Shabbat 93a (צג.) — the Talmud in English

But if they were holding

a fig cake and carried it out

it

into the public domain,

or

a beam and carried it out

it

into the public domain,

which are too heavy for one person to carry,

Rabbi Yehuda says: If

each

one

of them

could not carry it out, and two carried it out—

they are liable. But if not,

rather, each one separately could carry it out—both are

exempt.

Rabbi Shimon says: Even though

each

one

separately

could not carry it out, and two carried it out—

they are

exempt.

For

it is stated: “When he performs it,”

to teach that specifically

an individual who performs it is liable.

But

two who perform it are exempt.

And we explain:

With regard to what do they disagree?

With regard to this verse!

As it is written:

“And if one person from among the people sins unwittingly, when he performs it.”

Rabbi Shimon holds: Three exclusionary expressions are written

here.

a.

“A person

sins”—

which implies one person, but not many persons.

b.

“One”—

“sins.”

c.

“When he performs it—

he sins,”

which is phrased in the singular.

One

serves to exclude the case where: one uproots

the object from the public domain

and the other places it

in the private domain. This is the most logical case to exclude, since each one performed only half of the labor, and neither even assisted with the other half of the labor.

And one—

serves to exclude

the case where two performed the entire labor together, and

this one

alone

could

alone

and that one could

perform it, for they are exempt, since it is not the usual manner to perform a labor jointly when each one can perform it alone.

And one—

serves to exclude the case where: this one cannot and that one cannot

either,

for they are exempt, even though in such a case it is usual to perform the labor jointly.

And Rabbi Yehuda

holds:

One—

serves to exclude the case where: one uproots and the other places.

And one—

serves to exclude the case where: this one can and that one can.

And one—

serves to exclude the case of an individual who performed it on the basis of a ruling of the court,

for if the court ruled that a particular type of forbidden fat was permitted to eat, and the individual acted on the basis of their erroneous ruling, he is exempt from a sin-offering, since he is not an unwitting transgressor but one who acted under duress. We derive this from one of these exclusions: it implies that he is liable specifically when the individual acted on his own initiative, and not on the basis of the ruling of the court.

And Rabbi Shimon

holds:

An individual who performed it on the basis of a ruling of the court

also

is liable

to bring a sin-offering. Therefore, one exclusion remains superfluous for him.

And Rabbi Meir

holds:

Is it written, “a person sins,”— -

“One sins,”

“when he performs it, he sins,”

so that there would be three exclusions?

Only two exclusions

are

written!

For the word “person” is not an exclusion, since it is the biblical style to say “person” even when referring to many persons [Ritva]. Rather:

One—

serves to exclude the case where: one uproots and the other places.

And one—

serves to exclude the case of an individual who performed it on the basis of a ruling of the court.

The Master said: “This one can and that one cannot,”

everyone agrees that he is liable.

We inquire:

Which of them is liable?

Rav Hisda said: The one who can!

He is considered as though he performed the entire act,

for if it is the one who cannot, what does he accomplish?

Rav Hamnuna said to him: But he is assisting him!

He said to him,

Rav Hisda:

Assistance—

has no substance!

One who cannot perform the labor alone and merely assists with it is not considered to have accomplished anything.

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: We too have learned

that assistance has no substance.

A man afflicted with gonorrhea imparts impurity to the objects on which he sits or lies, with the severe impurity of a support that bears the weight of a zav. This applies provided that most of the zav’s weight rests upon them.

And we learned in tractate Zavim:

a.

If he was sitting

the zav

on a bed, and four cloths

cloths

were beneath the legs of the bed,

one cloth beneath each leg—

they are impure,

all the cloths being impure with the impurity of a support that bears the weight of a zav.

And although it would appear that most of the zav’s weight does not rest on each individual leg of the bed, but rather that the weight is divided among the four legs, nevertheless everything beneath each leg is considered as though most of the zav’s weight rests upon it.

Because it cannot

the bed

stand on three

legs alone, it follows that each of the four legs of the bed is as though it bears most of the zav’s weight. This is like the case of “this one cannot and that one cannot,” where each is considered as though he performed the entire act.

And Rabbi Shimon declares them pure,

the cloths, because he follows his position in our discussion: Even in the case of “this one cannot and that one cannot,” both are exempt, since each is considered merely an assistant. The same applies to the legs of the bed: each is not considered to bear most of the zav’s weight.

b.

If

the zav

was riding on an animal

and the animal was standing,

and four cloths were beneath the animal’s legs—

they are pure,

the cloths,

because it can

the animal

stand on three legs,

and each leg is considered as though it were the fourth leg and is merely an assistant.

With regard to each leg, we say that it cannot stand alone, while the other three can [Tosafot, in their commentary on “because”; Rashi wrote that this is the case of “this one can and that one can”; see Maharsha].

And we conclude the proof:

But why

are the cloths pure?

Is it not the case that

each leg of the animal

assists together with the others

the other three?

Rather,

is it not because we say: “Assistance—

has no substance!”

And we reject this:

Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said: I can always tell you that assistance does have substance.

But here it is different, because it uproots it

the animal’s fourth leg

entirely

from the ground when it stands, and it is not even an assistant.

And we raise an objection:

But since at times it uproots this one and at times it uproots that one,

that is, we do not know which leg it uproots, and each one is uncertain, perhaps it is one of the three that was not uprooted,

let it be like a zav who turns over

and thereby imparts impurity due to the uncertainty?

Did we not learn: If a zav was lying on five benches, or on five long couches

long wallets that are also used for reclining: if he was lying

along their length—

they are impure,

since with regard to each one there is uncertainty whether most of the zav’s weight rested upon it, as he may at times lie on one and at times on another.

But if he was lying

across their width—

they are pure

from the impurity of a support that bears the weight of a zav, since most of his weight rested on none of them.

If he

was sleeping

across their width, and there was

uncertainty

whether he might

have turned over upon them

in his sleep until he was lying upon them along their length—

they are impure,

since with regard to each one it is uncertain whether he turned over upon it.

It is therefore evident that they impart the impurity of a support that bears the weight of a zav due to uncertainty. Why, then, should we not declare all the cloths impure due to uncertainty?

Rather, is it not

that the reason is not that one leg is constantly being uprooted? Rather, the animal always stands on all four legs, and each one assists, yet the cloths are pure

because we say: “Assistance—

has no substance!”

Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: We too have learned

that assistance has no substance: