Shabbat 93a — the Talmud in English

But if they were holding

a round cake of dried fig and carried it out

—it—

into the public domain,

or

a beam and carried it out

—it—

into the public domain, since they are heavier than one person’s capacity to carry them.

which are too heavy for one person to carry,

Rabbi Judah says: If

each

one

of them

could not carry it out, and two carried it out—

they are liable. But if not,

but each one separately could carry it—both are

exempt.

Rabbi Shimon says: Even though

each

one

separately

could not carry it out, and two carried it out—

they are

exempt.

For

for this reason it is stated: “when he performs it,”

to teach that specifically

an individual who performed it is liable.

But

two who performed it are exempt.

And we explain:

With regard to what do they disagree?

With regard to this verse!

For it is written:

“And if one person from among the people sins unwittingly, when he performs it.”

Rabbi Shimon holds: Three exclusions are written

here.

1.

“Person

sins”

which implies one person, but not many persons.

2.

“One”

“sins.”

3.

“When he performs it

he sins,”

which is phrased in the singular.

One—

to exclude: This one uproots

from the public domain

and that one places

in the private domain. This is the most logical matter to exclude, since each one performed only half the labor, and did not even assist with the second half of the labor.

And one—

to exclude:

two who performed all the labor together, and

this one

alone

could

alone

could

perform it, for they are exempt, since it is not the usual manner to perform labor through two people when each one can perform it alone.

And one—

to exclude: This one cannot and this one does not

can,

for they are exempt, even though in such a manner it is usual to perform it through two people.

And Rabbi Judah

holds:

One—

to exclude: This one uproots and that one places.

And one—

to exclude: This one can and that one can.

And one—

to exclude: An individual who performed it on the instruction of the court,

for if the court ruled that a certain fat was permitted for eating, and the individual acted according to their mistaken instruction, he is exempt from a sin-offering, since he is not unwitting but compelled. We derive from one of these exclusions that it implies that he is liable specifically when the individual acted on his own initiative and not according to the instruction of the court.

And Rabbi Shimon

holds:

An individual who performed it on the instruction of the court

also

is liable

for a sin-offering. Therefore, one exclusion remains superfluous for him.

And Rabbi Meir

holds:

Is it written, “a person sins”— -

“One sins”—

“when he performs it he sins,”

so that there would be three exclusions?

Only two exclusions

alone

are written!

For “person” is not an exclusion, since it is the manner of Scripture to say “person” even concerning many persons [Ritva]. Rather:

One—

to exclude: This one uproots and that one places.

And one—

to exclude: An individual who performed it on the instruction of the court.

The Master said: This one can and that one cannot

everyone agrees that he is liable.

And we inquire:

Which of them is liable?

Rav Hisda said: The one who can!

He is considered as though he performed everything.

For if it is the one who cannot, what has he done?

Rav Hamnuna said to him: But he assists him?

He said to him,

Rav Hisda:

Assistance—

has no substance!

One who cannot perform the labor alone and merely assists with the matter is not considered to have done anything.

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: We too learned

that assistance has no substance.

A man with a flux renders impure the objects on which he sits or lies, with the impurity of a support, which is a severe impurity. This is on condition that most of the weight of the man with a flux rests upon them.

And we learned in tractate Zavim:

1.

If he was sitting

the man with a flux

on a bed, and four cloths

garments

were beneath the legs of the bed,

one cloth beneath each leg—

they are impure,

all the cloths with the impurity of a support.

And although apparently most of the weight of the man with a flux does not rest upon each leg of the bed, but the weight is divided among the four, nevertheless everything beneath each leg is considered as though most of the weight of the man with a flux rests upon it.

Because it cannot

the bed

stand on three

legs alone, and it follows that each of the four legs of the bed is as though it bears most of the man with a flux. This is like the case of “this one cannot and that one cannot,” where each is considered as though he performed the entire act.

And Rabbi Shimon declares them pure,

the cloths, because he follows his position in our discussion: Even in the case of “this one cannot and that one cannot,” both are exempt, since each is considered merely an assistant. The same applies to the legs of the bed: each is not considered to bear most of the man with a flux.

2.

If

the man with a flux

was riding on an animal

and the animal was standing,

and four cloths were beneath the legs of the animal—

they are pure,

the cloths,

because it can

the animal

stand on three legs,

and each leg is considered as though it were the fourth leg, and it is merely an assistant.

For with regard to each leg we say that it cannot, while the other three can [Tosafot, discussion beginning “Because”; and Rashi wrote that it is like “this one can and that one can”; see Maharsha].

And we conclude as proof:

And why

are the cloths pure?

But

each leg of the animal

assists together with the others

the other three?

Rather,

is it not because we say: Assistance—

has no substance!

And we reject this:

Rav Judah of Diskarta said: I can always tell you that assistance has substance.

And here it is different, because it uproots it

the animal’s fourth leg

entirely

from the ground when it stands, and it is not even an assistant.

And we challenge this:

And since sometimes it uproots this one and sometimes it uproots that one,

that is, we do not know which leg it uproots, and each one is in doubt, perhaps it is one of the three that were not uprooted,

let it be like a man with a flux who turns over

and renders impure through doubt?

Did we not learn: A man with a flux who was lying on five benches, or on five long couches

long purses that also serve for lying: If he was lying

along their length—

they are impure,

since there is a doubt concerning each one whether most of the man with a flux was borne upon it, for sometimes he lies on this one and sometimes on that one.

But if he was lying

across their width—

they are pure

from the support of the man with a flux, since most of him is not borne upon any one of them.

If he

was sleeping

on them across their width, and

there was a doubt

whether he might

turn over upon them

in his sleep, until he was lying upon them along their length—

they are impure,

since concerning each one there is a doubt whether he turned over upon it.

It follows that they render impure with the impurity of a support through doubt. Why, then, should we not render all the cloths impure through doubt?

Rather, is it not

that the reason is not because it always uproots one leg; rather, the animal always stands on all four legs, and each one assists, yet the cloths are pure

because we say: Assistance—

has no substance!

Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: We too learned

that assistance has no substance: