Shabbat 94b (צד:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon deemed him exempt

even when one carries out a corpse in order to bury it,

for although there is a need involving the corpse here, it is nevertheless a labor not required for its own purpose, since it does not serve a need of the person carrying it out.

And do not say that Rabbi Shimon deemed him exempt only when one carries the corpse outside in order to remove it from his presence, since this carrying out serves neither the person carrying it out nor the object being carried out.

Rava said: And Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to one who carries out

a

hoe,

“a digging implement,” in order

to dig with it, and a Torah scroll in order to read from it, that he is liable.

And we raise an objection:

Is this obvious?

That he is liable for carrying them out.

For if this, too, is a labor not required for its own purpose,

there would be a difficulty:

then, according to Rabbi Shimon, a labor required for its own purpose—

where could one find it?

And we answer:

It might enter your mind to say

that a labor is not called a labor required for its own purpose

unless there is a need both

a need both

for the person carrying it out

being carried

and

a need

for the carrying out itself,

so that the object carried out is needed in order to repair it.

For example,

if he carried out

a hoe,

a digging implement, in order

to make a metal plate for it.

For the point of the hoe had become damaged, and it was necessary to attach a sheet of metal to it so that it would be fit for digging. And similarly, one who carries out a

Torah scroll in order

in order

to proofread it, to correct it,

and repair it,

and to read from it.

It teaches us

that it is sufficient that there be a need for the person carrying it out: He needs the hoe in order to dig with it and the Torah scroll in order to read from it, even though there is no need for the carrying out itself—to repair the objects being carried out.

There was a certain corpse

a dead person

that was in Drokra,

a place-name.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak permitted taking it out

from the house on Shabbat

to a karmelit,

because it was lying in disgrace, or there was a fire in the house, or it was lying in the sun and might begin to decompose. [He placed a loaf or a child upon it in order to permit moving the muktzeh. Rashi]]].

Rabbi Yoḥanan, the brother of Mar the son of Ravena, said to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak: In accordance with whom

did you permit taking it out—

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

who deems one exempt for carrying out a corpse?

Say that Rabbi Shimon deemed one exempt

only

from liability to bring a sin-offering,

but

there is at least a rabbinic prohibition, is there not?!

He said to him

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak:

By God! You yourself would have done this!

You yourself would have done it,

even according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds one liable for carrying out a corpse.

What am I saying,

to take it out

to the public domain?

After all,

I am saying to a karmelit!

For that is only a rabbinic prohibition , and we hold:

Great is human dignity,

such as taking a corpse out of a place of disgrace,

which overrides a negative commandment of the Torah.

"That is, it overrides a rabbinic prohibition, whose enactment the Sages based upon the prohibition of “Do not stray.”

We learned there,

in tractate Negaim:

One who plucks the signs of impurity

from a lesion on his body, such as the two white hairs in a baheret,

or burns the living flesh

in a se’et, where there was living flesh, which is a sign of impurity in a se’et lesion, and he scorches it in order to nullify it and render himself pure—

he violates a negative commandment,

as it says: “Beware of the lesion of leprosy, taking utmost care and acting accordingly.” We derive from this a prohibition against plucking the signs of impurity from a lesion.

And concerning this it was stated:

If one plucked one hair

of

among

two

in a baheret—

he is liable.

For by doing so he rendered the lesion pure.

And if he plucked one hair

of

among

three,

so that two hairs still remained to render the lesion impure:

Rav Naḥman said: He is liable

to lashes.

Rav Sheshet said: He is exempt.

And we explain:

Rav Naḥman said he is liable:

For

his

actions

were effective.

For if another one were removed,

if another hair were taken from the two that remain—

the impurity would depart.

Rav Sheshet said he is exempt:

because

at present, it is still present,

still

for impurity.

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say this,

that he is exempt?

