Shabbat 94b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon exempted ![](pamud.bmp "

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even one who takes out a corpse in order to bury it,

for although there is here a need of the corpse, nevertheless it is a labor that does not need its own purpose, since there is no need for the person taking it out.

And do not say that Rabbi Shimon exempted only when one takes the corpse outside in order to remove it from him, for this taking out serves neither the body of the one taking it out nor the body of the object being taken out.

Rava said: And Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to one who takes out

a

spade,

“a digging tool,” in order

to dig with it, and a Torah scroll in order to read from it, that he is liable.

And we raise an objection:

It is obvious

that he is liable for taking them out.

For if this too were a labor that does not need its own purpose,

let it be difficult:

but, a labor that needs its own purpose according to Rabbi Shimon—

where can one find it?

And we answer:

It might enter your mind

that it is not called a labor that needs its own purpose

unless there is

a need both

for the purpose

of the one taking it out

and

a need

for the purpose

of the taking out, that he needs the object being taken out in order to repair it.

For example,

if he took out

a spade,

in order

to make a metal plate for it.

For the point of the spade had become damaged, and he needs to attach to it a metal sheet so that it will be fit for digging with it. And likewise, if one takes out a

Torah scroll in order

to

correct

it, to repair it,

and to read from it.

It teaches us

that it is sufficient that there be a need for the one taking it out alone: he needs the spade in order to dig with it and the Torah scroll in order to read from it, even though there is no need for the purpose of the taking out itself, to repair the objects being taken out.

That certain corpse

dead

which was in Darukra,

a place-name.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak permitted taking it out

on Shabbat from the house

to a karmelit,

because it was lying in disgrace, or because there was a fire in the house, or because it was lying in the sun and might begin to smell, [and he placed a loaf or a child upon it in order to permit the prohibition of moving muktze. Rashi].

Rabbi Yoḥanan, the brother of Mar, son of Ravina, said to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak: In accordance with whom

did you permit taking it out—

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

who exempts one for taking out a corpse?

Say that Rabbi Shimon exempted

specifically

from liability for a sin-offering,

but

there is at least a rabbinic prohibition?!

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak:

By God! You have entered into it yourself!

You yourself would do this,

even according to Rabbi Judah,

who holds one liable for taking out a corpse.

What do you think I said,

to take it out

to the public domain?

Behold,

I said to a karmelit!

which involves only a rabbinic prohibition, and it is established for us:

Great is the honor of created beings,

such as taking a corpse out of a place of disgrace,

for it overrides a negative commandment of the Torah.

That is, it overrides a rabbinic prohibition, whose ruling they based upon the prohibition of “You shall not deviate.”

We learned there,

in Tractate Nega'im:

One who plucks the signs of impurity

from a lesion on his body—for example, two white hairs in a bright spot—

and burns away the living flesh

that is in a swelling, where there had been a patch of living flesh, which is a sign of impurity in the lesion of a swelling, and he scorches it in order to nullify it and make it pure—

violates a negative commandment,

“Be careful regarding the plague of leprosy, to observe very carefully and to do.” We derive from it a prohibition against plucking out the signs of impurity of a lesion.

And concerning this it was stated:

If he plucked one hair

of

within

two

in a bright spot—

he is liable,

for by doing so he purified the lesion.

And if he plucked one hair

of

within

three,

so that two hairs still remained to render the lesion impure:

Rav Naḥman said: He is liable,

for lashes.

Rav Sheshet said: He is exempt.

And we explain:

Rav Naḥman said he is liable:

for

his actions were effective.

actions

were effective.

For if another one were removed,

if another hair were taken from the two remaining—

the impurity would disappear.

Rav Sheshet said he is exempt:

because

at present, behold, it exists

still

for impurity.

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say it,

that he is exempt?

For we learned

in the Mishna:

And likewise,

one who takes out

an olive-bulk from a corpse and an olive-bulk from an animal carcass,

which he took out on Shabbat—

he is liable.

And we infer:

This

means that if he took out only

half an olive-bulk—

he is exempt.

But was it not taught: Half an olive-bulk entails liability?

What, is it not so that the one which was taught, “he is liable,”

is speaking

of one who took out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk,

where there had been a complete olive-bulk in the house and he took out half of it, for he is liable because he thereby purified the house, since it no longer renders impure with tent impurity?

And the one which we learned, “he is exempt,”

is speaking

of one who took out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk and a half,

where a complete olive-bulk still remained inside the house, and he did not accomplish anything to prevent the house from rendering impure with tent impurity.

Thus, we do not say that “his actions were effective” because if a little more were removed from the olive-bulk, it would again no longer render impure with tent impurity.

And the same applies to one who removes one hair from among three hairs in a lesion: he is not liable.

And Rav Naḥman

will say to you: In fact,

both this and that entail liability,

even one who takes out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk and a half.

And the one which we learned, “he is exempt,”

is speaking

of one who took out half an olive-bulk from a large corpse,

where his actions accomplished nothing.

And not specifically from a large corpse; the same law applies when he takes out half an olive-bulk from two olive-bulks, that he is exempt. He is liable only in a case where after he takes it out, a minimal measure remains, such that if a little more were removed from it, the house would become pure. Tosafot, s.v. “from a corpse.”

Mishna:

One who removes his nails, one with the other,

where with one nail he cuts another nail,

or

who removes his nails

with his teeth.

And likewise

one who plucks

his hair

with his hands,

and likewise his mustache, and likewise his beard,

which he plucks with his hand.

And likewise a woman

who

braids,

braiding the hair of her head.

And likewise one who applies eye paint,

to her eyes with blue-colored paint around the eye.

And likewise one who pokeses,

combing her hair with her hand or with a comb. [ Another explanation: she places dough on her face so that it will receive a red coloring.]

Rabbi Eliezer holds one liable

for a sin-offering for all of these.

For removing nails, hair, mustache, and beard, because of shearing; and regarding the other cases mentioned in the Mishna, for what reason he is liable will be explained in the Gemara.

And the Sages prohibit

only

because of “shevut”

alone, since this is not the manner of performing the labors.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute,

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages, applies specifically when he removed his nails

by hand, but

if he removed them

with an implement—

according to all opinions

he is liable.

And we raise an objection:

Is it obvious?

For their dispute specifically concerns one who removed them

“one with the other,” we learned.

And we answer:

It might enter your mind:

in fact,

the Rabbis also exempt when using an implement.

Since they hold that the essence of the labor of shearing applies only to shearing the wool of an animal.

And the fact that it teaches

in the Mishna, in the formulation that he removed them

“one with the other,”

is in order

to inform you of the strength of Rabbi Eliezer,

for even by hand he is liable.

It teaches us

that the Rabbis exempt specifically when done by hand, because shearing by hand is not the normal manner of shearing; but when done with an implement, he is liable because of shearing even for removing nails.

And Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis applies specifically when he removes his nails by hand

for himself.

For Rabbi Eliezer holds that a person can train his hands and cut his own nails with them.

But one who removes nails

one who removes nails

for another—

according to all opinions he is exempt,

since he cannot cut another person’s nails well without an implement.

And we raise an objection:

Is it obvious?

For, behold,

“his nails,” we learned.

And we answer:

It might enter your mind:

in fact,

Rabbi Eliezer,

one who removes nails

for another is also liable.

And the fact that it teaches

in the Mishna, one who removes

“his nails,”

is in order

to inform you of the strength of the Rabbis,

that even when doing it for himself he is exempt.

It teaches us

that Rabbi Eliezer holds one liable only when doing it for himself.

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise his hair.

A tanna taught: One who removes

hair

the full mouth of a pair of scissors,

the measure that the head of the scissors can contain,

is liable.

For the Rabbis, specifically when done with an implement, and for Rabbi Eliezer even by hand; and it comes to teach us the measure.

And we explain:

And how much

is

the full mouth of a pair of scissors?

Rav Judah said: Two

hairs.

And we raise an objection:

But it was taught

in the latter clause of that beraita:

And for baldness,

for the Torah warned, “You shall not make a baldness between your eyes for the dead”—

two

hairs.

It follows that the measure of the full mouth of a pair of scissors is a different measure!

And we answer:

Say: And likewise for baldness—

two,

and that is the measure of the full mouth of a pair of scissors.

It was taught likewise

in accordance with Rav Judah, that the full mouth of a pair of scissors is two:

One who removes the full mouth of a pair of scissors on Shabbat is liable.

And how much is the full mouth of a pair of scissors?

Two.

Rabbi Eliezer says: One.

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer concerning one who plucks

hairs

white from among black, that even

for one hair

he is liable,

because he is particular even about a single white hair, so that he should not appear old; therefore this is considered a labor.

The same law applies to a black hair among white hairs. Mishna Berura, section 340, subsection 4, in the name of the Tosefta.

And this matter is prohibited even on a weekday—

to pluck white hairs from among black ones—

because it is stated, “A man shall not wear a woman’s garment.”

And women customarily take care about this in order to beautify themselves.

It was taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: A nail whose greater part has separated

from the hand,

and strips of skin

thin strips of skin around the nail

whose greater part has separated,

and which are close to tearing away.

By hand—

it is permitted

to remove them.

With an implement—

he is liable for a sin-offering.

And we raise an objection:

Is there anything for which, when done with an implement, he is liable for a sin-offering, while by hand it is permitted initially?

Since when done with an implement he is liable for a sin-offering, by hand it should at least be prohibited rabbinically, as a safeguard against the implement.

And we answer:

This is what Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar means: If

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar

the greater part has separated—

by hand it is permitted; with an implement he is exempt, but it is prohibited.

Since they are close to tearing away, they are considered as though already detached, and there is no Torah prohibition of shearing in them.

If the greater part has not separated—

by hand he is exempt, but it is prohibited; with an implement he is liable for a sin-offering.

Rav Judah said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

The matter in which Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar permits removing by hand when the greater part has separated

is when they have separated upward,

toward the tips of his fingers [which are above when he raises his hands],

and they cause him pain.

For in a place of pain the Sages did not decree when he removes it through a deviation, namely, with his hand. [Mishna Berura, section 328, subsection 96].

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise one who braids.

And we discussed it:

One who braids, applies eye paint, and pokeses—

because of what is she liable?

Rabbi Avin said in the name of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina:

One who braids,

one who braids her hair is liable—

because of weaving.

One who applies eye paint

is liable—

because of writing,

for she moves the brush around the eye like a person moving a quill around a letter. [See Kehillot Yaakov, which explained why one who applies eye paint is not liable because of dyeing: the blue color is not intended to dye the area around the eye in order to beautify that area with blue color, but is intended to emphasize the eye. Any dyeing that is not for beautifying the dyed object, but is intended to express a certain matter—for example, dyeing red as a warning—is not dyeing but writing, since through the color he expresses a message].

One who pokeses—

because of spinning,

for she straightens her hairs between her fingers when they curl [and in the Mishna Rashi explained it as combing with a comb; see there Tosafot, s.v. “pokeses”]. And according to another explanation, if pokeses means that she places dough on her face, the spinning is in the dough, for she makes it into something resembling a thread.

The Rabbis said before Rabbi Abbahu:

Why is she liable?

Is this the manner of weaving?

Is this the manner of writing?

Is this the manner of spinning?

Rather, Rabbi Abbahu said: For me, it was explained to me from Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina: