Shabbat 92b (צב:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows: One who carries a burden on his head is exempt.

And if you wish, say:

behold,

the people of Hutzal do this?

Their opinion is disregarded in relation to everyone else!

And this is not the usual manner of carrying out an item.

Mishna:

One who intends to carry an item in front of him,

for example, one who tied coins in his garment so that they would hang in front of him and be properly safeguarded,

but it came to be behind him,

because the garment turned over and the coins reached his back while he was carrying them, in a manner in which they were not well safeguarded—

he is exempt,

because his intention was not fulfilled. His intention was to provide superior safeguarding, but ultimately inferior safeguarding was provided, and this is analogous to one who is merely occupied with an unintended act.

But if he intended to carry it

behind him, but it came to be in front of him—

he is liable,

as the Gemara explains.

In truth they said: A woman who girds herself with an apron

and hangs an item on it in order to carry it on Shabbat,

whether in front of her or behind her,

that is, even if she intended to carry it in front of her but it came to be behind her—

she is liable.

For this is fit to turn over.

It is the nature of an apron to turn over, and from the outset she knew that it would ultimately turn over; therefore, her intention was fulfilled.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even those who receive royal letters

in order to deliver them to messengers are liable, even if their intention was not fulfilled—for example, they took them out intending to deliver them to one particular messenger but gave them to another. This is common when a royal decree is urgent: if the intended messenger cannot be found, it is given to someone else, and he initially carried it out with this possibility in mind.

Gemara:

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

What is different about the case where he intended to carry it in front of him but it came to be behind him, in which he is exempt,

because

his intention was not fulfilled?

Behold,

in the case where he intended to carry it behind him but it came to be in front of him as well,

why is he liable?

Was his intention not fulfilled?

And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar said: It is a contradiction; the tanna who taught this one did not teach that one.

The tanna of the first clause exempts even in the latter clause, while the tanna of the latter clause holds one liable even in the first clause, as the two cases have the same legal status.

Rava said: What is the difficulty?

Perhaps the reason that one who intended to carry it in front of him but it came to be behind him is exempt is that he intended superior safeguarding, but inferior safeguarding resulted.

And we are certain that he is not pleased with this.

But

the reason that one who intended to carry it behind him but it came to be in front of him is liable is that he intended inferior safeguarding, but superior safeguarding resulted,

and certainly he is pleased with this.

Rather, what

was

the difficulty

in the first place, given that Rava offered such an obvious resolution?

The inference from the Mishna is difficult!

For it teaches in the first clause:

One who intends to carry it in front of him but it comes to be behind him is exempt,

which implies that he is exempt specifically because inferior safeguarding resulted instead of what he intended.

But

if he intends

to carry it behind him and it comes to be behind him,

meaning that the item did not move from its place,

he is liable.

We do not say that this is not the usual manner of carrying, even though the item is not well safeguarded there.

Come and hear from the latter clause: It is specifically when he intended to carry it behind him but it came to be in front of him that he is liable,

because superior safeguarding resulted.

But

if he intends

to carry it behind him and it comes to be behind him, he is exempt,

because this is not the usual manner of carrying.

And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar said: It is a contradiction; the tanna who taught this one did not teach that one.

The tanna of the first clause and the tanna of the latter clause indeed disagree concerning the case where he intended to carry it behind him and it came to be behind him.

Rav Ashi said: What is the difficulty?

Perhaps

the latter clause

is stating “it is not necessary to say”:

It is not necessary to say that in the case where he intended to carry it behind him and it came to be behind him he is liable, for

he

fulfilled his intention.

Rather, it was necessary for it to teach us that even when he intended to carry it behind him but it came to be in front of him,

in order to teach us that, although

it might enter your mind to say: Since his intention was not fulfilled, he should not be liable,

it teaches us:

since

he intended inferior safeguarding and superior safeguarding resulted, he is liable,

for his intention was fulfilled in this case as well, since he is certainly pleased with this.

And we say:

The case where he intended to carry it behind him and it came to be behind him—

is subject to a dispute between tanna’im,

whether he is liable or not.

As it was taught in a beraita: One who carries coins in his pouch, with its opening facing upward, is liable.

If its opening faces downward—

Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable, but the Sages exempt him,

because this is not the usual manner of carrying, since the coins fall out.

Rabbi Yehuda said to them: Do you not concede that when he intended to carry it behind him and it came to be behind him, he is liable?!

Even though this is not the usual manner of carrying. The same law should apply to his pouch when its opening faces downward.