As we learned

in the Mishna:

And similarly,

one who carries out

an olive-bulk from a corpse and an olive-bulk from an animal carcass

which he carried out on Shabbat—

is liable.

And we infer:

This implies that

if he carried out only

half an olive-bulk—

he is exempt.

But was it not taught: For half an olive-bulk, he is liable?

What, is it not that where it was taught that he is liable,

it is speaking

of one who carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk,

where there had been a complete olive-bulk in the house and he carried out half of it, for he is liable because he thereby purified the house, since it no longer transmits impurity as a tent.

And where we learned that he is exempt

it is speaking

of one who carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-and-a-half,

so that a complete olive-bulk still remained inside the house, and his action did not prevent the house from transmitting impurity as a tent.

Thus, we do not say that “his actions were effective” merely because if a little more were removed from the olive-bulk, the house would no longer transmit impurity as a tent.

And the same applies to one who removes one hair from among three hairs in a lesion: He is not liable.

And Rav Naḥman

could say to you: Actually,

in both cases he is liable,

even when he carries out half an olive-bulk from an olive-and-a-half.

And where we learned that he is exempt

it is speaking

of one who carried out half an olive-bulk from a large corpse

where his actions accomplished nothing.

This applies not specifically to a large corpse; the same is true of one who carries out half an olive-bulk from two olive-bulks, who is exempt. He is liable only where, after he carries it out, a minimal measure remains, such that if a little more were removed from it, the house would become pure. Tosafot, s.v. Mimet.

Mishna:

One who removes his nails one with another,

using one nail to cut another nail,

or

who removes his nails

with his teeth.

And similarly,

one who pulls out

his hair

with his hands,

and similarly his mustache, and similarly his beard,

which he pulls out with his hand.

And similarly,

a woman

who braids,

braiding the hair of her head.

And similarly, one who applies eye makeup,

her eyes with blue coloring around the eye.

And similarly, one who arranges her hair,

combing her hair with her hand or with a comb Another interpretation: She places dough on her face so that it will acquire a red hue.

Rabbi Eliezer deems one liable

for a sin-offering in all these cases.

For removing nails, hair, mustache, and beard, the liability is because of shearing; and with regard to the other acts mentioned in the Mishna, the Gemara will explain for what reason one is liable.

And the Sages prohibit

only

because of “shevut”

alone, since these are not the normal forms of the labors.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages applies specifically when one removed his nails

by hand, but

if he removed them

with an implement—

according to everyone,

he is liable .

And we raise an objection:

Is this obvious?

For their dispute applies specifically when one removes them

“one with another,” as we learned.

And we answer:

It might enter your mind to say:

Actually,

the Sages exempt even when one uses an implement.

Since they hold that the essence of the labor of shearing applies only to shearing the wool of an animal.

And the fact that it teaches

in the Mishna, in its formulation, that he removed them

“one with another”

is in order

to teach you the extent of Rabbi Eliezer’s position,

that even when he uses his hand, he is liable.

It teaches us

that the Sages exempt specifically when one uses his hand, because shearing is not normally performed by hand; but when one uses an implement, he is liable because of shearing even for removing nails.

And Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages applies specifically when one removes his nails with his hands

from himself.

For Rabbi Eliezer holds that a person can train his hands to cut his own nails with them.

But

one who removes nails

from another person—

according to everyone, he is exempt.

Since he cannot cut another person’s nails properly without an implement.

And we raise an objection:

Is this obvious?

For

“his nails,” is what we learned.

And we answer:

It might enter your mind to say:

Actually,

Rabbi Eliezer

who removes nails

from another person is also liable.

And the fact that it teaches

in the Mishna, one who removes

“his nails”

is in order

to teach you the extent of the Sages’ position,

that even when one does so to himself, he is exempt.

It teaches us

that Rabbi Eliezer deems one liable only when he removes his own nails.

We learned in the Mishna:

And similarly, his hair.

A tanna taught: One who removes

hair the measure of

the full mouthful of the scissors,

the amount that the blades of the scissors can contain,

is liable.

According to the Sages, this applies specifically when using an implement, and according to Rabbi Eliezer even when using the hand; and it comes to teach the measure.

And we explain:

And how much

is

the full mouthful of the scissors?

Rav Yehuda said: Two

hairs.

And we raise an objection:

But it was taught

at the end of that beraita:

And for baldness,

as the Torah warned: “You shall not make a baldness between your eyes for the dead”

— two

hairs.

This implies that the measure of the full mouthful of the scissors is a different measure!

And we answer:

Say instead: And similarly, for baldness—

two,

which is the measure of the full mouthful of the scissors.

It was taught likewise,

in accordance with Rav Yehuda, that the full mouthful of the scissors is two:

One who removes the full mouthful of the scissors on Shabbat is liable.

And how much is the full mouthful of the scissors?

Two.

Rabbi Eliezer says: One.

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one who plucks

hairs

white from among black, that even

with one

hair he is liable,

because he is particular even about a single white hair, so that he will not appear old; therefore, this is considered a labor.

The same applies to a black hair among white hairs. Mishna Berura, section 340, subsection 4, in the name of the Tosefta.

And this act is prohibited even on a weekday

to pluck white hairs from among black ones,

because it is stated: “A man shall not wear a woman’s garment.”

Women customarily take care regarding this in order to beautify themselves.

It was taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: A nail whose majority has separated

from the hand,

and strips of skin

thin strips of skin around the nail

whose majority has separated,

and which are close to becoming detached:

By hand—

it is permitted

to remove them.

With an implement—

he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

And we raise an objection:

Can there be a case in which, when done with an implement, one is liable to bring a sin-offering, while when done by hand it is permitted ab initio?

Since, as he is liable to bring a sin-offering when using an implement, doing so by hand should at least be prohibited by rabbinic law, as a decree due to the use of an implement.

And we answer:

This is what

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: If

their majority has separated—

by hand it is permitted; with an implement he is exempt but it is prohibited.

Since, as they are close to becoming detached, they are considered as though already detached, and there is no Torah prohibition of shearing them.

If their majority has not separated—

by hand he is exempt but it is prohibited; with an implement he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

Rav Yehuda said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

The fact that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar permits removing them by hand when their majority has separated

applies when they have separated upward,

toward the fingertips [which are above when he raises his hands],

and they cause him pain.

For in a place of pain, the Sages did not issue a decree when he removes them by means of a deviation from the usual manner, namely, by hand. [Mishna Berura, section 328, subsection 96]].

We learned in the Mishna:

And similarly, one who braids.

And we discuss it:

One who braids, one who applies eye makeup, and one who arranges her hair—

because of what is she liable?

Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina said:

One who braids,

who braids her hair is liable—

because of weaving.

One who applies eye makeup

is liable—

because of writing,

for she moves the brush around the eye like a person moving a pen around a letter. [See Kehillot Yaakov, which explained why one who applies eye makeup is not liable because of dyeing: The blue coloring is not intended to color the area around the eye in order to beautify that area with blue coloring; rather, it is intended to emphasize the eye. Any coloring that is not for beautifying the object being colored, but is intended to convey a particular matter—for example, coloring something red as a warning—is not dyeing but writing, since through the color one conveys a message]].

One who arranges her hair—

because of spinning,

for she straightens her hair between her fingers when it curls. [In the Mishna, Rashi explained it as combing with a comb; see there Tosafot, s.v. Pokheset.] According to another interpretation, that pokheset means placing dough on the face, the spinning is performed with the dough, which she makes into something resembling a thread.

The Sages said before Rabbi Abahu:

Why is she liable?

Is this the normal manner of weaving?

Is this the normal manner of writing?

Is this the normal manner of spinning?

Rather, Rabbi Abahu said: To me, Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina explained it as follows: