it is obvious to it

on the basis of its interpretation of the incident of the gatherer

that detaching makes one liable

to stoning.

And Rav Aha bar Yaakov—

it is obvious to him that gathering makes one liable.

One Sage,

one of the three,

held: This one

the labor for which, in his opinion, the gatherer became liable

is certainly not uncertain;

there is no doubt concerning it, but one is certainly liable to stoning for it.

And another Sage,

the second of the three,

held: This one is certainly not uncertain.

And so did the third Sage.

The Sages taught: The gatherer

who was stoned in the wilderness

was Zelophehad. And so it says [

and this is derived from here]:

“The children of Israel were in the wilderness, and they found a man

gathering wood on the day of Shabbat.”

And there,

with regard to the daughters of Zelophehad when they spoke before Moses about their father’s inheritance,

it says: “Our father died in the wilderness

[

and he was not among the assembly of Korah, for he died because of his own sin].” Just as there,

with regard to the word “in the wilderness” stated there,

it refers to Zelophehad,

so too here,

with regard to the word “in the wilderness” stated concerning the gatherer,

it refers to Zelophehad; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said to him: Akiva! In either event,

whether your words are correct or not,

you will ultimately be called to account!

For

if

indeed

it is as you say,

you will ultimately be called to account because

the Torah concealed it

from Zelophehad, and did not say that he was the gatherer,

and

if

you reveal it.

And if it is not

as you say, you will likewise ultimately be called to account because

you cast aspersions upon that righteous man [

Zelophehad], suggesting that he desecrated Shabbat.