Shabbat 93b — the Talmud in English

For we learned:

Rabbi Yosei says: The horse renders impure through

its forelegs.

For if the zav was riding on a horse, and a garment was beneath one of its front legs, which is called a foreleg, it is impure.

The donkey

renders impure

through its hind legs,

but not conversely.

Because

the horse’s support

is

on its forelegs.

And the donkey

leans

on its hind legs. [The matter stated above, that none of all four of its legs renders impure, is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.]

And Rava inferred:

But why

does the horse not render impure through its hind legs, and the donkey through its forelegs? Even though their principal support is not on those legs—

do they not assist one another?

Rather,

is it not because we say: Assistance—

has no substance!

Rav Ashi said: We too have also learned:

Rabbi Eliezer says:

A kohen who performed the Temple service with

one foot on the vessel and one foot on the floor,

or

one foot on a stone

that is not one of the paving stones of the Temple

and one foot on the floor—

we look: anything such that, if the vessel were removed and

the stone

were removed, and he would still be

able to stand on his one

foot,

on the one

that is on the floor, then

his service is valid,

for he is then considered as though he were standing only on that one foot.

But if not—

his service is invalid.

Because the vessel and the stone interpose between his foot and the floor of the Temple courtyard, and we derive from a verse that the service is invalidated by this.

And Rav Ashi inferred:

But why

is the service valid when he can stand on the one foot that is on the floor?

Does not

the other foot

assist together

with the other foot, and is he not therefore considered as standing also upon it?

Rather,

is it not because we say: Assistance has no substance!

Ravina said: We too have also learned:

A kohen who

received

the blood of the offering

with

his right hand,

and

his

left hand assisted it, his service is valid,

and although service performed with the left hand is invalid, here the principal service was performed with the right hand.

And Ravina inferred:

But why

is his service valid?

Does not

the left hand

assist together

with the right?

Rather,

is it not because we say: Assistance has no substance!

And we conclude:

Infer from it!

The Master said: If this one can do it and this one can do it, Rabbi Meir holds him liable.

They raised a dilemma:

Do

we require

according to Rabbi Meir, who holds him liable when this one can do it and this one can do it, that there be

the measure

of carrying

for this one and the measure

of carrying

for this one?

For example, if they carried food together, must there be two dried figs in it?

Or perhaps

one

measure for all of them suffices?

They disagreed about it:

Rav Hisda and Rav Hamnuna. One said: A measure for this one and a measure for that one; and one said: One measure for all of them.

Rav Pappa said: We too have also learned

that one measure suffices for all:

For we learned:

If he was sitting on a bed, and four garments were beneath the four legs of the bed, they are impure, because it cannot stand on three.

But why

are they impure?

Should we not require a measure of flux for this one and a measure of flux for that one?

For each garment could be made heavy by another zav.

Is it not because we say: One measure for all of them!

For one zav suffices to render all the garments impure through his treading.

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said: We too have also learned: A deer that entered a house, and one person closed the door before it

of the house,

is liable

for trapping, for by this closing he trapped the deer.

If two closed it, they are exempt,

as we say concerning carrying, that when two perform it they are exempt, and the same applies to all the labors of Shabbat.

If one could not close

the door

and two closed it, they are liable,

as in the case where this one cannot do it and this one cannot do it, for both are liable.

But why

are both liable?

Should we not require a measure of trapping for this one and a measure of trapping for that one,

namely, two deer?

Is it not because we say: One measure for all of them!

Ravina said: We too have also learned: Partners who stole and slaughtered are liable

for the payment of four or five.

But why

are they liable?

Should we not require a measure of slaughtering for this one and a measure of slaughtering for that one,

namely, two animals?

Is it not because we say: One measure for all of them!

And Rav Ashi said: We too have also learned: Two who carried out a weaver’s rod

—a rod on which the weft thread is placed, which rises and descends through the warp—

are liable.

But why? Should we not require a measure of carrying for this one and a measure of carrying for that one?

Is it not because we say: One measure for all of them!

Rav Aha, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Perhaps

it is speaking

of there being

in the rod

enough to cook a small egg for this one and a small egg for that one,

which is the measure for carrying wood? Rav Ashi said to him:

If so, let him teach us an ordinary rod,

which is intended for fuel, whose measure is this.

What is different

about the fact that he mentioned a rod

of a weaver,

whose measure is enough for weaving? Rather, certainly he teaches us that one measure suffices for both of them [for it might have entered our mind that with a weaver’s rod more than one measure is not relevant].

And we object:

But perhaps there is enough in it to weave a cloth for this one and enough to weave a cloth for that one?

And we conclude:

Rather, nothing can be inferred from this.

A tanna taught before Rav Nahman: Two who carried out a weaver’s rod are exempt, and Rabbi Shimon holds them liable.

And we object:

In what direction?

In what place has this matter been reversed, for Rabbi Shimon exempts more than everyone else when two perform it?

And we answer:

Rather, say:

Two who carried out a weaver’s rod

are liable,

for it is speaking of a heavy rod, so that this one cannot do it and this one cannot do it.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts,

as we said above, for Rabbi Shimon exempts also in the case where this one cannot do it and this one cannot do it.

Mishna:

One who carries out food less than the measure

required for carrying it, and carries it

in

a

vessel—

is exempt even for

carrying out

the vessel,

because

the vessel is subordinate to it,

to the food. For his principal intention in this carrying is not for the sake of the vessel but for the sake of the food.

If he carried

the

living person

in a bed,

since he is not liable for carrying out a living person, because a living person is considered as though he carries himself and lessens the burden —

he is exempt even for the bed, because the bed is subordinate to him.

He carried

the dead person in a bed—

he is liable

for carrying out the dead person.

And likewise,

one who carries out

an olive-bulk

alone

from a dead person, and an olive-bulk from an animal carcass, and a lentil-bulk from a creeping creature, is liable.

Since they render impure at this measure, it is significant carrying, for through this carrying he saves himself from impurity.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts,

even when carrying out an entire dead person, because it is a labor that is not needed for its own purpose. For a person has no need to transfer the dead person from his house to another place because he needs the dead person in the other place.

Rather, all his need is only to remove him from his house, for he wishes to clear the dead person from his house. And it would have been more convenient for him had he had no dead person at all and had not needed to occupy himself with removing him.

And Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt for a labor that is not needed for its own purpose, since it is not included in “a thought-out labor,” but only if he needs the carrying, in that he needs the object in the place to which he carries it.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: One who carries out food in the measure

required for carrying out food:

If

he carried it

in a vessel, he is liable for the food and exempt for the vessel.

Since the vessel is subordinate to the food.

And if the vessel was needed by him,

for he wishes to use the vessel itself in the place to which he carried it—

he is liable even for the vessel.

And we wonder: Does

infer from this

that

one who ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in one unwitting lapse

without becoming aware of it in the interim

is liable for two

sin-offerings?

For the beraita makes him liable for two for carrying out the food and the vessel, even though they were in one unwitting lapse, since he carried them out at one time.