Shabbat 93b (צג:) — the Talmud in English

As we learned:

Rabbi Yosei says: The horse imparts ritual impurity through

its forelegs.

For if a zav was riding a horse and a tallit was beneath one of its front legs, which is called a foreleg, it is impure.

The donkey

imparts impurity

through its hind legs,

but not vice versa.

Because

the horse’s support

is

through its forelegs

while the donkey

leans

on its hind legs [And the statement above that none of all four of its legs imparts impurity is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei].

Rava analyzed this:

But why

does the horse not impart impurity through its hind legs, and the donkey through its forelegs? Even though their primary support is not through those legs—

they nevertheless assist together, do they not?

Rather,

is it not because we say: Assistance

has no substance!

Rav Ashi said: We, too, have learned this:

Rabbi Eliezer says:

A priest who performed the Temple service with

one foot on the vessel and one foot on the floor,

or

one foot on a stone

that is not one of the paving stones of the Temple

and one foot on the floor—

we see whether, if the vessel were removed and the

stone

were removed, he would still

be able to stand on the one

foot,

the

one on the floor;

his service is valid,

for he is then considered as though he were standing only on that one foot.

But if not—

his service is invalid.

This is because the vessel and the stone intervene between his foot and the floor of the Temple courtyard, and it is derived from a verse that the service is invalidated in this manner.

Rav Ashi analyzed this:

But why

is the service valid when he is able to stand on that foot which is on the floor?

The other foot assists

the first foot

together with it,

so he is effectively standing on the other foot as well.

Rather,

is it not because we say: Assistance has no substance!

Ravina said: We, too, have learned this:

A priest who

received

the blood of the offering

with his

right hand,

and

his

left hand assisted it, his service is valid,

even though service performed with the left hand is invalid; here, the primary service was performed with the right hand.

Ravina analyzed this:

But why

is his service valid?

The left hand assists

the right

together with it,

does it not?

Rather,

is it not because we say: Assistance has no substance!

And we conclude:

Conclude from this!

The Master said: If this one is capable and that one is capable, Rabbi Meir deems them liable.

They raised a dilemma:

Do

we require

according to Rabbi Meir, who deems them liable when this one is capable and that one is capable, that there be a

measure

of carrying

for this one and a measure

of carrying

for that one?

For example, if they jointly carried out food, must it contain two dried figs?

Or perhaps

one

measure for all of them suffices?

Rav Ḥisda and Rav Hamnuna disagree about this:

One says: A measure for this one and a measure for that one; and one says: One measure for all of them.

Rav Pappa said: We, too, have learned this

that one measure suffices for all of them:

As we learned:

If one was sitting on a bed and there were four tallits beneath the four legs of the bed, they are impure, because it cannot stand on three legs.

But why

are they impure?

Should we not require a measure of flux for this one and a measure of flux for that one?

For each tallit would be weighted down by a different zav.

Is it not because we say: One measure suffices for all of them!

For one zav suffices to render all the tallits impure through his lying upon them.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We, too, have learned this: If a deer entered a house and one person closed the door before it

of the house,

he is liable

for trapping. By closing the door he trapped the deer.

If two people closed it, they are exempt,

as we say with regard to carrying out, that when two perform a labor together they are exempt; and the same applies to all the labors of Shabbat.

If one person could not close

the door

and two closed it, they are liable,

as in the case where this one is incapable and that one is incapable, in which both are liable.

But why

are both liable?

Should we not require a measure of trapping for this one and a measure of trapping for that one,

namely, two deer?

Is it not because we say: One measure suffices for all of them!

Ravina said: We, too, have learned this: Partners who stole and slaughtered an animal are liable

to make the fourfold and fivefold payment.

But why

are they liable?

Should we not require a measure of slaughtering for this one and a measure of slaughtering for that one,

namely, two animals?

Is it not because we say: One measure suffices for all of them!

And Rav Ashi said: We, too, have learned this: Two people who carried out a weaver’s rod

—a rod on which the weft thread is placed, rising and descending through the warp—

are liable.

But why? Should we not require a measure of carrying for this one and a measure of carrying for that one?

Is it not because we say: One measure suffices for all of them!

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Perhaps

it is speaking

of there being

in the rod

enough to cook a small egg for this one and a small egg for that one,

which is the measure for carrying out wood? Rav Ashi said to him:

If so, let him teach us an ordinary rod,

which is designated for fuel and whose measure is this amount;

what is different

about mentioning a

weaver’s

rod, whose measure is enough for weaving? Rather, it certainly teaches us that one measure suffices for both of them [for one might have thought that with regard to a weaver’s rod, more than one measure is not applicable].

And we challenge this:

Perhaps it is a case where it contains enough to weave a cloth for this one and enough to weave a cloth for that one?

And we conclude:

Rather, no proof can be inferred from this.

A tanna taught before Rav Naḥman: Two people who carried out a weaver’s rod are exempt, and Rabbi Shimon deems them liable.

And we challenge this:

To which direction has this turned?

Where has this statement been reversed? For Rabbi Shimon exempts more than everyone else in a case where two perform a labor.

And we answer:

Rather, say:

Two people who carried out a weaver’s rod

are liable,

for it is speaking of a heavy rod, such that this one is incapable and that one is incapable.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts,

as we said above, for Rabbi Shimon exempts even in a case where this one is incapable and that one is incapable.

Mishna:

One who carries out food less than the requisite measure,

the measure for carrying out food, and carries it

in

a

vessel—

is exempt even for

carrying out

the vessel,

because

the vessel is subordinate to it,

to the food. For his primary intention in this carrying is not for the sake of the vessel but for the sake of the food.

If he carried

the

person

alive on a bed,

since he is not liable for carrying out a living person, because a living person is considered as though he carries himself and thereby lightens the load —

he is exempt even for the bed, because the bed is subordinate to him.

If he carried

the dead person on a bed—

he is liable

for carrying out the dead person.

And likewise,

one who carries out

an olive-bulk

alone

from a dead person, or an olive-bulk from an unslaughtered animal carcass, or a lentil-bulk from a creeping creature, is liable.

Since they impart impurity in these measures, carrying them out is considered significant, as through this carrying he saves himself from impurity.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts

even one who carries out an entire corpse, because it is a labor not needed for its own purpose. A person has no need to transfer the corpse from his house to another place because he needs the corpse in that other place. Rather, all that he needs is only to remove it from his house, because he wants to rid his house of the corpse. It would have been more convenient for him had he had no corpse at all and had not needed to engage in removing it.

Rather, his only need is to remove it from his house; he would have preferred not to have a corpse at all and therefore not to have to deal with removing it.

Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt for a labor not needed for its own purpose, as it is not included in “creative labor,” unless one needs the carrying out in the sense that one needs the object in the place to which one carries it.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: One who carries out food in the requisite measure

the measure for carrying out food:

If

he carried it

in a vessel, he is liable for the food and exempt for the vessel.

Since the vessel is subordinate to the food.

But if the vessel itself was needed by him,

because he wants to use the vessel itself in the place to which he carried it—

he is liable even for the vessel.

And we ask: Does

this prove

that

one who eats two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in one lapse of awareness

without becoming aware of it in between

is liable to bring two

sin-offerings?

For the beraita holds him liable to bring two offerings for carrying out the food and the vessel, even though he was unaware of both at the same time, since he carried them out simultaneously.