Shabbat 94a (צד.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Rav Sheshet said: Here we are dealing with a case

in which he was unwitting regarding

the removal of

the food, but intentional regarding

the removal of

the vessel.

And that which the Mishna teaches: “He is liable even for the vessel,” means that he is liable to death for the vessel, while for the food he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

Rav Ashi strongly objected to this: But it teaches, “even for the vessel,”

which indicates two equal liabilities?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

Here we are dealing with a case

such as one who was unwitting regarding both, and it became known to him

afterward that he had sinned with regard to one of them,

and it again became known to him

that he had sinned with regard to the second. In that case he becomes liable to bring two sin-offerings, despite the fact that both transgressions were committed during one period of unawareness, because the knowledge that intervened separates them into two liabilities.

And the reason Rav Sheshet did not answer in this manner is that he maintains that instances of knowledge do not separate the transgressions.

And

Rav Ashi and Rav Sheshet disagree

in accordance with the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish,

who likewise disagreed [above, 71a] whether instances of knowledge separate the transgressions or not.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who carries a living person on a bed is exempt even for the bed.

And we raise a question concerning it:

Shall we say that our Mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Natan and not that of the Rabbis?

As it is taught in a beraita: One who carries an animal, a living creature, or a bird into the public domain, whether alive or slaughtered, is liable.

Rabbi Natan says: For slaughtered creatures he is liable, but for living creatures he is exempt,

because

a living being carries itself.

It follows that the Rabbis do not hold that a living being carries itself, and if so, our Mishna is not in accordance with their opinion?

And we answer:

Rava said: You may even say

that our Mishna is the opinion of

the Rabbis.

The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Natan only with regard to an animal, a living creature, or a bird, which stretch themselves out;

they do not carry themselves, but, on the contrary, press themselves downward in order to slip from the grasp of the one carrying them.

But with regard to a living person, who carries himself, even the Rabbis agree

that one who carries him on Shabbat is exempt.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: But didn’t we learn

in tractate Avoda Zara, with regard to selling an animal to a gentile, that the Sages prohibited selling it, lest, once he sells it, he also come to rent or lend it to the gentile, and the gentile perform labor with the animal belonging to the Jew on Shabbat, while the Jew is commanded concerning the resting of his animal?

Ben Beteira permits

selling

a horse.

And it is taught in a beraita: Ben Beteira permits selling a horse, because the gentile performs with it a labor for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering.

For it is not customary to carry burdens on a horse; rather, one merely rides it.

And since we say that “a living being carries itself,” riding by the gentile does not constitute a Torah-prohibited labor with regard to the horse. For if a person were carrying the gentile, he would not be liable for doing so. Therefore, we do not issue a decree prohibiting selling it to a gentile.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ben Beteira and Rabbi Natan stated the same principle,

as both of them said that a living being carries itself.

And Rav Adda bar Ahava concludes his difficulty:

And if you say that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Natan only with regard to an animal, a living creature, or a bird, because they stretch themselves out, why particularly

did Rabbi Yoḥanan say that

Ben Beteira and Rabbi Natan

stated the same principle?

But you said

that

even the Rabbis agree

with regard to a person that a living being carries itself; and yet Ben Beteira is also speaking about a person?

And we answer:

When Rabbi Yoḥanan said this, he was referring to a horse designated

for carrying

birds.

That is, Ben Beteira permits selling even such a horse, because he holds like Rabbi Natan that even when carrying living creatures, we assess the situation as one in which a living being carries itself.

But according to the Rabbis, it is prohibited to sell such a horse, since it performs a type of labor for which a person is liable on Shabbat. [And consequently, all horses are prohibited, due to the horse designated for birds, Tosafot, commentary beginning “With a horse”].

And we raise a difficulty:

But is there such a thing as a horse designated for birds?

And we answer:

Yes! There are the household of Vayyadan,

bird hunters who place birds, such as a hawk, on the horse in order to hunt other birds with them.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And Rabbi Natan concedes with regard to one whose limbs are bound,

for we do not say with regard to him that a living being carries itself, since he certainly presses himself downward in order to slip free and loosen his bonds.

[It would also have been possible to state that the Rabbis concede with regard to a person whose limbs are bound. But Rabbi Natan is mentioned because, according to his view, even with regard to birds there is a distinction between one whose limbs are bound and one whose limbs are not bound.]

Rav Adda bar Matana said to Abaye: But what of these Persians, who are considered as though their limbs were bound,

for they ride while wrapped in broad garments that restrict their movement, and they themselves are pampered and do not place their feet on the ground?

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ben Beteira and Rabbi Natan stated the same principle.

For Ben Beteira permits selling a horse because a living being carries itself.

But Ben Beteira permits selling even to Persians, who are like people whose limbs are bound, whereas Rabbi Natan concedes with regard to such people that we do not say that a living being carries itself?

And we answer:

There,

it is only

haughtiness

that

they hold on to

the Persians, who do not walk on their feet; this is not considered equivalent to having their limbs bound.

For that one pardashka

an official appointed by the king,

when the king became angry with him, ran

ran

three parasangs on his legs,

on foot. This proves that when they wish to do so, they are capable of walking on the ground.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who carries a corpse on a bed is liable, and likewise one who carries an olive-bulk of a corpse ...

And Rabbi Shimon exempts him.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said.

And

so

Rav Yosef said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: