Shabbat 92b — the Talmud in English

Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows: One who carries a burden on his head is exempt. ![](pamud.bmp "

Precise page location")

And if you should say:

behold,

the people of Hutzal do this?

Their opinion is nullified in relation to all people!

And this is not the usual manner of carrying.

Mishna:

One who intends to carry in front of him,

such as one who tied coins in his garment so that they would hang in front of him and be properly guarded,

and it came to be behind him,

because the garment turned over and the coins reached his back during the carrying, in such a manner that they were not guarded well—

he is exempt,

because his intention was not fulfilled. His intention was for superior guarding, and in the end inferior guarding was effected, and this is like one who is “engaged in an unintended act.”

But if he intended to carry

behind him and it came to be in front of him—

he is liable,

as the Gemara explains.

In truth they said: A woman who girds herself with an apron

and hung an object on it in order to carry it on Shabbat,

whether in front of her or behind her,

that is, even if she intended to carry it in front of her and it came to be behind her—

she is liable.

For this is fit to turn over,

since it is the way of an apron to turn over, and from the outset she knew that it would eventually turn over; therefore, her intention was fulfilled.

Rabbi Judah says: Even those who receive writs

of the king in order to deliver them to runners are liable, even if their intention was not fulfilled—for example, they carried them intending to deliver them to this runner, but gave them to another runner. Since this is common when the king’s matter is urgent and this runner is not found, and he gives it to another, he carried it from the outset with this in mind.

Gemara:

And we raise a difficulty concerning it:

What is different about [one who intended to carry] in front of him and it came to be behind him, that he is exempt,

because

his intention was not carried out?

Behold,

[one who intended to carry it] behind him and it came to be in front of him also,

why is he liable?

Was his intention not carried out?

And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar said: It is a contradiction! The one who taught this did not teach that.

The anonymous teacher of the first clause exempts even in the final clause, and the teacher of the final clause makes one liable even in the first clause, for they have one law.

Rava said: What is the difficulty?

Perhaps the reason that [one who intended to carry it] in front of him and it came to be behind him is that he intended superior guarding, but inferior guarding came about,

and we are certain that he is not pleased with this.

But

the reason that [one who intended to carry it] behind him and it came to be in front of him is that he intended inferior guarding, but superior guarding came about,

and all the more so he is pleased with it.

Rather, what

was the

difficulty

in the first place, since Rava offered such a simple answer?

The inference from the Mishna is difficult!

For it teaches in the first clause:

One who intends to carry in front of him and it comes to be behind him is exempt,

and it implies that this is specifically because inferior guarding, lesser than what he intended, came about.

But

if he intended

behind him and it came to be behind him,

that is, the object did not move from its place,

he is liable.

And we do not say that this is not the usual manner of carrying, since it is not guarded well there.

Come and hear the final clause: It is specifically when [he intended it] behind him and it came to be in front of him that he is liable,

because superior guarding came about.

But

if he intended

behind him and it came to be behind him, he is exempt,

because this is not the usual manner of carrying.

And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar said: It is a contradiction! The one who taught this did not teach that.

The teacher of the first clause and the teacher of the final clause indeed disagree concerning the law of [one who intended it] behind him and it came to be behind him.

Rav Ashi said: What is the difficulty?

Perhaps

the final clause

is stating “it is not necessary”:

It is not necessary [to state that when he intended it] behind him and it came to be behind him he is liable, for

behold,

his intention was carried out.

Rather, it was necessary for it to teach us even when [he intended it] behind him and it came to be in front of him,

because

it might enter your mind to say: Since his intention was not carried out, he should not be liable.

It teaches us:

Since

he intended inferior guarding and superior guarding came about, he is liable,

for this too is the fulfillment of his intention, since he is all the more pleased with it.

And we say:

[The case of one who intended it] behind him and it came to be behind him—

it is subject to a dispute among the tannaim,

whether he is liable or not.

As it was taught in a beraita: One who carries coins in his pouch, with its opening upward, is liable.

[If] its opening is downward—

Rabbi Judah makes him liable, but the Sages exempt,

because this is not the usual manner of carrying, since the coins fall out.

Rabbi Judah said to them: Do you not concede that when [one intended it] behind him and it came to be behind him, he is liable?!

Even though this is not the usual manner of carrying. The same law applies to his pouch when its opening is downward.

And they said to him,

the Sages:

Do you not concede

that one who carried it

in the unusual manner of his hand or foot is exempt?!

Because he did not carry it in the manner of those who carry; the same law applies to his pouch when its opening is downward.

Rabbi Judah said: I stated to

the Sages

one matter,

namely, “You do not concede to me,”

and they stated

to

me one matter,

namely, “You do not concede to us.”

I found no answer to their words, and they found no answer to my words!

And we infer:

From the fact that

Rabbi Judah said to them

“Do you not concede,”

it follows that the Sages exempt

when [he intended it] behind him and it came to be behind him [see Iyunim].

Thus, the Sages and Rabbi Judah disputed this matter.

And we reject this:

But according to your reasoning,

what of

that which they said to him,

the Sages to Rabbi Judah:

Do you not concede

that one who carried it with his hand or foot in the unusual manner is exempt? Should you likewise say that

it follows that Rabbi Judah makes one liable

in this case?

But it was taught: [Carrying it with] his hand or foot—

according to everyone he is exempt!

Rather,

this is certainly the explanation of the matter:

[When he intended it] behind him and it came to be behind him—

according to everyone he is liable,

because there are people who carry in this manner, even though it is inferior guarding.

[Carrying it with] his hand or foot—

according to everyone he is exempt,

because this is not a manner of carrying at all.

They disagree concerning his pouch when its opening is downward.

One

Rabbi Judah

compares it to [one who intended it] behind him and it came to be behind him.

And the other,

the Sages,

compare it to [carrying it with] his hand or foot,

for it is not similar to [one who intended it] behind him and it came to be behind him, since there it is guarded to some degree. But when the opening of his pouch is downward, the coins fall out, and this is not a manner of carrying at all.

We learned in the Mishna:

In truth they said: The woman.

It was taught: Every “In truth they said”—

it is law,

and there is no room to question the matter.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Judah says: Those who receive writs:

It was taught: For royal scribes,

the king’s scribes,

do this,

when the king’s matter is urgent, giving it to another runner when they do not find the one to whom they had initially intended to give it.

Mishna:

One who carries a loaf into the public domain is liable.

If two carried it out, they are exempt,

as we learn in the Gemara.

If

even

one

of them

could not carry it out

because of its weight,

and two carried it out—

they are liable.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts.

Their dispute will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Rav Judah said that Rav said—and some say, Abaye said—and some say, it was taught in a baraita:

a.

This one can

carry it out alone

and this one can

carry it out alone, and the two carried it out together—

Rabbi Meir makes them liable,

but Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon exempt them,

because it is not the usual manner for two to carry out an object that one person alone can carry out, and below he excludes this from Scripture.

b.

This one cannot and this one cannot—

Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Meir make them liable,

for Rabbi Judah concedes here that they are liable, since in such a manner it is the usual way for two people to carry something.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts.

c.

This one can and this one cannot,

and they carried it out together—

according to everyone, he is liable,

only the one who can carry it.

This was also taught in a beraita: One who carries a loaf into the public domain is liable.

If two carried it, Rabbi Meir makes them liable,

even if each one could carry it alone.

But Rabbi Judah says: If one could not carry it out,

that is, each one of them alone,

and two carried it out, they are liable. But if not,

rather, this one could carry it alone and that one could carry it alone, and they carried it out together—both

are exempt.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts,

even when neither one could carry it alone.

And we raise a difficulty concerning it:

From where are these matters derived,

from where did each one derive his position?

For the Sages taught:

It is written concerning a sin-offering: “And if one person sins unintentionally ... when he performs one of the commandments of the Lord that may not be done.” And we derive from the fact that it is written

“when he performs it”

that specifically

the one who performs

the labor

in its entirety

is liable for it,

but not the one who performs part of it.

How so?

Two who were holding

a

pitchfork

[from a term meaning fork:] a rake,

and gathering

the ears of grain into a pile at the threshing floor, thereby performing the labor of gathering.

Or two were holding

a staff

a rod,

and striking

with it to straighten the warp threads, which is included in the labor of arranging the warp.

Or they were holding

a pen and writing

together.

Or they were holding

a reed and carried it out

it

into the public domain.

And in all these cases, this one could and this one could.

Could they be liable?

Scripture says “when he performs it”—

the one who performs it in its entirety, but not the one who performs part of it.