And they said to him,

the Sages:

Do you not concede

that one who carries

in the manner of carrying with the back of his hand or foot is exempt?!

Because he did not carry it in the manner in which those who carry items ordinarily do; the same law should apply to his pouch when its opening faces downward.

Rabbi Yehuda said: I presented

the Sages with

one point,

namely, “Do you not concede to me,”

and they presented

me with

one point, namely, “Do you not concede to us.”

I found no answer to their argument, and they found no answer to my argument!

And we infer:

From the fact that

Rabbi Yehuda said to them,

“Do you not concede

—”

this implies that the Rabbis exempt

in the case where he intended to carry it behind him and it came to be behind him [see Iyunim].

Thus, the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda disagree in this matter.

And we reject this:

But according to your reasoning,

what of

the statement they said to him,

the Sages to Rabbi Yehuda:

Do you not concede

that one who carries with the back of his hand or foot is exempt? Does this too mean that

it follows that Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable

in that case?

But it was taught in a beraita: Carrying with the back of one’s hand or foot—

everyone agrees that he is exempt!

Rather,

this is certainly the explanation:

When he intended to carry it behind him and it came to be behind him—

everyone agrees that he is liable,

because some people carry items this way, even though the safeguarding is inferior.

When he carries with the back of his hand or foot—

everyone agrees that he is exempt,

because this is not a manner of carrying at all.

They disagree concerning the pouch with its opening facing downward.

One master,

Rabbi Yehuda,

compares it to the case where he intended to carry it behind him and it came to be behind him.

And the other master,

the Sages,

compares it to carrying with the back of one’s hand or foot,

for it is not similar to the case where he intended to carry it behind him and it came to be behind him, since there the item is safeguarded to some degree. But when the opening of the pouch faces downward, the coins fall out, and this is not a manner of carrying at all.

We learned in the Mishna:

In truth they said: The woman.

The tanna taught: Every instance of “In truth they said”

is halakha,

and there is no room to question the matter.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Those who receive royal letters:

The tanna taught: For the royal scribes,

the king’s writers,

do this,

when a royal decree is urgent: they give it to another messenger when they cannot find the person to whom they initially intended to give it.

Mishna:

One who carries a loaf into the public domain is liable.

If two people carried it out, they are exempt,

as we derive in the Gemara.

If

even

one

of them

could not carry it out

because of its weight,

and two carried it out—

they are liable.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts.

Their dispute will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said—and some say that Abaye said—and some say that it was taught in a baraita:

a.

If this one can

carry it out alone

and that one can

carry it out alone, but the two carried it out together—

Rabbi Meir holds them liable,

but Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon exempt them,

because it is not the usual manner for two people to carry out an item that one person alone can carry out; later, the verse is expounded to exclude this case.

b.

If this one cannot carry it out alone and that one cannot carry it out alone—

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir hold them liable,

for Rabbi Yehuda concedes here that they are liable, since in such circumstances it is the usual manner for two people to carry out the item.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts.

c.

If this one can carry it out alone and that one cannot,

and the two carried it out—

everyone agrees that he is liable,

only the one who can carry it out alone.

This was also taught in a beraita: One who carries a loaf into the public domain is liable.

If two carried it out, Rabbi Meir holds them liable,

even if each one could carry it out alone.

And Rabbi Yehuda says: If one could not carry it out,

meaning, each one of them individually,

and two carried it out, they are liable. But if not,

rather, this one could carry it out alone and that one could carry it out alone, and they carried it out together—both of them

are exempt.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts,

even when neither one could carry it out alone.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

From where are these matters derived,

that each of them learned his position?

As the Sages taught:

It is written with regard to a sin-offering: “If a person sins unintentionally ... by performing one of the commandments of the Lord that may not be done.” And we expound from the fact that it is written

“by performing it”,

that specifically

the one who performs the

labor

in its entirety

is liable for it,

but not one who performs only part of it.

How so?

If two people were holding

a

pitchfork

—a rake, from a term meaning fork—

and gathering,

collecting the stalks in the threshing floor, thereby performing the labor of gathering.

Or if two were holding

a staff

for striking

and striking

with it to straighten the warp threads, which is included in the labor of setting up the warp.

Or they were holding

a quill and writing

together.

Or they were holding

a reed and carrying it out

it

into the public domain.

In all these cases, this one could do it alone and that one could do it alone.

Could they be liable?

The verse states “by performing it”—

the one who performs the entire act, but not the one who performs only part of it.