Shabbat 96a (צו.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

This is not difficult:

This one is referring to a large vessel:

in the case of a large vessel, most of it must be broken,

whereas this one is referring to a small vessel:

in the case of a small vessel, it is sufficient for it to have an opening large enough for a pomegranate to pass through for it to lose its status as a vessel.

Rav Asi said: They teach

the tannaim in a baraita:

The measure for an earthenware vessel is an opening large enough to admit liquid

which is the smallest measure stated with regard to causing it, to some degree, to lose its status as a vessel; and this is with regard to the consecration of the waters of purification.

And they stated the measure of an opening that allows liquid to seep out only with regard to a gistera

which loses its status as a vessel through a small hole of this kind [and these are precisely the words of Rava above, the five measures].

What is the reason

that a gistera differs from an intact vessel?

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, said: Because one does not say, “Bring a shard for a shard”

to place beneath it to receive the drops issuing from the hole; rather, once the gistera has a hole large enough for liquid to seep out, one throws it away.

But in the case of an intact vessel, one takes care of it, and one does not throw it away because of a hole of this kind. Rather, one brings a gistera and places it beneath the vessel.

Ulla said: Two amoraim in the West disagreed about this

as to what the measure of the hole is with regard to rendering seeds susceptible to ritual impurity:

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Yosei bar Zavda—

One said: An opening large enough for a pomegranate to pass through; and one said: An opening large enough for a small root.

And your mnemonic is,

so that you will not mistakenly say that one of them said an opening large enough for an olive to pass through:

“The one who offers more and the one who offers less”

[this is a Mishna in tractate Menahot 110a, and the Mishna concludes: “provided that he directs his heart toward Heaven.” This should serve you as a mnemonic: One of the amoraim adopted the largest of the three measures, namely, an opening large enough for a pomegranate to pass through [apart from the smallest measures, an opening large enough to admit liquid and an opening that allows liquid to seep out, as there is no room to err and think that they are the measure with regard to rendering seeds susceptible]. And one of them adopted the smallest of the three, namely, an opening large enough for a small root. Neither of them adopted the intermediate measure, namely, an opening large enough for an olive to pass through].

Rav Ḥinnana bar Kahana said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The measure for an earthenware vessel is an opening large enough for olives to pass through

with regard to its susceptibility to ritual impurity.

And Mar Keshisha, son of Rabba, concludes it in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: And they are like vessels made of dung, vessels made of stone, and vessels made of earth, which do not become susceptible to ritual impurity, neither by Torah law nor by rabbinic ordinance.

Even if one designated it for pomegranates, it does not become susceptible to ritual impurity. It is only with regard to a wooden vessel that the measure of an opening large enough for a pomegranate to pass through was stated when it was designated for pomegranates, but not with regard to an earthenware vessel.

And with regard to a tzamid patil

its measure is

until most of it is broken.

We will return to you, chapter HaMatzni'a.

Mishna:

One who throws

an object

from a private domain into a public domain,

or one who throws

from a public domain into a private domain,

he is

liable.

Because throwing from one domain to another is a derivative of carrying out from one domain to another, which is a primary category of labor.

However, regarding one who throws an object

from one private domain to another private domain, with a public domain in between,

the tanna'im disagreed:

Rabbi Akiva holds him liable,

and the Gemara will explain his reasoning,

while the Sages exempt him.

How so? —

Two balconies

[built on beams projecting from a wall, with planks placed on the beams so that people could walk on them], which are private domains, since they are ten handbreadths high and four by four handbreadths wide, that were standing

opposite one another in a public domain

[on the two sides of the public domain, with the public domain separating the two balconies on either side],

one who extends an object or throws an object from one to the other is exempt.

But if

both were on the same gallery

[on the same level, above the public domain], so that the balconies were not positioned opposite one another on the two sides of the public domain, but both were on one side of the public domain, and the balconies projected from the building, with a public domain between them, then only

one who extends an object

from one to the other

is liable.

This is the labor of “extending,” which is a derivative of the labor of carrying out.

And

if

one who throws

from one to the other,

he is exempt.

The distinction between one who extends an object and one who throws is because

this was the work of the Levites

in transporting the Tabernacle:

two wagons

[on which they carried the boards of the Tabernacle, and the wagons themselves were private domains] stood in a public domain,

one behind the other in a public domain, and

the Levites

would extend

the

boards from

one wagon

to

the other

wagon.

But they did not

throw

throw

them, because they were heavy. Therefore, one is liable for “extending” only in these two ways: a. When the wagons were one behind the other. b. When the object was extended, but not thrown. For this was how the work was performed in the Tabernacle.